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Introduction 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the achievement of modernity has been a permanent 
goal that has been pursued by many Latin American elites. The desire to be modern, 
that is, to achieve levels of economic, social, and technological development like those 
of Europe or the United States, has been a driving force in many Latin American 
countries. Especially those countries of the region that have experienced the highest 
development rates tend to demonstrate the strongest affiliation with modernisation. 
The advances in development seem to reinforce the thirst for modernity rather than to 
quench it.  
Chilean history provides a case in point. For the last 150 years, Chilean 
intellectuals, writers, and politicians have expressed a profound desire to make Chile a 
modern country, as well as a perception of sometimes being close to this objective. In 
the same period, the pace of development of the country has been one of the highest of 
the region. Its levels of education, health care, political stability, and industrialisation 
have given Chile the reputation of being one of the most developed countries of Latin 
America. This reputation became particularly strong in the 1990s, when booming 
economic activity, combined with a strong inflow of consumer goods like cars, 
computers, and cell-phones, gave the nation the appearance of a highly modern nation. 
Nevertheless, the call for further modernisation has not diminished; on the contrary, it 
has intensified over the last decade. During the last years, politicians and intellectuals 
have pressed for intensified efforts by the business sector as well as the government to 
increase the country’s economic growth, in order to reach ‘full development’ by the 
Bicentenario, the celebration of the country’s two-hundred year independence in 2010. 
Apparently the wish to be modern has only intensified with the growing sense of being 
close to that goal.  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which Chilean political and 
economic elites have attempted to modernise the country according to their own 
interpretation of modernity, and how patterns of modernity have arisen as a result of 
these attempts. It aims to show that despite ideological differences between elites, a 
strong line of continuity can be discerned in the different attempts to modernise the 
country by means of national projects. This continuity can be found at several levels: 
the use of ideological doctrines that are strongly oriented towards modernity; the 
influence of developmental intellectual currents, which have been adapted to the local 
context; the dominant role of the state, technocracy and planning in the 
implementation of the project; and the responses from civil society as well as from 
competing elites, which have had a crucial influence on the further development of 
each project. In short, this study intends to show that modernisation has been a 
paradigm that has been broadly carried by different sectors of society. While the 
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Chilean trajectory towards modernity has been particularly winding and has taken 
many different forms, modernisation has been an element of continuity in 
contemporary Chile.  
The case of Chile is especially relevant to the academic discussion on modernity 
and modernisation in Latin America for several reasons. To begin with, Chilean elites 
have shown great enthusiasm for modernity and modernisation, being also been key 
actors in Chilean modernisation processes. Second, they have tended to embrace 
ideological doctrines in a radical manner, leaving little doubt over their influences and 
sources. Thirdly, during the past 40 years a series of political projects have been 
implemented by different governments, with the intention of structurally reorganising 
social, economic and political relations in the country. These projects have been called 
the Revolution in Liberty (1964-1970), the Chilean Road to Socialism (1970-1973), the 
Silent Revolution (1973-1990) and Growth with Equity (1990-2006). They were 
ideologically conflicting and politically antagonistic, yet at the same time, as will be 
shown, all four projects were highly modernising.  
Even though these projects were set in motion by governments, they went well 
beyond regular political programmes. They were all based, in one way or another, on 
developmental theories and political ideologies that had become en vogue in 
intellectual circles even before the government in question had come to power. Neither 
were they executed by the political elites exclusively. As will be shown in this 
investigation, political elites have cooperated strongly with certain social actors in order 
to provide the legitimacy and support necessary for the implementation of their 
programmes. Because of this multi-actor cooperation, these programmes were able to 
achieve a scope and impact that went beyond ‘regular’ government-led modernisations. 
They have become true ‘projects of modernisation’, oriented to closing the gap between 
the country’s realities and the ‘modern world’, based on a specific understanding of 
modernity. 
Obviously, these projects of modernisation are not exclusively based on ideas. They 
also reflect the political realities of the moment as well as the socio-economic interests 
of their main actors. Even though these elements will also be addressed in this study, 
the main focus will lie on the dominant role doctrines and ideologies have played in 
recent Chilean history, which in some cases have even led certain social actors to act 
against their direct interest. In this sense, this book will combine a political science 
approach with the perspective of the history of ideas.  
One should be cautious in viewing these projects as static, homogenous, or one-
dimensional. They were dynamic constellations of ideas and actions with different 
connotations and meanings for the actors involved. They could also be presented in 
different forms and from specific points of view by the various participating elites. Nor 
were they constant in time. They have changed shape, focus and priority as a 
consequence of internal developments such as political conflicts between participating 
actors, or external factors, varying from earthquakes to international economic crises. 
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It has been argued that modernisation has taken such intense forms in Chile 
because the country forms a sui generis case in Latin America. The country’s stable 
institutional order, strong party system, powerful state, and propensity towards political 
doctrines have given the country a particular drive towards modernity. However, many 
of those elements can be found in other countries as well. Nevertheless, the scope and 
intensity of this study has not allowed for a comparative perspective. Hopefully this 
study will be a contribution to other studies in that direction. 
 
Conceptual framework 
The traditional conceptualisation of modernity has offered little space for the idea of a 
locally constructed modernity. Viewed as fundamentally a set of European patterns in 
which rationalisation, secularisation, the state, mass education, capitalism, 
democratisation, and other processes and institutions have reinforced each other, it has 
long been thought that in order to become modern, Chile (and Latin America in 
general) would have to reproduce these patterns faithfully. In failing to do so, the 
prospect for modernity in the Latin American context became grim. However, in recent 
decades, authors such as Habermas (1987), Giddens (1991), Wagner (1994), and Larraín 
(2001) have opened the door for more locally constructed forms of modernity, which 
consist of specific blends of elements of modernity and tradition. For the analysis of the 
four above-mentioned projects in question, though, I will make use of a more recent 
approach, the so-called ‘multiple modernities’ approach. According to this 
conceptualisation of modernity, which has only recently gained influence, there is not 
one single pattern of modernity, but there exist various ‘modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2002; 
Whitehead 2002). Furthermore, it argues that modernity is not a fundamentally 
European phenomenon which has spread on a global scale, but rather that modernity is 
constructed locally, albeit in interaction with external influences and points of reference 
such as Europe. As a result, each region, and even each country, may create its own 
structures of social, economic and political relations, which form different patterns of 
modernity.  
The existence of ‘multiple modernities’ is controversial and not uncontested. 
Nevertheless, this approach is in my view highly useful for the aims of this study, as it 
explains the processes that underlie the local construction of patterns of modernity. In 
this interpretation, these patterns are created through the interaction of competing elite 
projects. In Latin America, elites are characterised by a strong propensity towards 
modernisation. Different groups of elites seek to install their own project, each of which 
is characterised by its particular interpretation of what modernity is or should be. These 
different elites compete for power and the opportunity to implement their project. 
When they are able to do so, though, they generally only succeed in completing part of 
their modernising agenda. Subsequently, they are replaced by other elites which undo 
part of their achievements (Whitehead 2002). As a result, complex patterns of 
modernity are created, based on the successive waves of modernisation that have taken 
place. In the end, modernisation is not the result of the accumulation of different 
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projects of modernisation, but of their interaction, which is often conflictual and may 
create very complex patterns of modernity.  
I will apply the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ using the metaphor of waves.1 
Each project of modernisation may be seen as a wave that leaves certain marks in 
society. However, when two or more waves interact, they form patterns of interference 
which are very different from each original wave. In this way, patterns of modernity are 
created through the interaction between the different projects of modernisation. 
Moreover, each project moves through the three stages that waves go through: their 
construction; their implementation, and decline.2 In all of these phases the ‘waves of 
modernisation’ interact in specific ways which will be analysed in this study. 
Up to now, the ‘multiple modernities’ argument has been used relatively 
superficially in the case of Latin America, mostly in the form of comparative studies 
that cover the region as a whole. In this investigation, however, it will be applied to an 
in-depth country study. This will provide insights into how this relatively new approach 
can be applied to single-case studies on modernisation. As a consequence, this study 
aims to contribute to the debates on modernity and modernisation, and explore the 
explanatory power of the ‘multiple modernities’ approach in particular.  
The analysis of the four projects of modernisation under consideration will also be 
based on this metaphor of ‘waves’. First of all, their ‘rise’, or construction, is analysed 
by looking at the ideological, developmental, and political background of the projects. 
At the ideological level, the focus will lie on the use of doctrines, which often have 
been adapted from their original (often foreign) sources to fit the local context. In 
addition, the projects have been based on the selective use of existing examples of 
modernity, such as the North-West European welfare model, the U.S. liberal model, or 
the Socialist world. These examples have been combined with a varying focus on three 
dimensions of modernity: social, economic, and political modernity. At the 
developmental level, I will show that each project has been based on a new and 
vanguard theory of development, which often combines foreign theoretical approaches 
with a local contextualisation. The use of economic theory has been essential for all 
four projects, as it creates legitimacy, consistency, and produces clear policy guidelines. 
At the political level, I look at the ways in which the ideological background and the 
developmental theory are amalgamated into one ‘project of modernisation’. Often the 
figure of the President is a crucial factor in determining how these two elements are 
related to each other, and which elements are prioritised over others. 
Second, I will investigate the ‘peak’ of the wave, or the phase of its implementation. 
I will first focus on the role of the state, technocracy, and planning in the project. All 
projects have in common a state-oriented and top-down approach towards 
                                              
1 As will be seen in Chapter 1.3.2, I will make use of, and elaborate on, Whitehead’s (2002) notion of 
‘successive waves of modernisation’.  
2 Throughout this study, I will refer to the ‘decline’ of the projects under investigation with a strong 
emphasis on its relative character. It refers to the ‘ebbing away’ of a wave, rather than to its complete 
downfall. Therefore, when a project declines, it does not simply vanish, but maintains a certain level of 
influence. This legacy of a project may influence the construction and implementation of future projects.  
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modernisation, with a large role for relatively autonomous technocrats charged with the 
conception and implementation of the project. In order to do so, these technocrats 
make extensive use of state planning in order to achieve their objectives. Subsequently, 
I will focus on the element of political and ideological competition during each project. 
The interaction between the projects of the different political elites has had a defining 
influence on the development of each project. Finally, I will deal with the adaptation of 
each project. All four projects of modernisation have encountered moments of severe 
tensions, in which the implementation of the project generated high levels of public 
unrest and disorder. This has forced the governments to make a fundamental choice: 
either to push forward with the project, with the risk of disturbing public order, or to 
adapt the project in order to maintain social order. The ability of each government to 
adapt its course has been a crucial factor in explaining the outcome of its project of 
modernisation.  
Third, I will look into the decline of each project, and analyse its legacy. This will be 
done in two ways. First, by looking at the level of the modernisations that it had 
effectively established and which remained present after the project ended. Second, by 
focusing on the ‘unforeseen’ consequences of the project, such as the political 
animosity it engendered during its implementation. This will be analysed at the social, 
economic, and political level.  
 
The setup of the book 
Following this introduction, the main debates on modernisation and modernity in 
Chile will be analysed in Chapter 1. Additionally, a conceptual framework will be 
presented, making use of a range of theoretic approaches to modernity including the 
‘multiple modernities’ argument.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the Chilean trajectory towards modernity until 1964. In 
contrast to the sociologist Jorge Larraín (2002), who has claimed that this trajectory was 
characterised by the alternation of periods of expansion and periods of crisis of 
modernity, I will argue that the drive towards modernity and the processes of 
modernisation have represented elements of continuity in Chilean history. However, 
modernisation shifted in form and content, as the path towards modernity has been a 
continuous, but winding one. Focusing on different interpretations and dimensions of 
modernity, Chilean elites have created successive projects of modernisation that have 
sought to modernise the country in very different ways. 
The trajectory of modernity in Chilean history can be traced back to even before 
the establishment of this country as an independent nation in the early nineteenth 
century. Instead of a complete ‘denied modernity’ (in Larraín’s phrase), the colonial 
times did allow some space for modernisation. Especially under the ‘Bourbonic 
reforms’, in the eighteenth century, the first stirrings of modernity became visible. 
These were important because they came to influence the form modernisation would 
take place since then. First, Chilean elites came to accept modernisation even if it hurt 
their direct interest, because they were able to exchange it for a share in power. This 
 6 
would remain a characteristic for Chile’s elites in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
Second, from the first stirrings of modernisation, it was centred on the state and state 
institutions. This orientation on the state as the motor for modernisation has remained 
a constant since then.  
After independence, modernisation acquired a strong top-down and authoritarian 
character. This can clearly be seen by the introduction of a stable institutional 
framework in Chile: its founder, Diego Portales, used formal democracy in order to 
install a highly authoritarian model of governance. In this way, elements of modernity 
were used, in an instrumental fashion, to confirm the maintenance of the traditional 
order. In addition, modernisation became oriented towards reason, science, and a 
technical outlook. The emergence of liberalism was crucial in this respect, as influential 
liberals developed the first explicit doctrines on modernisation and progress, and were 
responsible for the foundation of several key educational institutions. In the late 
nineteenth century, August Comte’s positivism rapidly gained influence among 
Chilean intellectuals, strengthening the rationalistic and scientific approach towards 
modernisation.  
Between 1880 and 1920 modernity acquired a different face, and this was reason for 
Jorge Larraín to denominate it a period of ‘crisis of modernity’. True enough, political 
power eroded because of a parliamentary system which proved ungovernable, while 
much of the wealth that was generated by the booming nitrate business was wasted and 
was not used to alleviate the increasingly pressing ‘social question’ of the country’s 
poor. However, in this period, crucial steps were made on the country’s path towards 
modernity. The nitrate bonanza also allowed for the state apparatus to be rapidly 
expanded and be modernised into an relatively efficient bureaucracy, which introduced 
many ‘tangible’ expressions of modernity in Chilean society in the country’s 
infrastructure, architecture, and so forth. Education expanded rapidly and was viewed as 
a key element in the country’s progress, especially under the visionary leadership of 
positivist intellectual Valentín Letelier. Most importantly, though, a small but rapidly 
growing middle class, pressured by the growing ‘social question’, increasingly 
challenged the hegemony of the oligarchy.  
After 1920, a new phase of Chile’s trajectory towards modernity began when the 
middle classes for the first time gained access to governmental power. This was 
reinforced by a short dictatorial experience, between 1927 and 1931, in which a 
‘modern state’ was installed, based on authoritarian governance but simultaneously very 
open to the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure, giving the state a pivotal role 
in the promotion of industrialisation, and allowing the middle classes a large role in the 
policy-making process. From the 1930s onwards, this ‘modern state’ slowly moved in 
the direction of a ‘productive’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ state. This eventually took the form 
of the Chilean Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, 
CORFO), which was set up in 1939 by the state to stimulate and guide the process of 
industrialisation. Simultaneously, the Chilean state increasingly began to play the role 
of a ‘providing state’, by creating basic welfare structures for important sections of 
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society. In the 1950s, this modernisation process was accompanied by a widening of 
suffrage and deepening of the democratic process. This was, however, not enough to 
accommodate the demands of the lower classes. Towards the 1960s the social question, 
instead of having been resolved by the modernising drive of the Chilean state, had 
become more pressing then ever. Meanwhile, the success of the Cuban revolution made 
clear that the danger of a revolution had become more present then ever. It is in this 
context that the three main actors of the Chilean political system came, the Centre, 
Left, and Right, entered into an intense competition, and developed radical proposals 
for the ‘true’ modernisation of the country, at the political, social, and economic level. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the first project that is to be analysed: the ‘Revolution in 
Liberty’ (1964-1970) of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). This was an all-round 
project of modernisation which was based on two main intellectual currents. On the 
one hand, it drew on social-Christian doctrine which were adapted to the local context. 
Criticising both ‘materialist capitalism’ and ‘secular Marxism’, the Christian Democrats 
created an ideological doctrine that sought to modernise Chilean society while 
maintaining its moral basis. Drawing from the example of North-Western Europe, and 
emphasising the ‘social dimension’ of modernity, the PDC sought to improve the 
general living conditions of the population and include the marginal masses in the 
state’s structures. Additionally, the project of the PDC was also based on structuralism, 
a developmental theory which stressed the need to intensify the attempts towards 
economic expansion through industrialisation, as well as agrarian reform, development, 
and modernisation. These two currents were combined in the project of the Christian 
Democrats, the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, which emphasised agrarian reform, 
industrialisation, partial nationalisation of the copper mines in the north of the 
country, and the inclusion of the marginal masses through a governmental self-help 
programme (the so-called ‘popular promotion’). 
The project was characterised by its top-down approach. Even though Frei 
repudiated the idea of an all-encompassing state, all aspects of the project were 
implemented through the state apparatus, which was greatly expanded for the purpose. 
Furthermore, the project was marked by the ascendance of a large group of relatively 
autonomous professionals or technocrats, who were responsible for the elaboration and 
implementation of the project. They did so through state planning, which they 
considered to be the most modern way to address the complex social and economic 
challenges that had to be addressed. To this end, a Planning Office was set up, as a 
semi-independent institution which only reported to the President himself.  
The implementation of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ took place in the context of 
intense competition between the political Centre, the Right, and the Left, which had 
been intensified by the Christian Democrats’ choice to govern without a coalition 
partner. For the Right, the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ provoked a deep crisis, as it strongly 
influenced its traditional power base on the countryside. After this crisis, though, it 
fuelled an ideological radicalisation within the Right, which made the competition 
between the Christian Democrats and the Right particularly fierce, to the detriment of 
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the ‘Revolution in Liberty’. For the Left, the Christian Democrats were serious 
competitors in the mobilisation of the masses in order to achieve political change. In 
the context of a rapidly widening suffrage (which had been opened up to women and 
marginal sections of the population in 1949), the PDC and the Left ended up in an 
intense fight for the new electorate through awareness-raising activities, political 
agitation, and the provision of material assistance for the excluded masses. This process 
of ideological outbidding soon started to show negative results: the meagre performance 
of the economy after 1966 was insufficient to satisfy the mushrooming expectations of 
large sections of the population, which started to express its demands through strikes 
and political violence. 
In view of this conflict the Christian Democrats had two choices: first, to push the 
programme of modernisation forward with the risk of breaking the social order, or to 
adapt the project in order to maintain it. Frei Montalva’s choice was both clear and 
decisive: the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was slowed down in order to prevent a further 
escalation of social disorder. As it turned out, though, this was not enough, as political 
conflict and social unrest came to characterise the last years of the PDC’s rule.  
The clearest economic legacies of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ consisted of the 
agrarian reform, still well underway by 1970, and the ‘Chilenisation’ of the copper 
mines. On the social level, the project had generated a broad consensus on the need to 
include the marginal masses on the countryside and in the cities. Politically, the 
‘Revolution in Liberty’ had created a strong call for more radical reforms, which came 
to be carried among both the Centre and the Left.  
Chapter 4 deals with the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, which was set in motion by 
the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) government of Salvador Allende (1970-1973). 
This project, too, was based on an ambiguous position with regard to modernity. It 
particularly focused on the political dimensions of modernity, mixing elements of the 
‘really existing Socialisms’ of the Eastern European countries with the Social-Democrat 
European tradition. The UP focused on the creation of an egalitarian society which 
would extend political power directly to the working class through the nationalisation 
of large sections of the economy. In contrast with the ‘really existing Socialisms’, 
however, the UP maintained the element of liberal democracy in the political realm, 
creating a particularly ‘Chilean’ mix. The project was once again sustained by a 
vanguard theory of development, the so-called ‘dependency theory’, which argued that 
true development would only be attainable by abandoning the paradigm of 
international capitalism. These elements were mixed into a project of modernisation 
which sought to reform the social, economic, and political foundations of Chilean 
society. Its main targets were the intensification of agrarian reform, the full 
nationalisation of the copper mines and other important sectors of the economy, and 
redistribution of power by allowing the workers control over industry, through ‘people’s 
power’.  
The implementation of the project was extremely state-oriented and top-down in 
nature. While ideologically ambivalent to the state (by many members of the UP 
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considered a bulwark of bourgeois interest), it used all attributes of the state, often in a 
very instrumental way, in order to achieve the objectives of the ‘Chilean Road’. Once 
again, planning was considered a key element of the project, and an elaborate five-year 
plan was set up for all sectors of the economy. However, due to limited political 
independence of the Planning Office, as well as the severity of the political and 
economic conflict in the country, the plan was never put into practice. Technocrats, 
who suffered from a poor image because of their bourgeois background and non-
political orientation, suffered from less autonomy than under the Frei government, with 
the notable exceptions of Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol and the Minister of 
Economy Pedro Vuskovic.  
The ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ suffered from intense competition from both the 
Centre and the Right. For the latter, the UP-government was a near-death experience, as 
the intensified agrarian reform and the nationalisation of large sections of the economy 
fundamentally signified the abolishment of the Right as a socio-economic class. As a 
result, the Right dropped what was left of its democratic disposition and moved towards 
a confrontation, both by means of prolonged economic lock-outs and through political 
violence. As a result (but also because of mismanagement by the UP itself) the economy 
collapsed, and social disorder came to characterise the daily course of affairs, 
increasingly legitimising a military way out. The Christian Democrats, who had moved 
to the Left in the late 1960s, had initially shown some cautious sympathy for the 
project of the UP, and followed a line of moderate opposition. The instrumental use of 
power by the UP, however, which often bypassed parliament, infuriated the Christian 
Democrats, who soon moved to a more confrontational position. In the end, the final 
break was provoked by a technicality: the last serious attempt to compromise between 
the PDC and the UP stranded in a ‘grey area’ of the parliamentary statutes and ended 
up blocking the legalistic exit from the political conflict. As a result, the Christian 
Democrats distanced themselves from the ‘Chilean Road’, creating, in the process, the 
necessary middle-class support for a military intervention.  
Similar to Frei, Allende came to be confronted with the dilemma of either pushing 
forward his project of modernisation in the hope of regaining momentum, or adapting 
it in an attempt to quench the social and political conflict it had generated. His 
position was, however, complicated by the internal conflicts within the UP. Large 
sectors of the UP were not only calling for an intensification of the project, but even for 
a move away from the democratic path and towards a violent and revolutionary 
confrontation with the opposition. Torn between the need to reach a compromise with 
the Christian Democrats in order to ensure a parliamentary majority for the Chilean 
road and the need to keep the dissident groups within his coalition, Allende proved 
unable to make a choice, leaving the initiative to the most radical forces of the 
opposition.  
The ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ of the UP-government, as well as its overthrow in 
1973, left deep and visible marks in Chilean society. At the economic level, it 
confirmed the legitimacy of the agrarian reforms and the nationalisation of the copper 
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mines: both were never fully reversed by the military regime and are still in place. In 
turn, the economic crisis that took place under the UP had created large-scale resistance 
among the population to populism and state intervention in the economy. Similarly, at 
the political level, the experiences of civil disorder and political confrontation de-
legitimised popular mobilisation as political tools.  
In Chapter 5, the project of the Right under the military regime is analysed. This 
project, which has been dubbed by some the ‘Silent Revolution’ (1973-1990), consisted 
of a mix between Latin American conservatism and North American neo-liberal 
economic thinking. At the political level, it was based on an authoritarian and 
conservative order. However, it was considered that such an order could only be 
sustained within the context of formal democracy. As a result, it proposed a ‘protected 
democracy’ which, much like the Portalian state in the nineteenth century, would allow 
for formal (but limited) elections, while guaranteeing stability and a considerable 
influence for the Right.  
The neo-liberal development model which supported the project of the Right was 
inspired by the economic theories put forward by Milton Friedman, but which were 
adapted to the realities of the Chilean situation. Compared to the ‘Friedmanian’ 
orthodoxy, the regime’s economists, the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’, allowed a relatively 
large role for the state, a key position for economic planning, and a significant, 
although insufficient, redistribution of wealth through taxation. Together with the 
conservative ideology of the Right, the neo-liberal model turned out to be a project of 
modernisation with a large scale and impact, envisioning a modern market-oriented 
society (resembling the North American example) in the context of authoritarian (even 
though eventually formally democratic) rule and conservative ethics. 
In the implementation of the project, the state once again played a key role, despite 
the anti-state ideology of the neo-liberal policy-makers. The logic of withdrawing the 
state from society required a strong and active state in the process. Similarly, the 
‘invisible hand’ of the free market came to be accompanied by an elaborate and 
sophisticated system of state planning. Although this no longer concerned productive 
planning but rather the coordination of all state investment programmes, the Planning 
Office reached its peak in terms of influence during the military regime. The scientific, 
modern, and politically ‘neutral’ approach of the project, as well as its revolutionary 
nature, led to an important rise of technocracy in Chile, up to the point that the former 
political class had almost been replaced by technocrats. Where traditionally politicians 
and advocates had been the bearers of the image of progress and modernity in Chile, 
now this image was taken over by economists and businessmen. 
Formal political competition was almost nonexistent under the authoritarian 
regime. However, in the attempts to create a viable alternative to the military regime, 
the Christian Democrats and the Left underwent important changes, which would be 
crucial in the construction of the next project. For the Christian Democrats, a growing 
awareness that a successful government cannot be based on the exclusion of the 
majority of the political spectrum reoriented the party towards cooperation with the 
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moderate sections of the Left. Meanwhile, the Left underwent a long and slow process 
of ideological reorientation, the so-called ‘renovation process’, which led it to renounce 
violence and revolution, and to define its objectives more in terms of the European 
welfare system than in that of the really existing Socialisms.  
Like its predecessors, the project of modernisation of the military regime faced 
strong civil society responses. When in 1983 massive protests took place against the 
regime after an economic crisis had broken out the year before, the Pinochet 
government had to choose between the adaptation of the project or its maintenance, at 
the risk of a popular rebellion. In this case, though, adaptation of the project turned out 
to be successful. The government proved to have the political manoeuvring room it 
needed to slow down the project as long as the protests continued. Subsequently, it was 
reoriented towards a more pragmatic line, which turned out to be highly successful in 
the second half of the 1980s.  
Even though the regime was voted out in a referendum in 1988, and democracy 
returned a year later, important elements of the project of the Right were continued 
following the democratic restoration. First of all, the success of the economic model 
had made the prioritisation of economic growth a condition sine qua non for the future 
governments of the Concertación. As a result, the American-style consumer society 
which had arisen in Chile during the late 1980s proved to be irreversible. Second, the 
constitution that had been installed by Pinochet in 1980 limited the democratic system 
that would emerge in 1990 in several important ways, favouring the Right forces in 
Congress, and limiting the future governments in their ability to change things. 
Together with the growing orientation towards consensus-politics of the Centre and the 
moderate Left, these restraints guaranteed a moderate course of action of future 
governments. 
Chapter 6 deals with the project of the Concertación coalition (1990-), called 
‘Growth with Equity’. This project will be approached from two perspectives. On the 
one hand, it can be seen as a fourth project of modernisation, sharing many 
characteristics with its predecessors. On the other hand, it may be interpreted as a 
synthesis between the three former projects and, as such, a final stage, producing a kind 
of ‘end of history’ in the country.  
Starting with the first interpretation, ‘Growth with Equity’ was ideologically based 
on a ‘re-encounter’ with the modernity that had characterised Chile before the coup, 
that is, the liberal democratic model. Simultaneously, it selectively drew from the 
examples of the North-West European welfare model as well as the American liberal 
model. In this way, it attempted to create an ‘alternative model’ in the form of a ‘third 
way’ between neo-liberal capitalism and social welfare.  
This approach was supported by a new approach in development thinking, called 
‘neo-structuralism’. Like the structuralism that had been used in Frei’s ‘Revolution in 
Liberty’, neo-structuralism stressed social inclusion, redistribution of income, and a 
stronger role for the state. However, it no longer attempted to guide the course of 
economic activities in a planned way. Rather, it stressed the continuous maintenance of 
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macroeconomic equilibriums in a heterodox and pragmatic manner. Neo-structuralism 
and the ideology of the Concertación were blended together in a modernising project 
called ‘Growth with Equity’. The fundamental argument of this project was that neo-
liberal growth and social inclusion are not opposites, but that they mutually reinforce 
each other. The only path towards true development and modernity, it is argued, is to 
emphasise economic growth and investing its proceeds in social policies.  
During the four governments of the Concertación, shifts in approach and ideology 
took place. During the Aylwin government (1990-1994), the emphasis lay on the re-
inclusion of Chile in the world economy, the strengthening of civil society, and a 
smooth and successful termination of the process of the transition. The government of 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) prioritised modernisation, especially in the field of 
high-tech developments and a more rationalisation of the state apparatus. During the 
Lagos government (2000-2006) the emphasis on technology and communication 
remained, but was slowly eclipsed by a modest move towards the establishment of a 
welfare system. The government of Bachelet (2006- ) seems to be following this line, 
seeking to create a full-blown European-style welfare system for the majority of the 
Chilean people.  
In the implementation of the project the state has played a crucial, if conflicting 
role. On the one hand, state intervention was viewed as essential for the success of the 
model, and on the other the state should never hinder economic growth. As a result, 
under the Concertación, the state was reduced in size as a result of several important 
privatisations, while it gained in strength due to an efficiency-raising operation called 
the ‘modernisation of the state’. By shedding all functions that it deemed outside its 
core activities, the state could devote all of its attention to social policies and the 
‘regulation’ of the markets. Initially, planning was conceived as a key factor in these 
activities: the Planning Office was even upgraded to a true ministry in 1990. However, 
the new ministry has never been able to achieve a central position such as the 
ODEPLAN had under the military regime, and has limited its activities to the 
formulation and implementation of poverty reduction policies. The growing influence 
of technocracy, however, has been continued under the Concertación. Under the 
military regime, most of the opposition of the Centre and Left had been organised in 
academic think-tanks. This ‘refuge’ turned out to be a blessing in disguise: it led to a 
‘technocratisation’ of the leadership of the Concertación, emphasising pragmatism and 
objective-oriented action above principles and political intransigency, and giving it an 
‘academic language’ that allowed for the smooth settlement of internal political 
conflicts. 
The element of political competition changed under the project of the 
Concertación. While during the first half of the 1990s the conservative opposition was 
fierce, especially concerning issues that had to do with human rights violations by the 
military regime, towards the end of the decade a growing consensus could be discerned 
between the government coalition and the opposition. Even though the electoral 
competition remained intense, especially in the 1999-2000 elections, both blocks 
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fundamentally proved to agree on many fundamental themes, such as democratic 
values, economic policy making, and socio-economic strategies. The only true 
differences that sets the opposition apart from the Concertación are ‘ethical issues’ like 
abortion and institutional heritages from the military regime, such as the binomial 
electoral system. Other than that, the differences between the Right and the Centre-Left 
remain limited to nuances and small differences in approach. In this sense, an ‘end of 
history’ seems to have occurred, as all main political actors agree on the general strategy 
for development and modernisation for the country. 
Also with respect to the adaptation of the project, ‘Growth with Equity’ differed 
from its predecessors. During its installation until the elections of Michelle Bachelet as 
President in 2006, no significant mass protests have broken out. It therefore would seem 
that the success of economic policy-making, combined with the consensual-style of 
governance of the Concertación, has removed the dilemma between state-led 
modernisation and the maintenance of social order from the agenda. This is, however, 
not the case: the Concertación actually did adapt its project under pressure of public 
opinion, even without popular unrest and social disorder expressing the discontent 
among the population. The ‘academisation’ of the Concertación made the coalition 
particularly sensitive to social unrest as it was reflected in academic social studies. When 
such dissent was encountered, around 1998, an intense debate within the Concertación 
on the nature of the project arose, and this eventually created the space for its 
adaptation towards a more welfare model. In this sense, the Concertación has been able 
to avoid the difficult dilemma between modernisation and social order. 
In the other interpretation of the ‘Growth with Equity’ project, it is seen as a 
historical synthesis of the previous projects of modernisation. This synthesis consisted 
of a model that was based on elements of all three preceding projects of modernisation 
which have remained influential in different ways. From the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, the 
notion of social inclusion has remained prominent, in the sense that all sectors of the 
population have access to state benefits and are not excluded from social and economic 
citizenship. The notion of ‘popular power’ of the UP, however, has become almost 
completely de-legitimised, being associated with the chaos and political conflict of the 
early 1970s. Instead, the leadership of the Left has been able to fill key positions in 
government, and have two elected Presidents. For the Right, the picture is the reverse: 
most of its agenda is still being implemented by the Concertación, but it has been 
unable, during the last sixteen years, to win the presidency. The result of this mix is a 
model which is carried by all three actors, and which consequently has become 
particularly stable; it is not possible to take away one of the three pillars of the model 
without it collapsing.  
Much like the way in which past projects of modernisation have created a historical 
synthesis in the form of a particular, unequal balance between them, so the previous 
attempts to modernise the country have created particular patterns of modernity in 
Chile. Apart from institutional modernisations, such as the agrarian reform and the 
nationalisation of the copper mines, these patterns of modernity have become 
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characterised by four paradoxes. First of all, Chilean modernity is defined by the mix 
between democracy and low levels of civil society participation. Second, it combines 
social policies and poverty reduction without achieving a more egalitarian society: 
despite the impressive drop in poverty, inequality in Chile remains one of the highest 
in Latin America. The third paradox is that it consists of a market economy which is 
administrated by the Centre-Left. And finally, the fourth paradox of Chilean modernity 
is that despite its clear success in the social, economic, and political fields, the model 
seems to generate a profound dissatisfaction among the population.  
In the final chapter, the general conclusions of this study will be presented. These 
show how modernisation has been a driving force for Chile’s elites, and especially 
during the last decades. They will also stress the lines of continuity between the projects 
of modernisation in their construction and implementation. Finally, they will underline 
their mutual interaction and the ways in which they have formed patterns of modernity 
which are typical for the Chilean case.  
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Chapter 1 
Modernity and Modernisation in Chile 
This chapter focuses on three theoretical aspects of modernisation in Chile. First, it will 
explore the Chilean debate on modernity as it has emerged since the 1970s, and in 
which different positions relating to modernity can be discerned. Second, it will 
attempt to conceptualise a ‘Chilean’ form of modernity, and construct a general 
framework for the interpretation of how this modernity has been constructed. Finally, it 
will ‘operationalise’ the theoretical framework by explaining the approach towards 
modernisation that will be used in this study, and by addressing several themes that are 
relevant to the analysis of modernity in Chile.  
1.1 The Debate on Modernity in Chile: A Theoretical Assessment 
The debate on modernity in Chile has been a particular one. It has not been a debate in 
the strictest sense, in the form of a discussion between intellectuals, but has rather taken 
the form of a stream of publications which rarely refer to one another. In addition, 
rather than being purely theoretical or philosophical, the debate has been marked by a 
distinctively practical and even political style. Publications on modernisation in Chile 
tend to focus on concrete aspirations and experiences of modernity, and to present 
solutions or policy guidelines for the achievement of a desired form of modernity 
(Brunner 1990: 43).1 This is by no means accidental, but indicative of two specific 
characteristics of Chilean intellectuals. First, they view modernity — whatever they 
perceive that to be — as something that is proximate and attainable. As a result, they 
tend to discuss it in practical ways rather than in a highly theoretical form. Second, 
Chilean intellectuals maintain little distance from the political classes and the political 
processes in general. The political arena and the academic world are not, as in some 
other Latin American countries, separate spheres, and the political elites in Chile have 
been recruited from within the academia since the early twentieth century (Silva 1993a: 
200). Intellectuals regularly participate actively in politics or actively support political 
parties, and their work is often policy-oriented. Some of the country’s most notable 
intellectuals, such as the economist Sergio Molina, the historian Gonzalo Vial, and the 
sociologist José Joaquín Brunner, have fulfilled high governmental positions.2 As a 
                                              
1 This political nature of publications that deal with modernity and modernisation (or the corresponding 
terminology used in each different period) can be seen as early as the nineteenth century, in the writings 
of intellectuals such as Francisco Bilbao and Victorino Lastarria, and in twentieth century classics such as 
La Raza Chilena of Nicolas Palacios (1904), La Fronda Aristocrática of Alberto Edwards (1928), and Jorge 
Ahumada’s En Vez de la Miseria (1958). 
2 As will be seen in the course of this study, the thin line between the intellectual and the political realms 
has given political projects in Chile a particular intellectual and academic dimension. In contrast to other 
Latin American countries, in Chile political projects are usually founded on academic doctrines and 
theoretical underpinning, rather than on political slogans only.  
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result, the works that have been published on modernity and modernisation are not as 
much intellectual contributions to a purely academic debate, but rather practical and 
even policy-oriented works geared to creating support, both among the population and 
political circles, for political projects of modernisation. The result is a ‘debate’ that 
consists of a stream of individual contributions, rather than a true exchange of ideas 
and views.  
The discussion on modernity in Chile started in the nineteenth century, after 
Chile’s independence, focusing on the path of modernisation (or, in the nineteenth-
century parlance, ‘progress’) that the country should follow, and, more profoundly, the 
sort of modernity it should aspire to.3 These discussions were fuelled, in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, by the so-called ‘theories of modernisation’ that, coming from the United 
States, argued that the ‘developing world’ would be able, given certain circumstances, to 
follow the North American path of modernisation and development (Rostow 1961, 
Apter 1965). As the following chapters show, the Latin American (and particularly 
Chilean) reaction to these theories led to the construction of new paradigms, such as 
structuralism and dependency theory, that would become dominant in the debates on 
modernisation in the 1960s and the early 1970s.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the debate on modernity in Chile assumed an 
unprecedented intensity. This was largely the result of the nature of the military regime 
that had come to power in 1973 and which, besides installing a harsh and extremely 
repressive dictatorship, implemented an ambitious project of economic modernisation.4 
As a result, the concept of modernity (usually understood as being connected with 
notions such as democracy, social welfare, and individual freedom) came into tension 
with the idea of modernisation. Furthermore, during the 1980s, the concept of ‘post-
modernism’, which was in vogue in the United States and Europe, raised the question 
of whether Latin America could also partake in this post-modern culture, and, more 
profoundly, if Latin America could be called modern at all.5 
In the case of Chile, the debate on modernity and modernisation has taken place 
largely in the political arena. This can be attributed to several factors. First, as has been 
mentioned above, in Chile the line between the political and the academic realms is 
very thin. Second, and as will be shown in the next chapter, the notion of 
modernisation and the quest for modernity have been an driving force among Chile’s 
                                              
3 The trajectory towards modernity and the debates surrounding modernisation of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century will be discussed in Chapter 2.  
4 The military regime sought to explicitly legitimise its project by appropriating the language and 
discourse on modernisation. For instance, a series of structural reforms that were announced in 1977 were 
dubbed the ‘seven modernisations’ by the regime. As a result, the word ‘modernisation’ came to be 
closely identified with the neo-liberal policies and the authoritarian nature of Pinochet’s rule.  
5 Contrary to what happened in the field of literature, post-modernity has not become an important 
paradigm in the Latin American social sciences. It will therefore not be dealt with in this investigation. In 
the literary field, the most important contribution to the debate on postmodernism in Chile has been the 
publication of series of short stories, edited by Alberto Fuguet and Sergio Gómez, with the title 
‘McOndo’; referring both to García Márquez’ Macondo and to a consumerist modernity. See Fuguet and 
Gómez (1996).  
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elites at least since independence.6 Third, the military government of Pinochet started, 
from the mid-1970s on, a discourse of modernisation that would become emblematic 
and would prove to be one of the regime’s cornerstones of legitimacy. This triggered 
criticisms from the opposition, which argued that the economic modernisation of the 
military regime hardly amounted to a true path towards modernity, as it excluded and 
repressed large sections of society. However, the modernising discourse of the military 
regime proved so successful that it was adopted (with adaptations) by the governments 
of the Concertación coalition. As a result, the debate on modernity became a key 
element within the debates on the course of the project of the Concertación. 
The most notable characteristic of the debate on modernity as it emerged in the late 
1970s is that almost all contributors, even the most conservative ones, fundamentally 
support the notion of modernity - albeit with strongly varying interpretations of what 
modernity should look like (Pinedo 1997: 38). This is significant, as it indicates the 
intensity that the drive towards modernity has gained in Chile: even the sectors of the 
country’s elites that resist modernisation the most adhere to some form of modernity. 
Another notable characteristic of this debate is that it generally does not focus on the 
shape and content of modernity itself, but rather on the processes of modernisation 
that construct modernity. The criticisms and defences are directed to the processes of 
modernisation that have been taking place in Chilean society. Usually, critiques of 
modernisation are based on two general arguments: either they claim that a certain path 
of modernisation does not lead to the construction of modernity, or they claim that 
modernisation creates an undesirable form of modernity.7 Generally, these critiques 
focus on the incompatibility between Chilean identity and modernisation, or the speed 
of modernisation, which gives Chilean society insufficient time to adapt to the changes 
it undergoes (Larraín 2001: 7-9).8 The defence of modernisation is usually based on the 
argument that although modernisation may have high social and human costs, it will 
eventually construct modernity. According to this view, it is necessary to move forward 
while simultaneously mitigating the harmful effects of modernisation.  
The Chilean debate on modernity revolves around four different perspectives that 
are used for the creation of different proposals and counter-proposals for projects of 
modernisation. The first perspective of modernity has been be labelled ‘baroque 
modernity’ (Larraín 2001: 191-192). It is based on a specific Latin American 
interpretation of modernity, in which Hispanic and Catholic influences play a 
                                              
6 Throughout the history of Chile, influential publications have dealt with modernity and modernisation, 
but mostly without open and clear reference to the term itself. These publications focused on themes like 
‘progress’ (in the nineteenth century) and ‘development’ (in the 1950s and 1960s). However, only in the 
1970s did a true debate emerge surrounding the theme. Therefore, this section will focus on the post-
Allende period exclusively, while earlier contributions will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
7 As Pinedo (1997: 38-39) argues, the critics of modernisation in Chile are often ambivalent in nature, 
considering it to be: ‘disruptive, breaking the moulds of identity, and excessively promoting to leave 
behind the proper elements and to imitate the realities of the developed countries: modernity and 
identity as counterparts. A country that celebrates Pablo Neruda or Claudio Arrau as the most ‘universal’ 
Chileans, but at the same time fears that universality itself’. See also: Larraín (2001).  
8 The same has been argued outside of Chile as well. See: Paz (1979), Quijano (1989) and Fuentes (1990). 
 18 
significant role. Generally conservative in outlook, it rejects Illustrated modernity and 
its ‘one-sided’ focus on rationality, and pleads for a more intuitive, human, and ethical 
form of modernity. It is critical of capitalism and also suspicious of the modern state. In 
its most conservative expressions it will reject democracy and plead for a semi-
monarchical system, although usually it will approve of democracy and the state from 
an instrumental perspective.  
The other three perspectives refer to what have been called the ‘actually existing 
modernities’ of the twentieth century, which can be found in North-Western Europe, 
the United States, and in the former Socialist world (Wagner 1994: 13). The first one, 
which can be called ‘Social-Democratic welfare modernity’, is based on the role of the 
state in the construction of general welfare and strong collective rights for the working 
class. It is democratic and capitalistic; however, it is able to mitigate the negative side-
effects of capitalism through a redistribution of wealth, both on the initiative of the 
state and through collective bargaining. The second is ‘liberal modernity’, which is 
oriented towards an US-style society and the individualisation of risks and 
opportunities. In this model, the social and economic roles of the state are greatly 
reduced, and the market is expected to organise most processes in society. Thirdly, the 
‘Socialist alternative’ is oriented towards an egalitarian society, in which the role of the 
market is minimised and the state becomes the dominant actor. In this model, the 
democratic model is sacrificed in the pursuit of collective well-being and the eradication 
of socio-economic inequality by the state.  
 
The Baroque Perspective 
The first perspective in the Chilean debate is that of ‘baroque modernity’. This position 
is defended by a range of religious authors, from both the Left and Right, among whom 
are intellectuals such as Pedro Morandé, Cristián Parker, Carlos Cousiño, and 
Bernardino Bravo Lira. They argue that Latin American identity has a strong 
undercurrent of Catholicism, which is incompatible with the notion of instrumental 
reason that has been put forward in the modernity of the Enlightenment. Latin 
American identity is not necessarily anti-modern, but comes from a ‘baroque 
modernity’, that is, a form of modernity that was constructed before the Western-
European rational modernity took shape. This ‘baroque modernity’ is modern because 
it has left behind the medieval structures of thought, but has simultaneously been able, 
in contrast to enlightened modernity, to maintain Catholicism as its foundation. It is 
therefore a form of ‘Catholic modernity’, which tends to emphasise the spoken word 
over written text, and sentiments and intuition over rationality. This Latin American 
form of modernity has not been recognised by the continent’s elites, who have sought 
to copy enlightened modernity from Europe, estranging themselves from their cultural 
foundations in the process. However, in popular religion the roots of ‘baroque 
modernity’ can still be seen (Larraín 2002: 188-200).9 Morandé in particular emphasises 
                                              
9 Larraín sharply criticises the notion of a ‘baroque modernity’, because of fundamental conceptual 
problems: how can a modernity be modern when it does not incorporate essential aspects of modernity 
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the ways in which modernity has been forced upon Chile and Latin America. 
Enlightened modernity never penetrated the Latin American culture profoundly, he 
argues, because of the existence of a Latin American cultural synthesis (a ‘baroque 
modernity’) which emerged in the sixteenth century and which was based on mestizaje 
(the mix between Indian and Spanish cultures). However, the criollo-elites (born in Latin 
America but descended from Spanish immigrants), who identified with European 
modernity, since the nineteenth century enforced modernity on Latin America in 
different waves of modernisation. As a result, they destroyed much of the moral Latin 
American ‘ethos’, which had been based on the ‘sacred’ and voluntary sacrifice 
(Morandé 1984). 
Many of the defenders of the notion of a ‘baroque modernity’ not only criticise 
enlightened modernity for being incompatible with Latin American identity and 
culture, but also predict its downfall. Much in line with the ‘socialist alternative’ 
argument, they argue that modernity is unsustainable because of its internal 
contradictions, and will eventually collapse. As a result, ‘baroque modernity’ will 
eventually be victorious in Latin America. As Morandé puts it: 
Spanish America (…) is greatly favoured with the fall of the Enlightenment. 
When illustrated modernity collapses, baroque modernity will reappear, buried 
under a more or less thick layer of rationalist varnish, but still alive, especially 
among the popular sectors (quoted in Larraín 2001: 200).  
From a different perspective, José Bengoa also seeks to reconcile modernity with Latin 
American identity, and, more specifically, with the concept of community. In his book 
La Comunidad Perdida, he analyses how modernisation (or, as he argues for the case of 
Chile, ‘obsessive modernisation’) breaks the traditional ties of community and identity 
without replacing it with an alternative culture:  
The culture of ‘obsessive modernisation’ is opposed to that of the ‘culture of 
identity’. The growth of the economy, without respect for persons and the 
environment, and without basic solidarity of society, is opposed to the concept 
of human and sustainable development. (…) Often it seems that today, the last 
ties are being broken that bind people together, that bind men and women with 
the land and with the nature they are living in. Many view this process of 
modernisation with apprehension and, at times, with pessimism (Bengoa 1996: 
16). 
According to Bengoa, modernity in Chile has created a modern state that has enforced 
a repressive morale on its citizens, especially women. Modernity has also stimulated 
racism, intolerance, exclusion and poverty. As a result, Chilean society has become 
characterised by sentiments of insecurity and nostalgia, a cultural void that is 
unsuccessfully being filled with technology and gadgets, and high levels of drug abuse 
                                                                                                                                        
such as reason, rationality, political democracy, science, and so on? Instead, he argues that baroque 
modernity is mainly conservative, connected to a hierarchic and agrarian model of society, and based on 
order and stability and the affirmation of faith - all characteristics that are clearly anti-modern. However, 
as will be seen in the next section, there is no fundamental reason to discard a model of modernity 
because it contains elements that are anti-modern or does not involve certain elements that are modern.  
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and delinquency. Bengoa does not argue against modernity as such, but against the 
path of modernisation that Chile has taken. Although Bengoa does not explicitly 
endorse the notion of a true ‘Latin American baroque modernity’, he implicitly follows 
the same line of argument, by claiming that fundamentally Latin American identity and 
community are not irreconcilable with modernity. The question is rather what kind of 
modernity can truly take root in Latin America? For Bengoa, modernity may well be 
successful in Latin America, but only under certain circumstances:  
The desire for change and for modernisation can well have a enormous 
constructive sense; it can create a modern society, with self-consciousness, 
which is at peace with its past, and which has a shared project of constructing a 
friendly future (ibid., p. 12).10  
So, while ‘compulsive modernisation’ destroys Chile’s ties of community, Bengoa, like 
Morandé, sees no fundamental contradiction between modernity and Latin American 
identity.  
Related to ‘Baroque modernity’, but even more critical of modernisation, is the 
perspective of those authors who have stressed the ‘Hispanist’ roots of Latin America. 
This current was strongly influenced by the figure of conservative historian Jaime 
Eyzaguirre, who, in the 1940s and 1950 constructed an elaborate ideology of Hispanic 
traditionalism, rejecting most aspects of enlightened modernity, modern capitalism, and 
liberal democracy. According to Eyzaguirre, the processes of modernisation the country 
passed through in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were incompatible with 
Chilean identity, and as a consequence led to social conflict. The rise of the middle 
classes, for instance, never took root as it did in Europe, but only provoked the 
weakening in patterns of identity:  
While the European bourgeoisie developed a truly different identity and was 
able to give form and content to its class, the Chilean middle class rather 
exhibited a hybrid and insecure physiognomy in contrast to the clear and 
authentic ones of the ‘nobleman’ and the ‘peasant’. Its fear of deserving the 
pejorative epitaph of ‘affected’ by which it was characterised from below, often 
made the middle class live in a perpetual flight from its ambience, in a 
continuous negation of itself (Eyzaguirre 1973: 171). 
Historian Mario Góngora has been one of Eyzaguirre’s most famous followers. 
According to Góngora, Chile was born ‘without Renaissance or Reformation’, and even 
without ‘a true baroque monarchy’, in other words, outside modernity (Góngora 1980: 
129). Góngora strongly resisted the rationalism which characterises modernity, and 
which lies at the root of Marxism, liberalism, and developmentalism: 
I become more and more adverse towards developmentalism, technocracy and 
economicism, to which regrettably most governments of the Western world 
                                              
10 Bengoa’s analysis is supported, but from a completely different perspective, by the sociologist Eugenio 
Tironi. Both agree that modernity clashes with community. However, their conclusions are different: 
Bengoa seeks to construct an ‘alternative modernity’ that can be reconciled with Latin American identity, 
while Tironi (2005) argues that community can be restored within the context of enlightened and liberal 
modernity.  
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succumb. The rationalism that is the basis of this complex ideology, its 
deprecation of the local and national traditions, its neglect of all humanism and 
of all spiritual or vital motivation, all these tear away all the profound 
resistances that form exactly the obstacles for Marxism (Góngora 1987: 38).  
However, Góngora is not critical of all things considered modern. He specifically 
supports the idea of the ‘modern state’, which, in his view, is the precursor and creator 
of the Chilean nation. For Góngora, the Chilean state, which was given its original 
shape and form in the 1830s, is the first modern ‘Chilean’ institution, and has, so to 
speak, given the Chilean nation its shape and form. Consequently, for Góngora 
Chilean modernity is intrinsically tied to the state. As a result, the state should reflect 
Chilean national identity and not impose external developmental models (or, in 
Góngora’s words, ‘utopias’) through state planning, as happened in the 1960s and 
1970s. Góngora is particularly critical of the neo-liberal policies of the military regime, 
precisely because they were targeted against the Chilean state. For him, the down-sizing 
of the state under the neo-liberal model was an act that violates the soul of the nation. 
Neo-liberal modernity, he argues, is fundamentally incompatible with Chilean identity:  
In fact, neo-liberalism is not a proper fruit of our society, as in England, 
Holland, or the United States, but a ‘revolution from above’, paradoxically anti-
state, in a society which has been formed by the state (Góngora 1986: 301). 
Osvaldo Lira also stressed the Hispanic nature of the Latin American peoples, 
emphasising that in the mix between Spanish and Indigenous blood, the former has 
proved superior to the latter. He sharply criticises the adoption of modern and liberal 
views by Latin American elites, stressing that the true values of Latin America are 
fundamentally medieval, and, as a consequence, incompatible with modernity (Lira 
1985: 6).  
An intriguing mix between ultra-conservatism and neo-liberal modernity was 
elaborated by a younger and less theoretical exponent of conservative ideology, who 
gained much influence under the military regime. This was Jaime Guzmán, the 
intellectual father of the constitutional order that was set up under Pinochet and which 
is still partially in place today. Originally following the examples of Eyzaguirre and Lira, 
by the late 1970s Guzmán came to make a shift in the traditional rejection of all liberal 
elements of modernity. Mixing the essentialist conception of a Chilean identity (both 
Hispanic and Catholic) with neo-liberal views, Guzmán created a hybrid ideology that 
rejected key elements of modernity while accepting others. Liberal individualism, for 
instance was considered alien to Chilean society as it would disrupt its ‘natural order’. 
Modern democracy, in contrast, was accepted, but only in a restricted manner, as 
Chilean society had not yet reached the level of maturity to support this element of 
modernity:  
The democratic system, based on the creation of authority through truly free 
suffrage, constitutes an ideal that only functions adequately in countries with a 
high level of economic, social, and cultural development (Guzmán 1979a: 43).  
 22 
The neo-liberal economic model, however, eventually gained the full support of 
Guzmán, who came to accept the idea of compatibility between Chilean identity and a 
radical market economy. Calling it a ‘modern social market economy’, he attributed to 
it a capacity for the progress that the country needed and an efficient allocation of 
resources.11 
 
The Social-Democratic welfare perspective 
From the 1950s on, North-Western Europe came to be viewed by progressive and 
reformist Chilean intellectuals as a key example of how the state could initiate 
development and create a modern industrial society in which the state’s safety-nets 
protected the collectivised workers from exploitation.12 This perspective became 
particularly important in criticising the modernisations that had been set in motion 
under the military regime of Pinochet. Contrasting the inequalities that had been 
produced by project of modernisation of the military regime with the North-Western 
European model of modernity, academic Norbert Lechner asked himself, ‘are 
modernity and modernisation compatible?’ (Lechner 1990). In a similar way, the 
sociologist Malva Espinoza concluded that under the military regime modernity and 
modernisation were completely contradictory, and that modernisation had become 
‘perverse’ (Espinoza 1989). A more elaborate critique of modernisation was produced 
by the sociologist Eugenio Tironi, who attacks the extreme free market policies of the 
regime, while stressing the role the state should play in providing general basic welfare 
for the population. During the military regime, modernisation showed its ‘hidden face’, 
as Tironi called it: it had created economic growth and affluence for some, but it 
excluded and repressed large sections of the population (1989: 53). Finally, following a 
more moderate line of argument, José Joaquín Brunner argued that the military regime 
has created a ‘modern culture’ that was oriented towards the market and the private 
sectors. However, this modernisation of culture had been two-sided: on one hand, 
modernisation increased heterogeneity and differentiation on the cultural level, which 
is proper of modern societies. On the other, the authoritarian nature of the regime, and 
the subsequent limited nature of modernisation, had converted this differentiation into 
cultural exclusion and social division, incompatible and even contradictory to the 
experience of modernity (1989: 204-209). 
After the democratic restoration, ‘Social-Democratic welfare modernity’ has 
remained a strong point of reference for many academics, politicians, and observers. 
Especially during the discussions on the socio-economic model of the Concertación 
that arose in 1998, this model of modernity became highly visible. One of the 
publications that triggered that discussion, the Human Development Report by the 
UNDP in Chile, showed that Chileans experienced high levels of insecurity and anxiety 
                                              
11 For a more extensive analysis of Guzmán’s views on modernity, see Chapter 5.1.1.  
12 The word ‘social-democrat’ does not necessarily indicate that this model is only supported by the 
moderate Left. It merely points to the organisation of society that emerged in the twentieth century in 
North-Western Europe and which was based on a large role of the state in society, a strong tendency to 
the collectivisation of social actors, and the creation of social safety-nets by the state.  
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because of the path of market-oriented modernisation that the country had followed 
since the return to democracy. This path, the report argued, individualised risks and 
opportunity to such an extent that the population experienced an increasing and 
problematic dislocation between their subjectivity and the processes of modernisation. 
However, the model of modernity that the country was moving to could be adapted, 
the report claimed:  
The country is inserted in a global process of modernisation from which it 
cannot distance itself without falling into a possible stagnation. This does not 
imply, though, that the objective and rhythm of modernisation have been 
determined beforehand (PNUD 1998: 224). 
A similar position can be observed in the discussion that arose at the heart of the 
Concertación following the publication of the report. Critical sectors of the 
Concertación have argued in favour of a different path of modernisation, which would 
not consist of economic growth exclusively, but in which the state would offer more 
protection for the population.13 
Finally, sociologist Jorge Larraín also takes the perspective of ‘North-West European 
welfare modernity’ when analysing the path of modernisation in Chile. In his Identidad 
chilena, he avoids taking a clear position on what exactly modernity should be like. 
However, in his analysis of modernity and modernisation if Chile, Larraín paints an 
image of modernity that is closely tied to democracy, social inclusion, certain levels of 
equality, and a state that takes responsibility for the common good, all characteristics of 
the North-Western European welfare model. Furthermore, he suggests that the liberal 
model that is currently dominant in Chile is unbalanced:  
 [W]hile the progress of modernisation in the period after the Second World 
War was combined with an increasingly radical social critique, geared towards 
the change of the system, the advances of modernity in the 1990s coexist with a 
domination - almost without counterbalance - of the liberal ideology and the 
acceptance that poverty can only be overcome with more development within 
the system (Larraín 2002: 135). 
A more radical critique on Chilean modernity from the perspective of Social-
Democratic welfare modernity comes from former Socialist Party leader Carlos 
Altamirano. According to Altamirano (2000: 48-50), in Chile modernity almost 
exclusively takes the form of economic modernisation and the consumption of 
technological artefacts such as cellular phones and microwave ovens. However, he 
argues, it is not sufficient to buy and use products that are in vogue to be truly modern. 
Chilean society is still largely defined by non-modern structures and practices. At the 
political level, the democratisation is still far from complete. At the level of science and 
education, the country lacks adequate institutions and structures of scientific research. 
At the economic level, the country is unable to produce industrial goods, which create 
                                              
13 Like the authors of the PNUD-report, these critical sectors argued in favour of the construction of a 
model of modernity in which the state would provide more protection for its citizens: ‘[o]ur values 
determine the type of modernity we aspire to. The road to modernisation does not exclusively exist of 
economic growth’ (Concertación 1998b). For an extensive analysis of this discussion, see Chapter 6.2.3. 
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added value. And culturally, Chilean society has never experienced a true process of 
secularisation. Some modernisation has occurred, but only recently and in very limited 
form, Altamirano argues:  
The last years Chile has experienced very important advances in terms of 
structures, of roads, and other modern structures, especially in the cities. 
However, this is a process, and has started only in the last ten, fifteen years. 
Before that, we weren’t modern. We lived in a dictatorship, led by a figure like 
Pinochet, who is a completely pre-modern person. This is why I speak of our 
‘frustrated modernity’ (interview with Carlos Altamirano on 5 May 2004). 
In short, the Social-Democratic welfare perspective has specifically been used to criticise 
the strong liberal orientation that Chilean modernity has acquired since the 1990s.  
 
The Liberal Perspective 
The image of an ‘American-liberal modernity’ also has some ancestry, as in the 
nineteenth century some intellectuals like José Victorino Lastarria already called for the 
incorporation of particular elements of North American civilisation, science, and 
industry in the Chilean educational system, despite the dominant European outlook of 
the era (Larraín 2002: 87). However, the orientation towards the United States as a 
model for modernity only really took shape in the mid-1970s, with the implementation 
of the neo-liberal economic model under the military regime. It is therefore not 
surprising that the most outspoken proponent of ‘American-liberal’ modernity was a 
fervent supporter of the regime, the economist Joaquín Lavín. In his bestseller La 
Revolución Silenciosa, and without entering into the theoretical aspects of modernity and 
modernisation, Lavín celebrates an image of Chilean modernity that is based on the 
modernisation of the economy along neo-liberal lines and patterns of consumption. 
Modernity, according to Lavín, is based on economic expansion and integration with 
the developed world through the markets, with minimal state intervention. As a result, 
he argues, Chileans have become better informed, work more efficiently, and have 
access to a wide variety of consumer goods. This business-oriented and consumerist 
modernity will allow all Chileans freedom of choice and access to modern technology 
that until then were unattainable (Lavín 1987).14 
After the return to democracy, the ‘American-Liberal’ view of modernity did not 
remain confined to the Right. Claudio Véliz, for instance, has argued that Latin 
American culture, and Chilean in particular, has been able to withstand the 
modernising influences of the Anglo-Saxon world for centuries. Using Isaiah Berlin’s 
metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox, Véliz claims that the Latin American ‘baroque 
hedgehog’-culture, resisting change and progress, finally succumbed, under the 
influence of the bombardment of consumption, to the innovative forces of the Anglo-
                                              
14 Obviously, Lavín’s view of modernity at the time included a defence of the military regime, which 
clearly did not match the United States model and was also not very liberal. This is an example of the 
mixing of two images of modernity. Lavín’s support for the military regime was largely based on the 
Catholic conservative ideology that sustained the notion of a ‘Latin American baroque modernity’, while 
he combined with liberal economic thinking.  
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Saxon ‘Gothic fox’. As a result, the paradigms of the past, such as the welfare-state and 
state provision of social justice, have been replaced by the drive towards individual 
success, mass consumption, and market orientation. This will allow Chile, Véliz argues, 
to become a something of a ‘Gothic fox’ itself, and replicate at least partially the 
patterns of modernity that are characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon world. Whether the 
other Latin American countries will follow suit remains to be seen, however. It might 
also be that Chile constitutes the modern exception in Latin America:  
With the exception of Chile, the country that led the exodus to the promised 
prosperities of the free market (…) the early experience of those countries that 
have already embraced economic liberalism has not proved an immediate and 
undiluted success. This leaves open the possibility that the explanation for 
Chilean economic abilities, and much else, may have more to do with the 
country’s sui generis insularity with respect to the mainland of Latin America, a 
feature that is immediately comparable with Britain’s insularity with respect to 
Europe or Japan’s with respect to Asia, than with the application of this or that 
fashionable economic prescription (Véliz 1994: 228).  
As has been shown above, Eugenio Tironi was critical of the way in which ‘liberal 
modernity’ took shape under the military regime. However, he was also one of the first 
prominent members of the opposition who openly acknowledged the scope and lasting 
influence of modernisation under Pinochet:  
Under Pinochet - and in particular after the crisis of 1983-85 - Chile has 
experimented with an impulse of modernisation that has been very different 
from the one that had developed before 1973, and that comes very close to the 
tendencies that modernisation has taken on the international level: reduction of 
the role of the state, flexibilisation, (…) and minimal and discretional state 
assistance (in contrast to the universality of the welfare state) (…) This has been 
the meaning of Pinochet’s revolution in Chile; and with different modalities 
and intensities in each case, this has also been the meaning of the processes of 
modernisation in all of the contemporary world, from the developed countries 
to the undeveloped ones (Tironi 1990: 34).  
Following the democratic restoration, Tironi has consistently defended the path of 
modernisation that was set in motion under the Concertación, considering that it is 
present, fundamental, and irreversible and that the only question that remains is how to 
mitigate its negative consequences. He argues that the sentiments of anxiety and 
frustration among the Chilean population, as they were laid bare by the Human 
Development Report of the United Nations, reflect the insecurity of a society that is 
moving forward rapidly. He specifically points to the elites in Chilean society, 
reproaching them that while they verbally support the modernisation of the country 
and the improvement of the socio-economic position of the poor, they in fact hinder 
those processes, because of their unease towards the ‘invasion of the masses’. Chile, 
Tironi argues, has always been a paradise for its elites, both from the Left and Right. 
Enjoying both access to the modern world and the exclusiveness of their second home 
in the countryside or on the beach, the elites were: ‘being citizens of modernity and 
small aristocrats at the same time, making use of the privileges that are offered by a 
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profoundly unequal society’ (Tironi 1999: 45). However, in the 1990s, the lower classes 
gained access to some of the benefits that originally were reserved for the upper classes, 
such as cars, holidays, travel, and consumer durables. This process of modernisation, 
Tironi argues, has provoked sentiments of dissent among the elites, who find 
themselves deprived of their exclusive position. He attacks in particular the elites of the 
Left, who in their attacks on the ‘materialist’ and ‘consumerist’ model of modernity that 
emerged in Chile in the 1990s, seem to forget the tremendous progress that the 
excluded and the poor experience within that model (ibid., p. 40).  
Tironi specifically deals with the relation between the family, community, and 
modernity. The path of modernisation that Chile is following, he argues, corresponds 
to liberal modernity as it exists in countries such as the United States, with a small role 
for the state, promotion of market solutions, individualisation of risks, and a strong 
focus on social mobility (Tironi 2005: 20). As a result, the ties within communities and 
families erode, creating an atomised society, in which mistrust, insecurity, and a general 
cooling down of human relations are not mitigated by social networks. In his view, this 
is not a reason to attempt to change the model of modernity. On the contrary, the only 
possible option for Chile is to intensify the path of modernisation that was embarked 
on in the 1990s, while effectively governing the changes, uncertainties and fears it 
generates (Tironi 2002). In addition, a strategy should be conceived to strengthen 
community, and particularly family, in the context of liberal modernity. This can be 
achieved through what he labels ‘conservative progressiveness’, which advocates a 
society in which modern values such as liberty and equality are combined with human 
warmth and a strengthening of the social ties within society (Tironi 2005: 26-27).15 
The sociologist José Joaquín Brunner, who has written extensively on the topic of 
modernity, presents more or less the same line of argument as Tironi. In the 1980s 
Brunner followed the image of ‘Social-Democratic welfare modernity’, arguing that a 
key characteristic of modernity is the shift of the focal point of culture (in a broad 
sense) from the private to the public sphere, with the state as the main actor in the 
organisation, regulation, and stimulation of cultural activities (Brunner et al. 1989: 28-
30). In this period, Brunner argues that Chile is experiencing a ‘peripheral’ or 
‘fragmented’ modernity, in which the elements that constitute its modernity are not 
endogenous, but are ‘received’ from the industrialised countries (Brunner 1986: 57). In 
the 1990s, though, Brunner heartily defended the more ‘American-Liberal’ path of 
modernisation that the country took. For Brunner, contemporary Chile lives a paradox: 
Chile today is culturally submerged in the problems that are typical of late 
modernity, independent of the degree of modernisation of its economic and 
social structures (Brunner 1998: 28).  
According to Brunner, the sentiments of anxiety, insecurity, and detachment that were 
signalled by the report of the PNUD are precisely the result of the modernisation of 
                                              
15 The agenda of ‘conservative progressiveness’ resembled in many ways the electoral agenda of the 
Christian Democratic presidential pre-candidate Soledad Alvear, who was indeed actively supported by 
Tironi during the 2005 presidential campaign.  
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culture: old values are left behind and replaced by much more dynamic patterns of 
threats and opportunities, which are experienced on a personal level. As Brunner puts 
it: ‘to live in modernity is necessarily to live in tension’ (ibid., p. 30). As a result, 
Brunner argues, those who claim that the malestar (disenchantment) is a sign that the 
country is on the wrong path of modernisation, are mistaken: there exists no 
modernisation without sentiments of anxiety and insecurity (Brunner 1998b). Like 
Tironi, Brunner blames the country’s elites (and the ‘intelligentsia’ in particular) for 
failing to take a leading role. While at first they rightly complained about the 
limitations of ‘peripheral modernity’ in Chile, they now no longer have cause for such 
complaints. For the first time in history, Chile is thoroughly experiencing the culture 
and patterns of modernity; at last the masses are incorporated, in an inexorable and 
conflicting way, into modernity; and meanwhile the ‘intelligentsia’ are shocked with 
apprehension, resisting the further progress of modernity (Brunner 2001: 259). The fact 
that this incorporation into modernity takes place on the basis of consumption and 
consumptive credit does not bother Brunner:  
The people of the popular sectors, who enter into the formal labour market, and 
make a thousand peso above the minimum wage, their only desire is to get 
access to a credit card of Ripley, go to the store and buy something for their 
children (interview with José Joaquín Brunner on 21 March 2002). 
As will be shown in Chapter 6, Brunner, Tironi, and other exponents of the Liberal 
perspective became important cornerstones in the construction of the ‘Chilean model’ 
in the 1990s, and, as such, of Chilean modernity today. 
 
The Socialist Perspective 
The fourth perspective of modernity, the ‘Socialist perspective’, no longer represents a 
very strong current in the debates in Chile. It possesses a long history, though, as 
Chilean Socialist and Communist movements were among the first and strongest in 
Latin America. From the early twentieth century on, the Chilean Left, especially the 
Communist Party, has attempted to construct alternatives to capitalism. In practice, 
however, it was largely oriented towards a North-West European welfare model. Only 
in the 1960s and early 1970s did the ‘Socialist perspective’ achieve a momentum as a 
result of the rise of revolutionary movements following the example of the Cuban 
Revolution in particular. On a more theoretic level, this perspective was fuelled by the 
so-called ‘dependency theory’ which was elaborated in Latin America in order to 
explain the problematic path of development that the continent had experienced. 
According to this theory, Latin America was fundamentally blocked from modernity, 
because of its subordinate position towards the industrialised world in the global 
market. Capitalism, it was argued, divided the world into an industrialised ‘centre’ and 
an underdeveloped ‘periphery’, where the first could only maintain and develop its 
modernity at the cost of the latter. As a result, capitalist modernity was not a valid 
option for a country like Chile. Instead, the capitalist paradigm had to be abandoned in 
favour of a model of modernity that would be free from inequality and exploitation 
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(Frank 1967). This ‘Socialist perspective’ took as examples the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
China, or, for more moderate socialists, countries like Yugoslavia. However, since the 
mid-1980s, and especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ‘Socialist perspective’ has 
lost most of its examples, rendering the construction of a functioning ‘socialist 
modernity’ a difficult, if not impossible, endeavour.16 
Despite the demise of the socialist examples, the image of modernity of the 
‘Socialist perspective’ did not wither. The notion that an egalitarian alternative should 
be constructed for capitalism remains present in, for instance, the anti-globalisation 
movement. However, in the debates surrounding modernity in Chile, only very few 
serious contributions have come from this current, with one notable exception. With 
the publication of his best-seller Chile Actual: Anatomía de un Mito, the sociologist 
Tomás Moulian instantly became the most important intellectual exponent of the 
Chilean extra-parliamentary Left. Although never actually promoting the construction 
of a socialist state, Moulian’s work clearly has the ‘Socialist perspective’ as the 
underlying idée-force. Strongly criticising the socio-economic model that was installed by 
the Concertación, Moulian argues that the Chilean model of the 1990s is in fact a 
continuation, albeit under the guise of democracy, of Pinochet’s authoritarian and neo-
liberal model. As a result, the modernity that was so much celebrated in Chile in the 
1990s is in fact nothing other than the one-sided process of modernisation that had 
been set in motion by the military regime:  
What is the form of today’s Chile? What are its ancestries, the pedigree of this 
society that is obsessed with a modernisation that it happily mistakes for 
modernity? (Moulian 1997: 17).  
Moulian claims that Chile’s modernity is a farce: the new democratic structures only 
exist because of the ongoing presence, in the shadows, of the same forces that 
supported the military regime, and which guarantee the continuation of a socio-
economic model that maintains extreme levels of inequality and exclusion:  
How is it possible, in this Chile that is conceived to be a champion of 
modernity and of democracy, that political structures survive which do not even 
create equal power conditions for all sectors? The state presents itself, 
spontaneously (…) as an instrumental institution, as a tool, for the reproduction 
of the socio-economic system (ibid., p. 53).  
Moulian specifically criticises the market-orientation and consumption of Chilean 
modernity. He argues that obsessive consumption, as is stimulated by the neo-liberal 
model, not only leads to hedonism and waste, but also underlines the disciplining and 
repressive nature of the free market. People are not only driven by the constant need to 
consume; they have also fallen into the power of financial institutions that control their 
behaviour. On a more fundamental level, a consumerist society leads to a ‘fetishisation’ 
of objects, and a structural disregard of spiritual and intellectual activities, as well as the 
erosion of public space as the result of the ‘privatisation of life’ As a result, Chilean 
                                              
16 For a further analysis of the dependency theory, see Chapter 4.1.2. 
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modernity, which is often portrayed as a model of political and economic freedom, is 
in fact the opposite: politically, the old powers of the dictatorship are still in place, and 
economically, the freedom to consume becomes a disciplining force. Weber’s metaphor 
of modernity as an ‘iron cage’ becomes true on all levels (1997: 47; 1998).  
Moulian’s point of view became especially visible in a debate with his former 
colleague José Joaquín Brunner. While both position themselves on the Left of the 
political spectrum, their differences of opinion clarify the point of view of the ‘Socialist 
perspective’. While Brunner stresses the material improvements for the large (and 
poorest) majority of the population, Moulian emphasises that inequality had risen 
during the 1990s. Brunner responds by arguing that the failures of the model are the 
result of poor governance, but Moulian argues that they are intrinsic shortcomings of 
the capitalist system itself. While Brunner claims that the people are happy with their 
new possibilities for consumption, Moulian calls for a ‘radical democratisation of 
society, politics, economy, and culture’, which will have to:  
co-exist with capitalism, but not because it believes that capitalism is the best 
system to create wealth in order to satisfy human needs. It co-exists with 
capitalism, because it conceives its struggle to be a long march, like a march 
without end to improve the existing world (Brunner and Moulian 2002: 103) 
However, while the ‘Socialist perspective’ of modernity consists of a clear and elaborate 
neo-Marxist critique of ‘Capitalist modernity’, it no longer provides a clear answer to 
the question: ‘what then?’ This is probably the most important reason why this image 
has found little support among the country’s political and intellectual elites.  
A similar critique of modernity and modernisation is presented by the historian 
Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt. While Jocelyn-Holt can surely not be considered to share the 
Socialist perspective (he is a political outsider, even though a self-proclaimed 
conservative), he shares much of Moulian’s criticism of Chilean modernity. He, too, 
views it as a farce, because the transition to democracy has produced a ‘civil-military’ 
regime in which the true power remains with the forces of the dictatorship. Moreover, 
he argues that with the demise of what he calls the ‘ancient regime’ in the 1960s (based 
on large landownership and a patriarchal social model), Chilean society completely lost 
its orientation. Running from one exclusive political project to another, all in the name 
of modernisation, Chile still remains excluded from true modernity. Cut off from 
tradition, and a world ‘in which things actually had meaning’, a fake-modernity had to 
be constructed, and in the end this only leaves a bitter taste:  
Therefore, the forging of a ‘happy’ modernity, to which we are invited time and 
again, is compelling; but happiness may not come, and may cause a profound 
dissatisfaction (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 308).  
Finally, and on a more philosophical level, the sociologist Fernando Robles analyses 
how modernity leads to ‘molestations, irritations, and bitter fruits’ in peripheral 
countries like Chile. He argues that modernity (and globalisation in particular) 
transforms societies into what Ulrich Beck has labelled ‘risk societies’, in which security 
mechanisms increasingly are unable to protect individual lives, and in which ‘dangers 
 30 
are converted into the stowaways of the normal course of the world’ (2001: 28). Robles 
claims that the industrialised countries have been able to shield off most of the risks 
and dangers for their citizens, and have in fact become ‘residual risk societies’. 
Countries like Chile, he argues, are not able to mitigate the effects of modernity, and 
therefore suffer the consequences of modernity in a much more direct way. Even 
though modernity in Chile may look like modernity in for instance Europe, it is 
fundamentally different, as peripheral countries like Chile cannot protect themselves 
against the ‘bitter fruits’ of modernity (ibid., p. 26).  
 
In short, four general positions may be discerned in the Chilean debate on modernity. 
First of all, the ‘baroque’ perspective is critical of modernisation, as it considers it to be 
in conflict with Chilean identity. This does not mean, however, that it rejects 
modernity as such: it argues for a ‘Chilean’ (or, more generally, Latin American) 
modernity, which is not based on the Enlightenment but has Catholicism and 
Hispanism as its main foundation. It supports modern institutions such as the state, but 
is critical of the liberal and individualistic aspects of modernity, which it considers to be 
damaging the patterns of community, identity, and morals in Chilean society. As such, 
it is a conservative perspective, which is open to modernisation, but only if this takes 
place endogenously and stays in keeping with Chilean identity.  
The ‘Social-Democratic perspective’ emphasises the importance of social justice in 
modernity, taking the example of the North-European welfare societies. It focuses on 
the state for the achievement of this social justice, while it also leaves room for the 
market. This perspective has been critical of modernisation, arguing that certain forms 
of modernisation do not lead to modernity: there exist ‘perverse’ forms of 
modernisation that enforce traditionalist structures of power and inequality instead of 
resolving them.  
The ‘Liberal perspective’ takes a much more positive position towards 
modernisation in general, and is oriented towards a USA-style market society, with high 
levels of individualisation of risks and opportunities. It downplays the negative side-
effects that have been reported by several social-science studies, by pointing to the fact 
that processes of modernisation always increase sentiments of insecurity and discontent, 
but that they simultaneously provide more opportunities for everyone. In general, it 
does accept that modernisation has its costs; however, it claims that the benefits will 
eventually be higher.  
Finally, the ‘Socialist perspective’ is fundamentally negative about both 
modernisation and contemporary Chilean modernity. Taking as a point of reference the 
image of ‘equal societies’, it criticises the unequal distribution of wealth that the market 
produces. Furthermore, it attacks the Chilean model as a whole, considering it to be a 
continuation of the military dictatorship under the banner of civil rule. In short, it 
argues that any modernity that is based on the market and the support of the dominant 
economic sectors is incompatible with social justice, and should be replaced with an 
egalitarian model.  
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1.2 Constructing ‘Local Modernity’ 
As has been set out in the introduction, one of the main contentions of this study is 
that modernity in Chile has been constructed through political projects of 
modernisation. There are three implicit theoretical assumptions that underlie this 
statement. The first is that modernity can be local and that it takes different shapes and 
forms in different locations. The second is that modernity is a construct, a process that 
can be mounted and adapted in time. And third, that this construction can take place 
through elite projects. In this section, these assumptions will be analysed in the light of 
the leading theories of modernity and modernisation.  
 
The Locality of Modernity 
The ‘locality’ of modernity has been a widely discussed theme. Traditionally, modernity 
has often been understood in universal terms, as simply a period in time: the ‘modern 
era’. This conceptualisation made the question of the locality of modernity redundant, 
as it assumed that everything in the era of modernity is modern, as everything in the 
Middle Ages was medieval (Larraín 2001: 13). The main question was therefore not the 
nature or functioning of modernity, but rather its starting point (the Enlightenment, the 
Reformation, or the discovery of Latin America) and possible end (the late twentieth 
century, with the dawn of so-called post-modernity). As a result, this conceptualisation 
did not shed much light on the locality of modernity or on its nature (Wittrock 2000: 
31-32).  
Another traditional approach was ‘institutional’ in nature. It sought to identify a 
series of historical processes and social institutions that were defined as modern. Only a 
society that contained a certain number of ‘modern institutions’ could be labelled as 
modern. The fundamental assumption here was that modernity is the result of a series 
of historical processes that took place in Western Europe. These processes (like the 
Industrial Revolution and the rise of liberalism) created institutions that were 
considered key elements of modernity: mass education, capitalism, democracy, 
bureaucracy, and so on. For instance, Feher and Heller (1989) argue that modernity is 
defined by both the period and the region in which capitalism, industrialisation and 
democracy ascend and reinforce, complement and limit each other mutually.  
This ‘institutional approach’ falls short in explaining the progress of modernity in 
non-European countries, however. In his study on the local construction of modernity 
in Iran, Ali Mirsepassi (2000) shows that this approach, which he labels the ‘liberal 
vision of modernity’, and which has been dominant since the writings of Hegel, Weber, 
and Durkheim, is problematic in three ways. First, it holds a homogeneous view of the 
Western world, assuming that all Western countries have followed the same historical 
trajectory. That is, of course, a crude simplification. Even on issues that are considered 
fundamental for the development of modernity, like the role of the state in society, the 
consolidation of democracy, and the expansion of a liberal free market economy, 
substantial differences between Western countries can easily be found in the course of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Wittrock 2000: 33-35). The second, and related, 
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problem of the liberal view is its homogenising approach to the different Western 
societies themselves. By defining Western societies as modern, the internal 
contradictions of modern societies were neglected or ignored. Throughout the 
nineteenth and at least a major part of the twentieth century, large sections of the 
European population were excluded from the benefits and/or curses of modernity. As 
the German sociologist Peter Wagner points out, even European modernity has had a 
very uneven socio-historical development: 
Modernity, so to speak, had very few citizens by 1800, not many by 1900, and 
still today it is hardly the right word to characterise many current practices 
(Wagner 1994: 24).  
The third, and more important, problem of the liberal vision of modernity lies in its 
Eurocentrism. By defining European social, political and economic constellations as 
‘modern’, the non-European world is converted into modernity’s ‘other’. This ‘other’ 
can be defined in terms of what it lacks in Western qualities, or can even be viewed as 
‘fundamentally hostile to modernity and incompatible with modernisation’ (Mirsepassi 
2000: 2, 8). The only way in which modernity can spread outside Europe is by adopting 
European patterns of behaviour, defining modernisation as a process of catching up. 
This discourse of modernisation has been dominant throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and has been academically supported by the ‘modernisation 
theories’ that have strongly influenced the development debates since the 1950s. 
However, the developments in the industrialising countries showed that no simple 
reproduction of European-style patterns of modernity has taken place.  
For Latin America, the situation is somewhat more complicated. While the many 
distinctions between Europe and Latin America are obvious, the latter still constitutes 
an integral part of the Western world, as it was the product of Spanish and Portuguese 
colonisation, and a substantial ‘transplantation’ of population from the old continent 
took place (Ribeiro 1968).17 Scholars such as Wiarda (1992; 2003) have therefore 
emphasised that Latin America has followed a special trajectory within the Western 
tradition. As a result, Latin America represents elements of both worlds: on the one 
hand, it shares the foundations, structures, and expectations of the Western world, and 
on the other the outcome of development and modernisation in Latin America has 
always been a different one from the rest of the Western world. For example, the rise of 
dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s, and the lack of success of the project of 
industrialisation which was set in motion in the post-war period, led to a general sense 
of pessimism regarding the viability of the modern project in the continent. How could 
the trajectory of modernity in Europe be reproduced at increased speed, if Latin 
America had wandered along such a different historical path for so long? ‘We, the Latin 
American peoples’, Octavio Paz lamented, ‘have never really become modern, since 
unlike the rest of the Western world, we never had a critical era’. Carlos Fuentes added: 
‘We are children of the Spanish counter-reformation, a bulwark that was raised against 
                                              
17 It is for this reason that Alain Rouquié (1987) has labelled the region the l'extrême-occident. 
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the expansion of modernity. How then can we be modern?’ (quoted in Brunner 1994: 
16). In the end, rather than localising the notion of modernity by explaining its local 
construction, the institutional approach serves to sentence modernity in Latin America 
to being a ‘mask’, or a ‘simulacrum’, which has been, in García Canclini’s words: 
conjured up by the elites and the state apparatuses, above all those concerned 
with art and culture, but which for that very reason makes them 
unrepresentative and unrealistic (García Canclini 1995: 7).  
The failure of the ‘institutional approach’ in explaining the trajectory of modernity (and 
its disqualification of local variants of modernity) outside the industrialised world, has 
led to the formulation of new, more complex approaches. Even though they maintain 
many elements of the liberal interpretation, Habermas (1987), Berman (1988) and 
Giddens (1991) have proposed interpretations of modernity that include the possibility 
of an authentic experience of modernity outside the Western world. Habermas speaks 
of modernity as an ‘incomplete project’; it has been built on a one-sided form of 
rationality, namely instrumental (or purposive) rationality. Habermas emphasises that 
the crisis of modernity does not lie in modernity itself, but in  
the failure to develop and institutionalise all the different dimensions of reason 
in a balanced way (quoted in Mirsepassi 2000: 3).  
By opening up modernity to different forms of rationality, Habermas suggests that there 
may be more than one historical trajectory to modernity. However, he maintains that 
modernity is founded in the Enlightenment and cannot be seen separately from 
European history.  
Marshall Berman opens the door even wider, by presenting modernity as a vital 
experience that is shared worldwide. It is not restricted to a single geographical area, or 
to one culture:  
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography 
and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, 
modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity 
of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and 
renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish (Berman 1988: 
15).  
Modernity springs from processes that originate in the West, like the expansion of the 
physical sciences, industrialisation, the rise of the nation-state, the bureaucracy, 
capitalism, and so on. However, this ‘maelstrom’, as Berman calls it, of modernisations 
creates a daily experience of modernity that is universal:  
To be modern is to be part of a universe in which, as Marx said, ‘all that is solid 
melts into air’ (Berman 1988: 15).18 
                                              
18 Zygmunt Bauman (2000) elaborates on Marx’s metaphor of evaporation by introducing the notion of 
‘liquid modernity’. According to him, the volatile nature of modernity is restricted to its subsystems, but 
these subsystems themselves are tied together in a highly rigid fashion. The term ‘liquid modernity’ is 
used to explain the increasing flexibility and fluidity of this new order that modernity itself has created. 
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Anthony Giddens also argues that modernity is a global experience. Based on 
institutions (like the nation-state, capitalism, and industrialism), it creates an extreme 
dynamism in which social practices and behaviour are changed at an unprecedented 
pace, and with unprecedented scope and profoundness. This extreme dynamism of 
modernity is a consequence of three fundamental elements that constitute modernity, 
namely the ‘separation of time and place’, the ‘disembedding of social relations’, and 
‘institutional reflexivity’. The first allows for the coordination of actions over distance 
and time, while the ‘disembedding of social relations’ allows for the use of symbolic 
tokens, such as money, and expert systems, both of which work on trust. Third, 
modernity is based on ‘institutional reflexivity’, through which all knowledge is 
constantly revised and reinterpreted. As a result, certainty of knowledge is replaced by 
radical doubt, which is, in Giddens’ words, ‘not only disturbing to philosophers, but is 
existentially troubling for ordinary individuals’ (Giddens 1991: 21, italics in the original).  
Even though Giddens opens the door for locally mediated experiences of 
modernity, he retains the liberal argument that modernity is fundamentally a Western 
project, which started in post-feudal Europe, but spread on a global scale during the 
twentieth century. Modernity, he states, ‘can be understood as roughly equivalent to 
‘the industrialised world’, so long as it is recognised that industrialism is not its only 
institutional dimension’ (1991: 15; 1990: 174-178). Like Habermas, he maintains the 
notion that modernity is one universal process, even though it may be experienced 
differently in different locations. 
A more radical line of ‘localising’ modernity (in the sense of conceiving it to be a 
locally constructed phenomenon, not a global one) is followed by sociologists such as 
Peter Wagner and Göran Therborn, who argue that there exist different historical 
trajectories towards modernity in different parts of the world. Wagner contends that in 
the twentieth century, the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union 
constitute the three ‘actually existing modernities’ (Wagner 1994: 13). Therborn argues 
that there are four trajectories: a European one, in which modernity was endogenous, 
one of the ‘new world’ (spanning both North and South America), where the trajectory 
of modernity mirrored the examples of Britain and the Iberian peninsula respectively, a 
colonial one (consisting of North-Africa and the South Pacific), where local resistance 
to modernity was crushed by the European colonial forces, and that of countries that 
have known an ‘externally induced modernisation’, which modernised under the 
pressure of subjugation by European powers. Jorge Larraín discerns five trajectories, 
separating the North American path towards modernity from the Latin American one 
(2000: 19-24). The question of the existence of three, four, or five trajectories, however, 
is indicative of the weakness of this approach: to attempt to create clusters of countries 
with disparate histories and experiences easily leads to a homogenising approach. 
Additionally, the focus on the period of the first encounter with modernity, the 
confrontation with the European colonial powers, runs the risk of leading to 
predetermination. This is not to say that in general there exist no shared trajectories 
between countries, but only to the degree that the substantial differences between 
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societies, for instance between neighbouring countries like Chile and Bolivia, are taken 
into account. Furthermore, these authors still maintain the notion of one fundamental 
model of modernity, and even though the trajectories around the world may be 
different, they will eventually unite in one global modernity. Larraín, for instance, 
argues that the various existing trajectories towards modernity will eventually converge 
into one global modernity:  
No doubt, modernity was born in Europe and Europe became a necessary point 
of reference for the processes of modernisation in the rest of the world, but 
modernity has followed different routes in Japan and South East Asia, in North 
America and Australia, in Africa, and in Latin America. Thus, at least five routes 
to modernity can be distinguished which diverge, especially at the beginning, 
but which, as globalisation expands, start to converge (Larraín 2000: 19).  
Even though this approach allows for authentic non-European forms of modernity, the 
element of convergence still echoes a classical view of modernity, assuming that 
Western patterns of modernity will eventually become globally dominant. Furthermore, 
they pay relatively little attention to the underlying processes that mediate the 
construction of a localised trajectory towards modernity. 
Another approach focuses on the nature of modernity outside the industrialised 
world. Brunner (1994a), for instance, emphasises the different modalities that it can take 
in the context of developing countries like Chile. He stresses the mixed and complex 
ways in which models of modernity can create options and possibilities of action in 
societies. Democratic modernity offers series of ‘contexts of choice’, through which 
individuals can exercise their liberties. Instead, the main alternative, socialist modernity 
(in the sense of the ‘Socialist alternative’ of the real existing socialisms), offers ‘contexts 
of hierarchy’, based on the Communist party, the state and bureaucracy. The model 
that was introduced by Pinochet in Chile is a mix of the two models, limiting the 
context of choice strictly to the economic realm and emphasising hierarchy in all others 
(1994: 19-22). Brunner also argues that modernity creates different ‘cultural modalities’ 
in which complex patterns of cultural activities can be exercised. Using two axes of 
‘individual’ to ‘group’ and ‘autonomy’ to ‘hierarchy’, he creates maps of modernity in 
which the manifold forms and experiences of modernity are charted. As a result, 
Brunner is able to show that while ideally modernity may have a democratic and liberal 
face, mixtures of modern modalities may come into existence in which other more 
authoritarian and collective elements are dominant. As a result, modernity in Latin 
America may well take shapes different from those in other parts of the world, and still 
be modern (1994b: 30). 
Others have stressed the ‘fragmented’ and ‘hybrid’ nature of modernity in Latin 
America. Nestor García Canclini, for instance, speaks of ‘hybrid cultures’, which are 
characterised by the blending of tradition and modernity. Modernity and tradition, 
which are usually viewed as being antagonistic and non-compatible, often cohabit 
rather than mutually excluding each other. As García Canclini puts it:  
Today we conceive of Latin America as a more complex articulation of 
traditions and modernities (diverse and unequal), a heterogeneous continent 
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consisting of countries in each of which coexist multiple logics of development 
(García Canclini 1995: 9). 
Indigenous artisans, for example, continue to produce traditional artefacts in 
modernity, actually making folklore one of Latin America’s prominent areas of 
production. On the one hand, this branch of economic activity is geared to the 
population itself, particularly to the groups which are least integrated into modernity, 
and on the other it serves the highly modern phenomenon of mass tourism (ibid., pp. 
152-170).  
In a similar vein, Vivian Schelling describes Latin America as a kaleidoscope, a 
‘particularly heterogeneous society and culture’, in which ‘the modern and pre-modern 
modes of production and ways of life’ are combined (Schelling 2000: 7-8). According to 
these authors, modernity does not mean the simple destruction of tradition, but the 
creation of new mixes of both into a particular local blend, which creates particular 
patterns of ‘being in modernity’. As a result, the possible contradictions existing 
between ‘European modernity’ and Latin America can no longer be perceived in black-
and-white terms:  
There are many more opportunities in our future than to choose between 
McDonalds and Macondo (Canclini 1999: 52).  
This approach, which is generally applied to continents as a whole, is also relevant for 
specific societies. Jorge Larraín, for instance, labels the nature of modernity for the 
Chilean case as particularly hybrid: 
[Modernity] is actively, not passively, incorporated, adapted, and re-
contextualised in Chile (…). Chile has a specific way of being in modernity. 
This is why our modernity is not exactly the same as European modernity: it is a 
mix, a hybrid, the fruit of a process of mediation which has its proper trajectory; 
it is neither purely endogenous nor entirely imposed; some have called it 
subordinated or peripheral (Larraín 2001: 79) 
An important contribution of Larraín in explaining the local construction of modernity 
is his analysis of the specific trajectory which Chile has followed towards modernity. He 
argues that it has taken place in six different phases, in which an alternation between 
expansion and crisis of modernity can be identified. During the colonial period, Chile 
was ‘denied’ modernity by the Spanish crown. After independence, a period of 
stabilisation was followed by rapid economic expansion and a strong orientation 
towards Europe. In this period, European theories such as liberalism and positivism 
were imported and adapted to the local context by Chilean intellectuals. However, the 
experience of modernity was still confined to a tiny oligarchy. After 1900, modernity 
entered into crisis, first through the effects of the First World War, and later because of 
the economic crisis of the 1930s. In this period, the ‘oligarchic modernity’ of the 
nineteenth century reached its end, leading to the consolidation of the power, in the 
1930s, of the middle classes. In response to the economic crisis, a new developmental 
strategy was set up, in the form of state-led industrialisation. This strategy led, in the 
1950s, to a new phase of expansion of modernity, strongly focused on the deepening 
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and widening of democratic structures, the redistribution of wealth, and the 
achievement of economic development. After 1970, though, Larraín claims that the 
expansion of modernity once again was in crisis under the dictatorship, only to 
resurface after 1990 in the form of neo-liberal modernity. This conceptualisation of a 
national ‘trajectory towards modernity’ is useful for this study, as it describes the local 
construction of modernity in a particular society (ibid., pp. 77-137). It also shows, like 
the other ‘hybrid’ approaches, that modernity is constructed locally through the 
interaction of elements of tradition and modernity. However, they still fall short in 
identifying the processes within society that construct modernity; or in other words, 
they still do not explain how modernity is actually constructed locally.  
A more radical, and for this study particularly useful, approach can be found in the 
‘multiple modernities’ approach. This perspective argues that the developments in 
modernising societies have not sustained the theories of global conversion and 
Europeanisation. Charles Taylor, who initially coined the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ 
(even though he used the phrase ‘alternative modernities’) has claimed that different, 
but authentic, modernities have emerged in different societies worldwide (Taylor 1998: 
205). For a true understanding of modernity, Taylor argues, Europe should no longer be 
seen as the one true point of reference, but should be ‘provincialised’:  
This means that we finally get over seeing modernity as a single process of 
which Europe is the paradigm, and that we understand the European model as 
the first, certainly, as the object of some creative imitation, naturally, but as, at 
the end of the day, one model among many, a province of the multiform world 
(Taylor 2004: 196).  
The ‘multiple modernities’ argument, which has been further developed by social 
scientists such as Shmuel Eisenstadt, Carlos Waisman, Luis Roninger, Björn Wittrock, 
and Laurence Whitehead,19 claims that modernisation is a local process, even while it is 
influenced or even initiated from the outside. In modernising, societies have generated 
ideological and institutional patterns that were not ‘modern’ continuations of their 
traditional ones, and also not simple carbon copies of European patterns. They were 
‘distinctively modern, though indeed greatly influenced by specific cultural premises, 
traditions, and historical experiences of the respective societies in which they 
crystallised’ (Eisenstadt 2000: 2). European patterns served as a central but often 
contested point of reference; even many movements that were explicitly anti-European 
or anti-modern, were thoroughly modern themselves, from nationalist movements in 
the early twentieth century to the fundamentalist movements of today. The 
crystallisation of these manifold patterns is what Eisenstadt labels ‘multiple 
modernities’:  
The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the 
contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity - is to see it as 
a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural 
                                              
19 Apart from their separate contributions to the ‘multiple modernities’ approach, these authors have all 
put forward their arguments in Roninger and Waisman (2002).  
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programs. These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and 
ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors (…) holding 
very different views of what makes societies modern. Through the engagement 
of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, they crystallise 
distinct patterns of modernity (Eisenstadt 2002: 8). 
While general trajectories may be identified, all societies form their particular patterns 
of modernity, within the framework of their own institutional, political and social 
orders and identities, and in interaction with different outside models and counter-
models of modernity. Latin American societies in this way are not just:  
fragments of Europe (…) or mere replicas of one another in the era of 
globalisation (Roninger and Waisman 2002: 2).  
Instead, the colonisation of Latin America has produced societies that are 
fundamentally different from those in Europe, and from each other. This difference 
flows from two sources: the way in which visions of social and political order were 
institutionalised from a peripheral perspective, and the creation of new identities as a 
result of the encounter between Europeans and the indigenous population. Because of 
these differences, the introduction of European ideas and institutions created tensions 
which crystallised in deviating patterns of institutional and social order, and of identity 
(Roninger and Waisman 2002: 2). 
 
The Construction of Modernity 
The particular value of this approach is that it sheds light not only on the trajectory 
towards modernity that societies in Latin America have followed, but also on the way in 
which this trajectory has been constructed historically. It starts out by arguing that 
modernity, rather than being limited to a set of institutional constellations, has to be 
understood in terms of ‘aspirations’ or what Björn Wittrock has labelled ‘promissory 
notes’. These promissory notes are not just vague demands or desiderata, but are 
aspirations that can be expressed in explicit terms, and which refer to the community as 
a whole. They are also not just open or casual demands, but may be legitimately 
expected, based on existing conceptualisations of man, values, and community. 
Promissory notes are not strange elements in society. They are always embodied and 
expressed in a country’s political and social institutions. As a result, these institutions 
affirm the reasonability (and therefore legitimise) the aspirations of members of society 
that may partly reaffirm, but also reject or transcend the promissory notes that are 
embedded in the existing institutions. Finally, promissory notes are not just expressed 
in principle, but are set out in public forums, with the explicit objective of gaining 
influence among policy-makers.  
These promissory notes serve as generalised reference points for modernity. As a 
result, they become the point of departure for various projects and proposals that would 
lead to their realisation, as well as to counter-proposals that seek to maintain older 
promissory notes. In this way, the perspective of promissory notes allows us to view 
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modernity as being mediated through proposals and projects, which are constituted 
culturally, but entrenched institutionally (Wittrock 2000: 37-38). 
A similar perspective has been applied by Laurence Whitehead in analysing the 
Latin American relation with modernity. In Latin America, Whitehead argues, elites 
have been the key mediators of modernity. The conquista in Latin America was 
characterised by the all but total destruction of the existing Indigenous empires, as well 
as by a demographic disaster among the indigenous populations. As a result, a return to 
a pre-European past soon became a completely unfeasible alternative for colonialism. 
This produced an orientation among the successive elites in Latin America towards 
Europe, without the counterbalance of a truly local alternative. Subsequently, the 
United States’ independence and the French Revolution gave Latin American Creole 
elites two clear alternative models to Iberian rule.20 These two revolutions cast the image 
of backwardness over the Spanish and Portuguese empires, and awakened an orientation 
among the new Latin American elites towards the modern, enlightened world, to which 
they were now forced to relate themselves (even when rejecting elements of it). As a 
result, post-independent Latin American elites developed a ‘bias towards modernity’, 
and produced an endless series of influences, proposals, projects, counter-proposals, and 
counter-projects, all of which were intended to introduce (or deflect) certain aspects of 
modernity. 
The elite-orientation of these proposals and projects of modernisation, Whitehead 
argues, resulted in processes of modernisation that were ‘from above and without’. They 
were met with local processes of resistance by the population at large, who did not share 
the elites’ ‘bias towards modernity’. This resistance usually did not take the form of 
outright protest, but rather that of distortion and defensive absorption, while at times it 
initiated a search for alternative versions of modernity to replace the current one. So 
while different versions of modernity were implemented in Latin America in a top-
down fashion (and were not directly enforced from the outside, as in colonial regimes), 
there remained ample room for local adaptation, bargaining, and negotiation. The elites 
themselves have also been forced to adapt their ideal-type projects under pressure of the 
logic of coalition building and other political realities. As a result, projects of 
modernisation are only stabilised and institutionalised after having gone through 
substantial adaptations. When they subsequently did not deliver on their original 
promises, new proposals were created that were intended to overcome the flaws of the 
previous ones, or to contradict them altogether by referring to completely different 
elements of modernity. This created an on-going sequence of ‘successive waves’ of 
modernisation, leaving behind remnants of the incomplete results of each wave. As a 
                                              
20 Luis Roninger, another proponent of the ‘multiple modernities’ interpretation, has analysed in some 
depth how Spain, France and the United States have served both as models and as counter-models to 
Latin American elites. As a result, he argues, different rival groups have created different images of the 
modern which they presented as universal, and which they attempted to implement at the cost of other 
groups. The failure to do so often reinforced the outward-oriented drive of Latin American elites toward 
modernisation, setting in motion a new round in the conflictual path towards modernity (Roninger 2002: 
79-100). 
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consequence, Whitehead concludes, Latin America has come to display the 
characteristics of a ‘littered landscape’ of ‘no longer fashionable monuments to once 
desired futures’. In this sense, it has become a ‘mausoleum of modernities’ (Whitehead 
2002: 29-61). 
The ‘multiple modernities’ approach also has its detractors. It has gained some 
influence in the study of societies that have been historically marked by the encounter 
of East and West,21 and has been supported by several theorists on modernity,22 but has 
also been received with a shrug among academics working on the theme of modernity. 
A truly fundamental contestation of the ‘multiple modernities’ argument has been 
elaborated by the sociologist Volker Schmidt, who has claimed that its fundamental 
assumptions are conceptually flawed and empirically dubious. According to Schmidt, 
the notion that there exists more than one modernity cannot be stand up to serious 
academic scrutiny. His criticism focuses on three points. First, he argues that the quality 
of modernity remains largely undefined. When arguing, for instance, that Japanese 
modernity is different from European modernity, the proponents of ‘multiple 
modernities’ do not provide the necessary information in order to determine whether it 
is really necessary to award Japan (or whatever region or country) a truly different brand 
of modernity, or that it was also possible to explain the existing differences within the 
perimeters of one global modernity which shows local variations and different stages in 
realisation. Putting it this way, the ‘multiple modernities’ argument seems to overrate 
the differences that exist between societies (whereas the modernisation theories of the 
1950s seemed to underestimate them).  
Second, the ‘multiple modernities’ argument does not indicate how many 
modernities there actually are. It speaks of regional modernities (such as a Latin 
American one), but regularly suggests that modernity is constructed on the national 
level first, which implies that there exist as many modernities as there are societies. 
Does this not amount to saying that culture equals modernity? And even if this is not 
the case, how does it explain the heterogeneity within societies? In some cases 
differences within one society far exceed the differences from other countries. Will we 
have to speak of a Quebecois modernity, which is different from the modernity that is 
experienced in the rest of Canada? Putnam has pointed to significant differences 
between the North and the South of Italy - do these regions constitute distinct 
modernities? Or, for the case of Chile, would we need to think of a Santiago-
modernity, and a peripheral one? And what about Southern Chile, where most of the 
Indigenous population live?  
Third, Schmidt attacks the orientation of the ‘multiple modernities’ argument to 
political institutions and national culture. In other fields, modernity may not differ 
quite as much as might be expected on the basis of a ‘multiple modernities’ approach. 
Is science in Belgium, for instance, fundamentally different from science in Egypt? At 
the organisational level, it probably is; but at the level of benchmarking and scientific 
                                              
21 See Masoud (2005), Kwok Wah Lau (2002). 
22 See, for instance, Beriain (2004) and Taylor (2004). 
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methodology, the divergence will probably be very small. Or, to put the question 
differently, if in a developing country medicine is practised quite differently from 
Western standards, does that necessarily imply a multitude of modernities? Or could it 
be that some societies have not yet internalised modernisation in the ways others have? 
Could it be that some countries are less modern than others?  
For Volker Schmidt, the ‘multiple modernities’ argument seeks to integrate cultural 
relativism in the debates on modernity in order to downplay or even neglect the 
possibility that some societies are more modern than others. This ‘politically correct’ 
position is maintained by referring to the existence of a multitude of modernities, 
which not only have not been identified properly, but have also not been sufficiently 
conceptually defined. As a consequence, Schmidt advocates a yet-to-be developed 
concept of ‘variations of modernity’, which are all part of one, originally European but 
now global modernity, but may show differences due to the particular pace of 
modernisation that their institutions have experienced (Schmidt 2006).  
The questions that have been posed by Schmidt are both legitimate and significant, 
as they touch the core of the ‘multiple modernities’ argument. The theoretical 
supporters of this approach will have to deal with them. For the purpose of this 
investigation, though, the choice between ‘multiple modernities’ or ‘varieties of 
modernity’ is not essential - at least not at the level of identifying ‘Chilean modernity’ 
as a sui generis modernity or as a branch on a larger family tree of modernity. The same 
goes for the question of the conversion of all variations into one global modernity. 
Both Volker Schmidt and the proponents of ‘multiple modernities’ may be right in 
respectively advocating and contesting this process of global conversion: for this 
investigation the essential point is that such conversion has only partly taken place until 
now, and that a heterodox and hybrid form of modernity has been constructed in Chile 
during recent centuries. Whether this Chilean modernity will eventually converge with 
the European original is not a matter of importance for this study.23  
Notwithstanding the criticisms of the ‘multiple modernities’ argument, I therefore 
propose to make use of elements of it as far as this serves the purpose of the 
investigation. This refers in particular to its conceptualisation of the way modernity is 
locally constructed, that is, through the interaction of competing elites, who, based on 
different interpretations of what the modern is, seek to implement their project of 
modernisation, producing successive waves of modernisation. 
1.3 Operationalisation: Projects of Modernisation in Chile 
In order to make use of the ‘multiple modernities’ approach in the case of Chile, some 
differentiations should be made, especially regarding the conception of modernity held 
by elite groups. It should be emphasised that the formulation of doctrines and projects 
of modernisation is not something that takes place in the heads of modernising elites 
                                              
23 I will use the phrase ‘Chilean modernity’ in a twofold way, referring to both the possibilities of its being 
a sui generis modernity or just a variation of modernity.  
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exclusively. To a large extent, it is determined by the ‘window of opportunity’ that is 
created by the path of modernisation the country is following at a given moment. 
Projects of modernisation are feasible and appealing to the public only if certain 
prerequisites are met. As a result, the way in which elites orient themselves and 
construct doctrines and projects of modernisation should be placed in the context of 
the patterns of modernity that characterise society at that given moment. For example, 
the popularity of fascism in Chile in the late 1920s and 1930s was clearly influenced by 
the fascination of sectors of the Right with Italian fascism. However, it only became an 
option available to Chileans through the rise of the middle classes in the previous 
decades, which provided the support base for the semi-fascist dictatorship of Ibáñez 
(1927-1931). Conversely, while the creation of ambitious technological projects (such as 
a space programme) may be theoretically attractive to some, they remain completely 
unattainable because of the financial means that they would require. So while the 
Chilean elites may have a ‘bias towards modernity’ (Whitehead 2002: 33) and create 
‘promissory notes’ (Wittrock 2000: 38) that serve as points of reference for 
modernisation, they are bound by the existence of certain prerequisites that are essential 
for the introduction of elements of modernity. In this sense, the drive towards 
modernisation is limited by the realities within society, showing possible paths and 
trajectories that may be followed, but simultaneously excluding and obscuring others. 
It should also be stressed that not all processes, structures, and institutions are the 
direct or indirect result of the importation of ideas from abroad. Developments may 
take place simultaneously or even earlier in Chile than for instance in Europe. The 
pragmatic approach of the European Communist Parties towards democracy after the 
Second World War, for instance, was preceded by a similar approach adopted by the 
Chilean Communist Party decades earlier, joining in government between 1938 and 
1948. So while the orientation of Chile’s elites towards outside points of reference for 
modernity is crucial for the understanding of processes of modernisation in the 
country, some hesitation is called for in identifying local processes of modernisation as 
being simply ‘imported’ or ‘copied’.  
1.3.1 Examples of Modernity 
With those nuances in mind, the ‘multiple modernities’ approach provides us with a 
useful framework of analysis for the theoretical framework of this investigation. It shows 
that modernisation has taken place on the initiative of different elite groups, which 
construct ‘promissory notes’ that serve to orient their projects and counter-projects of 
modernisation. In the process of the interaction of the successive projects of 
modernisation, specific patterns of modernity emerge. Before dealing with the 
implementation and interaction of projects of modernisation, however, some attention 
should be paid to their conception and construction. Whitehead, as well as many other 
authors, emphasises the importance of existing examples of modernity for Latin 
American elites (Whitehead 2002: 33). For the case of Chile, I propose that the 
construction of projects of modernisation has roughly been based on four of such 
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examples. These examples have been used in a highly selective way, though. Even while 
Chilean political elites have shown a strong orientation towards external models of 
modernity, they have been very specific in the ways they have applied them to the case 
of Chile, using certain elements and ignoring others. Also, several examples have served 
as points of orientation at the same time. As a result, it is difficult to pin-point Chilean 
projects of modernisation to one specific example of modernity. Nevertheless, they 
have been of importance as they have provided Chilean elites with images of 
modernity, from which could serve as the basis for proposals of modernity.  
The examples of modernity that have been most important among Chilean elites 
more or less coincide with the perspectives that have been used to categorise the debate 
on modernity in Chile. They are the North-West European welfare model, the 
American-liberal model, the Socialist model, and the Latin American model of 
modernity. 
The North-Western European welfare model is based on the patterns of 
modernisation that were followed by the North-Western European countries such as 
England, France and Germany. It was based on what Peter Wagner has labelled 
‘restricted liberal modernity’. On the one hand this was based on liberalism and 
democratic values, and on the other it was based on the central position of the nation-
state as a container of these modern ideas. As a result, Wagner argues, already in the 
nineteenth century liberal modernity was blended with an emphasis on collectiveness. 
In the twentieth century, this model developed into ‘welfare modernity’, or, as Wagner 
labels it, ‘organised modernity’. In this model, the liberal autonomy of individuals was 
restricted by the state, which sought to include social certainties in the interest of the 
common good. Especially after the Second World War, the ‘European Social-Democrat 
welfare modernity’ expanded rapidly into an institutional network which provided care 
‘from the cradle to the grave’. Apart from creating standardised levels of welfare, it 
maintained a strong focus on the state as both the provider and container of modernity, 
and on collectivisation of identity and social structures (ibid., pp. 69, 98).  
The liberal example of modernity can mainly be found in the United States. Rather 
than being a simple ‘fragment of Europe’, North America has produced a 
fundamentally different model of modernity, with a strong emphasis on individualism 
and the primacy of civil society over the state (Beriain 2005: 47-50). This does not 
reflect a different disposition or cultural identity of the original settlers, but rather the 
way in which modernity has evolved in North America. After independence from 
England, the American people had to create a completely new order after their break 
with the English colonial system. Without the existence of substantive rules that served 
as a foundation for the new order, individual freedom and pluralism were the logical 
alternative. Thus, as Wagner argues, modernisation in the United States was determined 
by the absence of a previous model, and provoked fundamentally different patterns of 
modernity from the European ones. This ‘American liberal modernity’ came to be 
characterised by a highly articulated civil society that allowed for little intervention by 
the state. This civil society, in turn, showed a little emphasis on large collectives and a 
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focus on individual rights and liberties. As a result, no ‘welfare state’ emerged in the US, 
and the market was allowed a much larger role in the allocation and distribution of 
material as well as cultural goods than in Europe (ibid., p. 54). 
The Socialist example originally emerged as an alternative model of modernity 
(Brunner 1994b: 19). Rather than constituting a true opposite to the European model, 
though, it was based on many of the same elements of the European model, such as a 
strong focus on the state in the organisation of modernity, and an emphasis on class 
(but without the European idea of the nation). As Peter Wagner put it:  
[f]ar from presenting a derailment of the modern project or the emergence of 
some kind of anti-modernity, Soviet socialism emphasizes certain features of 
modernity, though obviously at the expense of others. Just as American 
exceptionalism can be regarded as the epitome of one kind of modernity, so 
should socialism be seen as the epitome of another kind (1994: 13).  
In all respects, we can see socialism as precisely the epitome of organised 
modernity, rather than as a non-, pre-, or even anti-modern social configuration 
(ibid., p. 101; italics in the original) 
Ideologically, it drew on an egalitarian reading of liberal theory, in which the state 
legitimately may intervene by destroying existing structures of privilege for the higher 
good of social equality. In this sense, important elements of the modern were used in 
order to create a highly organised model for modernity, while others (such as the liberal 
idea of the limitation of the influence of the state for the benefit of the individual) were 
rejected completely (ibid., pp. 100-102).  
It should be noted, though, that the Socialist alternative was particularly heterodox 
in its manifestations. Apart from the Soviet model, several other models emerged, such 
as the Maoist one, and, particularly influentially for the Latin American case, the 
Cuban one. Furthermore, the Socialist alternative not only existed in its ‘really existing’ 
form, but also as an ideology that guided many Socialist and Communist parties. 
Rather than constituting a full converse to the ‘Social Democratic welfare modernity’, it 
should be interpreted as its more radical expression, with an extremely high valuation of 
equality, collectivisation, and the role of the state, combined with a deep mistrust of 
liberal concepts such as the market and democracy.  
The fourth example of modernity consists of the Latin American ‘baroque’ notion 
of modernity. It has been based on the conservative patterns of culture and identity that 
were inherited from the colonial era. Nevertheless, like the Socialist alternative, it is an 
‘alternative modernity’ rather than an ‘alternative to modernity’. Instead of resisting 
modernity in all its forms, Latin American conservative modernity selectively differed 
from European modernity by rejecting specific elements such as Rationalism, 
Enlightenment, and secularisation. In fact, Morandé argues, foreshadowing the multiple 
modernities argument, in Latin America a different model of modernity emerged:  
If modernity and Enlightenment are equal, then Latin American Catholicism is 
archaic and secularisation an inevitable process which will eventually demolish 
this archaism. If, instead, Enlightenment and secularism constitute only one of 
the historical variations that have been followed by modernity, the discovery of 
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the ‘baroque’ and the Latin American cultural ethos, which are, apart form an 
essential virtue of our particular identity, in itself a possibility of discovering the 
bases of a non-secular modernity (Morandé 1984: 142).  
Thus, Latin American conservative modernity can be viewed as a mix between the 
Catholic and traditional patterns of culture and identity in Latin America with certain 
elements of modernity. It may be authoritarian, resistant to change, and focused on 
ritual rather than on written text; but it is simultaneously modern - albeit in a form 
different from European modernity. This may seem to be a contradiction in terms. 
However, as Wiarda (2001 95-96) has shown, patterns and institutions that have 
become cornerstones of European modernity, such as the trias politica and the liberal 
notion of checks and balances, can be found in the Latin American baroque modernity 
as well, albeit in less explicit and powerful forms. Even though the outcome of such 
institutions and practices may deviate from the European model of modernity, they are 
certainly not anti-modern in essence, and may well be labelled modern themselves.  
Some of the most striking elements of Latin American conservative modernity are 
its authoritarian and top-down orientation (which is checked by means of corporatist 
institutions), centralism, dominance of the state over civil society (but by no means a 
disarticulated civil society), and a strong emphasis on order (but also on elements of 
progress), to name but a few (Wiarda 1978).  
Together with these examples modernity, I suggest to add another dimension to the 
analysis of how projects of modernity are conceptualised and constructed. This 
dimension consists of three dimensions that can be identified in modernity. Loosely 
paraphrasing T.H. Marshall’s notions of citizenship, I propose that modernity can be 
viewed from the a social, a political and a economic perspective.24  
The social dimension of modernity fundamentally reflects the notion of the 
expansion of civil rights in modern societies. This implies that all citizens receive equal 
access to the benefits of the state, and that no groups remain excluded. As such, social 
modernity refers to the role of the state in society, both on the level of bestowing 
citizenship on the members of the population, but also in providing basic care for all 
citizens. The political dimension of modernity emphasises the expansion of political 
rights, and includes the notion of power-sharing and a deepening of democratic 
structures. It is based on the idea that modernity implies the political emancipation of 
the people and the creation of a society in which the power of the executive is checked 
by representative and liberal institutions. Finally, the economic dimension of 
modernity reflects the idea of the expansion of economic rights for the population at 
large. These three dimensions bring to the light the focus that each project of 
modernisation has. Often, one or two of the three dimensions are emphasised strongly, 
while the other(s) are ignored of at least given less importance.  
                                              
24 In his famous Citizenship and Social Class (1950), Marshall underlines three levels of citizenship: civil 
citizenship, in which basic civil rights are attributed to the members of a society, political citizenship, in 
which individuals are bestowed with civil rights, and social citizenship, which allows for certain levels of 
socio-economic equality within a society. 
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1.3.2 Elites and Modernisation in Chile 
As the theoretical framework indicates, modernisation in Latin America takes place 
through elite-projects of modernisation, which interact with each other. First of all, 
some attention must be given to the use of the term ‘elites’. While during nineteenth-
century Chile a clear social, economic and political ‘elite’ can be identified in the 
oligarchy, from the early twentieth century onwards the term becomes problematic. The 
middle classes as well as organised groups representing the proletariat became 
increasingly powerful groups that competed politically with the traditionally dominant 
conservative sectors. As a result, political power pluralised, while in the social and 
economic realms a cohesive and identifiable elite remained in existence.25 Only in the 
1980s did middle class groups gain access to the economic elite, and did the social and 
economic cohesion of the oligarchy make way for pluralism and differentiation (Salazar 
and Pinto 1999b: 38-46). For the sake of this investigation, elites will be approached 
from a political perspective in particular. This implies that while some groups have 
never had economic stature or social ‘standing’, they may be called ‘elite’ in political 
terms. This applies especially for the middle classes and the socialist and communist 
movements which emerged in the early twentieth century, and turned into clearly 
identifiable social groups which became central actors in the political arena. In contrast 
to other Latin American countries, for instance, the Communist and Socialist parties 
were able to become significant political powers and even to control the government as 
soon as the late 1930s. Furthermore, the different classes came to organise themselves 
into three political movements, which represented their particular interests. The Right 
represented the old oligarchy and the social and economic elites, the Centre the middle 
classes, and the Left the popular classes. These three political sectors were relatively 
clearly outlined and cohesive, and more or less in balance: from the 1930s on, the 
Right, Centre, and Left each gained about one-third of the electoral vote (Oppenheimer 
1993: 14). Therefore, in this study the concept ‘elite’, when applied to the post-1920s 
period, will be used in the sense of ‘political elite,’ rather than in its social and 
economic sense. However, it should be noted that political elites do not work within a 
vacuum. They need to gain power among their constituencies in order to be able to 
impose their project. Often, these constituencies include other sectors of elites. In the 
case of the Right and, up to certain degree, the Centre, the influence of the economic 
elites has been significant. The Left, in turn, counted with the support of the much less 
politically influential but still not negligible cultural and intellectual elites.  
 
 
                                              
25 De Ramón (2000: 66-69) shows that in contrary to popular belief, the Chilean oligarchy does not 
consist of a few families which have perpetuated their influence during the course of the last two 
centuries. Instead, it changes its face every couple of decades, when new families come to gain 
importance and others lose their prominence. As a result, the Chilean oligarchy shows a relatively high 
degree of dynamism, which has allowed it to survive in the face of social conflict and confrontation with 
other classes. 
 47 
Elite Competition in Chile 
Some attention also needs to be given to the question of why modernisation as a 
project has taken such a radical and intensive course in post-1964 Chile. Several reasons 
which have contributed to this process can be identified. First of all, in contrast to most 
of the other Latin American countries, Chile’s elites have possessed a particularly high 
level of cohesion.26 This cohesion was visible from the first half of the nineteenth 
century onwards, in the creation of the ‘Portalian state’ and the subsequent relatively 
stable path of institutional development that the country has followed. This is not to 
say that there have been no severe intra-elite clashes; the civil war of 1891 was a clear 
example of such a confrontation. However, no fragmentation or dispersion of the elites 
has taken place in Chile as it has in other cases, such as Argentina and Peru. This has 
resulted in a social structure in which elites are capable of setting in motion relatively 
radical and far-reaching political projects. This can be seen, for instance, in the 
establishment of a successful state-led programme of industrialisation in the late 1930s, 
which assumed a pioneering role in the region. This has allowed the bourgeoisie to 
become a key actor in processes of modernisation.27 
Second, the role of the middle and popular classes has been essential in the 
country’s drive towards modernity. From the outset, Chilean middle classes have been 
highly attracted to and fascinated by modernity and modernisation, especially those 
elements that would represent its interests best. Traditionally oriented towards the state, 
the middle classes promoted state-oriented projects of modernisation, which linked 
their professionalism with their largest employer. The popular classes, meanwhile, have 
been particularly well organised in Chile, and this gave them a strong influence in the 
improvement of the social question and the position of the lower classes in Chile.  
Third, the relative wealth of Chile since the second half of the nineteenth century, 
especially in the period 1880-1920, but also in the 1940s and 1950s, has fed the elites’ 
expectations and anticipations of becoming part of the ‘modern world’. Even while 
large sections of the population lived in poverty, a feeling existed among the country’s 
elites that the gap with the ‘developed world’ could be closed relatively easily. This can 
be seen in the many trips to Europe that were made by members of the Chilean higher 
and upper middle class, which can be seen as ‘scouting trips’ that were meant to catch 
up with the newest ideas and most modern innovations and institutions.28 In examining 
the ‘modern world’, different elites have taken different examples (usually countries like 
England or France) for the construction of their own image of modernity. The 
                                              
26 In Latin America, elites have generally had very little cohesion and autonomy from the state, compared 
to Europe. Often they were organised in guild-like occupational groups that defended their limited 
interests exclusively, with very strong ties to their local surroundings. As a result, they competed keenly 
with the other groups, however similar, and maintained a local rather than a national outlook (Eisenstadt 
2002a: 53). 
27 See Barrington Moore (1966) on the modernising role that national bourgeoisies can play in 
agricultural societies. 
28 A good example is later Christian Democrat leader Eduardo Frei Montalva’s trip to Europe in the 
1930s, which was organised by the Conservative party, in order to examine the new developments in 
Southern Europe (for instance Mussolini’s fascism). See Chapter 3.1.1. 
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sensation of proximity to modernity has also created a high degree of legitimacy for 
modernising doctrines and for the notion of modernisation in general. Even among the 
country’s most conservative elites, modernisation was not simply rejected, but 
selectively integrated and instrumentalised (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 146).  
The fourth element explaining the intensity of Chilean projects of modernisation is 
the susceptibility of Chilean political elites to doctrines. Compared to other Latin 
American countries, doctrinal influences, mostly from the outside but also local ones, 
have been of great importance in the conception and implementation of projects of 
modernisation (Angell 1988: 95). French positivism, for instance, played a key role in 
the creation and organisation of a mass education system by Valentín Letelier in the 
early 1900s. Some decades later, fascism, and even Nazism, gained high levels of 
influence in Chilean politics, while the ideas of John Maynard Keynes laid the basis for 
the project of state-led industrialisation (Correa et al. 2001: 136). Finally, Chile’s 
political elites (from the Left to the Right) experienced, towards the late 1950s, a 
profound sensation of pending changes. All sides of the political arena expressed 
pessimism about the viability of continuing the state-led model of development, as it 
proved to produce insufficient growth in order to satisfy the rapidly growing social 
demands. Furthermore, the success of the Cuban revolution indicated that without 
serious reforms an outbreak of revolution might well be a real prospect. As a result, a 
broad consensus developed among all sectors of Chile’s political elites that substantial 
and structural change, even if undesirable (for instance for the Right), was necessary. 
This consensus created legitimacy for projects of modernisation that went further than 
partial reform or innovation. Simultaneously, though, the consensus on change went 
hand in hand with a process of ideological conflict regarding the nature of that change. 
As a result, the political competition between the three main political blocks in Chile 
(the Right, the Centre, and the Left) reached unprecedented heights in the late 1960s 
(Valenzuela 2003: 35). Together with the cohesion and the doctrinaire outlook of 
Chile’s elites, and the sensation of proximity to modernity, this consensus on the 
necessity for change, built the support base for the projects of modernisation as they 
have been set in motion since 1964.  
 
Political Projects in Chile 
The primary role that this investigation assigns to political projects in the construction 
of modernity also warrants some attention. Unlike in Europe, where modernity was 
disseminated first by philosophers and other intellectuals, and was only institutionalised 
at a later stage, in Latin America the philosophical basis of modernisation has been 
much thinner. The role of philosophy and other purely theoretical intellectual activities 
has therefore been of much less importance in the process of modernisation than the 
role of the applied doctrines and the institutions they created. As Brunner puts it:  
Modernity has originated in Latin America not in the heads of modernisers and 
through the dissemination of their ideas to their contemporaries, but through 
the cultural apparatuses that produce it, often behind the backs of the 
intellectuals (Brunner 1990: 43).  
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This is not to say that intellectuals play no or no significant role in the construction of 
modernity in Latin America. Their role, however, lies not so much in the elaboration of 
philosophical discourses on modernity, but more in the area of the translation of 
existing doctrines into political programmes and doctrines, often in the context of 
think-tanks and other advisory bodies, but also in religious organisations, trade unions, 
the media, and technology (Vial 2000: 99). This is why it has been stressed above that 
Wittrock’s ‘promissory notes’ are ‘applied’ in kind, and are not merely theoretical: they 
are not vague desiderata, but concrete aspirations that are put forward in public areas 
with the explicit purpose of influencing decision-making processes. As a result, the gap 
between the cultural constitution of modernity and its institutional entrenchment is 
very small, making political projects viable agents for modernisation (Wittrock 2000: 
38). 
For the Chilean case this is particularly true, as the state traditionally constitutes the 
prime actor in most processes of change in society, be it at the level of culture, 
economics, or institutional order. Many observers have pointed to the importance in 
Chile of state institutions in processes of modernisation (and change in general).29 As a 
result, the use of the state, and in particular political projects, in processes of 
modernisation, has become a ‘natural orientation’ for political actors in Chile, and 
possesses a high level of legitimacy among the population. The use of the state is also 
reinforced by the doctrinal outlook of the Chilean elites and their internal cohesion, 
through which the complex process of the construction of political projects is facilitated 
(Silva 1993c: 198).30 
The centrality of the state in the projects of modernisation has led to attempts to 
create mechanisms that would allow for their rational and efficient implementation. To 
this end, a relatively new and modern technique was introduced in Chile that would 
allow for efficient state control over its project, namely state planning. This technique 
had been introduced in the ‘Socialist alternative’ in the Soviet Union, and gained 
influence in Latin America in the early 1960s. It was considered to serve several 
purposes, for example to improve the government’s ability to mediate between the 
present and the future, to deal with the insecurities of future developments, to improve 
the policy-making process, to safeguard a global perspective in the face of the sectoral 
pressures coming from civil society, and, more generally, to strengthen the 
                                              
29 For instance, the historian Jocelyn-Holt argues that the influence of the state is so dominant in Chile 
that ‘Chile has no other history than that of its state’ (1997: 129). Mario Góngora (1986) claims that in 
contrast to Europe, where nation-building preceded the construction of the state, in Chile the state 
precedes the nation: only through the creation of a state apparatus did the first signs of a Chilean nation 
become visible.  
30 The role of the state in modernity and processes of modernity has recently been put in the shadow 
somewhat because of the increased emphasis on other, and less elaborate, agents for modernisation (such 
as globalisation, culture, etc). However, it should be noted that the founders of the theory of 
modernisation, such as Marx and Weber, closely connected the state and the form it took to the modern. 
More recently, Wagner (1994: 7) emphasises the state’s role of ‘container of modernity’, because of its 
ability to guide and discipline human behaviour and to contain the expanding aspirations of autonomy 
that modernity creates.  
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government’s capacity to implement its project (Matus 1989: 32-41). The growing 
influence of modern planning techniques was also indicative of a larger process of 
technocratisation that was taking place in Chile. Having roots as early as the late 
nineteenth century, technocrats, usually engineers economists from the middle class, 
have come to play essential roles in the political arena since the early 1960s. Their 
scientific and rational outlook and their ‘independent’ spirit made them particularly 
fitting actors in the state planning process, and their presence was generally (but not 
always) considered to be modern, compared to the traditional political elites which were 
recruited from the upper classes and among lawyers and medics (Silva 1991a, 2007)  
Obviously, modernisation cannot take place in a top-down fashion only. Civil 
society responses are crucial for the way in which projects of modernisation are 
implemented and ‘internalised’ in society. Arguing that the elite ‘bias towards 
modernity’ is not shared by the population at large, Whitehead claims that the civil 
society response to top-down modernisation mainly consists of deflection, distortion, 
and defensive absorption (Whitehead 2002: 39). However, in the case of twentieth-
century Chile, the picture is somewhat more complicated. The ascendance of a 
relatively large middle class, and the high degree of organisation of the working class, 
have allowed these sectors to increasingly orient themselves towards modernity. From 
different perspectives, both sectors called for different forms of modernisation, such as 
democratisation, social welfare, and industrialisation (de Ramón 2001: 119-121). As a 
result, civil society has not simply functioned as a deflector of modernisation, but also 
as a positive force, which was able to internalise and promote elements of 
modernisation projects from above. Simultaneously, its high degree of organisation has 
also allowed it to articulate its discontent with projects of modernisation explicitly and 
to pressure the government to adapt its policies. This has given Chile’s civil society a 
strong influence on the implementation of projects of modernisation, whether it be in 
promoting them or rejecting them. The influence of civil society on projects of 
modernisation in Chile is therefore a double one. On the one hand, Chilean elites have 
traditionally been willing to set in motion modernisation processes, even if these hurt 
their own interests, for the sake of appeasing the masses and maintaining social order 
(Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 131-132). On the other, as Huntington (1968) has shown, processes 
of modernisation have the side-effect of mobilising civil society. They loosen the 
traditional ties within society while implementing newer modalities in the socio-
economic relations that have not yet been internalised. Furthermore, they generate 
expectations that they will not always be able to satisfy. As a result, even the most top-
down and planned project of modernisation will have to deal with negative responses 
from below, usually in the form of social disorder. It is therefore essential for projects of 
modernisation to handle the tensions that exist between the further modernisation of 
sectors of society and the resistance that it generates in the process.  
In short, the groundwork for the sequence of projects of modernisation in Chile, 
which are the focus of this study, had been laid by several specific local circumstances 
and developments. First of all, the country’s elites were exceptionally cohesive and 
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prone to modernisation, due to their perception of being able to ‘bridge the gap’ with 
the industrialised world in a relatively short period of time. Second, they were 
exceptionally susceptible to doctrinal influences that were of a practical, hands-on 
nature, and which could easily be transformed into political programmes. Third, they 
were oriented towards the state and the political arena for the realisation of their 
modernising aspirations. And finally, they shared a broad consensus that profound 
changes were coming inevitably and could better be anticipated and implemented from 
above. In addition, the relatively positive attitude of the middle and lower classes 
towards modernity and modernisation, as well as their high level of organisation, 
intensified the interaction of projects of modernisation ‘from above and without.’ As a 
result of these factors, a sequence of modernisation was initiated in which all three 
main sectors of the country’s elites (the Right, the Centre, and the Left) took turns in 
constructing and implementing their specific project. These projects were not 
constructed simultaneously, but through the process of competition and interaction 
between them. They were ideologically antagonistic, but they shared a modernising 
outlook, as well as a revolutionary spirit that sought to build a modern society, so to 
speak, from zero.  
It should be noted that the projects in question are not all the same in shape. Some 
have been constructed in the course of decades, while others took only a few years to 
set up. Some, like the project of the Right under the military regime, were in place for a 
long period, while for instance the project of the Left only survived for three years. And 
some have fallen rapidly, while others have maintained much influence after their fall. 
These differences must be taken into account in analysing these projects. 
 
The Lay-out of the Analysis 
Based on the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section, and Whitehead’s 
notion of ‘successive waves of modernisation’ in particular, I propose to elaborate on 
the metaphor of waves in the analysis of these projects.31 Like waves, they go through 
three phases: their rise, which can be equated with their ideological and political 
construction, their peak, in which they are being implemented, and their fall. Based on 
this conceptualisation, I argue that modernity in Chile is not constructed as much 
through each individual wave of modernisation, but through their interaction. Making 
use of particular interpretations of what modernity is, each project has attempted to 
create a ‘modern society’. In some elements it may have succeeded in this purpose, and 
in others only partially, or not at all. In its implementation, is has influenced other 
projects, which now seek to undo its achievements and take its place. Some of its 
achievements may survive, though, and remain as lasting contributions to the 
construction of modernity. It is through this game of continuous competition and 
interaction between projects of modernisation that patterns arise which give shape and 
                                              
31 The metaphor of waves in relation to modernity has originally been put forwards by Taylor (1998), who 
considers it to progress in a wave-like fashion. Phillips (1998) also uses the metaphor, but in different way, 
referring to Huntington’s ‘three waver of democratisation’.  
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content to modernity in a particular society. Or, to stay close to the metaphor: a stone, 
thrown into a pond, produces waves, and these move through the water. However, they 
can interfere, and form new, complex patterns that may be much more stable than the 
original waves themselves. Similarly, I argue that the interaction between projects of 
modernisation (rather than the waves themselves) produces distinct patterns of 
modernity, in which elements of each wave may still be recognisable, but which are 
fundamentally different from the original waves themselves. 
 In the case of this investigation, the four waves that are analysed have been very 
different. They can reach back in time for decades, such as the project of the Left, and 
extend for decades in the future, such as the project of the Right. Also, they can end 
abruptly, as was the case of the Left (figure 1).  
Figure 1: Waves of Modernisation in Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study I will approach all four projects in a similar way (with the partial exception 
of the era of the Concertación, which I will treat as a fourth project of modernisation 
but also as a historical synthesis of the previous projects). All four of them will be 
analysed in the stages of their construction, implementation, and decline. At the stage 
of construction, I will first focus on the construction of the modernising ideology that 
lies at the foundation of each project, based on doctrines of modernisation and 
examples of modernity, and with different emphasis on the three dimensions of 
modernity. As will be seen, these modernising ideologies exist of mixes between certain 
elements of modernity while they neglect others. In fact, they are as much critiques of 
modernity as well as they are proposals of it. Subsequently, I will focus on the use of 
developmental theories that have been used in the construction of the projects. In these 
theories, the doctrinal outlook of Chile’s elites has become clear. All projects have 
made use of local or foreign, but always new, theories on development, which have 
served as scientific underpinnings for the modernising ideologies, and have enriched 
them with proposals for economic policy-making. These theories, too, have been 
selectively adapted and applied to the local circumstances. I end each section on the 
construction of a project with an analysis of how these modernising ideologies and 
development theories have been amalgamated into a single political project.  
The implementation of the projects will also be analysed in three ways. First, I will 
focus on the role of the state, technocracy, and planning. As has been argued above, the 
state has been the preferred agent for modernisation in Chile. In the case of the four 
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projects in question, it has been essential: they were implemented in a highly top-down 
fashion (even if this was counter to the tenets of the modernising ideology that it was 
based upon), making use of the resources of the state. The use of technocrats in the 
construction and implementation of the projects will also been analysed here. It will be 
shown that middle-class professionals have played crucial roles in the subsequent 
projects and were broadly considered (although not without contestation) as key actors 
for modernisation. The same goes for state planning, which was viewed as a highly 
adequate way of organising the modernisation of society. 
Another element that will be highlighted in this section will be the role of political 
competition between the projects in question. As has been argued, modernity is 
constructed through the interaction between projects of modernisation. It is in this 
section that I will address exactly how the three projects have interacted, and how they 
have developed as a consequence. Finally, I will look into the ways the projects have 
been adapted under pressure of civil society. Each project, I argue, has had to deal with 
the dilemma of pushing its agenda forward and risking social disruption, or adapting (or 
even terminating) the project in an effort to maintain order. It will be shown that 
factors such as the relative autonomy of the state have been crucial in explaining the 
success or failure of the strategies that each individual project followed.  
The fall of each project is analysed from the perspective of its achievements (in 
terms of its original objectives) in modernising Chilean society at the social, economic, 
and political level. Attention will also be devoted to the long-term influences each 
project has produced in relation with the other projects. 
In using this operationalisation, I intend to show strong elements of continuity in 
the recent history in Chile. In the first place, it allows us to interpret Chilean history as 
a long line of ‘successive waves of modernisation’, in which modernisation changes 
shape and content dependent on the images of modernity that were followed. This will 
also enable to show how the four projects of modernisation in question coincide in the 
way they have been constructed and implemented, as well as in the way they have had a 
long-term influence on Chilean modernity after their ‘fall’. It will show the strong state-
orientation and the focus on technocratic solutions and planning that modernisation 
has acquired in Chile, as well as the ways in which elites have had to adapt to civil 
society responses to their projects. It will also clearly demonstrate the crucial role that 
political competition has played on each project, but also on the construction of 
modernity in Chile in general. Finally, and at a more theoretical level, it will serve as a 
testing-ground by applying the ‘multiple modernities’ argument to a country case study. 
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Chapter 2 
The Chilean Construction of Modernity 
This chapter deals with the construction of modernity in Chile from the colonial era 
until the early 1960s. It intends to show that modernity has taken shape in Chile 
through the interaction of different ‘waves of modernisation’. These waves consisted of 
projects of modernisation which were set in motion by different political elites, each 
with a particular point of reference and oriented toward one or more dimensions of 
modernity. Their implementation was characterised by a rational and technical 
approach, as well as a strong focus on the state as the main agent of modernisation. The 
succession of these projects has made modernisation one of the great continuities in 
Chile’s history, albeit with a changing face.  
2.1 Waves of Modernisation: Continuity or Change?  
The idea that in the historical trajectory of Chile modernisation forms a line of 
continuity is not uncontested. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
leading study on modernisation and modernity in Chile, Larraín’s Identidad Chilena, 
argues that the Chilean trajectory towards modernity has been characterised by a 
succession of periods of expansion and crises of modernity.1 After each period in which 
the country’s elites focused on modernity and modernisation, a period of crisis 
followed, in which doubts rose regarding the feasibility of modernisation in the Chilean 
context. After some decades of crisis, a new project of modernisation arose, creating a 
new optimism about the prospects for making of Chile a modern country. In this way, 
six different phases in the Chilean trajectory can be discerned: the colonial era (in 
which the country was shielded from modernity), the nineteenth century, in which 
economic expansion and democratic consolidation took place (oligarchic modernity), 
the first half of the twentieth century, in which oligarchic modernity entered into crisis, 
the period 1950-1970, characterised by rapid democratic expansion, another period of 
crisis under the dictatorship, and finally, since 1990, a period of neo-liberal expansion 
(Larraín 2001: 77-137).  
For several reasons, though, this approach towards modernisation in Chile proves 
unsatisfactory. First of all, it fails to account for the processes of modernisation which 
take place in the periods it has called ‘crises of modernity’. This is, for instance, the case 
with the rise of the middle classes in the early twentieth century, and the ‘popular front’ 
governments of the 1940s and their successful project of import-substitution 
industrialisation. To postdate the modernising effects of this project until after 1950 
seems to be arbitrary. Similarly, to label the military dictatorship a ‘crisis of modernity’ 
                                              
1 Larraín loosely uses Peter Wagner’s notion of ‘crisis of modernity’ as the basis of his analysis (Wagner 
1994). 
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is to negate the clear and obvious modernisation that the country went through in this 
period. Second, and connected to the first, it uses very limited - as well as tacit - 
categories for the definition of modernity, focusing almost exclusively on the extension 
of democratic rights and economic growth as its main constituents. In this approach, 
authoritarianism is intrinsically anti-modern, and democratisation is modern, while the 
complexities and hybridities of modernisation processes are ignored. The same goes for 
the close connection that is suggested between economic expansion and modernity. 
Although processes of modernisation are generally more easily financed in times of 
economic boom, the absence of such a boom does not automatically imply that no 
modernisation takes place. Thirdly, the periodisation seems to be based on unclear, if 
not arbitrary, criteria. The choice to declare the end of ‘oligarchic modernity’ in 1900 
does not seem to be inspired by any particular event in the country’s history, but rather 
by a desire to use round numbers. Similarly, the break between crisis and expansion of 
modernity in 1950 does not match any noteworthy event. The three years of the UP-
government are actually even completely omitted by Larraín from the periodisation, as 
if the ‘Chilean Road’ falls outside categories such as ‘modernisation’ or ‘crisis of 
modernity’. Finally, Larraín’s approach is characterised by some internal 
inconsistencies. If economic expansion and political democratisation are as important 
for modernity as he suggests, why then is the ‘parliamentary period’ (1891-1920) largely 
called a ‘crisis of modernity’? Even though it has a bad name for being a period of 
political inefficiency and even corruption, it shows much higher levels of democratic 
representation than the previous period, because of the increased influence the 
parliament obtained in relation to the executive. It is also a period of great economic 
boom (due to the nitrate industry) and of expansion in areas such as education. 
Similarly, the 1950s may be seen as a period in which democratic rights were extended 
to new sectors of society, but they could also be seen as the decade in which the 
Communist Party was outlawed.  
In contrast to Larraín’s interpretation of the Chilean trajectory towards modernity as 
a series of periods of expansion and crises of modernity, I argue that it is characterised 
by continuity. This is not to say that no breaks took place; on the contrary, there have 
been clear moments of change in the way modernity took shape in Chile. However, 
these changes did not constitute crises of modernity itself: they were crises of the 
existing projects of modernisation. These projects were subsequently followed up by 
other projects, based on other reference points and dimensions of modernity. As a 
result, modernity changed shape and form after each break, rather than entering into 
crisis or expansion each decade or so. In this way, successive waves of modernisation 
have been a constant in the Chilean trajectory towards modernity. Following this 
interpretation, I propose the following periodisation in the trajectory of modernity in 
Chile up to 1964: 
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- The colonial era until 1717: modernity denied. In this period, the 
orientation to the Spanish counter-reformation is dominant. 
- 1717-1810: early stirrings of modernisation. Growing emphasis on the 
building of institutions, as well as the formation of a ‘proto-nationalist’ elite; in 
this sense, expansion of the political dimension of modernity - however, only at 
an embryonic level. In this period, the groundwork for further modernisation 
would be laid, with a strong focus on pragmatism and the state.  
- 1810-1890: independence and conservative modernisation. In this period 
the political dimension of modernity becomes dominant, in the sense of the 
creation of a modern state which functions in the context of formal democracy.  
- 1890-1920: the liberal project. A strong emphasis on the economic 
dimension of modernity is visible in the rapid expansion of the country’s 
economy and the infrastructural modernisations. The political dimension of 
modernity takes the form of the dominance of parliament over the executive. 
The main example is liberal modernity, but with a particular Chilean flavour.  
- 1920-1964: mesocratic modernisation. In this period, the ‘Social-
Democratic welfare state’ comes to constitute the main example, with a growing 
focus on the political and social dimension in the form of the extension of 
democratic suffrage to all sectors of society, the creation of a basic welfare state, 
and state-led industrialisation.  
2.2 Colonial Chile: Modernity Denied or Early Modernisation?  
It is not very common to include the colonial era in studies that deal with the 
development or modernisation of Latin American countries like Chile. Having been a 
remote and poor province of one of the colonial viceroyalties, Chile did not acquire 
much status or importance during the colonial era. Consequently, no ‘great past’ could 
be mourned after independence. Neither had important institutions been erected that 
would become fundamental contributions to the later modernisation of the country. 
Chile did not have, for instance, a powerful Consulate Tribunal (which controlled all 
trade) like Peru, which became the focus of the Peruvian oligarchy and would define its 
structures in the nineteenth century (de Ramón 2001: 67). As a result, modernity in 
Chile is usually depicted as a by-product of independence. Authors like Jorge Larraín 
and José Joaquín Brunner stress the anti-modern disposition of colonial rule, which 
they consider to completely isolate Chile from new intellectual currents which were to 
constitute the foundations of European modernity, namely the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment, and early liberalism (Brunner 1992). This ‘denial of modernity’, as 
Larraín has labelled it, held the continent in a tight traditional order and did not accept 
or hardly accepted changes to this structure (Larraín 2000). This is why the break with 
Spain, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was a necessary step for the entry of 
modernity into Latin America:  
The Chilean trajectory towards modernity starts later than in Europe, with its 
independence in the early nineteenth century, because Spain succeeded in 
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preventing the expansion of modernity in Chile for three centuries (Larraín 
2001: 83). 
However, one should be careful with negating all forms of modernisation under 
colonial rule, and viewing Chile around independence as a tabula rasa. In the colonial 
era, and especially after 1717, the foundations for future modernisations were laid. In 
fact, as has been argued by Howard Wiarda for Latin America in general, the experience 
of Spanish colonialism created the parameters that defined how modernisation would 
be internalised and integrated after independence (Wiarda 2001).2 Economically and 
politically, the province of Chile experienced significant growth, which enabled it to 
escape its marginal position in Latin America after independence. Furthermore, the 
creation of a state apparatus, together with the ascendance and emancipation of a 
Chilean aristocratic elite, brought about a self-consciousness and openness that laid the 
groundwork for the development of the country in the nineteenth century. In many 
ways, these developments created a framework for the political, economic and social 
relations of the country, and I will argue that they not only represent early forms of 
modernisation, but that they were actually decisive in defining the nature and shape of 
Chilean modernity.  
 
The early colonial period: modernity denied (1536-1717) 
During the first two centuries of colonial rule, the province of Chile was a relatively 
backward part of the Spanish Empire, and, like the rest of Latin America, culturally, 
politically, and intellectually locked out of European modernity. The Spanish rulers 
effectively prevented or restricted developments that might bring about change in the 
colonial order. This ‘denial of modernity’ took place by means of several mechanisms 
that functioned at intellectual, economic, political and social levels. Throughout Latin 
America, intellectual activities were limited, and were subject to censorship and 
religious tutelage. Even though universities were founded all over the continent (with 
the exception of Brazil), their intellectual level was very low. Literacy was extremely 
limited and the intellectual community of the continent never exceeded a few thousand 
members (Burkholder 2001: 236). Furthermore, most publications were religious in 
nature, and it was extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to publish works of a 
critical or reformist nature.  
At an economic level, modernity was limited by what Brian Loveman has labelled 
‘Hispanic Capitalism’. There was trade, and the province of Chile produced surpluses 
for export. However, the system of production and exchange had ‘more in common 
with a bastardized Iberian feudalism than with nineteenth-century capitalism’ (Loveman 
                                              
2 The surviving legacy of the colonial era is very difficult to assess, two hundred years after independence. 
While in general it can well be stated, as Wiarda does, that in colonial times patterns of social, political, 
and economic behaviour were created that left traces in modern Latin American societies, extreme care 
should be taken in reversing the argument and explaining contemporary phenomena by referring to 
colonial times. See for instance, Peppelenbos (2005), who argues that present-day neo-liberal practices in 
the Chilean tomato industry are strongly and directly influenced by the patrimonial heritage of the 
colonial era.  
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2001: 75). Production processes relied on forced labour, while trade was restricted by 
the royal authorities through fixed price-rates and monopolisation. This left little room 
for free competition or allocation of resources through a capitalist market system. 
Moreover, it created a system of interdependency between political elites, who 
governed the market through regulation and law-making, and the entrepreneurial sector, 
which made use of those limitations and financially supported their political 
counterpart (ibid., p. 79).  
Politically, the province of Chile was organised in a highly hierarchical and rigid 
manner. The Crown appointed the governor and the highest ranking officials, who were 
usually of direct Spanish descent (peninsulares), while the Latin-American born white 
criollos were only represented in the municipal councils. The relative weakness of the 
population in relation to the colonial rulers was enforced by a royal subsidy for its 
military expenses. Furthermore, the Crown was fearful that a European-like aristocracy 
would emerge in the New World, and that this would threaten the imperial structures. 
In order to avoid this, measures were taken to guarantee the Crown’s political 
hegemony in the area. Concessions of encomiendas (the forced labour of Indians granted 
to selected Spaniards as a reward for military services rendered) and noble titles were 
given very sparingly, while social status was strongly dependent on royal approval 
(Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 34). Status and influence were more dependent on economic and 
political activities than on the possession of an encomienda or a hacienda (large estate) 
(ibid., p. 39). 
Besides from these ‘colonial restrictions’, there were also several endogenous factors 
that hindered the entry of elements of modernity into Chile. First of all, its remote 
location, locked between the Pacific Ocean and the Andean mountains, made 
communications and trade with other regions relatively difficult. Furthermore, Chile’s 
main ports were an easy prey for Dutch and British corsairs, who frequently attacked 
and pillaged Spanish vessels and attacked coastal towns. Violent earthquakes also 
repeatedly levelled towns, sometimes more than three or four times over. In the coastal 
regions they were usually followed by tidal waves that destroyed the buildings and lands 
that had survived the tremor. During the seventeenth century, the town of Concepción 
had to be rebuilt three times, while Santiago and Valparaiso were badly damaged several 
times. 
The most important factor shaping Chilean history during colonial times was the 
presence of a large unconquered indigenous population. Chile remained a war-torn 
frontier zone between the colonial forces and the Arauco Indians south of the Bío-Bío 
River until the late nineteenth century. Although on several occasions truces were 
negotiated, the conflict re-emerged frequently and military conflict became a regular 
feature of Chilean society. Towns were attacked and sometimes destroyed by Indian 
uprisings, and trade as well as travel in the frontier zone was precarious. Moreover, the 
continuous military presence and activity had serious repercussions on the social and 
political structure of the province. The situado (royal military subsidy) that Chile 
received after 1600 to combat the Araucos proved to be a cause for corruption and self-
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enrichment by the political elites, while the soldiers themselves remained underpaid 
(Loveman 2001: 72; Encina 1950: 226). Governors and other political leaders regularly 
abused their powers, and the encomenderos largely refused to implement official 
regulations and to pay taxes. In the words of the historian Brian Loveman: 
the authoritarian politics of conquest had […] created in Chile the foundations 
of a highly stratified class society […] The politics of conquest also 
institutionalized political corruption, arbitrary use of government authority, 
disrespect for and evasion of law - in short, impunity for the powerful (Loveman 
2001: 73).  
As a result of all these factors, colonial Chile remained a remote, poor and precarious 
region, highly traditional and stratified and largely focused on survival rather than on 
expecting high levels of development. By 1700 the population did not exceed 150,000 
people, and the countryside was scarcely cultivated:  
[a]ll testimonies of the era accord in saying that at the beginning of the 18th 
century, the country, with the exception of the few cities, was a wasteland that 
extended from the desert in the north to the frontier [of the river Bío-Bío] 
(Mellafe 1986: 95).  
The nineteenth century historian Diego Barros Arana leaves us with an even more 
desolate image of Chile at the end of the eighteenth century, with its ‘most lamentable 
state of backwardness, its extraordinary depopulation, its poverty, its scarcity of 
industry, the lack of roads, the misery and dirtiness of its civilians’ (Barros Arana 2001a: 
43). In short, modernity, be it in the shape of cultural, political of economic processes, 
was hardly identifiable in early eighteenth century Chile (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 50).  
Despite this dismal outlook, some basic attempts at modernisation can be discerned in 
this period. In the late seventeenth century, for instance, attempts were made to ‘de-
ruralise’ society by erecting cities and villages, in an attempt to fortify colonial rule and 
stimulate the Christianisation of the Indian population. This strategy was generally 
fruitless, though, because of the extreme poverty of the region and the one-sided way it 
was implemented, involving only moving the poor workers to the city, and not the 
landowners themselves. Even though the creation of new cities remained a priority of 
the Crown, it would only show results in the eighteenth century (de Ramón 2001: 51-
52). 
 
Early Stirrings of Modernity: 1717-1810 
In the eighteenth century, the first moves towards modernity appeared. These took the 
form of physical modernisations, the creation of an embryonic state apparatus, which 
was based on criteria such as effectiveness and rational rule, and the formation of a 
local self-conscious elite, which developed a ‘proto-nationalist’ ideology vis-à-vis the 
Spanish Crown. Furthermore, these ‘early stirrings of modernisation’ would define the 
forms that modernisation would acquire in Chile during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. 
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The installation in 1717 of Governor Gabriel Cano y Aponte marked the beginning 
of ‘an almost uninterrupted series of intelligent, active and liberal governors, who [were 
to] incubate political and administrative maturity’ (Encina 1950: 273). Cano y Aponte 
was one of the first to introduce the notion of progress into Chile - albeit in an 
embryonic and tentative form. He had spent several years in Belgium and Holland and 
had seen the relative prosperity and economic advances of these societies. Being aware 
that a country like Chile, with a favourable climate and good soil, could have a great 
potential for growth, he showed a great fondness for progress, and introduced a range of 
material and economic modernisations in the country. These included sanitary reforms, 
a cemetery for the poor of Santiago, and the first fire brigade in the country. Cano Y 
Aponte also strongly advocated the creation of a ‘Chilean’ university. Furthermore he 
tried to stimulate economic growth and industrial development by stimulating the 
settlement of Non-Spanish Europeans, especially French, who, although small in 
number, introduced several new technologies and industrial techniques to the country 
(Encina 1950: 275-278, Barros Arana 2001: 43-45).3  
Meanwhile, the Spanish Crown, now taken over by the Bourbons, started 
implementing a series of modernisations that have become known as the ‘Bourbonic 
Reforms’. These reforms were mostly directed to limiting fraud, rationalising the 
administration, and stimulating trade, industry and culture. Above all, they were 
intended to re-establish Spain as the central and absolute centre of power of the empire. 
Although modest in scope, these reforms represent the first entry of the Enlightenment 
in Spain and Spanish America; this is why this phase is usually labelled the Bourbon 
Enlightenment or, in the case of Chile, the Enlightenment in Chile (Encina 1950: 273). 
Despite their absolutist and repressive character, these reforms had several positive and 
modernising effects on the development of Chile (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 50). First of all, 
they encouraged trade and production, at first hesitantly, but later on more 
enthusiastically, although real free trade was never allowed under colonial rule. The first 
step consisted of the Royal permission for individual merchants and traders to sail to 
Latin American ports. This concession reduced the prices of transport markedly, since 
ships could now sail straight to their port of destination. Despite its limited scope, due 
to many administrative restrictions, the measure had a considerable impact on the 
Chilean economy. The population had grown and demand for European products 
increased notably; and the greater and cheaper availability of these products led to the 
growth and spread of trading houses in Santiago and the major ports. These trading 
houses were eventually able to pressure the Peruvian viceroy into giving several trade 
concessions which further improved the economic position of the province (Barros 
Arana 2001a: 18-82). Overall, the Chilean economy grew steadily, despite setbacks like 
the 1730 earthquake, and in 1743 ‘Chile saw an establishment which was considered an 
expression of its progress and development’ - a mint (ibid., p. 131). This privately 
                                              
3 Unfortunately, a violent earthquake shook the country in 1730 and reversed its progress back several 
years. Cano y Aponte himself died later that year in a riding accident during the festivities celebrating the 
recovery of Santiago after the earthquake. 
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financed institution, which was incorporated by the Crown in 1770, was a major step in 
stopping the outflow of currency towards Lima, and helped in consolidating the 
trustworthiness of Chile’s financial institutions.  
In 1778 Carlos III of Spain decreed the ‘free trade of Spain and the Indies’. This 
should not be understood as an attempt to introduce full-scale modern capitalism into 
the Empire. In essence it was a mercantilist measure meant to revive the sluggish 
Spanish economy. Several measures were taken to favour the Spanish economy over 
those in the colonies: free trade was only allowed between ports of Spain and the new 
world, only with ships built in Spain, which should belong to Spaniards, and several 
products were officially reserved for Spanish industry. The import of products that were 
not produced in Spain was strictly forbidden, while Spanish produce was taxed lower 
than Latin American. It is therefore not surprising that the ‘free trade’ hurt the colonies 
badly in the first few years. However, after the initial shock, Chile fared well with the 
new trade system, and by the end of the century yearly trade revenues were over three 
million pesos, a considerable amount in those days (Barros Arana 2001a: 277-278). 
The second modernising consequence of the Bourbonic Reforms was the creation of 
a state apparatus which could achieve relative autonomy from the viceroyalty of Peru. 
This process took place on two levels simultaneously. On the local level, during the 
eighteenth century several institutions were created that, towards the turn of the 
century, were able to ‘introduce and implement new policies and simultaneously 
maintain a sustained dynamic of change’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 58). These were the 
Commercial Council (1736), the Mint already mentioned (1743) and University (1758), 
the Contaduría Mayor (1768), the Consulate Tribunal (1795) and the Mining Tribunal 
(1802). These achieved an importance that went beyond their individual functions: 
their decisions were considered so important that at times they even had repercussions 
in Spain, and they functioned as channels of communication with the Crown. They 
produced reports on a variety of subjects that were of relevance to the country, and 
promoted economic growth. Their importance was a direct consequence of the 
absolutist esprit that characterised the Bourbon administration: they had to be powerful 
in order to be efficient tools of intervention and control. However, these institutions 
also served to strengthen Chile’s position within the empire, as well as to bring a ‘new 
ethos of progress’ to the country (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 58, italics in the original). 
At a regional level, the Bourbonic reforms reinforced the geo-political position of 
Chile within the continent. This was mainly due to the emergence of the Río de la Plata 
region as an alternative commercial and political centre to Lima. In the course of the 
century, La Plata slowly undermined the Peruvian capital’s hegemony over the 
Southern Cone. This process was formalised with the creation of the new viceroyalty of 
La Plata in 1776, a part of the Spanish reform programme. One of the unintended side-
effects of this administrative realignment was the growth of Chile’s relative importance 
in the region. The strong bonds with dominant Peru were loosened, but without being 
broken, and Chile was able to look to the Atlantic for trade because of its new 
connections with Buenos Aires. Furthermore, Chile was able to profit from the 
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intermediary position it fulfilled between the two viceroyalties. This new position made 
it possible for Chile to free itself from its marginal and remote position in Latin 
America, and to develop a proper identity (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 53; Loveman 2001: 90). 
Finally, the most important element of modernisation to be found in Chile during 
the colonial era was partly a consequence of the above mentioned processes, namely 
the increasing autonomy and emancipation of the Chilean criollo elites, as well as their 
prudent embrace of liberal-republican thought. This was an essential step towards the 
creation of a proper state, which was to become a central element of Chilean modernity 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As in the rest of Latin America, the Chilean 
elites were largely traditional, if not feudal, and politically weak compared to the 
Peninsulares. The economic and demographic growth of Chile during the eighteenth 
century, however, substantially reinforced their position vis-à-vis the colonial rulers. 
Because of this, the success of the Bourbonic Reforms, especially towards the 
nineteenth century, was strongly dependent on their co-operation. This was not self-
evident: in many cases, the reforms reinforced the political position of the Spanish 
Crown; economically, they initially hurt the criollo elite’s interests; and finally, they 
included the transfer of a considerable portion of the province of Chile to the new 
viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. However, after some resistance, the Chilean elites did 
eventually accept and support them, for two reasons. On the one hand, they became 
convinced that the reforms, rational and modernising as they were, would bring 
progress to Chile (Loveman 2001: 99). On the other they understood that their 
cooperation could be exchanged for a share in the exercise of power:  
In the 18th century, the Creole elite, although founded on a traditional social 
and economic basis, accepted high degrees of modernisation in order to be able 
to exercise power; basically, it accepted political institutional modernisation by 
a state that could manage change (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 131)  
The most effective eighteenth-century governors were those that worked with, 
rather than against, the Creole elite (Collier and Sater 1996: 20) 
Because of this cooperation, the elites were able to play a major role in the creation and 
expansion of the new institutions that were already forming a Chilean state 
bureaucracy, the only political actor of the age (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 59). Chilean elites 
not only profited from this new position, but also developed a strong self-consciousness 
that was highly emancipating. This ‘protonationalism’ did not seek independence from 
Spain but pursued the highest degree of autonomy possible (ibid., p. 123; Jocelyn-Holt 
1997: 75; Collier et al. 1996: 24-27). They adhered to the King, but wanted to keep the 
Spanish administration, as well as Spanish immigrants, whom they saw as fortune-
seekers, at bay (Barros Arana 2001b: 313). 
The relations between the criollo elites and the colonial state of the eighteenth 
century laid the groundwork for the central project of modernisation of the nineteenth 
century, the creation of a Chilean state. The criollo ambivalence towards modernisation 
under colonial rule would become a defining feature of the Chilean elites since the 
nineteenth century. They did accept the erection of a colonial state apparatus, but only 
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if it did not threaten the existing political and social order. Furthermore, they did so in 
order to avoid the ascendance of a separate, administrative elite. In this sense, they 
showed a deep ambivalence with regard to modernity. By embracing the state in order 
to limit its influence, they adhered to modernisation in order to maintain the 
traditional order. It is in this light, Jocelyn-Holt states, that the political developments 
of nineteenth century have to be interpreted:  
From the 18th century onward (…) the ruling elites accepted the state as a 
concession, although without detriment to the fact that this acceptance was 
sceptical, the same way it would be during the nineteenth century (Jocelyn-Holt 
1997: 138)  
Ideologically, the country’s elites gradually opened up to elements of European liberal 
thought in the course of the eighteenth century. Notions of progress, social 
improvements, and economic growth became popular, especially towards the end of the 
century. The best example of this new thinking is probably Ambrosio O’Higgins. 
O’Higgins’ rule as governor of Chile (1787-1796) was characterised by indefatigable 
attempts to bring economic progress and improvement to the province. He wanted to 
‘create in the country the industrial spirit, to change the customs, to promote culture 
and to produce general prosperity’ (Barros Arana 2001b: 23). O’Higgins was responsible 
for numerous public works, such as a road between Santiago and Valparaíso, the 
construction of a new mint (nowadays known as La Moneda, the Presidential Palace), 
covering the channels for drinking water in the centre of Santiago, and the paving of 
footpaths along the main roads. He also created several cities, among them 
Constitución. However, it was in the economic and industrial fields that he developed 
the most original and modernising, albeit unsuccessful, strategies. In order to resolve 
the problem of Chile’s negative trade balance, he did not limit the import of consumer 
goods, as would be the traditional solution, but rather tried to improve exports. 
Moreover, he promoted the local production of products like cotton, rice and sugar 
which otherwise would be imported (Barros Arana 2001b: 23-24). This import-
substitution programme avant la lettre failed miserably, however, because the crops 
could not prosper in the cold and dry Chilean climate. O’Higgins also stimulated the 
fishing industry by setting up a boat factory, and intended to improve the mining in the 
north of Chile by inviting foreign specialists who would develop scientific mining 
techniques. However, most of his industrial and economic modernisations failed, not 
because they were not viable, but because, as Barros Arana puts it, he:  
did not understand that these conquests could not be obtained except after a 
slow and laborious evolution that should start with the demolition of the 
foundations on which the whole colonial building rested (ibid.).  
In this period, the importance of North-Western Europe as an intellectual and cultural 
example became stronger, and this led to a slow introduction of the European 
philosophy of enlightenment into Chilean elite circles. People like Don Manuel de 
Salas, who was an advisor to most governments between 1790 and the mid-nineteenth 
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century, had large estates in Europe, and read ‘forbidden’ works like those of Rousseau 
and Montesquieu.4 
In conclusion, rather than to ‘deny’ modernity, the late colonial era introduced 
‘modernity cautiously into a traditional society’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1992: 105). Furthermore, 
it laid the foundations of what would become key elements of Chilean modernity after 
independence: a relatively cohesive and confident elite, conservative in nature but 
simultaneously willing to trade off modernisations in return for power and the 
maintenance of social order; a strong focus on institutions in the construction of 
modernity; and an orientation towards North-Western Europe as a model for 
modernity.  
2.3 Conservative Modernisation: The Portalian State 
As in the late colonial period, modernity and tradition do not constitute opposites in 
nineteenth century Chile, but were in many ways complementary. The political and 
social elites accepted different aspects of modernity and modernisation, in order to be 
able to sustain the traditional social order. Furthermore, modernity became increasingly 
articulated as a project, in the form of the creation of a modern state which was able to 
combine order with progress. In the course of the century, Chile’s ‘conservative 
modernity’ becomes increasingly contested by the rise of liberalism. However, similar to 
the way in which the conservatives had incorporated elements of modernity in order to 
be able to maintain elements of tradition, now the liberals internalised many aspects of 
the conservative project, in order to implement at least part of their project of 
modernisation. 
 
Conservative Modernity: the ‘Portalian State’ 
Around 1810, the year of Chile’s independence, the country’s oligarchy was still 
relatively small and weak. However, in the two decades that followed, it would rapidly 
gain strength and become focused on its main project of modernisation: the creation of 
a modern state, which would be able to guarantee order and progress. This project was 
fundamentally ambivalent and consisted of a blend between the ‘bias towards 
modernity’, which had been developed by the Chilean political elites, and their 
ideologically conservative outlook. In this way, democracy was combined with the 
restoration of the ‘absolute authority’ of the colonial era. The ability of Chile’s elites to 
create a mix between elements of modernity and tradition proved to be a key to the 
success of the Chilean state and of Chile’s path of modernisation.  
Pragmatic and instrumental in their approach towards modernity, the oligarchy 
embraced ‘modern inventions’ like constitutional democracy because it saw 
                                              
4 Manuel de Salas became well-known for his dedication to the charitative beneficiencia-programme, which 
was targeted to help the poorest sectors of society. Rather than being a simple charitative fund, though, 
beneficiencia was based on the notion that society could not function properly if large sections of society 
are excluded and neglected. This same perspective would be used, some two centuries later, by the 
Christian Democrats in their promoción popular programme. 
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opportunities to mould them and use them as a means of power. Because of its limited 
scope, political modernisation did not threaten the social order; and therefore the 
Chilean conservative elites were happy to introduce it themselves, even though it 
clashed with their conservative ideology. They were not ‘reactionary’ in the traditional 
sense: they struck a pragmatic deal between tradition and modernity in order to 
maintain their position in the social order (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 131-132).  
The pragmatic approach of the oligarchy towards modernity allowed for a slow but 
relatively stable path of modernisation, albeit at the cost of a strong authoritarian 
culture.5 The quintessential representation of this model is the figure of Diego Portales, 
a conservative trader, who came to de facto power in 1830 when he took up two of the 
four ministerial posts in the government. It was under his supervision that the 1833 
constitution was implemented, which proved to be the core of a state model that some 
historians have labelled the ‘Portalian state’, or the ‘state in good shape’ (Estado en 
forma) (Góngora 1986, Edwards 1928). Essential in this model is the maintenance of 
social order by means of authoritarian rule within the framework of a democratic 
republic. In order to reconcile these opposites, Portales installed a powerful executive, a 
weak and submissive congress, and an extremely limited electoral system that would 
ensure political victories for the ruling party. Moreover, electoral ‘interventions’ became 
a regular feature of the political process, because of the numerous loopholes that the 
system offered (Collier and Sater 1996: 57). This authoritarian model of democracy, 
formalised in the 1833 constitution, remained effective until 1891, when congress 
succeeded in reasserting its position in relation to the executive.6  
As Góngora emphasises, Portales and his followers were not ideologists and did not 
follow a transcendental idea or belief. They fulfilled a ‘duty’ to restore order and make 
Chile a great country, the ‘England of the Pacific’, as Portales put it (Góngora 1986: 81). 
In order to accomplish this, they made use of traditional social structures, like the 
abstract notion of authority of the Spanish monarchy in colonial times, without 
intending to revert to colonialism or monarchy. They used elements of modernity and 
tradition wherever they saw fit; they were highly pragmatic. For instance, Portales once 
commented to Egaña, the main author of the 1833 constitution: ‘You believe in God; I 
believe in priests’ (quoted in Collier and Sater 1996: 59). This scepticism constitutes a 
strong break with the colonial or the Hispanic order. In this sense the Portalian state, 
                                              
5 The 1833 constitution was the fourth constitution to be installed in Chile in a period of twenty years. 
The previous ones, all of which were approved by democratically elected ‘constituent assemblies’, did not 
survive the political turbulence of the era. Interestingly, the 1833 constitution was the first one that was 
implemented without the approval of an elected body or ‘constitutive assembly;’ it was approved by a 
group of advisors that consisted of deputies and citizens of ‘recognised loyalty and enlightenment’ (de 
Ramón 2001: 70). The key role of authoritarianism in Chile’s constitutional history can be appreciated 
when considering that all of the country’s lasting constitutions (1833, 1925, and 1980) were implemented 
under authoritarian circumstances - even though they produced formally democratic regimes.  
6 Portales considered the authoritarian nature of his model to be a temporary feature, necessary to 
discipline the Chilean people. Once it has reached certain moral standards, he argued, ‘a completely 
liberal government may come, free and full of ideals, in which all citizens have a share’ (quoted in 
Eyzaguirre 2004: 121).  
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however conservative, may be called a ‘modern creation’ (Góngora 1986: 47). It should 
be noted, though, that Portales’ project was not exclusively based on doctrines and 
ideas: it was also a pragmatic reply to the turmoil that had characterised Chilean 
politics after independence, and was still very present in some places in the continent, 
where caudillos (warlords) fragmented and eroded the power of the national states. The 
result was a highly original and stable mix between modernity and tradition that would 
come to characterise Chile’s path towards modernity.  
The concept of a ‘Portalian state’ is not uncontroversial. Portales’ work has been 
interpreted from different points of view and has been debated thoroughly. Two 
different standpoints seem to have consolidated in the discussion: on the one hand the 
view of Portales as a great historical figure, either positive or negative, and on the other 
the view of Portales as the initiator of an impersonal political system. The defenders of 
the first position usually stress Portales’ authoritarianism, his lack of political ambition 
(he never seems to have aspired to the presidency and preferred to exercise power rather 
than to fill important political positions), and the absence of a structural political 
philosophy in his work. In this view, he was either a ‘despot’ (in the words of his liberal 
contemporary Lastarria), or an ‘imperfect genius’ whose work was ‘exclusively personal’ 
(according to the nineteenth century historian Vicuña Mackenna). However, these 
views fall short in explaining the relative stability and continuity of the political system 
he installed. This has led authors like Alberto Edwards Vives to stress the work rather 
than the man. In his famous La Fronda Aristocrática, Edwards describes Portales’ work as 
the restoration of the colonial order, and the ‘Spirit of Portales’ as the creator the ‘state 
in good shape’ (Estado en forma). This strong and centralised state is characterised by its 
impersonal and abstract form of government:  
The work of Portales was the restoration of a ‘fact’ and of a ‘sentiment’, that 
have served as the basis of public order during the Octavian peace of the three 
centuries of the colony. the ‘fact’ was the existence of a strong and enduring 
power, superior to the prestige of a caudillo or the strength of a faction; the 
‘sentiment’ was the traditional respect for the abstract notion of authority, for 
power which is legitimately established independently of those who wield it 
(Edwards 1966: 47, italics in the original).  
Mario Góngora follows this analysis in part, but questions the impersonal and abstract 
aspect of the Portalian State. According to Góngora, there was no restoration of an 
‘impersonal and abstract’ type of government, but only the practical solution of the 
problem of power:  
The government needed the support of an aristocracy - surely an American 
aristocracy of landowners, not of feudal lords - but this class needed to be 
obediently subject to the government because of its own interest in public order 
(Góngora 1986: 45).  
This view is supported, finally, by Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, who states that there is no 
Portalian system; and the stability of the Chilean political system is a result of his 
solution of the question of authority, but this was a conjunctural, pragmatic, solution, 
not a historical project. Portales was a dictator in the political sense, but he did not 
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intend to create a new system. If he had, he would have created a stronger institutional 
framework for it (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 131-132). However, even if there was no ‘Portalian 
state’ in the sense of a projected state configuration, Portales’ solution of the problem 
of authority did last for over sixty years, and in this sense it may be legitimate to speak 
of a ‘Portalian state’ or ‘Portalian system’. 
The ‘Portalian state’ was essential to Chilean modernity in three ways. First, it laid 
the foundations for material progress and economic growth. Portales as well as his 
successors (he was killed in 1837), slowly opened up the country’s economy, although 
they never went so far as to introduce true free trade. Again, the conflict between 
importing wholesale foreign doctrines like free trade and maintaining local balances was 
resolved in a pragmatic fashion. New economic principles were introduced, but only 
after they had been adapted to local circumstances. For instance, when in 1852 export 
duties on minerals were discussed in congress, Interior Minister Antonio Varas was 
attacked for such ‘unmodern’ and ‘uneconomic’ taxation. His reply was typical for the 
regime:  
I wish that the products of national industry could be freed from all imposts; 
but (…) it is one thing to write a book, and quite another to apply its doctrines 
to the government of a state (quoted in Collier and Sater 1996: 74-75).  
Apart from this cautious economic modernisation, the Portalian state continued the 
fostering of material progress that had been initiated during the late colonial period. It 
built railways, ports and highways, and expanded the educational system. These efforts 
were not impressive, but also not negligible. They betray a practical sense of progress 
that may not stem from a high abstract ideal but that is still tangible and real. 
Second, the Portalian state was important for nineteenth century Chilean modernity 
because it influenced the country’s self-image in a particular way. The stability of the 
model, combined with the early institutionalisation of democracy in the country, gave 
rise to a discourse of ‘Chilean exceptionalism’. According to this discourse, Chile stands 
out in the Latin American context because of its institutional stability, sobriety and 
democracy. Here there was no anarchy, there were no caudillos, no cruel dictatorships or 
slavery; Chile had reached a higher level of civilisation (and, in this sense, progress) 
than its Latin American neighbours. Usually this discourse stressed the links between 
Chile and Europe, especially the United Kingdom (Portales not only spoke of ‘making 
Chile the England of the Pacific’, but also joked that he would lend the country to 
England in order to improve it) and France (Collier and Sater 1996: 64). Additionally, 
the country’s military victories, especially in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), gave 
cause to label Chile the ‘Prussia of South America’ (Fermandois 2005: 38). The 
factuality of this discourse of exceptionality, democratic stability, and progress is only 
partial: throughout the nineteenth century Chile lived through several civil wars, some 
of them extremely bloody. The democratic system was very limited and regularly 
corrupted. Despite these shortcomings, however, the myth of Chilean exceptionalism 
has remained popular since then, together with the habit of looking for new models 
and doctrines outside Latin America.  
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Third, the highly authoritarian and exclusive nature of the Portalian state has 
marked patterns of modernity in Chile. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Chilean democracy was characterised by its highly top-down nature, especially in the 
authority and privileges of the President. The success of the Portalian state was also used 
to legitimise two dictatorial but modernising governments, those of Ibáñez (1927-1931) 
and Pinochet (1973-1990). The work of Portales, with its emphasis on social order, 
authority and the state, has deeply influenced Chilean history:  
The country, in the deepest sense of its being, is authoritarian. Chilean history is 
the history of its institutional authoritarianism. Chile has no other history than 
that of its state, be it ‘Portalian’ or ‘anti-Portalian’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 129, 
italics in the original).  
In conclusion, the Portalian state, which is the ultimate expression of the elite 
compromise between tradition and modernity, set the parameters for modernity in 
Chile: democratic, but simultaneously authoritarian; open to modernisation, but only 
if the social order and the authority of the state are not jeopardised. As will be seen in 
this study, these parameters are still tangible in the twenty-first century.  
 
The Ascendance of Liberalism 
The project of Conservative modernisation was by no means uncontested. From the 
early nineteenth century, sectors of the elites sought to construct an ‘alternative 
modernity’, based on European liberalism. The competition between the two camps 
was fierce. Portales and his followers vehemently tried to exclude the liberals (called 
pipiolos, novices) from political power and were initially successful in this: between the 
1830s and 1850s, the liberal opposition to the conservative (called pelucón, bigwig) 
government was marginal and weak. However, liberalism became highly popular within 
the educational system and within institutions that were set up by leading intellectuals, 
and slowly began to become the main ideology to be connected with ‘progress’. From 
the 1860s on, liberalism (and its Comtian equivalent, positivism), became the main 
paradigm for intellectuals in Chile, and it profoundly influenced the way modernity 
developed in the country. 
Already in the 1820s liberalism was circulating within intellectual circles, not only in 
the form of general ideas, but already as a doctrine. The pipiolos argued for a 
constitutional separation of powers, for religious tolerance and against the enormous 
political influence of the church, for education, and for free trade and the 
rationalisation of taxation. They referred to Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
Bentham. In particular Bentham’s utilitarianism (laws should be directed to bring about 
as much happiness for as many as possible, while simultaneously diminishing suffering 
for as many as possible) became popular. However, the import of liberal doctrines from 
Europe remained largely disconnected from reality in Chile. As a result, liberalism in 
Chile remained largely theoretic and somewhat utopian, for instance in its glorification 
 70 
of individual freedom.7 On the one hand, this led to a weakening of the political power 
of the liberals, and contributed to the rise of the conservative regime of Portales. On the 
other, however, the disparity between theory and reality gave way to a whole generation 
of intellectuals who sought apply liberalism as a doctrine that would contribute to the 
progress of the country:  
This imbalance (…) also explains the point of view with which the Chilean 
youths received liberal thinking, and the characteristics which it came to 
acquire, especially what could be called liberal voluntarism: the belief that the 
ideas - and in this case the liberal ideas - are the motor of progress, and that it is 
sufficient to educate the majority of the people in them so that not only the 
reality of the conscience, but also the society and the political life of the 
country would change (Subercaseaux 1997a: 23-24) 
The rise of liberalism was facilitated by the creation of several educational institutions, 
which would become bulwarks of liberal thought. In this sense, Venezuelan intellectual 
Andrés Bellos, who came to live in Chile in 1829, has been important. Bello, who was a 
conservative himself, became a leading figure in the main educational institutions of 
the era, the National Institute (Instituto Nacional) and the University of Chile, which he 
co-founded in 1842 and which he led during the rest of his life. For Bello, the emphasis 
was on the usefulness of institutions for the progress of the nation, rather than on 
creating possibilities for ‘knowledge for the sake of knowledge’, and it is in Bello that we 
see the first clear example of a ‘projected modernity’ (Ramos 2001: 24). Despite many 
ideological conflicts, these institutions came to educate generations of liberal thinkers 
in the course of the nineteenth century (Subercaseaux 1997a: 30). Especially the 
creation of the University of Chile is important in this context. It was not just an 
educational institution, but rather the combination of a Ministry of Education, a 
national think-tank and a university. It was partly fashioned after the French Imperial 
University and was placed under tutelage of the state, but not without maintaining its 
academic independence. This made possible the structural organisation of intellectual 
efforts for the sake of a national project:  
Only in 1842, with the creation of the University of Chile, did a truly 
articulated, well thought out, state-supported project become possible, which 
could permit a cultural transformation corresponding to a modern nation-state 
(Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 30).  
One of the major themes that Chilean liberals dealt with was the liberation of the 
mind, or the ‘emancipation of the spirit’. This referred to the cleansing of the Chilean 
conscience of the legacies of Hispanic colonialism, and the shedding of the dark past in 
                                              
7 In fact, the Portalian state was a pragmatic response to the lack of realism that Chilean liberals displayed 
in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The conservative historian Eyzaguirre argues that Portales 
was well aware of the gap between reality and the liberal discourse: ‘The fever of democracy, the excessive 
love for liberty, which has maddened so many, did not convince him. He knew that in the United States 
those ideals could work out well, because there they were the natural fruit of an evolutionary process. 
However, they did not possess an intrinsic virtuosity through which they would, just by being 
transplanted to Hispanic America, produce an immediate and miraculous transformation’ (Eyzaguirre 
2004: 120).  
 71 
order to reach a brighter future. In order to progress, Chile had to divest itself of its 
Spanish past and Catholic domination in order to be able to become civilised; political 
emancipation was not enough. José Victorino Lastarria, one of Bello’s most radical 
liberal pupils, in a famous lecture given at the University of Chile in 1842, labels the 
Chilean people:  
a disgraceful people, that seems to have been carried from its first moments to 
the carriage of a proud conquistador. It has been protected in its existence by 
ignorance and slavery for three centuries (…). Nature, however, does not 
support the taunts of men for a long time. It eventually recovers its empire, it 
will have its dishonoured dignity triumph and will give way to an era of glory 
and prosperity. The people, humiliated by slavery and ignorance, avenges its 
deepest degradation and presents itself today on the road to a brilliant future 
(Lastarria 1844: 18). 
Contemporary Francisco Bilbao took a similar position. Unlike Lastarria, though, 
Bilbao did not distinguish between the Hispanic legacy and Catholicism. If Lastarria 
attacked the Church and retained Christianity, Bilbao rejected both. He called for the 
creation of a ‘new religion’, based on social equality, liberty of worship, and political 
equality. Not surprisingly, Chilean society in the 1840s was hardly receptive to things 
like new religions, and Bilbao was condemned for blasphemy soon after. Both he and 
Lastarria were sent into exile for several years. Their ‘generation of 1842’ remained 
popular, though, and became a movement which vehemently fought the conservative 
regime.  
Even though not all liberal thinkers of the mid-nineteenth century concurred with 
Lastarria and Bilbao in their radical approach, most of them agreed in defining the 
position of Chile as being between tradition and modernity, or, in the terminology of 
the century, between ignorance and progress. The evils of the past, that is, colonialism, 
were easily identifiable; the path ahead, however, was less clearly discernible. An 
‘absolute faith in indefinite progress’ dominated the thinking of the century - the 
question was which road to take. The conservatives preferred the more cautious path of 
physical modernisation and slow change, while the liberals supported faster, more 
profound change (Edwards 1966: 121). The most common liberal proposal was to 
embrace the civilisations of Northern Europe, especially England and France. These 
countries were viewed as carriers of progress and modernity, and it was generally 
accepted that their examples should be followed in a more active way. The 
‘emancipation of the spirit’ usually consisted of liberating the country from Spanish 
influences, and replacing them uncritically with British or French ones (Larraín 2001: 
88). Important radical liberals like Bilbao openly labelled non-Iberian Europe as the 
model for Chile and claimed that ‘the new age has dawned in France’ (quoted in 
Bradford Burns 1980: 37). There were, however, some exceptions to this rule. Andrés 
Bello resisted the transfer of European cultures and civilisations to Chile:  
A machine can be moved from Europe to Chile and produce the same effects as 
in Europe. But the philosophy of the history of France, for example, (…) lacks 
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meaning when applied to the successive particulars of the existence of the 
Chilean people (quoted in Subercaseaux 1997a: 76).  
One other exception, Lastarria, turned away from Europe altogether after the failure of 
the 1848 revolutions. For him, the United States became the new paradigm for progress 
and should be the guide for Chile, if only to stop U.S. hegemony in the region: ‘It is 
necessary to become like the North American in order not to become a prisoner of the 
North American’ (quoted in Subercaseaux 1997a: 183).  
If Chilean liberals generally looked uncritically to Europe as a model for modernity, 
this does not mean that they imported European modernity integrally. Usually they 
favoured theory over reality and formal arrangements over practice. Collier and Sater 
stress that already soon after independence, ‘all Chileans in public life now proclaimed 
their belief in the rights of man (…), in representative government, in the division of 
powers, in equality before the law, and in republican virtue’ (Collier and Sater 1996: 
40). In practice, however, these principles proved to be open to adaptation. In the 
context of Conservative modernity and the Portalian model, liberals came to mix 
European liberalism with an increased orientation towards order, authority and the 
state. Thus, by means of restriction, European liberal modernity was adapted to fit the 
Chilean traditional social structure. As a result, the intense competition between 
pelucones and pipiolos could end with an amalgamation of both sectors. In the 1860s, 
moderate liberal thought became accepted within conservative circles, while the liberals 
agreed in maintaining the authoritarian and limited form of democracy. By the 1870s, 
almost all Chilean politicians would call themselves ‘liberal’ (Collier and Sater 1996: 
123). Whereas at first the conservatives had accepted a certain level of modernisation, 
now the progressives had internalised conservative doctrines by restricting the scope 
and intensity of their project of modernisation. As a result, ‘oligarchic modernity’, as 
Larraín labels it, which had been set up by the conservatives in the 1830s, came to be 
confirmed by most sectors in the country:  
Chile lived the paradox of having a dominant aristocratic class of rural origin 
that assumed a liberal ideology and constructed a republican and democratic 
state, but that restricted economic and political participation to the members of 
the dominant alliance (Larraín 2001: 91).8  
In conclusion, the oligarchic modernity of the early nineteenth century, based on Latin 
American conservative modernity with a strong focus on its political dimension, proved 
able to incorporate elements of liberalism and progress, but in a limited and restricted 
manner.  
                                              
8 This was not unique for the Chilean case. The highly restrictive pattern of liberation and participation 
was closer to the European example than some liberal ideologues would like to think - moreover, the 
combination of increasing liberties and high restrictions is, according to German sociologist Peter 
Wagner, proper to modernity itself: ‘In fact, the idea of containing the liberal utopia within certain limits, of 
creating boundaries against the consequences of its own claims, is crucial to any understanding of 
modernity’ (Wagner 1994: 6, italics in the original; Collier and Sater 1996: 41-42).  
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2.4 The Liberal Project: Positivism and the Decay of the Oligarchy  
From the 1870s onwards, the liberal project became increasingly articulated. Even 
though it took place within the context of the restrictions of the Portalian state, it was 
able to put forward much of its agenda, based on the example liberal modernity and 
with a strong emphasis on the economic dimension of modernity. Once again, this was 
not just an ideological triumph, but followed Portales’ logic of paternalism: the 
Portalian model had proved to provide authority and social order, and now, the 
possibility existed for more modernisation without jeopardising social order.  
Economically, the country gained a strong stimulus after the War of the Pacific 
(1879-1883), in which Chile gained control over Bolivia’s nitrate industry. The other 
political elements of the liberal project of modernisation, the separation of the Church 
and the state and a stronger position of parliament vis-à-vis the executive, would be 
resolved in the following decade, albeit at a high political and social cost. Ideologically, 
positivism rapidly gained influence among the intellectual elites, calling for a scientific 
form of government. The sudden end of the Portalian state in 1891, however, and the 
subsequent ‘parliamentary period’, thwarted the scientific-authoritarian aspirations of 
the Positivists. Their influence remained influential, though, in the expansion and 
modernisation of the system of education and other state institutions. As a result, the 
embryonic middle class that existed in the late nineteenth century was able to develop 
as a serious social actor, pressuring the oligarchy for a share in power. At the same time, 
the oligarchy’s blindness to the social dimension of modernity put the so-called ‘social 
question’ prominently on the middle-class agenda. However, it was not until 1920 that 
the oligarchy finally lost its dominance and the middle classes were able to come to 
power with their own project of modernisation.  
 
Economic Expansion: the Nitrate Era 
In this period, Chilean society was strongly oriented towards ‘liberal modernity’, with a 
strong focus on the economic aspects of modernity. It was a period of laissez-faire 
policies, in which the state took few or no steps to intervene in the economic arena, 
even if social unrest was the result.   
In the War of the Pacific, Chile had expanded its territory northwards and had 
gained the regions of Antofagasta, Tarapacá and Arica from Bolivia and Peru. The 
extensive nitrate fields in these regions, combined with the presence of large amounts of 
copper, provided Chile with a formidable mining capacity. From the 1880s on, nitrate 
mining would provide Chile with its main source of income. Its growth was impressive: 
between 1886 and 1890 the output more than doubled, amounting to 1,000,000 metric 
tons (Loveman 2001: 154). However, this nitrate bonanza did little to improve Chile’s 
economy structurally, for several reasons. First of all, the nitrate industry was almost 
exclusively in the hands of foreign businessmen. These were usually interested in short-
term profits only, and did little to develop the region. Although there was some 
discussion about the possibility of nationalisation of the nitrate industry, economic 
liberal ideology was usually dominant. For instance, when Minister of the Interior and 
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leading liberal Lastarria was approached by a Chilean businessman who suggested that 
the state should take over the nitrate industry, he answered:  
This government believes that the state is the worst industrialist, and that fiscal 
business does nothing but corrupt public administration. In contrast, it believes 
that handing these riches over to private initiative, to free industry, will realise a 
public benefit much more effectively (quoted in Pinto 1962: 57).  
Secondly, the nitrate producers responded to short-term changes in the demand for 
nitrate. This led to a highly fluctuating level of production, to cyclical unemployment, 
and to rapidly changing levels of income for the Chilean state. Third, nitrate exports 
increasingly became the state’s main source of income. The lack of diversification of 
revenues made the state extremely vulnerable for fluctuations in the volatile nitrate 
market. This was made worse by inflation, which became a regular feature of Chile’s 
economy in this period, and would remain so until the late 20th century. Finally, the 
miserable conditions of the workers in the nitrate sector led to the beginning of social 
conflict, which would only increase in the decades to come (Loveman 2001: 150-155). 
The results of the nitrate industry were, however, not all negative. From the mid-
1880s on, an increased state investment in physical modernisation was financed with 
the revenues of the nitrate exports. In particular President Balmaceda (1886-1890) 
invested heavily in railways, education, infrastructure and such like. In 1887 he created 
the Ministry of Public Works, which already consumed a third of the national budget 
three years later. It invested in railways, bridges and other physical manifestations of 
modernity. Simultaneously, urban architecture was conspicuous and carefully designed 
in European styles, usually French. Cities like Santiago had electric lighting as early as 
1886, and an electrified tram system in 1900. Outwardly, Santiago never looked better 
than at the turn of the century. This was, however, contrasted with a notable lack of 
primary services. Up to the 1920s, for instance, Santiago did not have sufficient 
drinking water. A sewerage system was not built until 1903, and housing conditions 
were deplorable (Collier and Sater 1996: 174-175).  
The nitrate bonanza also produced institutions which foreshadowed the state-
oriented project of industrialisation of the late 1930s. Growing demand for industrial 
goods such as railways, stimulated by a growing foreign trade, boosted the infant 
industrial sector. This sector consisted of little more than the ‘screwing together or 
weaving and dyeing of a semi-finished item’, with or without the use of imported 
machinery (Kirsch 1977: 17; Muñoz Gomá 1986: 49). In order to encourage 
development, the National Manufacturer’s Society (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, 
SOFOFA) was founded in 1883 to attend to the interests of the sector. It supported 
technical and industrial education, and the immigration of specialised technicians. It 
also advocated better housing for workers and legal protection for women and children 
(SOFOFA 1983: 81-94). Above all, though, it contested the liberal laissez-faire economic 
views which were popular in political circles. These views had been dominant in 
academic circles since the French professor Courcelle Seneuil had been invited by the 
Chilean government to fill a Chair in political economics in 1855. Courcelle Seneuil, 
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who had advocated Smithsonian and Ricardian theories of free trade and comparative 
advantage, soon gathered a group of devoted followers, who elaborated on his views 
after his departure in 1862. According to Encina these followers possessed ‘an invincible 
tendency to simplify, an absolute absence of observational spirit and a fragile scientific 
judgement’, and had changed Coucelle’s theories into simple ‘doctrinaire free trade’. 
According to this doctrine, Encina grumbles, modernisation would simply take place by 
imitation: 
The ambition of the backward countries to pass towards the manufacturing age, 
which the modern sociologists and economists acknowledge to be a biological 
necessity, (…) is nothing but the result of a childish form of imitation (Encina 
1912: 217-219). 
This doctrine did not allow for protection of Chile’s fragile industry as the SOFOFA 
advocated. Only in 1897 was the SOFOFA successful in its efforts when some measures 
were taken to protect the industrial sector by imposing taxes on the imports of 
industrial goods (Collier and Sater 1996: 159). Industry in Chile, although relatively 
modest in its extent and importance, continued to grow until the outbreak of the First 
World War, and, subsequently, the end of the nitrate era in the 1920s. However, it 
never reached a level where it could be seen as an alternative for nitrate. Lack of 
attention from investors and politicians, who, especially in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, had a propensity to ‘live off the interest’ rather than to seriously 
develop the country’s industry, left the sector weak and vulnerable (Pinto 1962: 55; 
Collier and Sater 1996). The SOFOFA’s call to create a ‘general policy of economic 
development’ (foreshadowing the policies that were to be implemented in the 1930s), 
had little effect. According to Francisco Encina, who supported the cause of the 
SOFOFA, one of the main problems of Chile’s industry was: 
 the indifference of the public authorities and the enlightened opinions towards 
the national industries and their marked preference for foreign manufactures, 
which goes so far that in order to invest in their products, the national industry 
is forced to disguise them with labels that suggest a foreign origin (Encina 1912: 
23).  
The attention of Chile’s elites remained focused almost exclusively on the export of 
agrarian products, until, with the outbreak of the First World War, this sector collapsed. 
  
Civil War and the Parliamentary Model 
On the political level, the settlement between the pipiolos and pelucones in the 1860s had 
left two points on the liberal agenda of modernisation unanswered: the influence of the 
Church and the tension between authoritarianism and liberalism. The first was resolved 
under the presidency of Santa María (1881-86), who ended a decade of religious conflict 
between the Church and the liberals in favour of the latter. Under his presidency, 
Church and state were irreversibly separated, and secular cemeteries, civil marriage and 
civil registry of births were established. Liberalism’s victory was decisive, and the 
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conservatives were left as a political minority. The influence of the Church remained 
significant, but no longer on a formal level (Loveman 2001: 155). 
The position of the executive was resolved by means of a civil war in 1891, in which 
the congressional sections fought the supporters of the President. The liberal victory of 
the 1880s had not led to a less authoritarian presidency - on the contrary; the executive 
had only gained in importance. For instance, liberal champion Santa María had duly 
extended suffrage to all literate men, only to openly intervene in congressional elections 
if he saw fit. His successor, Balmaceda, equally used his presidential prerogatives to 
bypass congress (and even his own ministers) in order to defend his programme of 
national development and modernisation. According to some historians, he equalled 
Portales (his ideological archenemy) in his attempts to restore the authority of the 
executive (Góngora 1986: 70-71). By now, however, Chile’s elites were no longer 
undivided. The Portalian system, in which the oligarchy supported the state’s power in 
return for social order, started to collapse. It had drawn its legitimacy from the 
restoration of authority, but only on the condition of its impersonal nature. Balmaceda 
broke the rule by enforcing a personal project (national development) and by his 
personalistic style of government. In the words of the presidents of the chambers of 
congress, Balmaceda had renounced: ‘the legitimate authority in which he had been 
installed, in order to assume a personal and arbitrary power, which does not have any 
other origin than his own will’ (quoted in Edwards 1966: 172). The tacit agreement 
between the executive and the aristocracy was broken, and in 1891 they entered into 
open, and violent, conflict (ibid., pp. 157, 166-173).  
It is through this conflict that politically ‘society started to become really modern, 
not just discursively modern’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 49). For the first time in Chile’s 
history, 
the forces behind modernity start to reach the level of momentum, independent 
from the elites instruments that permit them to canalise and restrict it (ibid., 
italics in the original).  
Furthermore, the state got its first opportunity to present itself as a viable alternative to 
the traditional elites. It could do so because of its new, independent source of income 
(nitrate), strong investments in the military, and a new, self-conscious style of 
governance by the executive. This new, independent state, capable of executing a 
national project of development and expanding its bureaucracy, opened up new 
opportunities for the middle classes, which were already on the rise (Góngora 1986: 64, 
68). However, it seems incorrect to interpret the civil war of 1891 as a class conflict, as 
some have done. The traditional order was still firmly in place and not in question: ‘it 
was a civil war, not a social revolution’ (Correa et al. 2001: 19). 
The conflict, which ended in a bloody civil war, was followed by a period which is 
known as the parliamentary period. The forces of the landed elites, represented by the 
congress, prevailed over the executive and took over control of the political system. The 
oligarchy now controlled the country without the counter-weight of a strong President, 
as in the Portalian system. This was ‘parliamentarism’ (Salazar and Pinto), an 
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‘aristocratic republic’ (Góngora), or a ‘parliamentary oligarchy’ (Edwards). From 1891 
until 1920, congress dominated the executive. This did not, however, constitute a 
process of democratisation, nor did it bring an end to the power of the oligarchy - on 
the contrary, ‘the aristocratic and oligarchic element of the old Chile reached the 
golden age of its predominance: for thirty years it dominated without control’ (Edwards 
1966: 174). This ‘parliamentary oligarchy’, as Edwards has labelled it, did eventually 
bring about its own downfall. With the executive out of the way, the policy process 
became increasingly characterised by party intrigues and bickering, and finally by 
political inertia:  
each time less of the grand rhetorical style; in exchange a more insistent 
parliamentary choreography: party machinations and an infinity of small 
agreements and manoeuvres in smoke-filled salons. (…) Each time less the 
sensation of dealing with a public forum of debate and controversy; in contrast, 
the feeling now spreads that politics is an exclusive art, mannerist, for the 
exclusive few invited to the club (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 51).  
Chile’s ‘oligarchic modernity’ slowly eroded from within, leaving a strong sentiment of 
‘decadence, and of governmental impotence’ (Góngora 1986: 81). Independent of the 
prevailing political culture, though, the expansion of the state bureaucracy and its 
modernisation continued. The state apparatus was reorganised in order to increase 
efficiency, to centralise services and to enhance its institutionalisation. Areas of political 
decision-making, like international relations, were moved to bureaucratic institutions, in 
order to improve efficiency, specialisation and a technical approach (Subercaseaux 
1997b: 98).  
The nitrate boom deepened social conflict, which stimulated the emancipation of 
both the middle and lower classes. As a result, the working classes started to organise 
themselves, while the middle classes pressed for an opening up of the oligarchic 
political system. In the end, these pressures would provoke the end of ‘oligarchic 
modernity’ and eventually give way to a new project of modernisation, this time set in 
motion by the middle classes (de Ramón 2001: 115-181).  
As in the rest of Latin America, nineteenth century modernisation brought progress, 
but not for everyone in Chile. In The Poverty of Progress, E. Bradford Burns shows that 
the import of European ideas and the integration of the region into international 
capitalism, combined with the persistence of traditional social relations, generally led to 
a deterioration of the living conditions of the lower classes (Bradford Burns 1980). In 
late nineteenth century Chile, this was not different. Living conditions for most 
Chileans were terrible, and were deteriorating fast. In the countryside, extreme 
concentration of land in the hands of the landed elites (in 1917, only 0.46 per cent of 
the farms covered half the available land) had created enormous haciendas, which were 
usually only partly cultivated. The monopolisation of the land and the stable local 
market created little incentive to increase production. This created a labour surplus 
which was forced to seek its fortune elsewhere: the number of minifudios, micro-farms 
that sought to produce family subsidence, boomed: about 60 per cent of all farms 
occupied less than 1.5 per cent of the land. Simultaneously, urbanisation rose 
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dramatically: Santiago’s population tripled between 1865 and 1907, and Valparaiso’s 
population doubled in this period (Collier and Sater 1996: 171-172). The situation of 
the urban poor was worse that that of their rural counterparts as disease, poor living 
conditions, lack of basic services like sewerage and plumbing, and harsh working 
conditions weakened the cities’ population. Child labour was common, especially in 
manufacturing. Child mortality accounted for more than half of the recorded deaths in 
1913 (Loveman 2001: 174).  
The situation of the nitrate workers in the north of the country was even worse. The 
work was dangerous, and the wages usually consisted of tokens (fiches), which were only 
valid in company stores (pulperías) that set higher prices than ordinary stores. 
Furthermore, the volatile character of the nitrate market prompted producers to lay off 
workers regularly, and this led to periodic waves of unemployment, in which thousands 
of unemployed workers were forced to seek work in the cities. These horrible conditions 
inevitably led to protest, and in 1890 government troops were sent out to quell Latin 
America’s first general strike. This was first manifestation of the social question, which 
would grow to become Chile’s most pressing national problem. Especially in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, strikes affected most cities and production centres, 
and quite a few were suppressed violently, with death tolls rising to several hundred. 
Meanwhile, socialism spread rapidly among the working class, and labour unions and 
socialist parties boomed. One of the central figures was Luis Emilio Recabarren, who 
was involved in the Chilean Workers’ Federation (Federación Obrera de Chile, FOCH) 
and who founded the Communist Party in 1912. Despite initial resistance from the 
political elites, Recabarren and other ‘revolutionaries’ were accepted in Congress in the 
1910s. Once again, Chile’s oligarchy was able to trade off modernisation (this time at 
the political level) in return for maintaining power.  
The demands for better conditions for the country’s working class were endorsed by 
the rising middle classes. These had gained in status and influence thanks to the 
booming nitrate industry, the growing economy and the expanding bureaucracy. They 
were employed in trade, education, public office and in higher military positions. 
However, their ascendance was slow and erratic, and they had, according to a 
contemporary, not yet ‘reached the point of forming an appreciable category’ by 1908 
(quoted in Collier and Sater 1996: 173). Nevertheless, their ranks grew, and in the 
decade of the 1910s a small but self-confident middle sector was clearly discernible. 
They were appalled by the living conditions of the poor, and equally afraid of their 
revolutionary potential. Repeatedly, the middle classes pressed the parliamentary 
oligarchy to address the ‘social question’ seriously. However, Chile’s elites remained 
aloof and refused to alleviate the position of the working classes, using liberal 
arguments for free trade and self-realisation. (Silva 1993a: 466) 
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Progress and Positivism: Lastarria and Letelier 
With the triumph of liberalism over conservative thought, the notion of ‘progress’ 
became a central feature of Chile’s intellectual and cultural life. In the course of time, it 
was replaced with the word modernisation, which conveyed more or less the same 
meaning:  
[b]oth words (…) implied an admiration for the latest ideas, modes, values, 
inventions and styles of Europe and the United States and a desire to adopt – 
rarely to adapt – them (Bradford Burns 1980: 8-9).  
This did not mean, however, that there were no theoretical notions to underpin the 
discourse (and project) of modernisation. Bernardo Subercaseaux (1997b) discerns three 
such suppositions. First, a teleological supposition harboured the idea of indefinite 
progress for mankind. This implied that the future would be a very humane and social 
one, and that modernisation would be a constant path towards that future. Second, a 
technical-scientific supposition echoed the belief that science and technology present the 
best ways to achieve full human development. Through reason, it would be possible to 
rationally redesign society into a rational, homogenous and modernising one. Finally, a 
supposition of the most adequate social modernisation glorified capitalism as the superior 
form of social and economic organisation, and advocated industry as the nexus between 
capital and science. Not surprisingly, the most popular philosophy among Chile’s 
intellectuals in this period, positivism, contained elements of all three suppositions.  
Positivism became an established ideology in Europe in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. It had come up as a doctrine that glorified science over philosophy, 
following the emergence and organisation of natural positive sciences in the eighteenth 
century. In a sense, it was a by-product of industrialisation, technology and empiricism; 
the use of scientific methods in daily life was one of positivism’s main roots 
(Subercaseaux 1997a: 203; Ardao 1963: 517). Its first representative was the French 
philosopher Auguste Comte; among the later interpreters we find Renan, John Stuart 
Mill, and Spencer. In Chile, however, positivism could not be an endogenous ideology. 
Industrialisation had been delayed, and there was very little scientific knowledge. Here, 
positivism brought about science, instead of the reverse. Moreover, it was introduced 
with an explicit intention of stimulating the natural sciences (Ardao 1963: 517).  
Unlike in some other Latin American countries, positivism was not carbon copied 
from the original sources, nor was it being used to legitimise authoritarian regimes 
under the flag of ‘ordered progress’. In Chile it became associated with ‘contestation 
and social regeneration’ (Subercaseaux 1997a: 205). This was almost fully attributable to 
the Liberal champion Victorino Lastarria, who introduced positivism into Chile in 1868 
and became its most vigorous, if heterodox, advocate. Lastarria was especially interested 
in the element of progress, which is central to the Comtian interpretation of positivism. 
According to Comte, societies pass through three levels of development: theological, 
metaphysical and scientific (or ‘positivist’). Lastarria adapted this view to the local 
context: Latin America had lived the theological phase in the colonial era, the 
metaphysical level had come with independence, and he considered the continent to be 
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in a transitional period to the positivist level in his days. He freely combined his liberal 
views with Comtian thought, even if these appeared to be antagonistic. For Lastarria, 
the state should only guarantee individual freedom, yet simultaneously he endorsed 
strong reformist policies. Similarly, his belief in individual freedom forced him to reject 
positivism’s authoritarian aspects, and he altered Comte’s motto ‘order and progress’ 
into ‘freedom and progress’. Moreover, he completely rejected Comte’s later notion of 
a ‘religion of the humanities’. Despite these adaptations, Lastarria used positivism to 
define a developmental path for Chile. Unlike other positivists, the example for 
Lastarria was not continental Europe, but England and the United States:  
In reality, it is the positive spirit which has saved the English countries from the 
general shipwreck, and which prepared and realised the triumph of semecracy or 
self-governance in the United States. If the American republics had been able to 
imitate it, their moral and political progress would have been more effective in 
the fifty years of independence that have passed (Lastarria 1875). 
For Lastarria, democracy, federalism and individual freedom are the positivist future for 
Chile. Economic and social development, he implies, will follow automatically. In 
order to reach this future, he suggests positivist politics, in which liberalism and Comtian 
positivism are reconciled (Jaksic 1989: 41-43; Subercaseaux 1997a: 209-213; Hale 1988: 
389-391). 
Lastarria’s ‘positivist liberalism’ became a popular current in Chilean positivism, but 
by no means the only one. There were also a handful of orthodox Comtians, who 
followed Comte in his ‘religion of the humanities’ and defended these doctrines with a 
sectarian fervour. More important, though, there was another group of positivists who 
originated in the ‘positivist liberalism’ but evolved towards a more consistent, solid 
form of positivism which was closely tied to the middle classes. This group would set 
up several institutions that would become crucial for the emancipation of the middle 
classes, and the subsequent implementation of their project of modernisation (Silva 
2007). The undisputed leader of this faction was Valentín Letelier (Subercaseaux 1997a: 
213).  
From the 1880s onward, Letelier became Chile’s main educational figure, creating 
cornerstone institutions like the Pedagogic Institute (Instituto Pedagógico) and receiving 
broad governmental support for his educational modernisation plans. In the 1880s, he 
had travelled to Prussia, where he studied the education system, and he hired German 
professors to become the teachers of the Instituto Pedagógico. In his view, pedagogical 
training on a positivist basis should be a cornerstone for the transformation of 
education, and of society. Although he copied from the Prussian model, he defended 
himself against criticisms of germanophilia:  
we did not hire German professors out of any special inclination for the 
German race, but rather because Germany is the nation that trains the best 
teachers, and also the nation that is better prepared to respond to our demand 
for services (quoted in Jaksic 1989: 51).  
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Letelier had rejected orthodox positivism in the early 1880s, but did adhere to many of 
Comte’s views. He was, like Lastarria, especially interested in the law of the three stages 
of society, and adapted it to the educational system. For Letelier, Chile’s educational 
system had been ‘theological’ under conservative rule, in the 1830s and 40s, and had 
partly remained so because of ongoing conservative attempts to control it. The 
‘metaphysical stage’ was represented by the influence of liberalism on education, which 
was characterised by chaos, abstract thought and ineffectiveness. Only the ‘scientific 
stage’ could render both previous stages obsolete, and bring much needed order and 
progress to the country (ibid., pp. 53-54). 
Letelier’s concern about order led him to take a much more authoritarian stance 
than Lastarria. For him, individual freedom and authority were complementary, not 
antagonistic: ‘Scientifically, freedom is equally indispensable for the development of 
human faculties as authority is to satisfy social needs’ (quoted in Larraín 2001: 93). He 
advocated strong governmental policies to enforce education, vaccination, social 
security and savings, to prohibit child labour and to regulate labour rights and 
prostitution:  
Let us be men of science, and as such keep in mind that the objective of politics 
is not freedom, is not authority, is not any other abstract principle, but that it is 
to satisfy the social needs in order to procure the perfection of man and the 
development of society (quoted in Subercaseaux 1997a: 214).  
In the end, positivism, in the versions of both Lastarria and Letelier, was crucial for the 
creation of state institutions which would become strongholds of the middle classes, 
such as the Instituto Nacional and several sanitary services (Silva 2007).9 Moreover, it had 
created both a conscience of and a language for modernisation, which should take place 
in the context of social order and through rational, if not scientific means. This would 
become another constant in the Chilean trajectory towards modernity. From now on, 
Chilean projects of modernisation, from whatever pedigree or political perspective, 
would all be substantiated by making use of theoretical or doctrinal underpinnings. 
2.5 Mesocratic Modernisation: The Welfare State and Industrialisation 
In the 1910s and 1920s, a series of external shocks put an end to the liberal project of 
modernisation, and with it the ‘parliamentary system’. Meanwhile, the middle classes 
were more than ready to take over power. Their emphasis on meritocracy and 
professionalism brought a new phenomenon into existence in Chile: technocrats, who 
used rational and scientific methods in order to modernise the country. However, they 
were not able to take the helm directly. In a typically Chilean way, the clash between 
social classes was resolved by means of an authoritarian but modernising interlude, in 
which a new order was given shape. Only in 1938 were the middle classes able to set in 
                                              
9 It should be noted that in this period the middle classes did not consist of entrepreneurs or 
industrialists, as was the case in Europe. Rather, the Chilean middle classes consisted of university 
professionals, bureaucrats, and provincial land-owners (Góngora 1986: 166). As a result, they have always 
been strongly oriented towards the state and higher education.  
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motion their own project of modernisation, which was based on the creation of a basic 
welfare state, state-led industrialisation, and a deepening of the democratic structures.  
 
The Interlude: Alessandri and Ibáñez  
The internal erosion of ‘oligarchic modernity’ during the parliamentary period was 
deemed to bring the political model down. The middle classes, who were yearning for 
political power, had become a strong, if heterogeneous, pressure group. More 
importantly, the social question had become acute with the collapse of the nitrate 
industries and other export sectors, directly after World War I. Even if these sectors did 
recover in the years to come, the influx of tens of thousands of unemployed into the 
urban slums underlined the country’s dependence on the world market and its 
economic vulnerability. It also deprived the oligarchy of its legitimisation: economic 
success. By 1920, it became clear that the Götterdämmerung of Chile’s elites could only 
end in the restoration of political legitimacy - the only question being: on what 
grounds. The restoration of ‘monarchic’ authority, as had been applied by Portales (and 
unsuccessfully reinstalled by Balmaceda) had become obsolete. By now, the masses had 
been bestowed with universal suffrage (that is, for literate men), and legitimacy had to 
be won at the ballot-box. On the other hand, the landed elites were still very influential 
(and able to manipulate electoral outcomes by forcing their inquilinos to vote for a 
certain candidate), and the system of ‘buying votes’ was still very popular, so ‘true mass 
democracy’ seemed a highly unlikely enterprise. The solution was brought about by an 
interregnum of 18 years, in which charismatic caudillismo and authoritarian military rule 
alternated (Góngora 1986: 137). 
Arturo Alessandri (nicknamed the Lion of Tarapacá) won the 1920 elections with 
fierce anti-oligarchic rhetoric and a programme which promised constitutional reform 
and social legislation. He appealed directly to the urban and rural masses in a famous 
eloquent style that made him extremely popular. Despite his anti-oligarchic rhetoric, 
though, he was not the man to revolutionise the system: ‘He was not a revolutionary. 
Nor was he (…) a popular leader. All in all, he was a parliamentary leader’ (Salazar and 
Pinto 1999a: 44). Moreover, the parliamentary system was still in place, leaving the 
President little room for the strong leadership he had in mind. The oligarchic 
opposition was able to obstruct his programme and his own liberal party was divided; 
even electoral victories in parliament could not alleviate the sense of disillusionment 
among his followers. In one aspect, though, the Alessandri administration signified a 
political modernisation. For the first time in Chilean history, the middle classes 
obtained access to the higher administrative echelons. Alessandri personally appointed 
urban professionals, union leaders and professors to the highest directive functions, as 
well as in the cabinet (Góngora 1986: 134). This first step towards mesocratic and 
democratic rule was, however, not enough to end the parliamentary system. Only the 
intervention of the military, in 1924-1925, could bring about fundamental changes in 
the political model, through the installation of a new constitution (which was approved 
by plebiscite in August 1925). This new constitution shifted the balance of power back 
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to the executive, but did leave the Congress budgetary influence. By then, Alessandri’s 
position had become untenable, and he had to make way for the next strong man of 
Chilean politics, Colonel Carlos Ibáñez del Campo.  
Ibáñez’s rule, which was formalised in 1927, was dictatorial, ruthless, and hardly 
constitutional. Nevertheless, the idea of a ‘strong man’ at the helm, combined with his 
success in economic matters, made him a relatively popular dictator. Contemporary 
intellectual Alberto Edwards praises him for ‘reconstituting authority’ (Edwards 1928: 
265). Indeed, his authoritarianism and ideology of order echoed much of the spirit of 
Portales - and foreshadowed that of Pinochet (Loveman 2001: 185). Rather than being 
exclusively conservative, he combined conservatism with a modernising outlook, 
mainly oriented towards the economic dimension of modernity (Silva 2007). For him, 
only authoritarianism could save Chile from the ‘soft anarchy of the salons’ of the 
parliamentary period, and bring about modernisation: 
 [I will not] hesitate, if the situation requires it, to assume the maximum of 
responsibilities and attributes I deem necessary to avoid chaos and to assure the 
welfare and the progress of Chile (quoted in Góngora 1986: 166).  
Much like Balmaceda had done some forty years earlier, Ibáñez embarked on a range of 
public works and innovations that transformed the appearance of the nation. Increasing 
copper revenues and a temporary resurgence of the nitrate industry enabled him to 
build roads, sewerage, ports, water systems, prisons, railways and irrigation. Thousands 
of workers were employed in this mushrooming enterprise. Furthermore, he created 
many new institutions, like the Chilean air force (Fuerzas Aérea de Chile, FACH), which 
carried out operations for what later became the Chilean Airlines (Linea Aérea Nacional, 
LAN) and the national police (Carabineros). Meanwhile, the educational system was 
expanded to double its capacity in a decade (Loveman 2001: 184). 
Ibáñez especially favoured the development of Chile’s industry. Moreover, he was 
the first to give the state a central role in its promotion, foreshadowing what would 
become known as ‘the productive state’ (Salazar and Pinto 1999a: 51). He installed 
tariffs to protect Chile’s infant industries and created credit institutions for agriculture, 
mining, and industry, Moreover, he gave the state several means to intervene in the 
economic realm by controlling exports and imports, capital markets, and the 
introduction of new technologies (ibid., p. 49). His incentives and import substitution 
policies did not miss their target: from the mid-1920s onwards, Chile’s industry grew 
rapidly, even diversifying on some fronts (Loveman 2001: 184; Góngora 1986: 184). For 
Ibáñez, the state should be the motor of this process:  
The historical parties (…) have not understood that the direction of the Modern 
State should be preferably and energetically oriented towards the solution of the 
economic problems, and towards the organisation of the productive forces that 
constitute the only solid basis for the strengthening of the national economy. 
(…) [T]hey have not understood that the old political standards must be 
substituted with a new government which resolves and executes, and does not 
neglect the solution of national problems (quoted in Ortega et al. 1989: 34).  
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Ibáñez’ ‘modern state’, as he called it, would remain in effect until 1973, albeit in 
different shapes and forms (Góngora 1986: 187). 
One of the main modernisations of the Ibáñez government was the rationalisation 
and de-politisation of the state bureaucracy. Ibáñez abhorred politics and politicians 
and intended to create an a-political and technical administration. To this end, he made 
use of young professionals and technicians: ‘I have tried to appoint to the high offices 
of the administration young, independent men, the majority of whom are fairly 
unknown in the political realm’ (quoted in Góngora 1986: 178). This group of middle-
class professionals provided Ibáñez with his own kind of ‘technocrats avant la lettre’, 
which were strongly guided by values such as professionalism, efficiency, and 
meritocracy (Silva 1998b: 52-61; Silva 2007). Furthermore he reformed the state 
apparatus to increase its efficiency, created a ‘General Controllership’ (Controlaría 
General de la República) to audit its performance, and installed a national treasury. Since 
congress had been completely subdued, the political game almost came to a complete 
standstill: ‘Between May 1927 and July 1931 Chile lived without interior politics; there 
was only administration’ (Góngora 1986: 170). The same would later be claimed for the 
dictatorship of Pinochet (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 183). 
Ibáñez’ technical ‘modern state’, his restoration of authority, and his economic 
success did not last. The 1929 world economic crash once again revealed Chile’s 
economic vulnerability: in 1932 exports had dropped to only 12 per cent of the 1929 
level, while imports remained high. Investments from abroad abruptly dried up and the 
state debt (which had doubled to $62 million since 1920) became an unbearable load 
(Correa et al. 2001: 105-106; Collier and Sater 1996: 220). In the end, Ibáñez was not 
defeated by his political enemies (who were many), but by the Great Depression. While 
he brought order and progress to the country, his authoritarian rule was accepted by the 
population; but when progress ended, his support soon followed (Góngora 1986: 178). 
In 1931 he was forced to resign, and a year later his archenemy Alessandri took over the 
rudder once more. By now, however, the parliamentary republic had died for good. No 
longer could the elite impose its will: the constitution of 1925 left too little room for it. 
The oligarchy had made way for the middle classes, parliamentarism for mesocracy. 
From now on until 1964, Chile’s state system would become defined by more or less 
democratic party politics, in what Mario Góngora has labelled the ‘presidential regime 
with party alliances’. No longer was one single party able to dominate congress, and 
party alliances became a characteristic feature (Góngora 1986: 237).10 Finally, the middle 
classes had come to power and were able to set in motion a project of modernisation 
that was based on the creation of a welfare system, industrialisation and 
democratisation.  
 
                                              
10 Changes in the state model in Chile have been brought about by authoritarianism or by social conflict. 
Portales created an authoritarian state, which Balmaceda lost in civil war. After the ‘parliamentary state’, 
Ibáñez created a democratic middle-class state through authoritarian means. As will be seen in the next 
chapters, the pattern continues: the state model once again went into crisis under Allende, giving rise to 
large-scale social unrest, only to be given a new shape and form under the authoritarian rule of Pinochet.  
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The Providing State and the Creation of a Welfare System 
In the late 1930s, a new project of modernisation was initiated, this time led by the 
middle classes, in an alliance with organised labour. Rather than being a premeditated 
and considered project, it responded to the direct needs of the era: the economic crisis 
of the 1930s, combined with the exacerbated social question, and the rise of organised 
popular classes. It was oriented towards the ‘Social-Democratic welfare modernity’ of 
North-Western Europe, and encompassed the social, economic and political 
dimensions of modernity. Central in this project of modernisation was the state, which 
obtained two new faces: the ‘providing state’ and the ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Correa et al. 
2001: 136; 149). Interestingly, the new central position of the state as the 
developmental motor of society was a postulation of the Left. However, in many ways 
it was a vindication of what conservative historians have labelled ‘the state in good 
shape’ or the ‘Portalian state’, that is authoritarian, oriented towards the maintenance of 
order and strongly normative (Salazar and Pinto 1999b: 47-48). Elements of this 
‘providing’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ state already became tentatively visible under the 
government of Alessandri (1920-1924) and Ibáñez (1925-1932) as well as the second 
Alessandri administration (1932-1938). However, it only developed into a true project 
of modernisation in the period 1938-1964. 
In 1938, the first ‘Popular Front’ government took office, consisting of a coalition 
between the political Centre (in the form of the middle-class Radical Party) and the Left 
(including the Socialist and Communist parties). One of its central elements was its 
agenda of social justice. The notion of social justice had become a central theme in 
political discourse since Alessandri’s election in 1920. It had evolved from general 
principles involving justice and equality to a more reduced concept of top-down social 
and labour legislation, all under state responsibility (Silva 1993a: 468). With the 
triumph of the centre-left Popular Front coalition in 1938, it became a driving force 
behind an unprecedented series of social investments and laws. Between 1930 and the 
1950s, social expenditure more than tripled. For this purpose, the state apparatus was 
enlarged with different institutions which supervised the execution of social policies: 
the percentage of civil servants employed in the social sector boomed from 1.3 per cent 
in 1925 to 31.7 per cent in 1955. Simultaneously, welfare expenditure tripled, health 
care was made accessible for all workers and their families, education was expanded 
rapidly and housing programmes tried to alleviate the living conditions in the urban 
slums (Correa et al. 2001: 150). 
Chile’s welfare state did do a lot to improve the fate of the country’s workers and 
poor, but it certainly did not reach all. Rather than being generally socialist in 
orientation, it was highly corporatist. Only the sectors that were well-organised into 
unions or guilds (gremios), or that otherwise were able to strongly articulate their 
demands, could exert enough influence on the government to be granted social 
benefits. On the one hand, this encouraged protests and strikes by labour movements 
and other groups, often directed by socialist and communist parties (Salazar and Pinto 
1999b: 117). In the period 1930-1964, mass demonstrations and strikes mushroomed, 
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making unions like the Chilean Workers Confederation (Confederación de Trabajadores de 
Chile, CTCH) major political players. On the other hand, it excluded the unemployed 
as well as the sectors which were poorly organised. These sectors could benefit only 
marginally from the willingness of the ‘providing state’ to implement social legislation 
and invest in social expenditure. Moreover, the concept of social justice did not extend 
to the rural sectors. Social legislation was directed to the urban masses exclusively, while 
the situation of the rural workers was structurally neglected. Attempts by the peasantry 
to organise were violently blocked, often with state support. Meanwhile, because of the 
extreme concentration of land in only very few hands, the lack of incentives for 
production and the obsolete production techniques, the position of the rural masses 
deteriorated. This politically dangerous situation was neglected by the state out of 
pragmatic motivations: the landed elites still held too much power. Therefore, the 
centre-left governments of the 1930s-1950s chose to ignore the situation of the rural 
workers, rather than to confront their masters (Loveman 2001: 213; Silva 1993a: 469). 
As a consequence of this ‘state corporatism’, then, only organised urban proletariats 
were able to emancipate themselves, and evolved, in the words of Salazar and Pinto, 
into a ‘modern class’: 
[t]hey became the modern class, whose culture adapted to the new times. In 
contrast, peasants, peons and Indians (the majority of the popular world) 
remained in the margin of the active participation in the emancipation project 
(Salazar and Pinto 1999b: 116).  
As a consequence, the ‘providing state’, despite its success, resolved only part of the 
social question, ignoring the situation of the urban marginal groups and the rural lower 
classes. In the context of the ideological radicalisation that swept the continent, 
especially after the Cuban revolution of 1959, these sectors became vast pools of 
electoral potential which were open to mobilisation. By 1964, they would become one 
of the main focus points of modernisation.  
 
The Entrepreneurial State: industrialisation 
While the ‘providing state’ focused on the social element of modernisation, the 
‘entrepreneurial state’ emphasised the economic one. This was a direct response to the 
effects of the economic depression of the 1930s which hit Chile’s economy particularly 
hard: of the 39 countries that provided some ninety per cent of total world trade, Chile 
was hurt the most in terms of its imports and exports between 1929 and 1932 (Ortega et 
al. 1989: 12). Exports of nitrates, which had recovered somewhat after the crisis of the 
First World War, dropped with 90 per cent between 1929 and 1932. Meanwhile, in the 
same period, copper exports fell by two thirds, while prices dropped from US$ 18 per 
pound to US$ 5.5. The social consequences of the crisis were tremendous: 50,000 
nitrate workers lost their jobs in three years, while general unemployment leapt to 
129,000 unemployed (SOFOFA 1983: 174). This crisis made amply clear that Chile’s 
economy was not only excessively dependent on exports, but that its lack of industry 
had made it equally dependent on expensive imports. Moreover, the lack of alternative 
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export products and the backward agrarian sector painfully exposed the obsolete 
structure of the economy.  
Chile’s response to the crisis was to diversify production by substituting imports, 
and to decrease the country’s dependence on exports. Chile’s outward-looking, export-
driven economy was changed into an inward-looking one, with a strong focus on an 
accelerated industrialisation. These strategies were implemented by the state, which 
took upon itself to define and execute a national development programme. In this way, 
Ibáñez’ ‘modern state’ expanded from fostering and protecting the national economy to 
actively and dynamically setting out on a completely new course. The state was now 
being viewed as an agent ‘capable of situating itself above particular interests and to 
embody the general interest of the nation’. For this purpose, it should transform its new 
functions into a ‘systematic development option, compensating the weaknesses and 
hesitations displayed by private enterprise towards reorganising the economy around a 
process of substitutive industrialisation’ (Salazar and Pinto 1999c: 81).  
The strongest expression of this new state role was the establishment, in 1939, of the 
Chilean Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, CORFO). 
The creation of this agency, which was charged with planning and executing industrial 
policies, played a major role in Chile’s modernisation in several ways. First, it affirmed 
the supremacy of developmental thinking in the country’s political circles, and 
consolidated this approach in state institutions and agencies. With CORFO, the 
creation of a national industry became pivotal. Industrial development was considered 
‘decisive for the general progress of the country and of the workers in particular, as well 
as for the possibility of achieving independent national development’ (Muñoz Gomá 
1986: 76). Industrialisation, it was argued, would favour the growth of income of the 
working classes over the others, thus creating an increasingly expanding internal market 
for its products while simultaneously benefiting the poor (Pinto 1962: 186). This line of 
development, which was based on the theories of John Maynard Keynes, intended to 
copy from what Peter Wagner has labelled ‘organised modernity’ in Europe, in which 
modern institutions (from the nation-state to modern business enterprises), organised 
labour and mass consumption interacted in the formation of what has been called the 
‘golden age of capitalism’ (Wagner 1994: 73-88). However, the Chilean version of 
European ‘organised modernity’ was markedly different in three ways. First of all, state-
led industrialisation through the CORFO project left much less room for private 
industrial enterprise. Second, the participation of foreign capital remained excessively 
high compared to national investments (which would later lead to the formulation of 
dependency theories). Finally, the inclusion of the marginal classes was only partial, in 
contrast to Europe, and did not include the rural and unorganised sectors (Larraín 
2001: 110). 
The second modernising aspect of the industrialisation project led by CORFO was a 
shift in economic emphasis, which left the landed oligarchy marginalised, while it 
simultaneously favoured the new industrial elites. These, organised into groups such as 
SOFOFA, were integrated into the CORFO project through representation in the many 
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planning committees as well as the board of directors. In many ways they supported the 
industrialisation project set in motion by the Popular Front government, even if this 
meant accepting the state fostering of organised labour. One indication of the level of 
consensus between the private industrial sectors and the state-led industrialisation 
bureaucrats is the fact that SOFOFA never filed a serious complaint against CORFO. 
Chile’s new industrialising modernity was characterised by a tacit agreement between 
industry elites and organised labour (Silva 1996: 35). The landowning elites, however, 
were less pleased with their end of the bargain. They were not included in the state-led 
developmental strategies, and often suffered from the consequences of the import 
substitution programme, because locally produced machinery often proved inferior and 
more expensive than imported machinery. Above all, they feared the rise of the rural 
masses, if labour organisations would be allowed to work on the countryside. However, 
they no longer had sufficient political leverage to block the industrialisation project, 
and were forced to strike a deal with the Radical party. Thus, their tacit support was 
traded for the guarantee that the government would not allow any form of peasant 
organisation and that the existing rural social relations would not be changed. As in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, the landed elites had made a trade-off with the 
state: in return for recognition and support for modernisation, they were able to 
maintain the traditional social relations on the countryside. However, this was no 
longer the nineteenth century, and this deal would soon contribute to the breakdown 
of the system (ibid., p. 36; Ortega 1989: 55-56; Muñoz Gomá 1986: 81-84).  
The third way in which the import industrialisation strategies, and the CORFO 
project in particular, shaped Chile’s trajectory of modernity was through the ascendance 
of a technocrat elite, which was to direct the different state institutions charged with the 
implementation of these policies (Silva 2007). These ‘new men’ (hombres nuevos), mostly 
economists and engineers, had already gained in status and importance under the rule 
of Ibáñez, with the creation of the ‘modern state’. Now they became the central 
executors of the developmental policies of the ‘entrepreneurial state’. They were an 
answer to the need to address the economic problems of the age and to create, in the 
words of the Minister of Interior of the time, Roberto Wachholtz, ‘a comprehensive, 
rational and scientifically elaborated plan, methodically applied and developed in the 
course of years’ (quoted in Muñoz Gomá 1986: 77). Indeed, there was a lack of 
economic statistics and information. According to CORFO vice-president Guillermo de 
Pedregal:  
We did not have an ordered and complete idea of the richness of our land nor, 
in general, of our possibilities. Neither did we know, in a more or less certain 
manner, how to rationally utilise the resources of the country’s different regions. 
The proper statistics are -and still are - deficient (quoted in Correa et al. 2001: 
146).  
The ascendancy of technocrats was a also response to the increasing massification of 
Chile’s society. Mario Góngora argues, referring to the writing of Jaspers, that the rise of 
the masses required more efficient methods and means of production of capital goods. 
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This is why, according to Góngora, the economist and the engineer became the two 
most valued professions in this period (Góngora 1986: 245). Simultaneously, the 
CORFO technocracy reaffirmed and consolidated the position of those middle classes 
that were tied to the state apparatus, private enterprise, and academic centres (Salazar 
and Pinto 1999b: 83). Finally, the technocrats fulfilled the role of a political buffer 
between the Left and the Right. By leaving the management of the project of 
industrialisation in the hands of technocrats, the political use of the project was 
avoided, mitigating the political conflict between the Left and Right (Silva 2004). 
The ‘entrepreneurial state’ would leave strong marks on post-1964 Chile, on two 
levels. First, it further strengthened the already strongly present Chilean orientation to 
the state as the motor of modernisation. Whereas before the state did not actively 
interfere in the economic development of the country, it now had become the single 
largest investor of the country. As a result, the state came to be seen as the most 
responsible actor in economic development as well as the prime agent of further 
modernisation. Second, the increasingly technocratic outlook of Chilean politics and 
the rationalisation of the economic activities of the state made state planning the next 
logical step in the economic activities of the state. This would be concretised in 1964, 
with the beginning of the so-called ‘era of planning’ (Góngora 1986: 280).  
Finally, the project of the middle classes was oriented towards political 
modernisation. This was achieved mainly through the extension of suffrage and 
representation to groups that had previously been excluded. Beginning with the 
parliamentary inclusion of the Communist and Socialist parties (in respectively 1922 
and 1933), women were granted suffrage in 1949. The drive towards increased 
democratisation was temporally set back, though, by the outlawing of the Communist 
party in 1948, which lasted for ten years. In 1958, finally, the introduction of the cédula 
única electoral (the single voting card) put an end to the large-scale buying of votes in the 
countryside. These measures led to a large increase in the participation of the 
population in elections, combined with an increased political awareness (de Ramón 
2001: 117-121). It was in the context of this process of democratisation combined with 
selective social modernisation (excluding the urban masses and the rural poor) that 
modernisation would acquire a new, radical nature. 
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Chapter 3 
The Third Way: Modernisation and the  
Revolution in Liberty 
The project of modernisation of the PDC was based upon Christian doctrines that were 
selectively taken from their European sources, and which were as much of a critique of 
modernity as a proposal for modernity (section 3.1.1). These doctrines were 
complemented with a new and locally developed developmental theory, structuralism, 
which strengthened the project’s legitimacy and provided it with scientific 
underpinning and concrete policy proposals (section 3.1.2). These two currents were 
brought together into an all-encompassing project of modernisation, which sough to 
fundamentally change the country’s social, political, and economic structures (section 
3.1.3). Despite an ideological ambivalence towards the state, the project was 
implemented by means of state institutions, with the strong support of a group of semi-
independent technocrats and a new policy tool in Chilean history: state planning 
(section 3.2.1). The implementation of the project caused the competition between 
three main political actors to intensify, provoking the ideological radicalisation of the 
Right and the Left (section 3.2.2). Under pressure of this competition, and especially of 
the popular unrest that was produced by the ideological ‘outbidding’ between the PDC 
and the Left, the project was slowed down and the party made a sharp move to the 
Right (section 3.2.3). In the end, the project left strong legacies at the economic level, 
such as the agrarian reform and the ‘Chilenisation’ of the copper mines, and at the 
social level, through the emphasis on the inclusion of the marginal masses. At the 
political level, the legacy of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was unforeseen, and consisted 
mainly on the polarisation of the political spectre (section 3.3).  
3.1 Constructing the Revolution: Communitarianism and the ECLA 
The project of the Christian democrats was constructed against the backdrop of a 
faltering economy, increasing electoral competition, and the Cuban revolution. By the 
late 1950s, the developmental model that been based upon state-led industrialisation 
and the creation of a welfare system for organised labour, had become exhausted. It was 
no longer able to create levels of economic growth that would be necessary to provide 
goods and services to the working classes, let alone the marginal sectors. As a result, it 
became unable to appease the working classes, which had been a key factor in the 
stability of the model. Simultaneously, the extension of suffrage to all adults had 
opened up groups of society for electoral competition that had been excluded until 
then: women, the urban marginal sectors, and the rural poor. Combined with the 
radical revolutionary ethos that was sweeping Latin America since the Cuban 
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Revolution in 1959, the exhaustion of the developmental model and the availability of 
new and unsatisfied electoral groups created a potentially explosive situation. It is in 
this context that the Christian Democrats constructed a project of modernisation that 
sought to take away the causes of popular discontent as well as reignite the country’s 
economic development.  
3.1.1 The Doctrinarian Background of the Project 
The middle-class project of industrialisation and welfare became exhausted towards the 
1960s. The growth of the economy lagged behind expectations, making it increasingly 
difficult for the state to provide social care for the working class. Furthermore, the 
political success of the ‘Popular Front’ governments, consisting of the middle class 
Radical Party combined with parties of the Left, had waned. In the 1950s, two 
conservative governments, one led by former dictator Ibáñez (1952-1958) and one by 
the son of his archrival Alessandri (1958-1964), sought to modify the project, but to 
little avail. In addition, the wave of political radicalisation that flowed over Latin 
America, and especially the Cuban Revolution, produced an awareness among the 
middle classes that a different path should be chosen. This change came in the form of 
the Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC), which was set up in 
1957, as the successor of the Falange, a progressive Christian movement which had 
evolved out of the Conservative Party. Even though it had its electoral base among the 
same sectors as the Radical Party, it developed a contrasting style of politics: instead of 
focusing on pragmatic coalition compromises, it drew up an explicit and radical 
modernising ideology, which clearly distinguished it from its competitors.  
The basis of the Christian Democrat ideology was a critique of the trajectory of 
modernity in Chile. It argued that the still unresolved social question and class struggle 
had their roots in the capitalist economic system and in the traditional social structures 
of Chilean society, especially in the countryside. Simultaneously, it strongly rejected 
Marxism and the Socialist alternative that were becoming increasingly popular. It 
therefore proposed an alternative modernity, a third way, based on the idea of 
community, which would replace the capitalist system. Expanding on the reference 
point of ‘Social-Democratic welfare modernity’ (the strong role of the state in creating 
social justice and the emphasis on collective identities), it created a highly original 
modernising ideology that was translated into a powerful political project.  
 
Maritain and the Creation of a Christian Alternative 
The doctrinarian background of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was derived from the papal 
encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931), and from the 
teachings of French philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), all of which stressed the 
need for the Church to address the social needs of the lower classes. Maritain’s views in 
particular received much attention from the young Christian Democrats, as they dealt 
specifically with the position of the excluded masses in the context of modernity. As 
has been mentioned in Chapter 1, it was not uncommon or considered 
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disadvantageous to ‘borrow’ foreign doctrines and to adapt them to the local context - 
on the contrary, parties and ideologists were constantly on the lookout for new and 
avant-garde ideas coming from Europe. As the historian Bernadino Bravo put it: 
The first priority [of political parties] seemed to be not to lag behind, to keep 
up to date, to be ready for the new times, to move with the foreign currents that 
they considered to be the most advanced and to assume their representation in 
Chile (quoted in González 1989: 63). 
In the case of the Christian Democrats it was Eduardo Frei, one of the later founders of 
the PDC, who in 1934 was sent abroad to Europe by the Conservative Party to make 
contacts and explore the intellectual climate of the era. In France he met Maritain and 
attended some of his lectures, which impressed him deeply. After his return to Chile, 
Frei introduced the teachings of the French master to a circle of intimates, who began 
to study and develop his theories in depth, adapting them to the Chilean case and 
combining them with the Church’s doctrines (Gazmuri 2000: 156).  
The attractiveness of the philosophy of Maritain to the socialcristianos (as the socially 
engaged sector of the Church was then called) lay in his approach to the contradictions 
and problems of modern society. Maritain sought to rejuvenate Christian thought in 
order to confront the social and moral questions of the twentieth century. To this end, 
he merged traditional values, the idea of social justice and community and elements of 
modernity (like the secular state) into a ‘New Christianity’ (Corvalán 2001: 74). This 
approach was particularly appealing for the progressive sectors of the middle classes, 
who were very much aware of the pressing social question and its potential for 
revolution. It gave the young socialcristianos the means to confront the social question 
without having to resort to socialism. Coming from the Conservative Party, the bulwark 
of the rural oligarchy, they took up the social question with particular fervour, and 
reworked Maritain’s doctrines to fit the Chilean context. In particular the notion of 
communitarianism as an alternative to both capitalism and communism was carefully 
thought out and developed by socialcristiano leaders like Eduardo Frei and Bernardo 
Leighton. In contrast with the Left, which used the notion of social justice as a tool for 
co-optation and electoral rhetoric, the young dogs of the Conservative Party made it the 
central feature of their political doctrine (Silva 1993a: 468-474).1  
 
Social Transformation through Communitarianism 
Communitarianism as it was developed by the socialcristianos placed a strong emphasis 
on the social dimension of modernity. It envisioned a society in which the state and the 
                                              
1 It should be noted that the socialcristianos were not simply anti-capitalist, or simply anticommunist. 
They were critical of both, but acknowledged their values as well. For instance, Julio Silva Solar, one of 
the most progressive Social Democrat leaders, argued that despite all oppression, exploitation, and 
imperialism, ‘capitalism has worked for the progress of man unlike most other historical projects’ (Silva 
Solar 1954: 21). Conversely, Jaime Castillo Velasco, after criticising Communism for its totalitarianism 
and its anti-Christian disposition, emphasised that it is also a legitimate ‘expression of the global crisis of 
capitalism’ (Castillo Velasco 1954b: 18). Frei Montalva summarised these views during the presidential 
campaign of 1958 with his famous phrase, that ‘if there is one thing worse than Communism, it is anti-
Communism’.  
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citizen were incorporated through ‘intermediate levels’, like the family, the Church, the 
municipality and the corporation. All social sectors could be integrated in the 
functioning of society, by means of a mix between humanism and Christianity which 
would dissolve the antagonisms between the classes. As Frei summed it up in his 
Homenaje a Maritain (1964):  
[I]t will be thanks to Christianity, and because of the formation of a God-
centred humanism, which universal value can reconcile men of all situations 
(…). This will be realised as a result of the will to obtain social renovation, and 
man will assume more personal freedom, freedom and personality - not of class, 
which will absorb him in the conflict with another class, but of someone who 
communicates to his class his own dignity in which (…) the actual division of 
classes has disappeared (Frei and Bustos 1964: 32-33).  
In contrast to the Conservative interpretation of Christian thought, the socialcristianos 
viewed Christianity as a highly progressive force, and proclaimed it to be the core of 
their modernising agenda. It was claimed to be the basis for social justice and for the 
functioning of the modern, secular, state. Because it could avoid class conflict while 
reforming the country’s socio-economic structures, Christianity became the path for 
modernisation without social conflict. In other words, the Christian component of 
socialcristiano doctrine made it possible to combine profound social change with the 
maintenance of order.  
In particular the notion of communitarianism, originally taken from Maritain, was 
developed and adapted to the Chilean case over time. When the socialcristianos split 
from the Conservative Party in 1938 and organised themselves in the Falange Nacional, 
they proclaimed communitarianism to be the basis of the ‘establishment of a new 
order’ (24 points of the Falange). Fundamentally, the idea was that capital and labour 
should be joined together in intermediate organisations, which should be in control of 
the functioning of the processes of production (Corvalán 2001: 74). However, it would 
not be till the 1950s that the notion of communitarianism was concretised and given 
new dynamism by adding to it a particularly revolutionary flavour. Young socialcristianos 
such as Jacques Chonchol and Julio Silva Solar proposed profound changes that would 
adjust:  
the political, economic, and social structures, which have broken down, to the 
level of development of the consciousness of the people and the liberty of the 
common man (Chonchol 1952: 12). 
This ‘revolution’ consisted of a profound change in the values that directed society, a 
strong orientation towards the people and their struggle, and the replacement of the old 
social structures with communitarian ones. This ‘top-down modernisation’, with its 
strong focus on the social dimension of modernity, was the superior alternative for 
Marxist revolution:  
 The communitarian revolution, even if it is not the only possible revolution 
nowadays, is the only true one, because it is unique in translating the intimate 
nature of man, creature of spirit and flesh, to concrete historical reality (ibid., p. 
16).  
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In the late 1950s, the social doctrine of the socialcristianos became increasingly 
influenced by the teachings of the Belgian Jesuit Roger Vekemans. Vekemans, who had 
been sent by the Jesuit General at the request of the Chilean Church to aid its anti-
communist programme, had set up a Department of Sociology at the Catholic 
University of Santiago, where the country’s socio-political problems could be studied in 
depth. He elaborated on the notion of ‘marginality’. Marginals, in his view, were those 
sectors of society that were socially, politically and economically excluded from 
society.2 The ‘marginal masses’, which lived largely excluded from society, should not 
only be aided out of humanitarian considerations, he argued. Society itself cannot 
function well while maintaining such enclaves of exclusion3. In order to create a healthy 
and correctly functioning society, the marginal sectors should be incorporated. By 
connecting social integration with the modernisation of society, Vekemans created a 
highly appealing doctrine for the socialcristianos, which would eventually be 
incorporated into the PDC programme in the form of Promoción Popular (Moulian and 
Guerra 2000: 105, 179).4 
 
Political and Economic Modernisation 
The communitarian doctrine of the socialcristianos went far beyond the social 
integration of the marginal and excluded sectors of society. It also focused on the 
political level of modernity, considering that the exclusion of the masses is not only 
caused by economic or social structures, but also by the political system. In modernity, 
it was argued, the state had gained enormous powers vis-à-vis the population, while civil 
society had become increasingly fragmented and powerless. As a result, the people had 
lost their ability to exercise their proper role in society. As was summarised in a 1964 
party document:  
The enormous powers of the modern state increasingly disconnect it from its 
basis: the community. On the other hand, the growth of the population and its 
geographic distribution have disarticulated the community itself: the human 
concentration in the urban sectors is nowadays so large, that interpersonal 
relations within the social core itself have been limited to a minimum (…) 
While this situation exists, true democratic socio-economic development will be 
impossible, because decisions will be taken by an almost omnipotent state and 
will be implemented without active participation of the people. (PDC 1964: 1-2) 
The socialcristianos made a clear distinction between what they saw as ‘formal 
democracy’ and ‘true democracy’. Within the framework of ‘formal democracy’, the 
people would remain passive and powerless against the powers of the state. Instead, 
‘true democracy’, which was, in the words of Frei, ‘the profane name of the Christian 
                                              
2 For a more elaborate analysis of the notion of marginality, see Kay (1989). 
3 The idea that social investment should not be based on caritas but on the notion that society cannot 
function properly if large sections of the population are excluded was not new in Chile. It had been the 
main idea of the so-called beneficiencia programme that had been set up in late colonial times under 
Manuel de Salas (see Chapter 2).  
4 See section 3.1.3 for an analysis of the promoción popular programme.  
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ideal’, would go beyond the realms of electoral systems and be an integral model of 
power-sharing:  
Electoral power is a part of political power, which, in itself, is only part of power 
in general, which includes the economy and culture. The people should have 
access to all those forms of power and participate in its exercise in order to 
create a truly democratic nation (Presidential Message 1965).  
This expansion of the democratic system should, in the view of the Christian 
democrats, take place through intermediate groups, such as labour unions, local 
organisations and gremios. These organisations would have direct access to the 
government, or even have representatives on the boards of directors of semi-fiscal 
organisations like CORFO and the Bank of Investment (Declaration of Principles of the 
PDC 1957). To ensure an equal representation, socialcristianos like Bernardo Leighton 
had even argued for compulsary unionisation, ‘in order to incorporate the masses of 
workers and employees of our country’ (Leighton 1946). Only through the active 
participation of the proletariat, then, could Chile create a ‘real democracy’, instead of 
the ‘formal democracy’ it had known before (Cardemil 1997: 157-166).  
On the economic level, even more radical proposals were developed. In 1946 
Bernardo Leighton proposed the ‘substitution of capitalism’ by a ‘labourist economy’, 
in which the means of production would be in the hands of intermediate organisations 
in which representatives of the proletariat would have a place (Leighton 1946). This 
doctrine was elaborated, in the 1950s, by young radicals of the PDC, especially 
Chonchol and Silva Solar, who combined it with a Marxist analysis and who advocated 
a communitarian revolution that was fundamentally Socialist in nature. They proposed 
the transfer of the means of production to the workers, who, organised in corporations, 
would have full control of the production process (Fleet 1985: 54). These views did not 
represent the majority of the PDC, though, and were contested by more conservative 
leaders like Eduardo Frei.  
A compromise was found in the idea of a ‘human economy’, in which production 
would be organised with a view to the common good. The economic power should no 
longer lie with ‘individuals who are guided by the desire for unlimited gain, nor by the 
monopolistic state’. Instead, it envisioned ‘labour communities’ in which the workers 
would collectively own the means of production. The state, as the ‘ultimate expression 
of the communitarian life’, should:  
promote the expansion of the economy according to a general planning system, 
democratically managed, which coordinates private and public activities, and in 
which free enterprise and the spirit of profit will be subordinated to the moral 
norms and the interests of the collective (Declaration of Principles of the PDC, 
1957).5 
                                              
5 One should of course be careful to include electoral materials (as well as political speeches) in an 
evaluation of the construction of a party ideology, as these may well serve political purposes as well. In 
the case of the PDC’s ‘human economy’, an intention to capture a potentially Left-wing electorate may 
have played a role. However, it was also an internally debated and developed doctrine, which had been in 
the making for years.  
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As a result, the ‘human economy’ contained a strong critique of private property and 
free enterprise, and proposed that control over the means of production should be in 
the hands of labour collectives. As will be seen in the next chapter, this approached, 
from a communitarian perspective, the proposals that would be put forward by the 
Unidad Popular in 1973.  
 
The radical nature of the project of the Christian Democrat had repercussions on its 
style. While the Falange had been a relatively open political party, willing to 
compromise with the Left in the modernisation of society, that attitude changed in the 
1950s. Jaime Castillo, one of the ideological leaders of the party, even argued that all 
pacts and compromises should be abandoned. The scope of its project was so large that 
the party would have to gain power by itself in order to ensure its success (González 
1989: 67). As Castillo put it: 
[The Christian Democrats] will have to be - through the men who lead them - 
the nucleus of a vanguard that will come to power. (…) Our party will have to 
be the decisive element in the formation of a national vanguard, in which those 
who understand the urgent needs of the epoch and want to work for Chile are 
truly united (Castillo 1954a: 16). 
As a result, the Christian Democrat project was very much an elite project, full of 
intellectualism and doctrinal elaboration, which could only be fully appreciated by a 
small circle of insiders. That is not to say, though, that it did not respond to Chilean 
reality or the political developments of the era. It followed the general atmosphere of 
political radicalisation that had characterised the second half of the 1950s. The Cuban 
Revolution, and the Cold War in general, had created great expectations of 
revolutionary change in Latin America among the Left, and this pressured the Christian 
Democrats to create a viable alternative. Simultaneously the meagre economic results of 
the years before 1964 convinced the socialcristianos that a fundamental change in 
economic regime was necessary. Additionally, the Christian Democrats shared in a 
broader tendency, which took place on a global scale, towards ‘messianistic’ or ‘utopian’ 
proposals to reshape society (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 97).6 Finally, the ‘alternativist’ line 
between hard-line capitalism and Communism gained momentum with the Alliance for 
Progress that had been set up by the Kennedy administration and which supported 
reformism in order to avoid Communist take-overs in Latin America (Fermandois 2005: 
299). 
 
In short, the proposals for social, political and economic modernisation made by the 
socialcristianos focused on specific aspects of modernity, while ignoring or rejecting 
others. As an example, Social-Democratic welfare modernity was used, with a strong 
                                              
6 In this context, Jocelyn-Holt refers to Frei’s famous speech called the Patria Joven (the young nation), in 
which he uses a language and manner of speech which invokes religious associations, as if Frei himself 
were Moses leading the people through the desert. This ‘civil religion’, as Bellah (1967) has labelled it, 
was very influential in this period in Chile, and can be seen in the appearances of Frei, Allende and 
Pinochet. For an analysis of civil religion under Pinochet, see Cristi (2001) and Lagos (2001).  
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emphasis on the state, economic redistribution and collective identities.7 However, it 
took this point of reference some steps further with proposals for a ‘true democracy’ 
and a ‘human economy’. Furthermore, it argued that social justice could only be 
attained in modernity and by overcoming obsolete traditions and institutions. In this 
sense, the modern was advocated as a process of profound social change that would 
generate progress for the people at large. As a consequence, the socialcristianos took the 
secular nature of the state as a given and based their political programme on secular 
humanistic political doctrines that were only Christian in inspiration (González 1989: 
44). Moreover, they proposed the use of a modern institution such as the state for the 
creation of a ‘new order’, in which ‘the economy should be directed’, and ‘the state is 
the representative of the nation and the driving force of the Common Good’ (24 points 
of the Falange 1938). 
On the other hand, the socialcristianos were highly critical of certain aspects of 
modernity. Their position regarding democracy had always been ambiguous: they had 
defended democracy as the only acceptable political model, while simultaneously they 
criticised it because of its fundamental flaws and lack of real participation (Cardemil 
1977: 157-166). Modern capitalism was rejected as a whole, as well as its main 
alternative, communism. Traditional values like the family and Christianity, considered 
essential for the development of man, were threatened by modern liberalism:  
Sometimes one feels the temptation to compare which would be worse: the 
social misery that destroys all, or the suicide rates in some superbly organised 
and nourished countries, and which have, so it seems, lost the value of hope 
and inner happiness (speech by Eduardo Frei Montalva, 20 October 1963) 
Above all, the socialcristianos considered Chilean modernity to be not only incomplete, 
but even inadequate, since it could not provide a solution for the dichotomy between 
capitalism and Communism. For the PDC, it was precisely this crisis of modernity that 
created the opportunity as well as the need for an alternative model:  
the Christian Democrat Party fights for the realisation of a true Christianity, 
which may rise as the result of the crisis of modern civilisation (quoted in 
González 1989: 70).  
In sum, the Christian Democrat ambivalence towards modernity led them to propose 
an alternative modernity, which combined both modern and non-modern elements. It 
was an attempt to construct a modern society that did not suffer from the weaknesses of 
modernity as it had evolved in Chile, and that would be carried by elements of 
traditionalism that the socialcristianos deemed essential. In this way, the dichotomy 
between Christian identity and modernity, as described by Jorge Larraín in his Identidad 
Chilena, could be overcome. In fact, Christianity and traditional values could become 
                                              
7 As has been shown in Chapter 2, a basic welfare system had already been created under the ‘providing 
state’ that was initiated in 1939. However, this system had been limited to organised labour only, 
excluding the urban marginal masses and the poor in the countryside. The socialcristianos envisioned an 
extension of the welfare system to these groups. 
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the cornerstone of modernity, rather than be irreconcilable with it (Larraín 2001: 202-
203). 
3.1.2 Desarrollismo and Modernisation: Frei and the ECLA 
The communitarian ideal as it was developed by the socialcristianos suffered from two 
major weaknesses. First, it left largely undefined the implementation of the project, and 
did not offer the public a coherent set of policies that would eventually create a 
‘communitarian society’. Second, the radical proposals of the Chonchol-Silva Solar 
camp in the 1950s caused apprehension within the conservative sectors within the 
PDC, creating the possibility of a break within the party. These problems were resolved 
(at least for the time being), by the growing leadership of Eduardo Frei and his ability to 
act as a broker between the different sections of the PDC (Fleet 1985: 52-56).  
 
Frei’s Leadership 
Frei, one of the socialcristianos of the first hour, and co-founder of both the Falange and 
the Christian Democrat Party, represented the moderate and centrist sector of the party. 
His political success as a senator and his ability to reconcile different views made him 
the ideal ‘consensus candidate’ for the 1958 presidential elections. Even though the 
PDC did not obtain more than 20 per cent of the votes, the elections consolidated 
Frei’s position as party leader. Frei, whose centrist position and political skills allowed 
him to downplay the differences within the party, was able to give the PDC a unified 
and competitive face (González 1989: 92). He was able to avoid open conflict by 
emphasising the practical implementation of the project, while leaving room for the 
differences in theoretical and ideological thinking within the party (Fleet 1985: 57). In 
this way, he added to the party ideology a sense of practicality and policy orientation, 
as well as a common goal for all sectors. Of course, he did not act on his own - Frei 
surrounded himself with a group of highly educated technocrats (mostly economists), 
whose professionalism was highly regarded within the party. Furthermore, the moderate 
course of Frei facilitated a possible alliance with the Right, which had been alarmed by 
the radical proposals of the Chonchol-Silva Solar camp. This option turned out to be 
decisive for the PDC’s ascent to power in 1964.  
Frei was not a strict follower of party doctrines. Even though he had been a Falange 
ideologist for decades, and had published numerous books and articles on 
communitarianism, the thinking of Maritain and the restructuring of Chilean society, 
he considered that the country’s first immediate need was economic development and 
progress (Moulian and Guerra 2000: 104). Only an expanding economy would be able 
to accommodate the growing needs of the marginal classes without leading to class 
conflict. A country, he argued,  
which achieves a high level of economic development needs thousands of 
skilled workers, more culture and more organisations, all of which almost 
automatically produce better human conditions, eliminate differences, and 
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create equality upwards, rather than levelling poverty, misery, and backwardness 
(quoted in Fleet 1985: 55). 
In many ways, Frei took Europe as the example for development and progress, resenting 
the raw capitalism that he considered characteristic of the United States. However, he 
eventually considered a mix between the two as the best recipe for Chile’s path towards 
modernity:  
Our America is in many ways a transplant of European culture. All of our 
intellectual development has been inspired by the ideas, images and creations of 
Europe. Now, this tradition is combined with the new forms of technology 
coming from the United States, which are a lifestyle in itself. From this 
crossroads a young and robust synthesis may flow, and it is our hope that one 
day we may contribute with it to enrichment of the human heritage (speech by 
Eduardo Frei Montalva 1956). 
Frei’s economic and developmental outlook, quite uncommon for a professional 
politician and a trained lawyer in that era, made him receptive to a new current in 
developmental thinking that was gaining impetus in Chile, namely structuralism.8 This 
school of economic thought was an answer to the so-called ‘modernisation theories’ 
which had become fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States. These 
theories argued that economic development in so-called ‘third-world’ countries was a 
simple process of catching up. Given the right circumstances, such as the presence of a 
certain amount of capital, developing countries would ‘automatically’ modernise their 
socio-economic structures in the same direction as those of the industrialised world 
(Leys 1996: 9-13). 
This optimistic and mechanistic view of modernisation, which gained much 
influence worldwide and was a central element of the Alliance for Progress, was 
contested in Chile in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) of the 
United Nations. The ECLA, headed by the Argentine economist Raul Prebish, was 
founded in Santiago in 1948 with the strong support of Frei (Montecinos 1998: 46). 
This think-tank was founded in order to analyse and rethink the Latin American 
economies and to articulate new strategies that would stimulate the economic 
development of the region. It gathered a multitude of leading sociologists and 
economists who proposed new strategies of development and socio-economic 
transformation, all ‘immersed in a developmental and modernising ethos’ (Correa et al. 
2001: 239).  
 
Structuralism and Chilean Modernisation 
The analysis that was made by the ECLA economists argued that in Latin America 
spontaneous development could not occur (as was suggested by the modernisation 
theories), because of structural impediments in the trade relations between the 
‘developed world’ (the ‘centre’) and the ‘underdeveloped world’ (the ‘periphery’) (Kay 
                                              
8 Despite the fact that Frei had received no professional training in economics, he was considered a 
serious economic analyst, whose publications on the subject were considered influential (Montecinos 
1998: 45).  
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1989: 29). In order to overcome these blockages, a series of coordinated programmes 
should be implemented, with the support of international financial aid. An accelerated 
process of import-substitution industrialisation, economic and social modernisation 
and regional integration should ‘de-block’ the progress of the region and facilitate rapid 
social and economic development for the continent (ECLA 1969: 13-34). In fact, the 
‘structuralist’ analysis made by the ECLA in this phase shared much of the optimism of 
the ‘modernisation theories’ it opposed, in the sense that it predicted continuous and 
self-sustaining development (although under state tutelage) once a certain threshold had 
been reached. The main difference between the two theories lay in the definition of 
that threshold and in the difficulties of reaching it. While for ‘modernisers’ like Walt 
Rostow development would ‘start off’ more or less automatically as traditional 
structures and institutions were replaced by more modern ones, in the structuralist view 
the periphery needed to overcome several structural imbalances and barriers before it 
could embark on the road to development.9 
Two ECLA economists became particularly influential in the Christian Democrat 
Party; these were Aníbal Pinto and Jorge Ahumada, who made profound studies of the 
Chilean case. Pinto’s Chile: Un Caso de Desarrollo Frustrado showed how the 
‘underdevelopment’ of Chile, despite the country’s many favourable conditions, had its 
roots in its economic, political and social history. According to Pinto, the only 
possibility for generating real development would be through deepening the democratic 
system, the integration of the marginalised masses, and balancing the economy through 
the stimulation of industrialisation and the diversification of exports (Pinto 1959: 11). 
In a similar vein, Jorge Ahumada’s En Vez de la Miseria argued that Chile was 
experiencing an ‘integral crisis’ that was a consequence of its particular historical 
trajectory towards modernity. He distinguished three main fields of crisis: economic, 
socio-political and cultural. The economy, he argued, suffered from structural problems 
such as low productivity, unbalanced dependence on certain exports, feudal production 
relations in the countryside and poor income distribution. In the socio-economic field 
the exclusion of the population from the national decision-making process had led to 
an over-concentration of power in the hands of elites and a lack or representation that 
endangered the development of the common good. Finally, the cultural crisis referred 
to the inefficiency that characterised the country’s institutions. According to Ahumada, 
self-sustained modernisation, which ‘could be observed in all developed countries’, did 
not take place in Chile, because of these three crises. The solution lay in an integral and 
radical set of reforms of the country’s cultural, educational, and political system, but 
above all in the generation of economic growth. For Ahumada, economic growth was 
an indispensable aspect of modern society, since it would create the basis for the 
development of all other sectors of the country (Ahumada 1958: 55-59).  
 
 
                                              
9 For more profound contributions on modernisation theory and structuralism, see Leys (1996) and Rist 
(1997) 
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The PDC and Structuralism 
The adoption of structuralism by Frei and the Christian Democrat Party was no 
coincidence. With its emphasis on modernisation as an alternative to both capitalism 
and Communism, and its intellectual approach towards politics, the PDC had become 
a highly attractive party for middle class professionals such as the ECLA economists. As 
a result, Cepalinos such as Sergio Molina, Aníbal Pinto and Jorge Ahumada became 
prominent members of the party’s so-called equipos técnicos (technical teams), which 
were charged with the formulation of socio-economic policies. Furthermore, Frei had 
always laid emphasis on the value of economic theory in politics, and had often 
complained how little economic policy tools were being used in Chilean politics 
(Montecinos 1998: 45). Additionally, he had learned from the mistakes that were made 
during the conservative Alessandri government (1958-1964), which structurally ignored 
or disregarded the economic advice it was offered by its technical teams. As a result, 
Frei adopted a highly positive approach towards economy as a political tool and its 
leading expression, the ECLA, in particular (ibid., p. 46).  
There were also coincidences between the ECLA and the PDC at the level of 
content. Structuralism as it was elaborated by Christian Democrat Cepalinos like Pinto 
or Ahumada fitted the socialcristiano doctrine in several key aspects. They concurred in 
the analysis of the Chile being in a state of ‘integral crisis’, due to its obsolete social, 
political and economic structures. Chile, traditionally viewed as a stable, tranquil and 
ordered country, was in the eyes of the ECLA as well as of the PDC a país-problema, a 
country that had to be examined, studied and rebuilt before it could be ‘reconstructed’ 
(Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 100; Ahumada 1958: 151). They also shared a critical position 
regarding both unbridled capitalism and Socialism, arguing that neither would solve the 
fundamental problems the country was facing.10 Finally, they both claimed that a 
relatively short reform programme implemented by the state might be enough to 
reignite the development of the country, as long as it was meticulously organised and 
covered all key sectors of society. Such a programme would be able to bring Chilean 
society up-to-date with the modern world. As Frei put it in his first speech as President: 
I am here to break the rigidities of a social order that no longer responds to the 
exigencies of the times, and to give the people increasing access to the culture 
and responsibilities of sharing in the riches and advantages that characterise 
affluent modern societies (quoted in Pinochet de la Barra: 179).  
The structuralist theories also served to provide Frei and his close circle (the so-called 
freistas) with the translation of ideology into policy that the socialcristianos so sorely 
missed. In contrast to many of the Christian Democrat ideologues, as well as many of 
the Left, the structuralists were highly policy-oriented. They defined Chile’s ‘integral 
crisis’ as a developmental problem, and development as a guidable process. By 
                                              
10 The conservative historian Mario Góngora later argued that it was exactly this developmentalist 
ideology and technocracy which, because of their exclusively rationalistic approach, paved the way for 
the rise of Marxism, as they destroyed the national and local traditions, the humanism and the 
spiritualism which formed its main obstacles (Góngora 1987: 37)  
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incorporating their views, Frei could concretise the ambitious and sometimes utopian 
ideology of the PDC into practical policy points that were validated by their scientific 
origin. This not only facilitated the implementation of the PDC programme, but also 
legitimised it: this was no capricious whim or utopian experiment, but a programme of 
modernisation that originated from the most important and advanced economic think-
tank in the region. As will be seen in the remainder of this study, this form of 
‘technocratic legitimisation’, which has its origins in nineteenth-century Positivism, has 
been used by all projects of modernisation since 1964. As a result, the incorporation of 
economics became a central feature of the Christian Democrat project of 
modernisation. As Verónica Montecinos puts it: ‘economics guided Frei’s version of a 
modernising revolution’ (Montecinos 1998: 45). More importantly, it facilitated what 
Frei called the creation of a ‘political, social and economic model that responds to our 
most intimate being’, a set of policies that answered directly to the Chilean experience 
and reality (speech by Eduardo Frei Montalva 1965). 
Politically, the incorporation of the structuralist views into the socialcristiano 
ideology had two significant effects. First, it gave the PDC political leverage in its 
dealings with the Conservatives. Frei’s developmentalism soothed conservative fears of 
the ‘communitarian’ proposals of the more radical Christian Democrats (Fleet 1985: 
56). It was clear that he would not lead the party in a Marxist direction, and even 
though the Right strongly resisted his ideas of agrarian reform, they considered him a 
possible political partner.11 In 1964, this tacit understanding proved crucial, as the PDC 
won the elections thanks to the support of the Right, which was desperately attempting 
to avoid a victory for Allende.  
Second, Frei’s developmentalism made Chile an excellent candidate for 
international financial aid, especially from the Alliance for Progress, which had been set 
in motion by President Kennedy in 1961. By emphasising that programmes such as 
agrarian reform were developmental projects rather than anti-oligarchic class struggles, 
the aid of the Alliance for Progress was guaranteed (Correa et al. 2001: 224). Besides 
being a more than welcome addition to the country’s budget, Frei considered 
international aid crucial for developing the country and deterring communism:  
Only a planned and general investment of resources, that will allow the transfer 
of great sums of capital to insufficiently developed regions of the world, will 
allow for the production of a progressive economic development that will 
facilitate the increment of global production and will prevent the collapse of the 
most developed countries. (…) if this development is not rapidly set in motion, 
misery will provoke social disorder that will make the subsistence of the 
democratic regimes impossible (Frei 1950) 
                                              
11 The Right had already shown that it was prepared to allow for some modernisation in the countryside. 
In 1962, the conservative Alessandri government, pressured by the Alliance for Progress and the Roman 
Catholic Church, set in motion a much-debated agrarian reform. Even though the scope of this reform 
was limited and hardly touched actual landownership but mainly the use of land, it would later become 
the basis of the Christian Democrat agrarian reform project.  
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The developmental outlook of the Freistas was not fully compatible with the 
socialcristiano doctrines, however. In several aspects compromises were made, usually to 
the detriment of the latter. On the one hand, for instance, Frei advocated the social 
integration of the marginalised masses through the creation of intermediate 
organisations. On the other hand, he largely ignored the political role these 
organisations were to play in the communitarian ideal. Even though he promoted the 
notion of democracy as an open form of political participation, he prioritised social 
integration and economic development over political participation. As he said in 1966, 
his programme consisted of two ‘simple and fundamental ideas’:  
highly accelerated economic development, without which there is no solution 
for Chile’s problems, and (…) social development, without which the people 
have no destiny (speech by Eduardo Frei Montalva 1966a) 
Moreover, the focus on an integral and planned approach to the country’s problems 
left little room for direct participation. Frei’s promise not to change ‘one comma’ of his 
programme during his presidency was not just an electoral device. As we will see in the 
next section, the very nature of the Christian Democrat programme, thoroughly 
thought out and worked into a coherent and full-scale proyecto-país (a project that seeks 
to change the foundations of an entire society), only allowed for a top-down, 
unconditional implementation, not hindered by the capriciousness of the political 
process. As Frei put it: 
Democracy requires an efficient and responsible authority for the 
administration of the country (…) A Plan or Programme, once approved in 
accordance with general consensus, should not be paralysed or invalidated in its 
spirit or its basic lines (quoted in Cardemil 1997: 160). 
At the economic level, the differences between the socialcristiano ideology and Frei’s 
developmentalism became even clearer, bringing into the spotlight his own ambiguity 
on the matter. In the past, Frei had consequently rejected capitalism as the foundation 
for a just society: 
The capitalist regime has demonstrated that it is incapable of resolving the 
economic and social problems. (…) humanity looks for another road in which 
human labour reaches its full expression, a more just regime, in which goods 
fundamentally serve man before they are object of gain (Frei 1947).  
However, Frei’s emphasis on economic development led him to move away from a 
fundamental restructuring of the economic system. Obviously Frei supported the 
agrarian reform, the diversification of the country’s exports, and a major role for the 
state through economic planning (all of them ECLA recommendations), but 
simultaneously he clearly steered away from the socialcristiano ideal of a communitarian 
economy, be it the ‘labourist economy’ that Leighton had promoted, or the more 
socialist variant that the Chonchol-Silva camp had set out. Even the ‘human economy’, 
as it had been postulated in the Declaration of Principles of the PDC, which suggested 
that workers be organised in ‘working communities, in possession of capital and the 
means of production’, under the tutelage of the state, never became part of the freista 
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repertoire. Frei did not support the ‘alternative modernity’ of a ‘communitarian 
economy’. As he put it time after time, his first objective was ‘accelerated economic 
development’, ‘without which ‘Chile’s problems have no solution’ (speech by Eduardo 
Frei 1966a). Fundamentally, he advocated capitalism, but with an extended role of the 
state in the planning and organising of production and distribution (Fleet 1985: 55-56). 
Apart from an ideological change of course, Frei’s attitude towards capitalism also 
reflected political realism and pragmatism: it would be difficult enough to achieve 
socio-economic modernisation without simultaneously changing the rules of the game. 
However, as the ideological diversity within the PDC as well as the revolutionary 
atmosphere of the 1960s did not allow for such realism, nor for an open endorsement 
of capitalism, Frei remained vague on the subject, interlarding his discourse on 
economic development with opaque references to communitarian phrases such as the 
‘transformation of the structures of the economy’ (speech by Eduardo Frei 1964).12  
3.1.3 Forging the Revolution in Liberty 
The Freistas’ developmental and technical adaptation of the socialcristiano doctrine 
allowed for a profound and detailed translation from ideology into political project. 
Indeed, two years before the 1964 elections, a 108-page programme was presented in a 
congress for Christian Democrats and independent (but sympathising) técnicos. For four 
days it was discussed and reworked by participants from forty-six professional fields 
(Montecinos 1998: 21-22). The result was a thoroughly engineered programme that 
covered practically all aspects of Chilean society. This was no simple government 
programme, intended to be electorally attractive - this was a ‘proyecto país’, a full-scale 
blueprint for the transformation and development of Chilean society. It was the 
‘Revolution in Liberty’.13  
The programme focused on four main targets: economic growth, education and 
technical training, social justice, and political participation. It advocated the 
diversification and modernisation of both agrarian and industrial production. This 
could only be achieved if it was accompanied by a strong investment in mass 
education, through which not only illiteracy would be eliminated, but also a technically 
well-trained workforce could be created. Furthermore, social sectors that were largely 
excluded from the economy should be integrated into the productive process, and the 
rights of workers should be reinforced. Finally, political rights should be strengthened, 
suffrage extended to all Chileans above 18 years, and organisations such as mothers’ 
centres and homeless’ movements were to be granted political influence. Furthermore, a 
range of investments in housing and infrastructure as well as profound reforms of the 
                                              
12 As will be seen in section 3.2.2, Frei’s deviations from the original socialcristiano doctrines would create 
a conflict within the party, and eventually provoke a split within the PDC.  
13 This name shows the desire of the PDC to be associated with fundamental change, but without 
dictatorial Socialism as had taken root in Cuba. Also, it shows how discourses based on the 
‘Chilenisation’ of concepts such as ‘revolution’ were used to attract the electorate.  
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judiciary and the state apparatus were to create the framework for the modernisation of 
the country.  
The central feature of the project was agrarian reform. The abolition of the latifundio 
and the subsequent creation of a ‘hundred thousand new land-owners’ was not merely a 
matter of social justice, it was the cornerstone of the economic development 
programme. According to the analysis of Cepalinos like Ahumada, the anachronistic 
modes of production on the countryside were the bottleneck for the modernisation of 
the economy, and agrarian reform was essential for development (Ahumada 1958: 91). 
The redistribution of land was expected to generate a strong increase in production 
(Ahumada counted on some 112 per cent), while simultaneously significantly 
improving the living conditions of the rural worker.  
In the urban areas, the marginalised groups, mostly living in the shanty-towns (the 
so-called poblaciones), were to be integrated into Chilean society through a programme 
called promoción popular. This programme responded to the notion of ‘marginality’ that 
had been elaborated by Vekemans, and stimulated the creation of ‘intermediate 
organisations’ such as mothers’ centres, neighbourhood associations and homeless’ 
movements. On the basis of these private initiatives, the state could facilitate the 
necessary measures by providing the means needed for the improvement of the living 
standard in the poblaciones. Ranging from the creation of neighbourhood kitchens to 
supplying sewing machines, or the material and technical assistance in the creation of a 
sewerage system, promoción popular was a key element of the project of social 
modernisation of the Christian Democrats: 
Promoción popular means (…) to recognise and promote institutions, to create 
and facilitate - if necessary - the services and the resources that the people need 
in order to organise and to take up the role that they should have in a modern 
society (Frei 1964: 57).14 
As has been outlined in the previous section, the promoción popular programme also had 
a political side. It was intended to create a network of ‘intermediate organisations’, 
grouped together in regional and national federations, that would have direct access to 
the government and could function as pressure groups. In this way the citizens of the 
country, even in the most remote regions or unrepresented by unions, would be able to 
participate in the political decision-making process (González 1989: 125).  
The financial room for these projects was to be created through the Chilenización of 
the copper mines. For Frei, the copper mines in the north of the country constituted 
the viga maestra (‘master plank’) of Chile’s economy: ‘There exists no other sector that is 
                                              
14 The promoción popular programme, however well-intended, was profoundly paternalistic. Based on the 
idea that with some support from the state the poor could improve their own positions, later President 
Patricio Aylwin recalls how Christian Democrat professionals went to the poblaciones in order to oversee 
and direct the ‘the development of the capacities of the people’. In the mothers’ centres that were set up 
under promoción popular it was the wives of the Christian Democrat party leadership who took on the task 
of educating the people: ‘Sewing machines were given to all mothers’ centres. And the ladies (señoras) of 
the party leadership, including my wife, came together and visited those women and taught them how to 
sew, how to embroider, and how to make things for their own families, and even for commercial use’ 
(interview with Patricio Aylwin, 05 May 2004).  
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so dramatically and profoundly important for the success of our development as 
mining exports’ (Frei 1964: 5). However, the copper mines were in the hands of North 
American companies, and much of the profits left the country. Frei considered that a 
nationalisation of the mines was necessary, but only on the basis of cooperation with 
the American mining companies. The know-how of the US technicians regarding the 
running of the mines was viewed as essential for the success of ‘Chilenisation’, as well as 
the financial support of the USA, which would be jeopardised by outright 
nationalisation. By buying a large share in the exploitation of the copper mines, the 
Chilean state would be able to generate a long-term source of income that could 
finance the social and economic transformation of the country. In this way, private 
enterprise would not be endangered and the working of the copper mines could be 
guaranteed.15  
Even if the Revolution in Liberty was clearly founded on the communitarian ideal, 
it fell short of many of the communitarian postulates. The strong emphasis on 
development and modernisation had softened the focus on the transformation of 
society in keeping with communitarian prescriptions. It no longer envisioned a non-
capitalist economy, and direct grass-roots political participation was reduced to the self-
help programmes of the promoción popular. Social integration, however, remained a 
central feature of the programme, as well as the abolition of the latifundio through the 
agrarian reform. Socialcristianismo and developmentalism were combined in the areas 
where they were easily compatible; in the other areas development outweighed 
communitarian ideology.  
In sum, even while the Revolution in Liberty was based on a highly revolutionary 
discourse, which was based on the idea that non-interference would lead to social 
conflict. As Frei Montalva put it:  
We have to put the emphasis on the word revolution, because today, in our 
continent, there is no more time for evolution. Whoever thinks we have twenty 
or twenty-five years for the fulfilment of a slow evolution, is mistaken. The 
revolutionary process is not about to begin - it has already begun. The problem 
is of extreme urgency and consists in anticipating the political explosion, 
accelerating the speed of economic development, and, simultaneously, realising 
a social transformation (quoted in Pinochet de la Barra 1982: 250).  
However, this emphasis on revolutionary change mainly served to disguise the fact that 
the project of the Christian Democrats was both modernising and reformist, and sought 
to implement change within the context of the existing order (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 97). 
Whereas the ‘communitarian’ ideal originally envisioned the fundamental reordering of 
socio-economic relations as well as the political system, the project that the government 
set in motion remained much closer to the reference point of Social-Democratic welfare 
modernity. Moreover, the political dimension of modernity had been reduced to the 
                                              
15 The Chilenización was not a purely economic project, however. It appealed to growing sentiments of 
nationalism in Chile (as well as in the rest of Latin America), and to a growing antipathy among the 
population towards multinational corporations and the United States.  
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extension of suffrage to all adult Chileans. The project therefore focused mainly on the 
social and economic dimensions, in the form of the social inclusion of the marginal 
masses, the modernisation of the productive relations in the countryside, and the 
achievement of sustained higher levels of economic growth.  
3.2 The Implementation of the Project 
The implementation of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was characterised by its top-down 
nature, with the state as the central actor, a strong emphasis on technical policy-making, 
and state planning as the main tool for modernisation. However, it took place in the 
context of intense political competition, which not only influenced the project itself, 
but also led to the creation and intensification of alternative projects of modernisation. 
Finally, the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ encountered a turning-point when civil society 
began to mobilise under the influence of the process of modernisation and the 
competition between alternative projects. In the end, Frei chose to halt the project 
rather than to endanger social order. 
3.2.1 Revolution ‘from Above’: State, Technocracy, and Planning 
The Christian Democrats considered the planned and monitored implementation of 
the Revolution in Liberty as essential for its success. The only institution capable of 
performing such tasks, in their consideration, was the modern state. Furthermore, the 
prominent presence of técnicos in the PDC, and their close participation in the 
formulation of the project, gave the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ a highly technocratic 
character, even if this was at times concealed from the general public. Finally, for the 
first time in Chilean history, state planning came to define the relations between the 
state and the economy.  
 
The State as Director of the Common Good 
The ‘Revolution in Liberty’ signified an extension of the roles that the state had 
assumed in the decades before. After the creation of CORFO, in 1939, the state had 
fulfilled the role of ‘providing state’ (which had created a basic welfare system for 
organised labour), and that of ‘entrepreneurial state’ (through the stimulation of 
industrialisation). Now it added the role of ‘programming state’, which defined the path 
of Chile’s development in detail and directed public as well as private investment 
through incentives, taxes and subsidies (Meller 1996: 59). This did not amount to a 
total break with the past; given the fact that the ‘providing’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ roles 
of the state had started to lose their impetus toward the 1960s, the ‘programming state’ 
was the next logical step (Salazar and Pinto 1999a: 67). However, the role of the state as 
‘programmer of the future’ was new in the sense that never in the democratic history of 
Chile had the state exercised such direct and profound influence on the country’s 
development.  
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Seeking above all to create an alternative to the Socialist project, Frei held an 
ambiguous position regarding the role of the state in Chile’s society. Repeatedly he 
warned of the dangers of totalitarianism:  
The state as sole employer will inevitably mean the total loss of personal 
freedom and from there it will only be a small step to slavery (quoted in 
Pinochet de la Barra 1982: 94).  
Moreover, once in power, Frei repeatedly assured his conservative critics that he did not 
intend to create a ‘tutelage of the state’: ‘to fall for the temptation of dirigismo would be 
just as grave and pernicious as to leave the aspirations of the population for what they 
are’ (speech by Eduardo Frei 1964).  
However, the Revolution in Liberty was clearly implemented and directed from 
above, and extended the state’s powers to parts of society that it had so far been left 
untouched, such as the rural and mining sectors. Frei was able to reconcile his fear of an 
all-powerful state with the pivotal role he actually contributed to the state by 
emphasising its paternalism. To Frei, the state was the ‘head of the Chilean family’ 
(speech by Eduardo Frei 1966b) and the ‘rector of the common good and responsible 
for the life of the nation’ (speech by Eduardo Frei 1964). As a result of this new role, 
the state expanded rapidly under the Christian Democrat government. State spending 
grew from 35.7 per cent of GNP in 1964 to 46.9 per cent in 1970. In 1970, the Chile 
had become the Latin American country (with the exception of Cuba) with the highest 
level of state influence in the economy (Bitar 1986: 39).  
Apart from these paternalist considerations, though, the Christian Democrats had 
concrete reasons to focus on the state as the main agent of modernisation. As has been 
seen in the previous chapter, the state had always been the main point of reference for 
the middle classes, who saw it as an expression of meritocracy and professionalism. 
Furthermore, the scope and radical nature of the project of modernisation they wanted 
to set in motion required a powerful and efficient actor such as the state for its 
implementation. This was reinforced by the opposition that the project encountered: 
the Christian Democrats had decided to form a single-party government (with the 
initial support of the Right), and formed a minority in Congress. Nor could they count 
on the levels of popular support that the Left was able to mobilise. As a result, they 
needed to resort to the state as the main motor of modernisation.  
The centrality of the state in modernisation required, at the same time, a certain 
modernisation of the state itself. As finance minister and Cepalino Sergio Molina 
argued, the traditional functions of the state did not allow for enough control or 
knowledge to be able to implement a project of this scale: 
These state functions were designed for another era in which the intuition of the 
executives played a dominant role in the analysis, the politics, the programming, 
and the administration. (…) As a consequence, the reform of public 
administration should be a central item on the agenda of the ‘planners’ who 
prepare and implement programmes of development (Molina 1972: 177-178).  
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As will be seen in the next chapters, the link between the modernisation through the 
state and the modernisation of the state itself would remain a constant factor, even 
though it did not always materialise. Even though under Frei many attempts were made 
to rationalise the state apparatus and the decision-making process, few fundamental 
changes were actually achieved.  
 
The Influence of the Technocracy 
The government of the Christian Democrats was characterised by an unprecedented 
technocracy. Technocrats had played important roles in Chilean politics since the 
1920s, and had become important actors from the creation of CORFO onwards (Silva 
2007). However, under Frei their role was greatly expanded and institutionalised. On 
the one hand, this was a response to the need to rationalise and streamline the complex 
matter of economic planning. Frei promoted the ascendancy of economists and other 
technocrats to the highest echelons of state planning in order to de-politicise the 
decision-making process and to reduce policy fragmentation (Montecinos 1998: 7-8). 
Technocrat decision-making was considered by the Christian Democrats to be rational 
and efficient, and in general more ‘modern’ than the political process of negotiating 
collective interests, which reflected the class conflict that the PDC wished to avoid. In a 
Weberian sense, technocracy was considered to have a similar influence on the political 
decision-making process as the bureaucracy had had on its execution: rationalising, de-
personalising and standardising. Simultaneously, the technocracy served as a bulwark 
against political as well as ideological conflict. By creating ‘technocrat niches’ that were 
untouched by political struggle, continuity and consistency of policy were guaranteed 
(ibid., p. 131). There also existed similarities between the internal logic of the 
‘Revolution in Liberty’ and that of technocrats. As Centeno and Silva (1998: 4-5) argue, 
technocrats tend to consider political decision-making to be inferior because it favours 
the interests of particular groups. They have a tendency to consider the ‘whole’ before 
they analyse the individual parts, which corresponds with the PDC’s ‘integral 
approach’. Furthermore, they have an optimist belief that an ‘optimal solution’ can be 
found for all solutions. These elements were also very characteristic of the Christian 
Democrats and their ‘Revolution in Liberty’.  
On the other hand, the emphasis on technocratic governance served to justify the 
government’s projects towards the opposition. The PDC’s lack of a majority in 
Congress, and the fierce opposition it received from both Left and Right, made the 
implementation of the Revolution in Liberty a particularly difficult political endeavour. 
One of the ways in which the PDC succeeded in justifying their project in the political 
arena was by emphasising its rational and technical nature, as well as the professional 
skills of the policy-makers (ibid., pp. 130-131). 
Frei took the technocratic approach of his administration even further by 
surrounding himself with a group of technical advisors. These advisors, mostly 
economists, became so prominent in the government’s decision-making process, that 
they formed, in the words of the historian Silva Vargas, a ‘parallel administration, 
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composed of advisors, often technically highly qualified, who were directly and 
unofficially tied to the Executive’ (Villalobos et al. 1974: 866). However, as Silva (1998a: 
78) argues, the elitist and negative connotations of technocracy caused the government 
to downplay its influence. In fact, the prominence of his group of advisors created so 
much resistance that Frei was forced to trivialise their importance in public: 
It is said that if the advisors were discharged, there would be enough money to 
finance the expenditure for health care. Here in the presidency I have appointed 
four advisors, because I needed them for the overwhelming job we have 
imposed upon ourselves, and in the whole of our administration there are no 
more than 10 persons with such tasks (speech by Eduardo Frei 1966a). 
Technocrats played a complex role in the ‘Revolution in Liberty’. In her study of 
technocracy in Chile, Montecinos argues that they were only one of the three main 
polity actors. They had to work with the politicians, who occupied most of the party 
structures and the Christian Democrat seats in Congress. These generally did not know 
much about the technical sides of policy-making and often resisted its logic. They also 
had to deal with top executive officials, who were both technical and political at the 
same time. These officials were often caught between the problem of running their 
department on rational grounds and responding to the pressures from the political 
sectors. As one of Frei’s ministers explained:  
The politicians, pressured by their constituencies, had a phobia of technocracy. 
Congressmen from Atacama and Coquimbo [two northern regions] wanted 
higher prices for potatoes arriving early on the market. But we kept potato prices 
fixed to maintain the consumer index. Ours was a technical, not a political 
response. They thought we were prisoners of the technocrats (quoted in 
Montecinos 1998: 48).  
The technocrats themselves kept their distance from the world of party politics. They 
were at times not even members of the PDC themselves, although most were members 
of the party’s Technical Department. This distance from political affiliation was 
functional in the maintenance of their technical neutrality and independence. 
These three groups were held in balance by President Frei Montalva. Frei very 
actively directed his técnicos and was very concerned with economic policy-making. He 
also protected them from party pressures, creating some tensions with political circles 
within the party, who feared that the technocrats had gained too much influence. In 
fact, as some técnicos admitted afterwards, Frei’s unlimited trust in his technocrat team 
led him to make serious errors: ‘Frei made serious mistakes under the influence of his 
técnicos, because he paid too much attention to them’ (quoted in Montecinos 1998: 46, 
italics in the original).  
The dual role of the técnicos as both independent professionals and party affiliates 
was problematic at times. On the one hand, their double affiliation served to 
coordinate and improve the relations between the government and the party. On the 
other hand, these ‘political technocrats’ often had difficulty in separating their roles as 
independent advisors and party affiliates. This allowed for the radicalisation of a group 
of técnicos in 1967, demanding more rapid and radical reforms under the flag of ‘the 
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non-capitalist route to development’, a mix of developmental and economical analysis 
with Marxist and socialist doctrine. Later, in 1969, this group would leave the party and 
join Allende’s U.P. coalition, adding to the already powerful political technocracy of 
the left (ibid., pp. 48-51).  
 
State Planning through ODEPLAN 
The notion of planificación global (global planning) responded to what Brunner, 
Hopenhayn, Moulian and Paraimo have called the ‘positivist paradigm’, the idea that 
development is the natural outcome of the combination of intellectual innovation with 
well-planned developmental strategies (Brunner et al. 1993). State organised planning 
was not completely new in Chile: with the foundation of CORFO in 1939, some 
degree of planning had become usual in the organisation of the country’s 
developmental strategies. At first it had consisted of the formation of technical teams 
that studied the economy and set up industrialisation programmes. In a second phase, 
the planning consisted of the implementation of sector-oriented programmes of import 
substitution (Molina 1972: 159). From the 1950s onwards, the social sciences (especially 
economics) had rapidly grown in importance and popularity, offering exciting and state-
of-the-art analyses and solutions for the Chilean case. Combined with the revolutionary 
élan that possessed Latin America in the early 1960s, they added to the belief that social 
engineering by the state, if handled carefully and integrally, could create rapid and 
sustainable development. Furthermore, the studies of the ECLA showed that liberalism 
and the free market would only sustain the ‘underdevelopment’ of the country, 
pointing to the state as the best main actor for economic development. Thus, PDC 
ideologists and Cepalinos like Ahumada, Molina and Pinto expanded the notion of 
planning as it had existed before, and integrated it into the Revolution in Liberty as the 
antidote for Chile’s ‘integral crisis’ (González 1989: 136). Planificación global, as was 
implemented by the PDC, consisted of the harmonisation and continuous monitoring 
by the state of the developmental strategies followed in different sectors of the 
economy, such as agriculture, industry and international trade. It would, as the original 
proposal of law stated, make possible ‘a true planning of the socio-economic policies, 
reserving for the executive the initiative in legislating matters that may interfere with the 
fulfilment of the plans’ (quoted in Cardemil 1997: 196).  
Economic planning was executed from a new Planning Office, called the Oficina de 
Planificación Nacional (ODEPLAN), which was established formally in 1967 but had 
been active since 1964. It enjoyed more or less the same status as a ministry, and 
worked in close collaboration with the ministries of Home Affairs and the Budget. 
Working from the CORFO offices, ODEPLAN took over and widely expanded the 
planning that had been carried out there (CORFO 1989: 181). Its tasks included the 
study, calculation and planning of new state investments, as well as the close 
monitoring and guidance of the country’s socio-economic development. By 
meticulously and continuously comparing the results of the socio-economic 
programme with real developments, the técnicos of ODEPLAN were able to create a 
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highly efficient system of socio-economic guidance, which was considered to be one of 
the most advanced planning systems in the world (Hofmeister 1995: 69). However, it 
was not successful in all respects. In the field of monetary stabilisation, it achieved early 
and convincing successes, while in industry, agriculture and employment the results 
came later and were less satisfactory. The unofficial status of ODEPLAN in the first 
years, due to opposition in Congress as well as difficulties in its organisation, hindered a 
structural and integral approach. Only towards the end of Frei’s presidency did 
planificación become efficient in those areas (Molina 1972: 162-163).  
State planning not only expanded under Frei, but it also changed in nature. While it 
had been relatively autonomous from the executive before, now planificación became an 
integral and key element of the government strategy. Directly after the elections of 
1964, a so-called Comité Económico was created at the highest government level. Its 
permanent members included the President, the Ministers of Interior and Economy, the 
presidents of the Central Bank and the Banco de Estado de Chile, and the directors of 
CORFO and ODEPLAN. The Comité Económico directed and coordinated the socio-
economic policies that were implemented by the institutions involved, creating a kind 
of ‘executive board’ for state planning. In this way, Frei transformed the a-personal and 
bureaucratic planning of the CORFO into a presidential and political tool for the 
implementation of the Revolution in Liberty. 
The success of state planning (and the technocracy in general) under the Christian 
Democrat government can largely be attributed to the close links it had to the 
presidency. This created a ‘relative autonomy’ vis-à-vis other actors in the state process 
(such as the political parties, constituencies and the bureaucracy) which allowed it to 
function more or less independently.16 This coincided with Frei’s authoritarian style of 
governance and the relatively great distance he maintained from his own party. As a 
result, the técnicos had direct access to the presidency, while other actors needed to work 
through formal government structures (Montecinos 1998: 50). As will be seen in the 
next chapters, this ‘relative autonomy’ explains to a large extend the ability of 
technocrats to successfully use state planning as a tool for the implementation of the 
project of modernisation.  
3.2.2 Political Competition and the Development of the Project 
The ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was constructed and implemented in the context of an 
intensive competition between different projects of modernisation.17 The competition 
between the Left, Centre and Right, each with its own project (albeit in different stages 
of construction) not only lay at the base of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ (conceived as an 
                                              
16 O’Donnell (1973) has developed the notion of relative autonomy for the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 
regimes, arguing that it was a key factor in explaining their ability to implement far-reaching political 
projects more or less independently from civil actors, whether they were opposition or supporters of the 
regimes.  
17 Different terms have been used to describe the projects of the Centre, Left, and Right. Mario Góngora 
(1986: 280) speaks of ‘planificaciones’ (projects based on planning), while the historian Luis Corvalán uses 
the phrase ‘global projects’ (Corvalán 2001: 18) 
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alternative to both the Left and the Right), but also strongly influenced its 
implementation and development over time. This started with the presidential 
campaign, which was labelled the campaña de terror because of the images of terror that 
were used by the PDC and the Right to discredit the candidate of the Left, Salvador 
Allende. After the elections, the PDC decided to take a camino propio (‘own road’) that 
not only blocked collaboration with the other two sectors, but also intended to 
marginalise them as much as possible. Initially, this was successful: the Right plunged 
into a deep crisis, while the Left saw much of its agenda being implemented by the 
Christian Democrats. However, as the results of the project proved to be less than 
expected, and popular radicalisation pushed the project leftwards, internal divisions 
within the PDC led to a polarisation within the party. Meanwhile, the Right regrouped 
and dropped its pragmatic line of action, while the Left radicalised in order to outbid 
the ‘Revolution in Liberty’. In the end, the competition between the three sectors led to 
a political polarisation that would become the framework for the next project of 
modernisation, that of the Left.  
The competition between the projects of modernisation of the Left, Centre and 
Right did not originate in the 1960s. During the twentieth century, three projects had 
more or less coexisted peacefully: the project of the landed oligarchy, the nationalist-
developmental project, embodied by CORFO, and the socialist-Marxist project (Salazar 
and Pinto 1999b: 19). In the early 1960s, however, the revolutionary ethos that took 
over the continent, fuelled by the Cuban Revolution, and combined with the broad 
perception of an ‘integral crisis’, led to the radicalisation of the different projects, as 
well as of their interaction. In this conjuncture, the traditional role of the centre as 
broker between the left and right eroded, as the centre itself, now embodied by the 
PDC rather than by the Radical Party, experienced a fundamental change in character. 
While traditionally the centre had contributed to the political stability of the party 
system by taking a ‘positional’ attitude, prioritising access to political power over 
ideology, now it had become highly ‘programmatic’, refusing to compromise in matters 
of doctrine (Scully 1992: 11). As a consequence, the competition between the Left, 
Centre and Right not only radicalised on a programmatic level, but also in terms of the 
rules of the game (Valenzuela 2003: 35). One of the clearest expressions of this 
radicalisation was the camino propio that the PDC chose for the implementation of the 
Revolution in Liberty 
Even though the PDC had developed its programme as an alternative to both left 
and right, the party had collaborated with both on more than one occasion. Only two 
years before the 1964 elections, the PDC had even attempted to join the left-wing 
coalition FRAP, on the condition that Frei became the presidential candidate for the 
conglomerate (González 1989: 97). The reasons for this pragmatic approach were clear: 
even though the growth in the support of the party had been spectacular, it remained 
the third electoral block in the country. In the municipal elections of 1963, the PDC 
only received 22.7 per cent of the vote, against 31.2 per cent for the FRAP and 46.2 per 
cent for the Right-wing coalition. Up to a few months before the 1964 elections, there 
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was no prospect whatsoever that the Christian Democrats would be able to win the 
presidency. This changed, however, through a mixture of unforeseen events and the 
atmosphere of intense competition.  
Unforeseen events proved to be crucial for the outcomes of the elections. In March 
1964, the death of the socialist deputy Oscar Naranjo led to interim elections in the city 
of Curicó.18 These elections soon acquired highly symbolic significance, as the right was 
painfully defeated in this bulwark of the Conservative Party. Anticipating, without 
further analysis, a similar outcome for the national elections in September, the 
candidate for the right, Julio Durán, withdrew from the race. The atmosphere of radical 
political competition led the Conservative and Liberal parties to attempt to avoid a left-
wing victory at any cost - in this case, by supporting the PDC in the presidential 
campaign, despite its anti-oligarchic programme. This support from the Right, proved 
crucial, as the PDC received 55.6 per cent of the vote, more than double the support it 
had received a year earlier (González 1989: 100). However, the Christian Democrats 
hardly acknowledged the importance of the Naranjazo, as it became known. Assuming 
that a majority of the country’s population had voted in favour of the Revolution in 
Liberty, the PDC decided to follow a camino propio, excluding both the Left, with which 
it shared many ideological elements, and the Right, which had put them in the 
presidency, from power.  
The 1964 elections were also crucial in another aspect. New social actors were 
mobilised and competed for. The Christian Democrats actively sought the electoral 
support of groups that had so far been excluded from the political process: women, 
youth and the pobladores (Correa et al. 2001: 241). Furthermore, by breaking the 
conservative monopoly of the mobilisation of the rural vote, the PDC opened up the 
peasantry as a social sector that was an object of competition (Scully 1992: 151). As a 
result, the electoral competition between the Left and Centre (and, to a lesser extent, 
the Right), became increasingly characterised as a struggle for mass support. As Mario 
Góngora argues, this created the need for the use of modern means of political 
competition, such as mass communication, and of political propaganda (Góngora 1986: 
279-280). In 1964 the PDC was already using these new tools in an unprecedented 
fashion. Their campaña del terror, partly financed by the CIA, made extensive use of 
modern mass media, such as TV and radio spots, to emit radical anti-communist 
propaganda (Correa et al. 2001: 242-243)  
The dominance of the Christian Democrats, who also gained a majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1965 (not in Congress), did not reduce their competition with 
the Left and Right. By rapidly pushing forward the agrarian reform and mobilising the 
popular sectors on the countryside, the PDC succeeded in draining a large part of the 
conservatives’ electorate. Simultaneously, Frei’s advancement of ‘industrial deepening’ 
                                              
18 As will be repeatedly shown in the course of this study, accidental happenings or coincidences may 
prove to be crucial in Chilean politics over the last forty years. One of the explanations for the relative 
importance of such incidents may be found in the intense competition of different projects of about 
equal strength, creating a balance of power which cannot be broken easily by the actors involved. In such 
circumstances, unexpected outside influences may acquire added significance and weight.  
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was intended to drive a wedge between the landed and industrial elites, and to generate 
a profound crisis of the Right (Scully 1992: 154-160). As Jocelyn-Holt argues, the Right 
completely underestimated the radical nature of the PDC and its desire to marginalise 
the oligarchy:  
The Right poorly read the cards; it proved unable to decipher the Richter scale. 
It counted on being able to endure a small tremor that looked like mere 
gradualist reformism, without realising that what was coming over them was a 
cataclysmic revolutionary earthquake of large proportions (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 
96).  
The results of this crisis of the Right would be long-lasting and profound, in three ways. 
First of all, after the Conservative and Liberal parties regrouped in the National Party in 
1966, they left the pragmatic course that had characterised them for years. Blaming this 
pragmatism for their own crisis (as they had initiated the agrarian reform themselves), 
the Right turned towards a strong defence of the right to property and the maintenance 
of social order. Breaking with a tradition that went back to the nineteenth century, the 
Right was no longer prepared to accept socio-economic modernisation in return for a 
share in power. This new strategy would play an important role both during the 
remainder of the Christian Democrat government as during the project of the Left. 
Second, the Right lost all confidence in the Christian Democrat Party, which it 
accused of backstabbing. Having supported the PDC in 1964, the subsequent camino 
propio and agrarian reform that were followed by the Christian Democrats was 
considered the vilest form of treason. As a consequence, the Right came to be 
characterised by sentiments of mistrust of the political game in general and the PDC 
specifically. In particular the relations with the PDC became strained, which is still 
observable decades later.  
Third, the crisis of the Right provoked new initiatives which would prove crucial for 
the future of the competition between the three projects of modernisation. One group 
of students from the Catholic University (Universidad Católica, UC) in particular, under 
the leadership of Jaime Guzmán, started to develop an alternative and radical 
conservative ideology, largely based on the Catholic corporatism of General Franco in 
Spain. Arguing that the liberal system had entered a final crisis, they sought to construct 
an ultra-conservative social order that was almost completely anti-modern. These 
gremialistas, as they were called, soon gained influence in the university and became 
serious oppositional actors during the government of Allende. However, they would 
play an even greater role in the project of the Right, where they would form one of the 
main civil elites that would cooperate with the military regime in the construction of a 
new model of modernity (Correa 2004: 268).  
Meanwhile, the PDC kept up strong competition with the Left over the electoral 
support in rural as well as the urban areas. Their strategies varied from intensive 
campaigning, the co-opting of social actors, and the disarticulation of sectors that were 
unlikely to pass to the PDC. In the countryside agrarian reform was combined with a 
process of rapid unionisation under Christian Democrat supervision. While initially the 
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PDC (and earlier, the Falange) had mainly drawn from an urban support base, now its 
constituency in the agrarian sectors grew rapidly. The number of unionised peasants 
grew from 1,625 in 1964 to 114,112 in 1970, over 20per cent of the total rural 
workforce. By that time, almost 70 per cent of the unionised rural workers belonged to 
unions that were loyal to the PDC. However, the PDC only reached one sector of the 
rural workforce, the inquilino or tenant, who worked on the fundos (estates) of the 
oligarchy. This group benefited most from the Agrarian Reform, as the expropriated 
lands were distributed among them. The landless workers, or afuerinos, as well as the 
minifundistas (small landowners), were largely excluded from the benefits of the Agrarian 
Reform and the unionisation of the PDC. As a result, it was the Left that succeeded in 
gaining the support of the afuerinos, a much larger group than the inquilinos, and started 
to dominate the rural areas towards the end of the 1960s (Scully 1992: 159). 
In the urban areas the electoral competition between the PDC and the left mainly 
took place in the poblaciones. The promoción popular programme, mobilising thousands 
of grass-roots organisations such as neighbourhood organisations and mothers’ centres, 
created a powerful support base for the PDC. Within a few years, the Christian 
Democrats dominated the marginal urban sectors. Only a united opposition from both 
left and right in Congress could block the attempts of the PDC to give this client 
network direct access to the State. However, the attempts of the Frei government to 
increase its electoral base were not limited to the poblaciones. It also attacked the bulwark 
of the Marxist party, organised labour. By creating and promoting state-sponsored 
unions, the Christian Democrats attempted, with some success, to bring organised 
labour under their own banner. Another strategy used by the PDC was the ‘upgrading’ 
of several industrial crafts from obrero (blue-collar worker) to empleado (white-collar 
worker). By improving the social status of these groups, this strategy sought to divide 
the urban working sector and gain access to them (ibid., pp. 161-162). 
The competition between the Left and the PDC induced a process of ideological 
outbidding, which would have a decisive influence on the project of the Left. Even 
before 1964, the Christian Democrats had broken the discursive monopoly of the Left 
on revolution and integrated it into their political language. It is no coincidence that 
their programme was titled ‘Revolution in Liberty’ and not, for instance, 
‘Modernisation through Reform’. As Jocelyn-Holt (1997: 92) puts it: ‘after Cuba, the 
solution could only be revolutionary’. In order to be an attractive alternative to 
socialism, the Christian Democrats needed to make use of the zeitgeist and present their 
programme as the only ‘true revolution’. Thus, two ‘revolutionary projects’ took place 
simultaneously in Latin America, one in Cuba and one in Chile, both of them claiming 
to bring progress and development. Fidel Castro even challenged Frei to have a 
competition between the two countries and see which one would eliminate 
underdevelopment first (Moulian and Guerra 2000: 151). As a result, two models for 
modernisation were competing for dominance in Latin America. However, the project 
of the PDC held many elements in common with the project of the Left, such as 
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Agrarian Reform.19 This forced the Left to radicalise in order to differentiate itself from 
the Christian Democrats. Thus, a paradoxical situation emerged in the late 1960s, when 
the Left voted against many of the Reforms that it would have hailed some years earlier, 
while the Right, becoming increasingly sure of the victory of Alessandri in the 1970 
elections, supported them (Valenzuela 2003: 79).  
The process of ideological outbidding had strong implications for the projects of 
both the Centre and the Left. For the Christian Democrats, it led to a deep division 
within the party between a conservative and a radical section. Eventually this would end 
in a break, in which a sector of young intellectuals within the party split off to join the 
Left (see section 3.2.3). As will be seen, this section of the PDC, the MAPU, turned out 
to have substantial influence, not only on the project of the Left under the UP, but also 
on the ideological re-orientation of the Left in the 1980s and the construction of the 
project of the Concertación.  
In the case of the Left itself, the process of ideological outbidding also contributed 
to deep internal divisions. Especially in Salvador Allende’s Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista, PS), the differences between a relatively moderate wing, led by Allende, and a 
much more radical one became increasingly clear. While Allende’s moderates proposed 
working within the context of liberal democracy and creating a coalition with the 
‘progressive bourgeoisie’ (the reformist middle classes), the radicals turned towards a 
confrontational strategy. Arguing that the reactionary forces would never allow the Left 
to gain power, this section, under leadership of Carlos Altamirano, proposed following 
the armed road and taking up arms against the ‘class state’. In the twenty-second 
Congress of the PS, celebrated in 1967 in Chillán, this line of action was officially 
approved, and ‘revolutionary violence’ was declared both ‘inevitable and legitimate’ 
(quoted in Corvalán 2001: 54). As a result, the moderate sectors within the PS, 
including Allende himself, were faced with a radicalised internal opposition, which 
would have crucial consequences for the implementation of the project of the Left. 
Finally, the extreme competition between the government and the opposition led to 
a change in the informal rules of the game. During the first years of the Revolution in 
Liberty, the political opposition in Congress had forced the Christian Democrats to 
find pragmatic solutions for its implementation. The law for the agrarian reform was 
delayed due to Congressional opposition and could only be implemented in 1967, 
fourteen months after it had been submitted. Until that period, Jacques Chonchol, 
Director of the Institute for Agrarian and Livestock Development (INDAP), pushed the 
programme beyond the existing legislation (the cautious agrarian reform law that had 
been installed by the Alessandri government) by actively promoting labour conflicts 
and multi-farm unionisation (Loveman 2001: 242). This move beyond the letter of the 
law under pressure of radical opposition in Congress would set a precedent that would 
                                              
19 This has led some conservative critics to claim that the Frei government would inevitably lead to a 
Marxist takeover in the future. The most vehement attack from this direction came from the Brazilian 
advocate Fabio Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, whose best-selling title ‘Frei, the Chilean Kerensky’ was banned 
by the government after its publication in Chile in 1966.  
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later be followed by the Left, and which would eventually contribute to the collapse of 
the political system.  
3.2.3 Stepping on the Brake: Adaptation of the Project 
The Revolution in Liberty took a fundamental turn in 1967. Faced with increasing 
popular unrest, radicalising social demands and a faltering economy, Frei was forced to 
choose between his programme and the maintenance of social order. On the one hand, 
he was pushed to intensify the programme and satisfy popular demand in order to keep 
the initiative and outbid the Left, even if that would hurt the economy and further blur 
the programmatic lines between the PDC and the left. On the other hand, any attempt 
to slow down the project and enforce social order would generate fierce opposition 
from the Left and aggravate the internal divisions within the PDC.  
The Christian Democrats found themselves in a situation with little room to 
manoeuvre. Being a minority in Congress, the support of sectors of the opposition 
would be essential for a change in course. The camino propio of the PDC, however, and 
the polarised political competition had created a belligerent atmosphere in which 
multiparty cooperation was hardly possible. Furthermore, the centralised technocratic 
implementation of the project left little room for political compromise. Finally, Frei 
adopted an authoritarian style of government, and followed — at least discursively — a 
highly confrontational course towards the opposition:  
If they want to hurt me they will have to break me entirely, because I will not 
yield one step in my path, not for anyone or anything (speech by Eduardo Frei 
1967). 
To make things worse, the party had become internally divided into three fractions, 
which struggled to define the future of the Revolution in Liberty. The oficialistas, the 
largest of the three, followed the line of Frei and party chairman Patricio Aylwin, and 
advocated a conservative turn in order to maintain control over social and economic 
developments. The internal opposition was split into two factions, both arguing for a 
radicalisation of the programme. For them, moderate reformism had been doomed 
from the start, and only profound and revolutionary change would have a chance of 
survival. They particularly resented the ‘from above and without’ style of modernisation 
of the government. As one of the leaders of the internal opposition stated:  
There exists [within the government] a sincere wish to govern for the people - 
however, without its participation. Let us not forget that revolutions are not 
made by governments, but by the people. In this sense our popular movement 
is dramatically lagging behind (quoted in González 1989: 159).  
The first opposition group within the PDC, the so-called rebeldes, among them former 
‘young radical’ Julio Silva Solar, supported a Marxist approach and argued in favour of 
an alliance with the Left. The other faction, the terceristas, lead by Jacques Chonchol, 
more or less followed the same line, but stressed Christianity as the source of political 
inspiration and took a more conciliatory line towards the oficialistas. The divisions 
between the three worsened over time, not only weakening the party from within, but 
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also leading to conflicts within the executive, as rebeldes and terceristas such as Jacques 
Chonchol (director of the agency that implemented the agrarian reform) held key 
functions in the bureaucracy (Fleet 1985: 99).  
In August of 1967, the different factions clashed as rebeldes and terceristas published a 
proclamation titled the vía no capitalista de desarrollo (the non-capitalist road of 
development). This paper proposed an increase in popular participation in policy-
making, state control and democratic planning over the main socio-economic processes, 
and strong norms for private enterprise, and a more active focus on organised labour.20 
The document provoked a furious reaction from the oficialistas. In an internal memo, 
which was leaked to the press, Patricio Aylwin lashed out:  
The argumentation of the document shows, in my view, an astonishing lack of 
the most elemental sense of reality. (…) If we, social Christians, thought like 
Marxists, we should say so openly and proceed without hesitation with the 
nationalisation of goods. It would be useless to only go half the way. The ideas 
that the document insinuates regarding private business is reminiscent of the 
Yugoslav model, which is Marxist and not Christian (quoted in González 1989: 
145).  
Two months later, all lines came together in open confrontation. The cause was a wage 
adjustment plan that had been proposed by finance minister Sergio Molina. Alarmed 
by the negative prospects for 1968, Molina had considered that the only way to 
improve the economy while leaving the Revolution in Liberty intact would be the 
creation of a National Savings and Investment Fund. This fund would be financed by 
transferring 50 per cent of the annual wage correction (compensating for the rise in the 
cost of living) to it, and entitling the workers to state obligations (bonos) with annual 
interest in return. Typically a technocrat project, based on economic calculations and 
disregarding the political realities, the chiribonos were integrally rejected by the rebeldes 
and terceristas (Montecinos 1998: 47).21 For four months, the Frei administration 
struggled with his party, until in January 1968 Frei was able to restore his authority 
within the PDC, as rebeldes and terceristas were removed from leading positions and 
replaced by Freistas.22  
The conflict had deepened the cleavages in the PDC beyond repair. In 1969, the 
rebeldes would leave the party and join Allende’s Unidad Popular, only to be followed, 
                                              
20 This proposal foreshadowed the UP’s division of the economy in three areas (public, private, and 
mixed). Even though it did not explicitly make such a division, it promoted a large state area of economic 
activity, a private area that would be more or less function by itself (small enterprise), and an area in 
which private enterprise would be supervised by state planning (González 1989: 144). The idea of a true 
division in three areas would come from the Radical Party.  
21 The opposition labelled the project chiribonos, alluding to the obligations (bonos) and the chirimoya, the 
name for both a Chilean pear apple and an unsecured cheque, suggesting that nothing would ever be 
seen again of those savings.  
22 During the debate on the chiribonos project, attempts were made by the PDC to de-technocratise the 
programme by having it explained, in simple terms, by Minister of Finance Andrés Zaldívar, in a 
document called The Truth on the Saving Bonds of the Workers. In this document, Zaldívar repudiates most 
of the criticisms, both from Left and Right, among other things by pointing out that both in the 
capitalist world and in the Socialist world, some sort of obligatory savings exist (Zaldívar 1967: 11-12).  
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two years later, by the terceristas. The internal struggle within the PDC on the pace and 
the development of the Revolution in Liberty had been won by the conservative forces, 
who favoured a slowing down of the process and the maintenance of social order over 
the continuation of the Revolution in Liberty.   
The chiribonos programme was Frei’s last opportunity to reignite economic growth 
without jeopardising the Revolution in Liberty. If successful, it would allow the 
Revolution to be continued, while a growing economy would satisfy popular demands. 
However, the chiribonos project suffered a humiliating defeat in the Senate, where both 
the Left and the Right rejected it. Frei was now faced with the classic dilemma of 
Chilean politics: to move forward with modernization, or to restore social order. Frei, 
who had never made a secret for his abhorrence of disorder, chose to step on the brake 
in an attempt to regain his grip on the developments in society. 
One of the pillars of the Revolution in Liberty that suffered from this change of 
strategy was agrarian reform. Even though a new, tougher law had been approved by 
mid-1967, allowing for the expropriation of more farms, the speed of the programme 
was slowed down. In 1967 and 1968 fewer properties were expropriated than in 1966. 
Moreover, the area of expropriated irrigated land dropped from almost 58 thousand 
acres in 1966 to about 50 thousand in the following year, and to only 44 thousand in 
1968 (CORA 1970: 36). This slowing down was a result of both financial considerations 
(the expropriation of a farm cost roughly US$ 10,000) and the need to restore order in 
the countryside. The tomas and strikes that started to characterise the countryside not 
only created a political challenge for the government, but also had economic 
consequences. Landowners and entrepreneurs became increasingly hesitant to invest in 
agriculture, fearing expropriations and radicalising labour conflicts. The expropriated 
farms, now organised in asentamientos (settlements), were not able to compensate for the 
fall in production due to declining investments. Although there were cases of highly 
successful asentamientos, in general production declined after expropriation. The 
difficulty of setting up the new organisational structures, lack of know-how and the 
political polarisation of the workers affected the efficiency of the expropriated farms 
(Fleet 1985: 103-107).  
The promoción popular project also suffered from Frei’s conservative turn. The 
programme, intended to integrate the urban marginal masses by organising them in 
‘intermediate organisations’ such as the juntas de vecinos (neighbourhood organisations) 
and mothers’ centres, had been enthusiastically set in motion in 1965. Supported by the 
government, juntas de vecinos constructed sewerage systems and laid pavements in the 
cities’ shanty towns, while thousands of sewing machines were distributed to the centros 
de madres. However, the political side of the project, the mobilisation of the urban 
marginal sectors in the support of the PDC, elicited strong resistance from the 
opposition. It therefore blocked all legislation concerning the project, leaving the 
Promoción Popular without any legal basis. Simultaneously, though, the Left started to 
become active in the poblaciones, and when in 1967 the economy started to falter, large 
sections of the mobilised masses turned against the government and gave their support 
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to the socialist parties (Correa et al. 2001: 251). The law regulating the juntas de vecinos, 
which was finally approved in 1968, came too late, as the government had discontinued 
the promoción popular a year earlier (Cardemil 1997: 256; González 1989: 125). In the 
face of growing political destabilisation, the Frei government chose to put a brake on 
the popular mobilisation, leaving it completely to the Left to take the lead (Moulian 
and Guerra 2000: 183).  
As social unrest spread, the government resorted to increasingly repressive means in 
order to impose order. While Frei had always vehemently denounced the use of 
violence to suppress strikes and tomas, since ‘the bullets are always for the poor’ (speech 
by Eduardo Frei 1963a), he took a much more authoritarian style once in power. In 
1966 he had already defended the violent repression of a strike in one of the copper 
mines of the north by arguing that the armed forces ‘were fulfilling their duties’, and 
that the strike had been ‘absolutely illegal’, a ‘rebellion against legitimately constituted 
authority’, organised by ‘true union oligarchies’ (speech by Eduardo Frei 1966c). The 
hard line of the President exacerbated the feelings of disenchantment among the 
population and fuelled the opposition’s attempts to discredit the PDC, adding to the 
wave of strikes and tomas that took over the country after 1967. In order to turn the 
tide, Frei replaced Interior Minister Bernardo Leighton with Edmundo Pérez Zújovic, a 
strongly anti-communist businessman. His hard-line approach only served to further 
aggravate the situation, as it attracted the media to virtually any protest or 
confrontation (Fleet 1985: 109). The repression of a toma in Puerto Montt, in 1969, in 
which nine civilians died, came to be emblematic for Frei’s authoritarian line, 
provoking national cries of protest.23 
Frei did not react in an authoritarian manner exclusively, though. As Arturo 
Valenzuela shows, the proliferation of strikes in the late 1960s was partly a result of the 
willingness of the government to resolve labour disputes in favour of the workers. The 
government regularly tried to achieve peaceful solutions, by intervening swiftly after the 
outbreak of a strike and fulfilling substantial parts of the labourers’ demands before 
resorting to repression. In fact, the fall in the average duration of strikes between 1966 
and 1969, from 10.3 to 3.5 days, might be indicative of the government’s success in 
ending labour disputes by conciliation (Valenzuela 2003: 72-74). As Valenzuela argues, 
this was not necessarily just a result of government sympathy towards the unions. It is 
much more likely that the government intended to crush strikes and demonstrations as 
rapidly as possible in order to avoid violent repression and subsequent growing 
opposition. In this sense, both strategies were part of the same policy, that is, to 
maintain order with all available means.  
On the political level Frei tried to stay in control, not by cooperating with the 
opposition, but by excluding it even further. In the process, he increasingly took an 
authoritarian stance that did not serve to soothe the emotions. In 1967, the opposition 
                                              
23 See for instance the lyrics of Victor Jara’s song Preguntas por Puerto Montt, in which the singer personally 
blames Minister of Interior Pérez Zújovic for the drama.  
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was successful in denying Frei travel to the United States on an invitation by the US 
government. In a furious reaction, he stated:  
the opposition (…) has reached the extremes of forming a coalition in order to 
make impossible the execution of my constitutional mandate. (…) I have said, 
before I came here, that I would not change one point in my programme, not 
for a million votes. And now, I repeat that if to obtain a majority in the Senate 
would mean changing my programme, I prefer not to have that majority 
(quoted in González 1989: 119). 
In order to bypass the opposition in Congress, Frei had submitted a proposal for a 
Constitutional Reform in 1965 that would, among other things, significantly increase 
the power of the executive vis-à-vis parliament. Not surprisingly, he failed to gain 
sufficient support for this proposal. Other attempts to increase the President’s powers 
(for instance by allowing him to prorogue Congress and call for new elections once 
during his mandate) suffered a similar fate. Only towards the end of his presidency, in 
1969, was Frei’s Constitutional Reform approved, although on the condition that it 
would only go into effect after the 1970 elections. As a result, Frei’s attempts to 
strengthen his own position eventually served to strengthen that of his main rival, 
Salvador Allende (Fleet 1985: 113).  
Frei’s turn to the Right had an unexpected outcome within the party, however. It 
isolated him within the party, giving room to the progressive forces in the PDC to set 
the agenda for the coming presidential elections. The obvious candidate was Radimiro 
Tomic, who had been the Chilean ambassador in the United States. For Frei and the 
conservative camp within the PDC, Tomic, who proposed a coalition with the Marxist 
Left (supported by terceristas and rebeldes), was an unacceptable candidate. 
Simultaneously, though, they were aware that open resistance to his candidacy would 
lead to a break within the party, which would mean the end of the PDC. Their solution 
was to accept Tomic as a candidate, but on the condition that no coalition with the 
Left would be made and the camino propio would be maintained. This proved to be a 
miscalculation on Frei’s part. On the one hand, it provoked the break of the rebelde 
section with the party, and the subsequent creation of the MAPU, which joined the UP. 
On the other, the party, now led by Tomic, radically shifted course again, presenting an 
electoral programme for the 1970 elections that resembled that of the Left in most 
points. Arguing that Frei’s reformism had been good, but not good enough, Tomic 
embarked on a revolutionary course:  
Do you want a brief judgement? We have achieved much, but not the 
Revolution! And because we have not achieved the Revolution, the great 
question of a new destiny for Chile remains pending (speech by Radimiro 
Tomic 1969).  
As a result, Frei, who had wanted to maintain both the unity of the party and a 
relatively conservative course, had lost on both counts (González 1989: 184-188). 
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3.3 The Legacy of the Revolution in Liberty  
The Revolution in Liberty had initially been perceived as a project of social, economic, 
and political modernisation, based on doctrinal currents of socialcristianismo and the 
developmentalism of ECLA’s structuralism. However, in the course of its 
implementation, the project changed both in content and form. This was related to the 
success of the state in strengthening its capacity to govern, and the success of the 
technocracy in maintaining a certain independence from the political arena. It also 
responded to the realities of political competition and the reactions of civil society, 
which forced the government to adapt its project in order to maintain social order and 
consolidate its achievements. All these factors played a role in the formation of what 
would become the legacy of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’.  
 
Economic Modernisation 
The agrarian reform was the most successful part of the Revolution in Liberty. It was a 
project of economic modernisation (albeit with social and political connotations) that 
enjoyed a high level of societal support (as it had been introduced by the Right under 
Alessandri and had the support of the Left), and was efficiently carried out by the 
técnicos of the INDAP. It worked well because it could be defended from a 
developmental perspective (effective agriculture), as well as a doctrinal one (social 
justice). It could be implemented relatively autonomously and technically, as it already 
possessed a legal framework. Finally, the social unrest that was provoked by the agrarian 
reform remained relatively insignificant, and even though it caused a profound Right-
wing hatred for the Christian Democrats, its negative social consequences were limited. 
This is not to say that the project was a complete success. The reform did not lead 
directly to an increase in production - the productivity gains that were achieved in this 
period were mainly a result of higher output from the private sector (Silva 1987: 67). 
Difficulties in the organisation of the asentamiento system and the growing unrest on the 
countryside hindered the efficient functioning of the new cooperative agricultural units, 
let alone their transformation into privately-owned farms. The initial goal of creating 
‘one hundred thousand new agrarian proprietors’, as the project stipulated, was not 
achieved. In fact, by 1970 not even one asentamiento had been transferred officially to 
the families that worked it (González 1989: 95). Officially, this was mainly due to the 
delays the agrarian reform suffered: the law on agrarian reform, which stipulated that 
the transfer of expropriated lands should take place after three years, was only approved 
in 1967. However, given the extreme level of electoral competition between the PDC 
and the Left in the countryside, it is likely that a clientelistic approach was favoured in 
order to bind the rural constituents to the party. Moreover, the rationale of state 
planning created the need for direct control of agricultural production. This would be 
much easier if the expropriated land was collective and state-supervised. Finally, the 
question of ownership was contested within the PDC itself. Frei favoured the creation 
of individually owned farms, while the rebeldes and terceristas, ideologically following the 
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Left, were inclined towards collective ownership. By 1970, this dispute had remained 
undecided (Moulian and Guerra 2000: 157).  
Even though the agrarian reform was far from complete by 1970 (only about 20 per 
cent of Chile’s irrigated lands had been expropriated), the break with the past was 
evident. Moreover, the new law on agrarian reform, replacing the law that had been 
passed under Alessandri, gave way to an intensification of the programme. Although 
this intensification did not take place under Frei, due to his conservative shift in the 
second part of his government, the complete modernisation of the agrarian sector 
within the boundaries of the law had now become a real possibility.  
The other structural change that had been achieved under the Revolution in Liberty 
was the Chilenización of the copper mines. This, too, was a successful project of the 
PDC, although it suffered from bad publicity. The ‘Chilenisation’ followed the 
developmental logic of structuralist economics, but also reflected the high level of 
nationalism of the era. It was a typical technocratic solution, based on technical 
considerations rather than populist rhetoric. In addition, its costs were very high and 
would only bring benefits in the longer term (Moulian and Guerra 2000: 164). Even if 
the Chilenización was an economic failure in the short term, though, it was a 
fundamental step in Chilean history. It reflected a recognition that the copper industry 
was essential for the development of the country, and that its nationalisation, albeit 
partial, opened up a new phase in Chile’s political economy. In particular it opened the 
door for the full nationalisation of the copper industry. Like the agrarian reform, its true 
meaning lay not so much in the number of changes that took place in the period 1964-
1970, but in the influence that these would have in the years after that.  
In the other areas of the economy, the Christian Democrats did not leave a lasting 
legacy. This was caused by poor publicity rather than by bad performance, but was 
nevertheless a self-inflicted problem. The messianic tone of socialcristianismo, combined 
with the blind faith in technical solutions and planning of the técnicos, created 
expectations that could not be lived up to. As a PDC economist argued afterwards:  
We induced Frei to make grave political errors. He announced goals in 
quantitative terms: 100,000 new landholders, 600,000 houses… the Frei 
government did more than any other, but accomplished less than it had 
promised. People evaluate on the basis of promises, not accomplishments 
(quoted in Montecinos 1998: 49).24  
Planning as it was practised by the Frei government proved not to be enough to create a 
sustained high level of economic growth. Frei’s Minister of Finance, Sergio Molina, 
concluded in retrospect that the state planning suffered from several structural 
shortcomings, which severely affected its efficiency. First of all, the limited mandate of 
ODEPLAN, being an advisory institution to the Ministry of Finance, was not enough 
                                              
24 Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt focuses on the messianic attitude of the Christian Democrats rather than on the 
técnicos when explaining the high level of expectations the PDC generated but could not fulfil: ‘The 
revolution [of the Revolution in Liberty] was that it did not capitalise on what it had achieved. The 
revolution was the liberating messianism that took control of the political leadership without balance’ 
(1998: 97).  
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to support the planning programme, which remained dependent on the political 
conjunctures and the support of individual functionaries. Furthermore, planning 
focused almost exclusively on public works in infrastructure and energy, while little 
attention was paid to new projects. Finally, the rationale of planificación often clashed 
with the motives of politicians and executives. The planning experts often felt 
uncomfortable in dealing with concrete socio-economic issues that politicians and 
functionaries encountered at the local level, as they considered that such practical 
matters might disturb the perfect world of planificación: 
With the pretext of defending the ‘image’ of planning, they preferred to 
dedicate themselves to the construction of a future ideal in order to avoid the 
contamination with unpopularity that is involved in proposing concrete 
measures that surely will be the object of political controversy (Molina 1972: 
163-165).  
As a result, planning, and technocracy in general, created expectations that could not be 
satisfied, and as a result it strengthened the Left’s argument that reformism alone was 
not enough. 
 
Political Modernisation 
In terms of political modernisation, the legacy of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was 
limited. On the one hand, the planning system of the Frei administration required 
extreme levels of efficiency and control. As a consequence, Frei set in motion a process 
of rationalisation of the state apparatus, streamlining the decision-making processes and 
prioritising highly educated técnicos in all senior functions (Montecinos 1998: 76). In 
order to maintain personal control, Frei resorted to semi-fiscal institutions, such as the 
ODEPLAN, INDAP and CORFO, for the implementation of the Revolution in 
Liberty, largely bypassing both Congress and his own bureaucracy (Salazar and Pinto 
1999a: 85-86). This enabled him to put the decision-making process as well as the 
implementation of the programme into the hands of technocrats, and to achieve 
unprecedentedly high levels of efficiency and rationalisation. This tendency to move 
outside of the formal structures would be also used by Allende in the implementation 
of important elements of the project of the Left outside parliamentary control.  
The other side of the PDC’s ‘top-down revolution’ was the restructuring of the 
country’s political organisation through the direct participation of the marginal masses. 
This echoed the socialcristiano ideal of creating a ‘true democracy’, in which all sectors 
of society would be able to participate actively in the political system through 
‘intermediate organisations’, which would ‘respond to the progressive meaning of the 
development of man’ (quoted in Cardemil 1997: 163).  
The creation of this ‘organic society’ was characterised by its top-down approach. 
The logic of efficient and rational policy-making, as well as of maintaining some form 
of control over the newly incorporated masses, did not allow for bottom-up strategies. 
As a result, the ideal of a ‘participative democracy’ was articulated in the most 
paternalistic form only. Nevertheless, promoción popular led to the creation of many 
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juntas de vecinos, mothers’ centres and the like, under the tutelage of the state. While the 
government’s claim that over 20,000 of these organisations had been created, and that 
over 70,000 sewing machines had been distributed through them, was probably 
exaggerated, promoción popular would remain influential for years. Under the Pinochet 
dictatorship, the first lady’s charity work would still take place in mothers’ centres in the 
shanty towns that had been set up under the ‘Revolution in Liberty’.  
The most successful element of the creation of ‘true democracy’ under the PDC was 
the concientización (consciousness-raising) among the popular masses. This was mainly 
the result of the intense competition that evolved between the Centre and the Left in 
the search for new electoral groups. In the countryside, the agrarian reform gave the 
PDC a unique opportunity to capture the loyalty of the new farm-holders through the 
patronage of the INDAP and the CORA. In response, the Left focused on the landless 
peasants, initiating illegal tomas and expropriations in areas where the PDC was not yet 
dominant, and contributing significantly to the growing social rural unrest. In order to 
avoid further radicalisation in the countryside, the government decreased the speed of 
the Agrarian Reform, and resorted to repression in the case of illegal tomas. 
Simultaneously, competition between different factions within the Christian Democrat 
unions, as well as from the unions of the left, weakened the PDC’s attempts to 
consolidate peasant support (Scully 1992: 157).  
In the cities, where the left dominated organised labour, the competition between 
the PDC and the Left mainly took place in the poblaciones. As in the agrarian sector, the 
attempts of the Christian Democrats to consolidate popular support were answered by 
an ideological ‘bidding-war’ by the left, feeding the growing dissent among the 
pobladores over the pace and scope of the Revolution in Liberty. In this context, the 
creation of a network of political ‘intermediate organisations’ with direct ties to the 
PDC was strongly contested by both Left and Right, and a proposal for a law regulating 
the legal position of these organisations was blocked in Congress (ibid., p. 161). This 
was, however, not the sole reason for the abandonment of the Promoción Popular after 
1967. In the context of the ideological bidding and contesting of constituencies, the 
creation of a political network in the poblaciones could easily backfire and create a 
stronghold for the opposition. This would not only weaken the position of the PDC, 
but would also endanger social order in the cities, already under pressure because of 
illegal tomas and protests of the radical left. In the end, the Christian Democrats 
dropped the political element of the Promoción Popular and the ambitions for creating a 
‘true democracy’ altogether, as the need for political survival and the maintenance of 
social order proved incompatible with further increased popular political participation 
(Moulian and Guerra 2000: 182). 
Despite the PDC’s attempts to mitigate political radicalisation, the concientización of 
the formerly excluded masses became an important legacy of the ‘Revolution in 
Liberty’. As Finance Minister Molina argued afterwards: 
What earlier seemed an illusion or vague hope has been converted into a true 
possibility. In many social groups that had been excluded for years, a 
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consciousness of rights has been created, which has provoked a crisis in a system 
that maintained itself in a patriarchal way. As a result, those who were 
accustomed to dominate almost without counterbalance not only saw their 
orders becoming the object of discussion, but were even confronted with open 
rebellion (Molina 1973: 29-30).  
On the other hand, it raised the question of how to contain these forces. The PDC’s 
attempts to discipline or limit this popular mobilisation, be it by co-opting sections of 
workers or by resorting to authoritarian measures, failed, as they either raised 
expectations further or fuelled popular frustration. The emergence of the masses, highly 
politicised and hardly under the control of the political system, had become 
unstoppable by 1970.  
 
Social Modernisation 
The most successful aspect of the Revolution in Liberty was the modernisation of the 
country’s social structures. The inclusion of the marginal masses by the state therefore 
became the Christian Democrats’ most important legacy. Even though this social 
inclusion would be partially reversed under the project of the Left and Right, it 
maintained high levels of support and would eventually become one of the 
cornerstones of Chilean modernity. Apart from reflecting both socialcristiano and 
structuralist doctrines on social justice and societal development, this was a project that 
could be implemented in a direct top-down manner, using the facilities of the state and 
the technical logic of planning. It also served the clientelistic purposes of the PDC in 
the competition with the Left. Finally, it responded to sentiments that were shared 
nation-wide. By the mid-1960s, the alleviation of the misery of the excluded masses was 
a point of attention for all sectors, be it the form of liberating them from capitalist 
oppression, or in preventing them from turning to communism.  
The promoción popular was crucial in this respect, and even if its results may have 
been exaggerated by government officials, it certainly benefited thousands of pobladores 
and other urban marginals. Apart from the well-known distribution of sewing machines 
and creation of local organisations, the programme provided basic services that 
facilitated the social and economic integration of the communities. By 1965 over 600 
telephones had been installed in poblaciones around the country, as well as an intensive 
programme provided sewerage systems and drinking water, with help from local 
communities. Affordable public transportation was extended, allowing the residents to 
work outside their community. The State Bank set up a programme that granted loans 
to local initiatives, giving the pobladores access to bank accounts and instruction sessions 
on how to save their earnings. Even though the initial and over-ambitious targets were 
not met, about 260,000 houses were built and 200,000 blocks for self-help housing 
projects were allotted. Meanwhile, the government invested heavily in health care: the 
number of hospitals and beds doubled under Frei. The government also raised the 
education budget by about 50 per cent, building about 3000 new schools and raising 
primary education enrolment to an unprecedented 95 per cent (Collier and Sater 1996: 
312). Finally, one of the most important elements of this programme was its legal side: 
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civil registration offices were set up in order to register and distribute identity papers to 
the marginal masses (Gobierno de Chile 1965: 11-13). 
The project of social modernisation by the Christian Democrats left its marks on 
the projects of both the Left and the Right. The success of promoción popular in the 
inclusion of the marginal masses generated a general consensus on the undesirability of 
social exclusion. Both the Left (which sought to include the marginal masses by means 
of the state) and the Right (which used the market for the same purpose) attempted to 
resolve the social question. Only in the 1990s was the Concertación, working with both 
the logics of the state and the market, able to include the marginal masses into the 
Chilean socio-economic structures. This process, however, had been set in motion by 
the ‘Revolution in Liberty’.  
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Chapter 4 
The Chilean Road to Socialism and Modernity 
In the debate surrounding modernity and modernisation in Chile, the project of the 
Popular Unity government (UP), has received surprisingly little attention. Whereas the 
modernising nature of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ has been widely acknowledged, and 
the modernisations of the military dictatorship have received broad and thorough 
attention, little serious attempt has been made to analyse the ‘Chilean road’ in the 
context of modernity.1  
An explanation for this phenomenon may be found in a historiographic tendency 
to place the UP in the context of breaks rather than continuity, while modernisation is 
usually associated with continuity or gradualism rather than with revolutionary change. 
Therefore, the UP government is often contrasted with the ‘modernising’ and reformist 
project of the Christian Democrats. However, as has been argued in the theoretical 
outline, it is one of the purposes of this study to focus on continuity as well as change, 
and as the ‘multiple modernities’ conceptualisation suggests, the history of 
modernisation may well follow wave-like patterns rather than sequences of breaks and 
ruptures.2 Based on this conceptualisation, this chapter will show not only the high 
level of continuity between the ‘Chilean Road’ and the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ and 
their shared modernising outlook, but also the different shapes and forms that 
modernity can take. Despite the project’s obvious uniqueness, it by no means 
constituted an interruption in Chile’s long and winding trajectory towards modernity. 
Rather than proposing an ‘alternative to modernity’, the project of the UP sought to 
construct a proper ‘alternative modernity’, a hybrid form of modernity, in which 
capitalist elements of the modern were mixed with non-capitalist ones. 
The construction of the project followed more or less the same line as that of the 
‘Revolution in Liberty’. An existing political ideology, in this case Socialism, was used 
as the foundation of the project but was profoundly adapted to the local Chilean 
context (section 4.1.1). It was expanded with a developmental theory that gave it a 
‘scientific’ basis, this time the so-called ‘dependency theory’ (section 4.1.2). These two 
elements were mixed in an original and far-fetching project of modernisation, which 
                                              
1 There are of course always exceptions to the rule. For instance, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and Oscar 
Muñoz, both economists, in 1992 (long before the multiple modernities argument arose) already placed the 
UP in the context of ‘competing modernisation and development strategies’, arguing that ‘[f]or presidents 
Frei (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende (1970-1973), the objectives of redistribution (…) went hand-in-
hand with modernisation’ (1992: 248). Similarly, Espinosa (1990: 166) states that in 1970, ‘a good part of 
the Chileans fell for a mirage of modernity’, that is, the creation of a ‘politically modern country’ by 
means of the Chilean Road to Socialism. However, such affirmations are scarce and often lack a solid 
conceptualisation of modernity.  
2 See Whitehead (2002: 38-48). Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt takes a similar position when referring to the 
development of Chilean history: ‘In my view, the UP is just another chapter in a long history which 
stretches back and projects forwards in time’ (1998: 115).  
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sought to replace the country’s main social, economic, and political structures (section 
4.1.3). In its implementation, it shared the focus on the state, technocracy and state 
planning of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ (section 4.2.1). Simultaneously, it provoked 
strong reactions within the projects of the Centre and Right (section 4.2.2), and was 
forced to adapt its course in view of popular unrest and discontent (section 4.2.3). 
Finally, it left several lasting legacies on the social, political, and economic level, many 
of which were unintended and which strongly came to influence the next project of 
modernisation, that of the Right (section 4.3).  
4.1 The Construction of the Chilean Road  
Like the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, the project of the Left was constructed making use of a 
specific interpretation of modernity. This interpretation was generally based on the 
example of the ‘really existing Socialisms’, which rejected capitalism and focused on a 
‘people’s state’ for the construction of an equal society. However, rather than copying 
and pasting the models of the ‘really existing Socialisms’, the Chilean Left profoundly 
adapted them to the local context, creating a truly ‘Chilean’ road to Socialism. 
Even though the project of the UP placed much emphasis on the social side of 
modernisation, in the form of inclusion of the marginal urban sectors and the rural 
workers, its main emphasis lay on the economic and political dimensions, which came 
to be closely tied to each other. On the political level, the UP intended to liberate the 
working class from ‘bourgeois oppression’ by creating a ‘people’s state’ that would act 
only in the interest of the people. Furthermore, the workers were granted direct control 
over the management of factories and farms. At the economic level, it sought to end 
the exploitation of the working class by expanding the influence of the state in the 
economy and by emphasising the redistributive role of the state.  
Apart from Socialist doctrines and their adaptation to the Chilean context, the UP 
made use of a vanguard theory of development, called dependencia, which was 
constructed by former structuralists in the ECLA. This theory corroborated the Left’s 
thesis that true socio-economic development could only place by leaving the capitalist 
paradigm, providing the UP with a solid, and popular, scientific foundation.  
The doctrinal and developmental approaches of the UP were combined into an 
ambitious project of modernisation, called La Vía Chilena al Socialismo (‘The Chilean 
Road to Socialism’), consisting largely of an intensification of existing reforms as well as 
the introduction of new elements. 
4.1.1 The UP Ideology and Modernity 
The Chilean Left, one of the oldest of the continent, had developed and grown since 
the late nineteenth century, and exhibited, in the words of Jocelyn-Holt, a ‘extremely 
high historical density’ (1998: 116). It went back to the left-wing Popular Front (Frente 
Popular) coalition which came to power in 1938, and the subsequent participation of 
the socialists (and, until 1947, the Communists) in the governments led by the Radical 
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Party. Even further back, it echoed the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932, a twelve-
day populist dictatorship,3 and the presidential campaigns of leaders such as 
Marmaduque Grove and Luis Emilio Recabarren. The origins of the Chilean Left date 
back to the social question, especially among the nitrate workers in the north of the 
country, and the mobilisation and repression of the workers in that era.4 
Despite this long trajectory and historical density, much of the project as presented 
by the Left in 1970 was relatively recent. It reflected a change of strategy, not 
completely unlike that of the socialcristianos in the 1950s, by both of its main 
constituents, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista¸ PS) and the Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista de Chile, PCCh), which took place in the 1950s and which eventually led to 
the construction of the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’.5 The ideology of the UP was by no 
means uniform, though. The different parties held heterogeneous views of society and 
maintained different positions regarding modernity.6 Consequently, the ‘Chilean Road 
to Socialism’ left much room for interpretation, especially on the exact nature of 
socialism.7 It also tended to focus more on the path towards socialism than on the shape 
and form of a socialist society itself.8  
This is not to say that the members of the UP held no common ideologies or 
common positions regarding modernity. The central postulations of the UP were shared 
by most members of the coalition, uniting them in a position regarding the modern 
that was almost as ambiguous as that of the Christian Democrats before them. In this 
case, the central issues consisted in the consecutive rejection and embrace of elements 
of what are considered two central institutions of modernity, capitalism and democracy. 
                                              
3 These twelve days would have a great impact on the future. During this Socialist Republic a law was 
approved allowing for the takeover by the state of industries that were poorly administrated. This law, 
long since forgotten, was rediscovered by the UP and would come to play a crucial role in the 
implementation of the Chilean road. For a detailed description of the Socialist Republic, see: Luis Cruz 
Salas (1978); Jorge Arrate and Eduardo Rojas (2003a: 146-156). 
4 It is no coincidence that the first party of the Left, the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido Obrero Socialista, 
POS) was founded in Iquique, the centre of the nitrate industry, and as early as 1912.  
5 The historian Gonzalo Vial traces the origins of the UP back to 1952, when Allende ran for president 
for the first time. However, this is, in my view, putting too much emphasis on the person of Allende: in 
1952 the Communist-Socialist union, which is the backbone of the UP, was less than embryonic, as the 
PS was still split into two competing sections, and the Communist Party was still outlawed (2005: 53-55). 
6 Apart from the Socialist and Communist Parties, the UP consisted of the Movimiento de Acción Popular 
Unitaria (Unitary Popular Action Movement, MAPU), and three smaller parties, among which the 
Radical Party. In 1971, it was joined by the Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left, IC), which was, like 
MAPU, a splinter from the PDC.  
7 Marc Falcoff (1991: 25) argues that the UP programme was one of the ‘most thorough and 
comprehensive (…) ever offered to the voters of any democratic nation’. This applies mainly for the 
macro policy level, though. The programme only provided a rough outline of the shape and form the 
new socialist society should take. Furthermore, it left the question of the actual implementation of the 
project in terms of political and juridical mechanisms largely open. See: Altamirano (1978: 23), Bitar 
(1986: 24), and Corvalán (2001: 158). 
8 In this sense the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ contrasts with the communitarian ideology of the 
Christian Democrats, which provided an elaborate blueprint of society but lacked a concrete programme 
for its implementation.  
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The UP’s emphasis on these two institutions fitted the particular timeframe Chile 
experienced at that moment. 9 As Garretón and Moulian argue, by the 1970s the 
compatibility of capitalism and democracy had become exhausted. The rhythm of 
economic growth could no longer accommodate the growing popular demands, and the 
combination of a capitalist economy with a ‘providing state’ had become unsustainable. 
For the Right, this deadlock could only be overcome by limiting the democratic 
functions of the state and stimulating economic growth by restricting both participation 
and redistribution.10 For the Left, the solution lay in reversing the patterns of capitalist 
development, while reinforcing the democratic structures of the country (Garretón and 
Moulian 1983: 32-33). However, even if sectors of the Left advocated a full break with 
the trajectory towards modernity the country had followed so far, the eventual project 
of the Left was characterised by its gradualist and reformist approach.  
 
The UP and Capitalism 
The Chilean Left’s approach to capitalist modernity has been a complex one. For 
decades, the Left had taken a highly pragmatic position towards capitalism, following 
more or less a social-democrat line of action. Toward the 1960s this approach changed, 
and sectors of the Left took a more confrontational stance towards capitalism. This did 
not, however, constitute a rejection of modernity as such. Rather, it was argued that 
capitalism was an obstacle to true progress and modernisation, and that true modernity 
could only be constructed by limiting (or even replacing) the free market. 
The actual rejection of capitalism had not been a strong feature of the agenda of the 
Left until the mid-1950s. Before that time, both the PS and the PC had followed 
nonconfrontational lines of action, prioritising access to power over political idealism. 
In 1933 the Communist party already stated that the revolution in Chile was of a 
‘democratic and bourgeois’ character, meaning that it should take place gradually, 
through the ballot and in cooperation with the bourgeoisie. The Socialist Party, 
founded in the same year by Marmaduque Grove, formally rejected this strategy, stating 
in its declaration of principles that:  
evolutionary transformation through the democratic system is impossible 
because the dominant class […] has erected its own dictatorship in order to 
hold the workers in misery and ignorance and to impede their emancipation 
(quoted in Arrate and Rojas 2003a: 170).  
Despite its formal resistance towards gradualism, though, the PS steered a pragmatic 
course, especially after joining the Centre-Left coalition governments led by the Radical 
Party, starting with the Popular Front (Frente Popular) government of 1938. During this 
period, the socialists never seriously proposed fundamental changes to the economic 
structures of the country, postponing, in the words of the historian Luis Corvalán, ‘the 
                                              
9 Barrington Moore (1966) has argued that capitalism and democracy form key elements in the 
trajectories towards modernity. The way societies, and particularly elites, deal with the market and the 
political system may have a decisive outcome on how modernity takes shape.  
10 This argument is in line with Huntington (1968).  
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socialist ideal to an undefined future’ (2001: 44). Instead, the PS prioritised economic 
development and ISI industrialisation over the redistribution of wealth (Falcoff 1991: 
31; Roxborough et al. 1977: 26).11 Only in the early 1950s, after a profound ideological 
crisis which split the Socialist Party into the PS Chile and the more radical Popular 
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP), was this so-called colaboracionismo 
(collaboration) abandoned. In the following years both sections re-evaluated their 
positions and revived their traditional positions towards capitalism. In the General 
Congress of the PSP in 1955, tellingly titled ‘Revolution or Misery’, the final text issued 
a call to ‘destroy the capitalist economic order and promote the construction of a 
Revolutionary State which will promote the interests of the working classes’ (quoted in 
Corvalán 2001: 50).  
Even though the two sections came back together in 1957, the PS remained divided 
between a moderate camp, led by Salvador Allende, which followed a gradualist 
approach and sought to create a broad coalition for its reformist views, and a radical 
camp, which followed a clearly independent line and resisted cooperation with centrist 
forces. These two conflicting positions were not resolved until the 1980s, and even 
though generally the PS remained a reformist and centrist party, the radical forces had 
clearly gained ground after the Popular Front period (Roxborough et al. 1997: 33-34).12 
As a result, the position of the PS on capitalism was, although fundamentally 
dismissive, at best ambiguous.  
The Communist Party, for its part, had followed a much steadier ideological course 
in this respect.13 It had maintained its pragmatic, gradualist and non-confrontational 
course throughout the years, even though it had been banned from government and 
subsequently outlawed from 1948 until 1958 under the so-called Ley de la defensa 
permanente de la Democracia (permanent protection of democracy law). At the 10th 
Congress of the PC, held clandestinely in 1956, the party reiterated its gradualist 
position and their strategy of working together with the bourgeoisie within the 
institutional framework (Corvalán 2001: 47).14 Rather than projecting the rapid 
abolishment of capitalism as such, it proposed a revolution which was ‘anti-imperialist, 
anti-feudal [and] anti-oligarchic’, in other words, attacking the economic domination of 
                                              
11 One of the elements contributing to this pragmatism and cooperation of the Left was the need to form 
a block against the emergence of fascism both in Europe and in Chile itself (De Vylder 1974: 41). The 
economic crisis of the 1930s also created a consensus that the fulfilment of the most direct need of the 
working class, work, should be prioritised above far-fetched ideological ideals.  
12 As will be shown in the following chapters, the Socialist Party actually split again in 1979 due to more 
or less the same ideological differences (see Chapter 5.2.2), only to reunite once more ten years later. 
After the restoration of democracy in 1990, a similar division, albeit less profound, can be distinguished 
in the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente debate among the Chilean Left (see Chapter 6). 
13 This is not to say that the PC did not experience profound ideological changes. In particular the re-
evaluation of Stalin’s rule after his death in 1953 had a considerable impact on the party, which had been 
deeply Stalinist.  
14 The gradual and peaceful approach of the PC received ample international support from the twentieth 
Congress of the Soviet-Union Communist Party, which in the same year adopted the notion of a 
‘peaceful revolution’. Although it merely confirmed the strategies followed so far, this endorsement 
allowed the Chilean PC to make them official.  
 136 
the United States, the landowners and the oligarchy (quoted in Furci 1984: 58). This 
reflected a tendency to prioritise the destruction of patterns of economic exploitation 
which had been persistent in the country for decades over the establishment of a 
radically new economic order in the short or even mid-term.15  
When, in 1958, the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, FRAP), a 
coalition of the reunited Socialist Party and the recently re-legalised communists, took 
part in the elections, the differences in approach towards capitalism (and, as will be seen 
later, democracy) were far from resolved. In many ways, the FRAP, like the UP later, 
could only function effectively when the internal ideological divisions were ignored or 
neglected (Corvalán 2001: 57). As a result, the project of the Left, taken as a whole, was 
ambivalent in its position towards capitalism. On the one hand, it shared a 
fundamental rejection of capitalism as a foundation for modern society while on the 
other, the actual political position towards capitalism varied from reformist to 
revolutionary. Even though the Chilean Left had gained considerable influence after 
the Popular Front period, and had radicalised profoundly in the 1960s, by 1970 large 
sections of the UP (mainly Allende and the Communists) still did not envisage a clear 
break with the capitalist system during the presidency of Allende (Roxborough et al. 
1977: 72).  
The Left’s criticism of modern capitalism did not necessarily constitute a rejection 
of modernity as such.16 Following classical Marxist lines of thought, the UP considered 
the adoption of socialism as a form of progress, where the ‘old’ would be replaced by 
the ‘new’. Capitalism, rather than being a primordial expression of modernity, was seen 
as obsolete, or, in the words of the UP programme, ‘a system which does not 
correspond to present-day requirements’. It had remained in place because it was 
supported by the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy, whose survival depended on it, but it 
was no longer a viable system. As Luis Corvalán, leader of the Communist Party, 
argued, some months before the 1970 elections: 
The actual production relations have stopped corresponding to the 
development of the productive forces, the social movement in all its meaning, 
and the epoch in which humanity lives. (…) Neither the Right, nor the present-
day governing party, nor any political form which leaves the foundations of the 
actual system standing, can satisfy the needs that are imposed by the 
development of history (speech by Luis Corvalán 1970). 
As a result, the implementation of Socialism was considered to be a form of progress, in 
which an obsolete system would be replaced by a more modern one (Larraín 2001: 
122). However, this modernising outlook of the UP was not emphasised in the official 
                                              
15 The moderate position and institutional orientation of the Communist Party may be somewhat 
surprising given the repression it underwent, between 1948 and 1958, from its former allies, including the 
Radical Party and the Socialist Party. Partly this was due to its tight organisation and loyalty to Moscow, 
as well as by the longstanding parliamentary tradition of the PC, having participated in parliamentary 
politics from 1921 onwards.  
16 As has been argued in Chapter 1, Socialism should not be interpreted as an ‘alternative to modernity’ 
but rather as an ‘alternative modernity’, besides for instance capitalism. 
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discourse, as it would associate it with the ‘modernisations’ of the Christian Democrats. 
Any similarity with the project of the PDC had to be downplayed in order not to 
alienate the radical electorate. The competition between the Centre and the Left did 
not allow for a ‘modernising discourse’ of the Left, leaving room only for a 
revolutionary discourse, which emphasised rupture and neglected continuity. As 
Moulian puts it: 
In the Unidad Popular there existed a desire for change, but not for the word 
modernity. Who stands for modernity? Frei. Who stands for capitalist 
modernisation? Frei. The UP has another modernity, Socialist modernity. But 
this could not be said. The Communists within the UP certainly had an 
obsession with the modern: the battle of production, the development of the 
productive forces, all kinds of developmental ideas. Allende himself, too, was 
sensible to the idea of continuity and that fundamentally the revolution is a 
succession of reforms. But this could not be said. There existed discursive 
impossibilities that did not allow for these things to be said (interview with 
Tomás Moulian 15-05-2004). 
Beneath this revolutionary discourse, the project contained many developmentalist and 
reformist elements. It was considered to produce greater levels of development and 
progress than the present, capitalist circumstances would allow for.17 During his victory 
speech, on 5 September 1970, Allende put it thus:  
We have won in order to overthrow once and for all the imperialist 
exploitation, to put an end to monopolies, to carry out a serious and profound 
agrarian reform, to control the import and export trade, and to nationalise 
credit. These things will make Chile’s progress possible and will create the social 
capital which will promote our development (speech by Salvador Allende 
1970).18 
                                              
17 This line of argument is highly indebted to economists such as Paul Baran and Paul Sweezey, who have 
argued that free-market capitalism leads to inefficient allocation of consumption and investment, and 
that only economic planning can overcome this deficiency. See: Baran and Sweezey (1966). For further 
discussion of the developmental theories underpinning the UP ideology see section 4.1.2.  
18 Even those who did not follow this line of argument tended to view socialism as being closely related 
to modernity and progress. For instance, Clodomiro Almeyda, one of the more radical Socialist leaders, 
stressed the link between Socialism and Latin American underdevelopment. In Europe, he argued, 
economic liberalism had been successful because of the deep entrenchment of modern bourgeois 
individualism. Consequently, liberalism could not yield positive results in Chile, because of its lack of 
modern culture and virtues like hard work, foresight and saving. In short, economic liberalism was too 
modern a system for the traditional Chilean culture: ‘The economic liberalism of the European countries 
[…] has produced results because those peoples have an individualist, bourgeois consciousness which has 
been formed over the centuries. […] Here, the same freedom to work, invest, consume and live, produces 
completely contradictory effects. There, in Europe, more savings; here, waste. There, in Europe, 
efficiency; here, disorder; there, economic stability; here, inflation; there, progress, here stagnation. The 
attempt to artificially introduce ways of life, of thinking and of organising in Latin America, which are 
foreign to our historic period, has been the fundamental cause of the dead end in social development 
which is being experienced by our countries (speech by Clodomiro Almeyda 1964: 22)’. This line of 
argument interestingly closely follows that of the Chilean conservatives, who have argued that in Chile 
liberal modernity does not take root, as it is imported from the outside, and does not connect with 
patterns of Chilean identity. See Chapter 1.  
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Finally, the attempts of the UP to put an end to the domination over the economic 
realm by several, largely traditional, minority groups, include strong elements of 
modernisation. In many ways, this was a form of ‘economic democratisation’, opening 
up a traditionally exclusive system to the masses, and empowering them in the control 
over the means of production. Even though the project did not follow strict liberal 
lines, it was emancipatory and democratising, and sought to replace traditional, 
restricted economic structures with ones that responded better to the demands of a 
modern mass society. Allende, in his inaugural address, placed it explicitly in the 
context of the progress of the country:  
Our road, our path, is that of liberty - liberty for the expansion of our 
productive forces, breaking the chains that have smothered our development so 
far (…) and liberty for all Chileans who work for a living to gain social control 
over and ownership of their work centres.  
In this sense, and despite the revolutionary discourse, this was a modernising project, 
which sought to overcome the structural blockages for the true development and 
progress of the people.  
 
The UP and Democracy 
Democracy, generally considered to be another fundamental pillar of modernity, was 
emphasised by the UP as one of its most central foundations. It was one of the UP’s 
most original contributions, as for the first time, it envisioned a Socialist model that 
functioned within the context of ‘bourgeois democracy’. It was this element in 
particular which gave the ‘Chilean Road’ its distinct ‘Chilean’ features and added to it a 
particularly festive element, its ‘empanadas y vino tinto’, as Salvador Allende liked to call 
it (Correa et al. 2001: 263).  
Even though sections of the UP enthusiastically promoted democracy, it remained a 
controversial issue within the ranks of the coalition. As has been mentioned in the 
previous chapter, radical sections of the UP proclaimed the use of non-parliamentary 
and violent means as a legitimate path to power. In November 1967, during a party 
congress in Chillán, the PS had already opted for the violent ‘road’, stating that the 
armed struggle:  
is the necessary result of the armed and repressive nature of the class-state. It is 
the only way that will lead to winning political and economic power and their 
ultimate defence and empowerment. Only the destruction of the bureaucratic 
and military apparatus of the bourgeois state can consolidate the socialist 
revolution (quoted in Correa et al. 2001a: 312).  
This revolutionary rhetoric, reflecting the Socialist Party’s strong adherence to orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism, remained largely confined to the theoretical realm, however. As 
Arrate (1985: 76) shows, the discourse of armed revolution created a certain amount of 
theoretical unity within the coalition, while the political practice was left in the hands 
of Allende and the moderate sector:  
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the Popular Unity came to reflect a Left-wing orthodoxy in the theoretical field, 
but was original and heretical in its practice. (…) Ideology was sustained by 
Marxist-Leninist theory, political praxis was sustained by Allende. The theory 
and Allende became the two moulding elements of the Chilean Left, like idea 
and reality.19  
As a result, even while large sections of the UP discursively promoted the armed 
destruction of democratic structures, in practice the coalition followed the official pro-
democratic line of strategy.20 This gap between discourse and practice was partly a 
cultural one. As Moulian (1997: 161) points out, the politicians of the UP had little 
feeling for language or discourse. In their zeal to be discursively authentic, and speak 
‘the full truth to the people’, sections of the coalition created radical discourses that 
eventually turned into an internal opposition towards their own project.  
The pro-democratic sectors of the UP not only endorsed the democratic system, but 
even sought to develop it further. In clear contrast to orthodox Marxist-Leninism, 
Allende considered civil liberties and individual liberal rights to be ‘victories of 
humanity, rather than superstructures of capitalism and the domination of the 
bourgeoisie’ (Corvalán 2000: 157). However, the UP went beyond the idea of strictly 
liberal democracy, envisioning a participative model, in two ways. First of all, the UP 
proposed to extend participation in the policy process to all unions, worker’s 
organisations and grass-root organisations such as juntas de vecinos.21 Social movements 
were to be created, empowered, and given the proper mechanisms in order to 
participate directly at different levels of the state. In this way, the UP programme 
proclaimed, the ‘power and authority of the People’s Government will essentially be 
based on the support extended to it by the organised population’, creating ‘the most 
democratic political government in the country’s history’. Second, the UP sought to 
implement a process of decentralisation of the administration, redistributing much of 
                                              
19 The ideological divisions within the UP, which, thanks to Allende’s capacities as a unifier (similar to 
those of Frei before him), had little bearing on the initial political praxis of the UP, came to play an 
increasingly problematical role in the implementation of the Chilean Road. As Arrate (1985: 76) states: 
‘While Allende became the unifying element that was able to mould together project, actor, and tasks in 
the Chilean social process, (…) revolutionary theory became the great disarticulating force of that 
project’. An early example of this development became publicly apparent when in October 1969 a 
military uprising under General Viaux took place, the so-called ‘Tacnazo’. During this short-lived 
rebellion, the PC jumped to the defence of institutionality and the Frei government, while the Socialists 
supported Viaux, in the hope that a constitutional crisis would create an opening for a revolutionary 
alternative (Corvalán 2000: 59). This extra-democratic tendency within the UP was reinforced by the lack 
of confidence of sectors of the UP of winning the 1970 elections. 
20 This ‘discursive gap’ was nothing new for the political system in Chile. In fact, Petras (1969: 355) argues 
that the “radical-rhetoric-moderate-behaviour syndrome so characteristic of Chilean politics” is the result 
of both the middle class make-up of the bureaucracy as well of the political parties’ need to maintain the 
support of those middle classes. As a result, the political parties, especially those of the Left, had become 
accustomed to the use of radical rhetoric for electoral purposes.  
21 This form of popular participation echoes much of the communitarian approach of the Christian 
Democrats. Both projects propose to extend the democratic system by creating an ‘organic’ system of in-
between organisations which directly influence the policy-making process. The main difference, however, 
was a shift in focus, reflecting the subsequent constituencies of the two projects: for the PDC, the 
Church, family and women, and for the UP, the unionised workers. Both, however, coincided in 
prioritising the poor neighbourhoods and their juntas de vecinos.  
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the centralised powers of the state to the municipalities. This required a fundamental 
modernisation of the state, in which the ‘municipalities will be modernised according 
to the plans for coordinating the whole state organisation, while granting them the 
authority due to them’ (UP Programme).  
Through these expansions of the democratic system, the UP sought to bridge the 
gap between what Allende called ‘formal democracy’ and ‘true democracy’:  
A true democracy is only such when it assures and permits the participation of 
the whole population in the vital decisions for the course of the country. 
Nowadays, we live in a purely formal democracy, with a paternalism of the state 
which, inevitably, shows its bourgeois orientation (quoted in Cardemil 1997: 
332).22  
Apart from popular participation, true democracy could be distinguished from formal 
democracy by its pluralist nature and respect for civil liberties. As Allende argued in 
1972: 
In this country we have a most authentic political democracy, a pluralist 
democracy, in government and opposition; to deny this is to lie blatantly. (…) 
In this country there is total freedom of the press and information and we have 
the utmost tolerance and respect for all creeds. These liberties are greater than 
ever in the history of Chile (speech by Salvador Allende 1972).23  
The democratic disposition of the UP was not unambiguous, however. The programme 
stipulated the creation of a unicameral Popular Assembly, replacing the bicameral 
system of Congress, and in which ‘all the various currents of opinion will be expressed’ 
and all revolutionary parties were to be represented. However, the members of this 
Popular Assembly would be subject to a ‘rigorous code of conduct’, requiring the 
representatives to lose their post if found ‘guilty of acting on behalf of private interests’. 
Furthermore, the programme envisioned the Supreme Court being appointed by the 
Popular Assembly, which would mean the de facto end of the division of powers in 
Chilean society. So, while on the one hand the UP promoted a deepening of the 
democratic process, by allowing the direct participation of the masses in the decision-
making process, it simultaneously intended to limit it, by excluding social sectors from 
the Popular Assembly, and by extending the power of the executive over the other 
branches of power.24 In this sense, the ultimate frame of reference of the parties of the 
                                              
22 The similarities to the communitarian ideas of the Christian Democrats are very strong here. Frei also 
regularly spoke of the difference between ‘true’ and ‘formal’ democracy, in which popular participation is 
the key difference. See also section 3.1.1.  
23 In the same speech, Allende acknowledges the detention of several journalists. These ‘so-called 
journalists, who are really delinquents’, as Allende calls them, have been taken to trial, ‘not for their ideas 
but for the crimes they have committed’.  
24 This does not necessarily equate to the establishment of a Soviet-type of socialism, as Gonzalo Vial 
suggests (2005: 35). It should be noted, furthermore, that in practice Allende actually did not pursue the 
installation of this unicameral system seriously, just as Frei had disregarded the creation of a 
‘communitarian’ political system after coming to power. Maybe both considered such profound 
institutional change as unviable complications of their already strained reformist agendas, or they feared 
the consequences of its outcomes. Allende, for instance, might have to deal with the MIR gaining a 
prominent position in the Popular Assembly (ibid., p. 87). See also section 4. 2.2.  
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UP, despite their differences in strategy, seemed to have been the one-party state system 
of Eastern Europe (with adaptations to the Chilean case), rather than a truly multiparty 
system that would be dominated by the Left (Cancino 1988: 36-37).  
Even though the Socialist and Communist parties largely defined the ideological course 
of the UP, there existed other factions within the coalition that were of some 
importance and that added to its Marxist-Leninist outlook. This applies in particular to 
the Christian Democrats who joined the UP in two waves: first, with the Movement of 
United Popular Action (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, MAPU) in 1969, and 
later, in 1971, with the addition of the Christian Left (Izquierda Cristiana, IC).  
The MAPU was founded by Rebeldes and Terceristas from within the PDC, among 
whom were Jacques Chonchol, Rodrigo Ambrosio and Jaime Gazmuri. Resisting the 
conservative course of the Freistas and the ‘failed adventure of reformism’ of the PDC, 
they adopted a revolutionary ideology, but not without maintaining some elements of 
the Christian Democrat doctrines (quoted in Arrate and Rojas 2003a: 441). Radically 
renouncing capitalism, they also criticised socialism for being a system that is unable to 
change the nature of man, as ‘there are always some who put themselves on top and 
keep the others down’ (Silva Solar and Chonchol 1969: 26). Based on Christian 
thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and Francis of Assisi, they proposed ‘common 
ownership’ of the means of production but, in contrast to socialist ideology, this 
‘common ownership’ was not to be put in the hands of the state. It should be a 
‘communitarian socialism, not a state-oriented socialism, where the principle of self-
government of the workers with regard to the company and the economy as a whole is 
fundamental’, and the state fulfils a ‘subsidiary or supplementary function’ (ibid., p. 50). 
However, during the first year of the Allende government, the communitarian approach 
of the MAPU rapidly dissolved and was replaced with a straightforward Marxist-Leninist 
approach (Falcoff 1991: 38).25 
In 1971, a group of terceristas split off from the Christian Democrat Party to form a 
new party, in a protest against the collaboration between the PDC and the Right in the 
opposition against Allende. They founded the Christian Left, entered the UP, and soon 
were joined by several key leaders of MAPU, such as minister of agriculture Jacques 
Chonchol and parliamentarians such as Julio Silva Solar and Rafael Agustín Gumucio, 
practically all of them terceristas who resisted the ideological turn of their party (Arrate 
and Rojas 2003b: 54). Ideologically, the IC sought to maintain both the ‘evangelical 
roots’ and the communitarian ideal in the promulgation of socialism. As Gumucio put 
it: 
The religious inspiration has been of great importance for the common features 
which distinguish the Christians of the Left. In the margin of this theory, the 
day-to-day behaviour of these Christians has acquired political characteristics. In 
my judgement, the most important of these characteristics is to demand popular 
power from below (quoted in Arrate and Rojas 2003b: 54).  
                                              
25 Internally, MAPU was divided into a moderate section, close to the Communist Party, and a radical 
faction, closer to the PS and even the MIR. In March 1973, these sections would split into the ‘Workers’ 
MAPU’ (MAPU Obrero Campesino, MAPU OC) and the ‘regular’ MAPU.  
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The IC’s mix of Christian thought and socialism was short-lived, however. Within 
months, the party radicalised, embracing positions close to those of the PS, the MIR, 
and the radical offshoot of the MAPU led by Oscar Garretón. Critics such as Gonzalo 
Vial (2005: 93) reduce this process of rapid ideological radicalisation to the ‘enthusiasm 
of converts’. However, as Donoso (1975: 126) shows, Marxist ideology had been 
emerging among Roman Catholics since 1967, and had gained widespread support in 
1971, when eighty priests openly declared themselves to be Marxists, and had pledged 
their support to the UP. Later, this ‘group of eighty’, which worked under the motto of 
‘the collaboration of Christians in the construction of Socialism’, was extended to the 
‘group of 200’, and became of serious influence within the Catholic Church. In this 
sense, the radicalisation of the Christian parties within the UP should be viewed in the 
context of the radicalisation of sections of the Church itself. 
Although neither MAPU nor IC ever became important in an electoral sense, they 
contributed to the UP in two ways. The first was by forming a bridge to the middle 
classes and to workers opposed to traditional Marxism (Bitar 1986: 19; Falcoff 1991: 
38), and the second was by adding to the UP a body of highly trained professionals and 
intellectuals, who would contribute greatly to the construction and implementation of 
the ‘Chilean Road’ (Montecinos 1998: 58). 
4.1.2 Dependencia, Developmentalism, and the UP Project 
Just as the project of the Christian Democrats had found part of its theoretical basis in 
the ‘structuralist’ school of economics, the project of the UP was heavily influenced by 
dependency (dependencia), an offshoot of structuralism. In contrast to structuralism, 
though, dependency never constituted a well-defined school of thought, and was 
generally considered to be an approach or a perspective rather than a theory. Nor could 
it be considered a true developmental theory, as it focused on the analysis of the 
blockages for development rather than on the policies that would remove those 
blockages (Montecinos and Markoff 2001: 123).  
Dependency theory was an answer to both modernisation theory and structuralism 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978: 536). Both theories had maintained that given certain 
circumstances (ranging from a certain level of capital influx to state-led 
industrialisation), economic development and modernisation would be structural and 
self-sustaining. However, by the late 1960s, a growing awareness emerged among Latin 
American economists that the import-substitution processes that had been set in 
motion in order to reduce the dependence of the industrialised world had failed. In 
fact, setting up the industries had actually increased dependency, as the investments for 
factories and infrastructure were financed on the international capital markets, as well as 
the machinery that was used in production. As a result, the foreign control over the 
Latin American economies had gained such heights (through foreign indebtedness and 
influence over resources), that several authors began to speak of Latin American 
industrialisation as ‘dependent development’ (Monteci
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Consequently, economists all over the continent started to analyse the exact nature 
of the dependency relations between the ‘centre’ (the industrialised world) and the 
‘periphery’ (the developing world). As Kay (1989: 126-128) shows, the multitude of 
contributions to dependency can generally be divided into two main currents: a 
reformist and an explicitly Marxist approach.26 The first remained relatively close to the 
structuralist school, incorporating in the approach of ECLA a special focus on import-
substitution industrialisation and stressing national autonomy as a key element for 
economic development. In contrast, the Marxist approach rejected the idea that the 
problem of dependence could be overcome through reform and argued that only a 
socialist revolution could overcome the dependent nature of Chile’s economy.27 As a 
result, while dependencia formed a profound critique of the modernisation theories of 
the 1950s, it was ambivalent on the prospects of modernisation for Latin America. On 
the one hand, it argued that some level of development and modernisation would be 
possible, in the form of ‘dependent development’. On the other, it claimed that no true 
socio-economic modernisation could take place as long as capitalism was still in place 
as a world system. 
Both currents of dependencia coincide in the central definition of the problem, 
though. Underdevelopment, in their view, is not a temporal historical phase 
which the developing countries need to pass through, but is the ‘other side’ of 
capitalist development. Development and underdevelopment are two sides of 
the same system, which tends to reinforce itself over time. Therefore, 
underdevelopment has become, in the words of Kay, ‘the particular form 
capitalist development assumes’ in the countries of the periphery. The origins of 
this specific form of development lie in the way in which the underdeveloped 
world has been integrated into the world economy - and therefore, the solution 
for underdevelopment should be sought in its relation to the international 
capitalist system (Montecinos and Markoff 2001: 129). 
In the course of the 1960s, Dependencia had rapidly gained influence on the economic 
and political thinking of the Chilean Left. It was new and provocative, fitted the anti-
capitalist ideology of the Left like a glove, and could easily be expounded in non-
professional and even popular terminology without losing its academic impact.28 
Furthermore, even more so than structuralism, dependencia was authentically Latin 
                                              
26 As Joseph Love (1996: 261) notes, dependency theory came out of structuralism, and only later 
developed ties with Marxism. As structuralism itself had been partly a critique, and partly a continuation 
of modernisation theory, dependency should be seen as an offshoot of modernisation theory, even 
though it rejects that pedigree.  
27 These two approaches reflect an ambiguity towards modernity similar to that described in the previous 
paragraph on the ideology of the Chilean left - the Marxist line fundamentally rejecting capitalist 
modernity as a viable option, while the reformist line accepted it under certain conditions. As has been 
argued before, though, the Marxist rejection of capitalist modernity did not necessarily constitute a 
rejection of modernity as such.  
28 In fact, dependencia must have been one of the few twentieth century economic theories that became 
widely popular among non-academic audiences worldwide, probably as a result of its historical approach 
and political implications. One of the main contributors to this development was the Uruguayan 
journalist and novelist Eduardo Galeano, who’s Open Veins of Latin America became an international 
bestseller after its publication in 1971. 
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American, both in origin and in focus, breaking the hegemony of classical liberal 
thinking that for decades had homogenised international economic theory. 
Structuralism had proved that similar economic processes have different outcomes in 
the ‘developed world’ than in Latin America, and that the outcome was negative for the 
latter. Now dependencia showed that underdevelopment found its roots in the 
development of the ‘centre’, and that the development of Latin America would be 
impossible within the framework of liberal economics (ibid., p. 117). In this sense, 
dependencia had an emancipating influence, as it forced Latin American countries to 
revaluate and strengthen their position vis-à-vis Europe and the United States.  
 
The Influence of Dependencia on the UP 
The notion of dependencia was mainly developed and put forward by former 
structuralistas who had worked at the ECLA, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
André Gunder Frank,29 and Theotonio dos Santos. Its dissemination to the political and 
non-economic circles of the leadership of the Left took place mainly in the University 
of Chile, where from the mid-1960s a developmental economic programme 
(ESCOLATINA) of the department of economics had become very influential. It was 
the head of this department, Pedro Vuskovic, who was appointed Minister of 
Economics by Allende. Vuskovic had been a long-time Cepalino and had become a 
fierce promoter of dependencia. His appointment is indicative of the influence that 
dependencia had gained among the UP leadership, as Vuskovic was not a member of any 
of the parties of the UP (Montecinos 1998: 54-55; Larraín 2001: 122-123).30  
Marxist dependencia influenced the UP mainly in three ways.31 First of all, it 
promoted an isolationist and highly nationalist policy towards the international 
capitalist community. In essence, this was nothing new. Among others, Lenin and 
Luxemburg had been highly influential in their analysis of the imperialist nature of 
capital accumulation in industrialised countries, stressing the increased need and 
competition for new markets (Luxemburg) and raw materials (Lenin). However, the 
                                              
29 In fact, Gunder Frank not only bridged the project of the Centre and the Left, but also had a strong 
connection with that of the Right, having written his dissertation with Milton Friedman at the University 
of Chicago. His ideological turn since that time has been cause for accusations; for instance, John Toye 
labelled him ‘an orthodox Chicago economist who abruptly became a Latin American revolutionary 
figure’. Gunder Frank himself has downplayed his ideological transformation, suggesting that he never 
was a real Miltonian, and that ‘political climate, conditions, opportunities, and responses’ had strongly 
influenced his choices (Gunder Frank 1997: 80).  
30 During the same period, the economic policies of the projects of the Christian Democrats as well as of 
the military regime were in the making in the ‘other’ key university in the country, the Catholic 
University in Santiago. Two groups of scholars, funded by different foreign organisations, were 
simultaneously working on two economic theories that defined the economic course of the projects 
before and after the UP: one on the structuralist reforms of the Frei administration, supported by the 
Ford Foundation, and the other on a neo-liberal agenda, subsidised by the University of Chicago 
(Montecinos and Markoff 2001; 121).  
31 Even though it is very difficult to assess the direct influence of a heterodox economic school like 
dependencia, its influence is clear on programmatic texts such as the UP’s electoral programme, and on 
speeches given by Allende and others. See for instance Allende’s address to the UN General Assembly in 
1972 (Cockcroft 2000: 200-221).  
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contribution of the dependentistas to these theories was that they explored the ways in 
which this imperialism took shape in the developing world, a gap which so far had been 
left open (Kay 1989: 143).  
The most influential elaboration of this argument has been made by André Gunder 
Frank. In his comparative study on underdevelopment in Chile and Brazil, Frank argues 
that the underdevelopment of Chile (a necessary by-product of development in the 
industrialised countries) cannot be reversed from within the logic of capitalism.32 The 
capitalist structures that have been imposed on Chile not only deepen 
underdevelopment and increase the poverty of the majority of the people, but they also 
minimise the abilities of the national ‘progressive’ bourgeoisie (in the case of Chile, the 
Christian Democrats) to lead the country toward development. It is therefore necessary, 
Frank argues, that the underdeveloped countries, including Chile, withdraw themselves 
from the capitalist system, through which they will ‘deepen the contradictions of the 
capitalist world and, through their resolution, […] liberate the people of Chile and the 
world’ (Frank 1969: 120).  
Frank’s argument, which was supported by others as well, strengthened the 
nationalism and anti-imperialism of the UP. It particularly substantiated the idea that 
international capital should not be able to control the natural resources of a developing 
country like Chile. The nationalisation of the copper mines, which had been 
‘Chilenised’ before, was therefore corroborated scientifically (Bitar 1986: 30).  
The second way in which Marxist dependencia strengthened and underpinned the 
ideology of the UP was by identifying the national bourgeoisie as the main obstacle to 
development. Dos Santos and Vania Bambirra, for instance, argue that through 
dependency social conflict in Latin America will deepen, and this will inevitably lead to 
a showdown between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, ending either in a neo-fascist 
takeover or a socialist revolution. Gunder Frank, in turn, stresses the servile nature of 
the bourgeoisie as well as the state in the process of the exploitation by the ‘capitalist 
metropolis’:  
The ‘national bourgeoisie’ and its ‘national state’ have always been and are still 
integral parts of a worldwide capitalist system in which they are fundamentally a 
satellite or ‘underdeveloped’ bourgeoisie and state. Thus, ‘national’ satellite 
bourgeoisie and state became and are dependent on the world capitalist 
metropolis, whose instrument in the exploitation of the periphery they 
necessarily have been and remain (Frank 1969: 116) 
In consequence, Frank argues that the national bourgeoisie is the main obstacle to 
national development, just like imperialism is the main obstacle for the problem of 
underdevelopment in general. This line of argument served to put the UP’s emphasis 
on breaking the power of the economic elites into a developmental context. The 
                                              
32 André Gunder Frank, as well as other dependentistas, were strongly influenced by the work of Paul Baran, 
who had argued in the 1950s that underdevelopment is the result of global capital accumulation, that 
capitalism no longer is a progressive force, and will eventually fall due to its internal contradictions, 
especially the wasteful use of capital both in the developed and the underdeveloped world.  
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takeover of economic power by the working class now became a sine qua non for 
economic development, as well as for the liberation of the people. 
Thirdly, and connected to the last, is the Marxist dependentistas’ prioritisation of 
political change over economic development (with the exception of Theotonio Dos 
Santos, who remained positive about a possible path for development within the 
parameters of world capitalism). Generally, it was argued that the structures of 
capitalism should be demolished first, and that economic development could only take 
place after that. Moreover, it was rarely specified what this subsequent development 
would look like (Rist 1997: 120; Leys 1996: 53). The influence of this approach in the 
thinking of the UP leadership can be seen in the neglect of the maintenance of 
economic equilibriums and the political use of the economy in general. For some 
sectors of the economic teams of the UP, dependencia confirmed the idea that economic 
development would be impossible in any case, as long as the socio-economic structures 
remained as they were. This allowed for an instrumental use of the economy (for 
instance by raising wages, even if this might cause high inflation) for the political 
purpose of gaining support for the project. 
Much of dependencia’s influence on the UP came from its moderate, non-Marxist 
current, though. The large : Marxist dependencia offered very little in the policy 
department, and the internal divisions within the UP allowed for a relatively high level 
of heterogeneity in the academic orientation. As a result, the UP not only incorporated 
Marxist dependencia, but also its moderate contender, and even structuralist recipes, in 
three ways (Kay 1989: 199). 
First of all, it was argued that some form of economic development could well take 
place within the context of dependency. This was argued most clearly by Cardoso and 
Faletto who, in their influential Dependency and Development in Latin America, claim that 
a certain level of autonomous development may well be possible within the context of 
dependency, providing that certain conditions are fulfilled (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 
175-176). This cautiously optimistic outlook is reflected in the fact that the UP did not 
set out to withdraw the country completely from the international community (outside 
of the socialist countries), as the Marxist approach would have prescribed. Instead, the 
UP government vigorously used international forums to argue for improvement in the 
terms of trade for Chile’s exports, as well as a reduction of protectionist measures by the 
developed nations and greater controls on foreign capital.  
Second, the UP adopted several policies that were consistent with moderate 
dependentistas who claimed that with specific and well-planned strategies dependency 
could be partly overcome. Sunkel and Paz (1970), for instance, argue that this might be 
achieved through an integrated set of state policies combining the expansion and 
diversification of exports, agrarian reform, and the revitalisation of the industrial sector 
through intensifying capital-goods production. This approach, reminiscent of 
structuralism, was largely adopted by the UP, with the exception of Sunkel’s suggestion 
of joint ventures with international corporations. 
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Finally, the socio-economic policies of the UP for a large part followed the 
prescriptions of the ECLA (where at the time reformist dependency analysis was mixed 
with structuralist approaches), such as agrarian reform, redistribution of wealth, 
inflation control and self-reliance, all in the context of projected high levels of 
economic growth (Kay 1989: 199). Allende, like Frei, strongly relied on ECLA’s studies 
and argumentations in the analysis of the country’s economy, and put great trust in the 
ECLA economists, many of whom were involved in the economic decision-making 
process. According to Verónica Montecinos, it was said in the 1960s that:  
The only difference between Allende and Frei is that Allende has Das Kapital in 
one hand and ECLA’s documents in the other, and Frei has the Pope’s 
Encyclicals in one hand and ECLA’s documents in the other (1998: 53).33  
Concluding, the project of the UP was, like its Christian Democrat predecessor, heavily 
influenced by leading theories on development, which it interpreted and used 
according to its own interest and goals. Where structuralism held a positive — if critical 
— view of the viability of development and modernisation for a country like Chile, 
though, dependencia showed a more ambivalent position towards development. The 
reformist dependentistas, who remained close to the structuralist school, argued that 
development was possible, provided certain prerequisites were fulfilled. The Marxist 
approach, in contrast, held that underdevelopment was inescapable except by means of 
a socialist revolution.  
The project of the UP incorporated elements of both currents, but not in an equal 
manner. In general, Marxist dependencia underpinned and reinforced notions that were 
already prominently present in the ideology of the Left, but did not directly lead to the 
formulation of concrete policy.34 The reformist approach, in contrast, was translated 
directly into several policy fields, as it offered concrete and precise prescriptions for 
development. Notwithstanding the UP anti-reformist and revolutionary discourse, it 
followed a largely reformist course and remained close to the strategies of the ECLA.35 
The combination of the two developmental schools (and in addition some Keynesian 
redistributive strategies) did not improve the coherence of the UP’s socio-economic 
                                              
33 Allende’s ability to combine a developmental outlook with a highly ideological discourse made him an 
excellent broker between the different factions that comprised the UP. Just as Frei had reconciled the 
socialcristianos and the more conservative Christian Democrats, Allende followed a long trajectory as the 
main unifier of the moderate and the radical Left, especially the Communist and Socialist parties 
(Montecinos 1998: 25). 
34 The exception here was the nationalisation of the (formerly ‘Chilenised’) copper mines in the north of 
the country, a clear prescription from both currents of dependencia, who held particularly negative views 
on the impact of foreign control over natural resources.  
35 It could be argued that the internal divisions within the UP created a ‘division of labour’ within the 
coalition. The radical sectors (the radical wing of the PS and MAPU) set much of the discursive agenda, 
stressing the revolutionary and confrontational character of the ‘Chilean road’ and even legitimising the 
use of violence, but their line was hardly reflected in the formal policies of the UP. The moderate sectors 
(PC and the moderate wing of the PS, mainly) were in control of much of the policy-making, prioritising 
stable and reformist policies over fundamental ruptures. However, in the field of public rhetoric, their 
position was marginalised, as revolutionary discourses were dominant.  
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policies, however, and would soon lead to internal contradictions which would become 
increasingly difficult to manage (Bitar 1986: 30).  
4.1.3 The Project of the UP: The Chilean Road to Socialism 
The Left’s ideological and developmental influences crystallised in a progressive project 
of modernisation, titled the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’. This was based on a mix 
between two points of reference for modernity: the Social-Democratic welfare model of 
north-western Europe, and the ‘Socialist alternative’ of the really existing Socialisms. 
From the latter it took the idea of a state-led economy and the state as the 
representative of the working class. The Social-Democrat welfare model was mainly 
represented in the maintenance of the liberal democratic system.36 The ‘Chilean Road’ 
was an all-inclusive project, in the sense that it included the social, economic, and 
political dimensions of modernity. Socially, it focused on the activation and inclusion 
of the marginal sectors of society. Economically, it envisaged a path of non-capitalist 
development that would lead to a substantial rise in the level of living conditions for 
the large majority of the population. However, the political dimension was prioritised 
above the social and economic ones. Arguing that the majority of the population had 
been exploited and repressed by the country’s elites, the UP sought to empower the 
population by granting it direct power over industry and agriculture.37 As a result, giving 
‘power to the people’ became the central modernising value in the ‘Chilean Road to 
Socialism’.  
Even though some observers, like Stepan de Vylder (1976: 33), praise the electoral 
programme of the UP for its thorough formulation, it never achieved the same level of 
internal consistency and cohesiveness as the project of the PDC. This was mainly due 
to the fact that the Left had not expected to win the election. Allende had been the 
Left’s presidential candidate three times before, without gaining the necessary electoral 
support. Furthermore, important sectors of the UP argued that even if the UP did win 
the elections, the Right, with the support of conservative Christian Democrats, would 
keep it from power (Correa et al. 2001: 257). As a result, there was no comprehensive 
attempt within the Left to create a cohesive and profound all-inclusive project. 
However, it was Allende who brought together several of the proposals that came from 
                                              
36 The conservative historiography maintains that the UP was exclusively oriented towards the ‘really 
existing Socialisms’, and that the maintenance of the democratic structures was mainly instrumental 
(Góngora 1986: 289; Vial 2005: 61). This may have been the case for the radical sector of the PS, but 
certainly not for the Allende camp. The MAPU took an intermediate position, by focusing on the more 
‘liberal’ examples of Socialism, especially Dubcek’s Czechoslovakia, but also on intellectual western-
European Marxism. As former MAPU Viera-Gallo recalls, the MAPU was influenced by a myriad of 
Marxist influences: ‘we clearly turned away from Christian Democracy towards Marxism. But we 
discussed this a lot, because there existed many forms of Marxism in those days. Many of us, for instance, 
were very much influenced by French structuralism, but others were not. In each case, it was not Soviet 
Marxism that guided us, but western-European Marxism of the critical intellectuals, such as Althusser, 
Gareaudy, or Gramsci’ (interview with José Antonio Viera-Gallo on 20 April 2006).  
37 Once the project was set up a more instrumental reason for the empowerment of the people emerged. 
As the UP faced a majoritarian opposition in Congress, it started to focus on the expansion of its 
electoral basis by politically mobilising the marginal masses in the cities and in the countryside. 
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the different parties and moulded them into one programme. As former MAPU and 
UP-minister José Antonio Viera-Gallo puts it:  
The Left was not prepared to govern. It did not believe it would win in 1970, 
but thought it would lose. It therefore did not create a true government project. 
It was Allende who invented a project (interview with José Antonio Viera-Gallo, 
24 April 2006). 
The project that was ‘invented’ by Allende envisaged high levels of continuity. It 
consisted of an intensification of the project of the PDC, and more or less the same as 
the 1970 election programme of PDC candidate Tomic.38 Apart from populist policies 
such as providing half a litre of milk for all children, wage redistribution and guaranteed 
physical education in schools, the project consisted of three main proposals, all of 
which were rooted in the project of the PDC but were intensified and reinterpreted by 
the UP. 
First of all, the agrarian reforms, which had been set in motion under Frei but had 
lost much of their impetus in the last years of the 1960s, were accelerated and targeted 
to expropriate all land- holdings over 80 basic irrigated hectares in the short term. As 
the UP knew that it would be impossible to pass a new land reform law through 
Congress (at least before the Congressional elections of 1973), the existing laws were 
maintained and, as will be shown in the next paragraph, stretched to their limits. 
However, the change in the land reform was not just quantitative. Even though the 
programme of the UP remained rather vague on the precise organisation of the 
reformed sector, there were some clear discrepancies from the previous approach to 
land reform.  
On the one hand, the land reforms were no longer legitimised with an appeal to 
higher food production and increased efficiency, as had been argued by Christian 
Democrat structuralists such as Jorge Ahumada and Aníbal Pinto (Falcoff 1991: 101). 
The programme of the UP explicitly placed land reform in the context of the transition 
to socialism:  
the agrarian reform should be complementary to, and simultaneous with, the 
overall transformation which we wish to promote in the country’s social, 
political and economic structure, such that its implementation is inseparable 
from the rest of our overall policy (UP Programme).  
As a result, the reform was no longer subordinated to the logic of development, but 
now became instrumental in the creation of a new socio-political order. Considerations 
such as efficient use of the land were no longer critical in identifying eligible latifundios, 
and the explicit target was to expropriate all farms over 80 basic irrigated hectares (Kay 
1976: 82). The conditions of the expropriations also became substantially more 
unfavourable to the landowners. No longer were they allowed to choose which lands 
would be expropriated and which would remain private property. Furthermore, the UP 
                                              
38 As González (1989: 197) notes, the PDC under Tomic had set out to implement a socialist agenda, but 
with a Christian emphasis to it, mainly in the stress on communitarian social structures instead of class.  
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programme stipulated that both the livestock and the equipment present on the farms 
were to be included in the expropriation.  
On the other hand, the asentamiento system (providing for a temporary cooperative 
organisation, which could be maintained or abolished after a three-year test period), 
which had been central in the Christian Democrat approach to land reform, was not 
even mentioned in the UP programme. Even though some provisions were made for 
private ownership in the programme of the UP (‘[i]n certain qualified cases land will be 
allocated to small farmers, tenants, sharecroppers and trained agricultural workers’) this 
was clearly not a desired state of affairs. The programme explicitly stipulated that 
‘[e]xpropriated land will be organised preferably on the basis of cooperative forms of 
ownership’, and that ‘lands will be allocated to create state agricultural enterprises using 
modern technology’. However, the question of how the mix between private, 
cooperative and state enterprise would be achieved was not addressed. Falcoff (1991) 
attributes the vagueness that characterised the programme in this respect to the 
hovering, but inarticulate, aspirations within the UP of creating a Soviet/Cuban style 
cooperative society. As the current legislation would not allow for such transitions, and 
the UP did not wish to antagonise the agrarian workers in the short term, the question 
was left open for the time being (101-102).39 
Second, the copper mines in the north, Chilenised under Frei, were now to be 
nationalised. Even though the nationalisation of private enterprises was a general 
feature of the UP government, the copper mines were of particular interest, both at an 
economic level and a symbolic level. The economic element lay in the great surplus 
that was generated by the mines (Allende himself spoke, in his famous address to the 
U.N. General Assembly, of a profit of US$ 4 billion, taken out in 42 years, with an 
initial investment of US$30 million). Furthermore, the nationalisation of the mines fell 
in line with dependencia views, which took foreign ownership of natural resources as one 
of the main causes of underdevelopment. Copper constituted, as the Left argued, 
‘Chile’s wages’, and the ownership of the mines was essential for the project of the UP. 
At the symbolic level, the takeover of the American-held mines constituted an act of 
defiance towards the United States and international capital in general. In particular the 
compensation conceded to the owners was considered outrageous by the companies in 
question. They were calculated according to a new and highly original reform bill, 
which included ‘excess profits’ (above twelve per cent) that had been made in the last 
fifteen years, as well as poor maintenance and the use of obsolete materials. In the end, 
the nationalised companies not only lost their assets in Chile, but also turned out to 
owe the Chilean state several hundred million dollars (De Vylder 1976: 128). This 
humiliation of foreign companies was a powerful boost for the nationalist and anti-
                                              
39 The result was that the asentamiento-system remained solidly in place, albeit with some minor 
adaptations, despite the express wish of the two subsequent governments to terminate it in a relatively 
short time The Christian Democrats had installed it as a transitional system, but never came to the point 
of replacing it with a permanent one. Similarly, the UP set out to demolish it, but never had the 
opportunity (Silva 1987). 
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American sentiments that were central features of the Chilean Left’s ideology at the 
time.40  
It should be noted that both the nationalisation of the copper mines and the 
intensification of agrarian reform may appear to diverge considerably from the original 
1964 Christian Democrat programme, but compared to the 1970 programme they did 
not. The Tomic programme plainly supported both policies, and if we can take the 
election results as a guideline, so did the majority of the population, as the UP and DC 
combined amounted to an absolute majority.41 So while these were key policies in the 
project of the UP, they obtained broad and substantial popular and political support, 
reflecting a large overlap in the projects of the Christian Democrats (or at least their left 
flank) and of the UP, rather than occupying opposing positions, despite the intense 
animosity and competition between them.  
The third key element of the ‘Chilean Road’, and the one that would ignite the 
most political and social conflict, was another intensification of a policy that had been 
set up under the Frei government. The Christian Democrats’ Promoción Popular was 
upgraded to Poder Popular (popular power), meaning, in the words of the UP’s 
programme, ‘the transfer of power from the old dominant groups to the urban workers, 
rural population, and progressive sectors of the urban and rural middle class’. This 
transfer of power was achieved through the reorganisation of large sections of the 
economy, and the incorporation of workers and workers’ organisations in the 
management of industry and agriculture.  
The programme of the UP proposed the division of the economy into three sectors: 
the Social Property Area (Area de Propiedad Social), the Private Property Area (Area de 
Propiedad Privada), and a Mixed Property Area (Area de Propiedad Mixta).42 The Social 
Property Area involved large-scale nationalisation of private enterprises in mining, 
banking and foreign trade, and also of firms that were considered to be ‘strategic 
industrial monopolies’ or otherwise had ‘a strong influence on the nation’s social and 
economic development’. Most of the smaller enterprises would remain in the Private 
Property Area, while the Mixed Area consisted of ‘joint venture’ constructions which 
were never given a definitive form. In order to maintain normality and stability, the 
state would actively support private small and middle-level entrepreneurs with credits 
                                              
40 In terms of cost effectiveness, the strategy followed by the UP was by no means a straightforward 
success. Even though the nationalisation of the copper mines was more or less costless, and the structural 
gains substantial, the international resentment that was caused by the conditions of the nationalisation 
led to the implementation of a series of financial sanctions, mainly in the form of loan impediments, but 
also in unofficial trade blockades, which, in the words of Allende, constituted an ‘invisible blockade’, 
severely hurting the economy and the ‘Chilean road’ (speech by Allende 1972a).  
41 In fact, the nationalisation of the copper mines became the only proposal of the UP to gain a majority 
in Congress. The opposition (both the Right and the conservative Christian Democrats) hesitantly 
supported the bill, being aware that a rejection in Congress would open the way for a plebiscite on the 
issue, which Allende would very likely win (De Vylder 1976: 125-126).  
42 The idea of the ‘three areas of the economy’ was a new item on the agenda of the Socialist and 
Communist parties. In fact, it came from the leader of the social-democrat Radical Party, Alberto Baltra, 
who shortly after the elections came into conflict with Allende and went over to the conservative 
opposition. 
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and tax advantages. Only after the government had come to power were the criteria for 
expropriation set, making 253 individual enterprises eligible for nationalisation, 150 of 
these belonging to the industrial manufacturing sector. Out of a total of 35,000 
industrial establishments this was a tiny minority; but in terms of production and 
employment they represented the bulk of national industry (De Vylder 1976: 136).  
The second aspect of Poder Popular was the direct participation of the workers and 
workers’ organisations at the national level, regional level and in each unit of work. In 
order to achieve this, workers were integrated into the policy-making process through 
different commissions and councils at the national or regional level, such as the Mining 
Councils and the Supply and Price Directorates. Furthermore, standards and norms 
were formulated for workers’ participation in factories, mines and agriculture. By the 
end of 1971, such participation had taken shape in 105 of 125 private and national 
firms that were under review (Bitar 1986: 45). It should be noted that even though the 
Allende government put tremendous effort into the formation of poder popular, in this 
phase it was not envisioned as a source of power ‘from below’ which would eventually 
establish a ‘workers’ State’. On the contrary, poder popular was conceived in legal terms, 
under state tutelage, and aimed to increase production (Roxborough et al. 1977: 77; 
Cancino 1988: 126). 43  
Together with the intensification of agrarian reform, poder popular signified a 
radicalisation of the anti-oligarchic line that had been followed by the Revolution in 
Liberty. Simultaneously, it added an anti-bourgeois element in attacking the industrial 
and corporative elites. As a result, it was a frontal attack on the Right, a ‘licence to kill’, 
figuratively speaking, leaving little (if any) room for the economic and political survival 
of the traditional economic elites.44 The middle classes, who were either small enterprise 
owners or worked as professionals, were hardly touched by this attack on the Right. In 
this way the door was left open for cooperation with the PDC. 
                                              
43 In the course of the establishment of the ‘Chilean road’ a second and informal form of poder popular 
emerged, in a reaction to the state-oriented and gradualist strategies of the government. The radical 
sectors of the Left, mainly the MIR, but also sections of the PS as well as MAPU and IC, pushed for the 
creation of a parallel form of power, consisting of the direct participation of the workers in the (illegal) 
takeover of industries and farms, the creation of cordones industriales (industrial cordons), and the 
propagation of street violence as a legitimate strategy for the transition to socialism. Some, like Corvalán 
(2001: 55-57) have called this the ‘second project of the UP’. I do not follow this argument, because the 
second approach has been too diffuse in its implementation to be labelled a true ‘project’. Rather, it was a 
second ‘strategy’ which was advocated by a large section of the UP (and by the MIR) but which was never 
materialised in a cohesive set of measures. For an analysis of this second form of poder popular, see section 
4.2.2 
44 This was not just an ideological construct. In the late 1960s, the Left became increasingly aware that the 
power of the Right could actually be overcome. The success of the Cuban Revolution had proved that 
socialism could be achieved in Latin America. Perhaps even more importantly, the agrarian reform of the 
Christian Democrats, which had plunged the Right into a profound crisis, had proved the political 
weakness of the traditional elites, adding to the conviction that with a little more pressure the Right could 
be permanently overcome. Also, around 1970 the Right lacked a ‘mature’ project (the neo-liberal and 
gremialista projects were still embryonic) with which it could counter the attacks from the Left (Vial 2005: 
104). It could resist and defend, but was unable to propose an alternative other than to maintain the 
social status quo, an option that was unacceptable to the large majority of the population 
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In conclusion, the project of the UP was essentially reformist and modernising 
(Roxborough et al. 1976: 72; Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 109). Only at a later stage, when 
enough political and electoral power had been obtained, were more profound changes 
envisaged, but, as a consequence of the internal divisions within the UP, these were not 
formulated explicitly and were postponed for future debate.45 The project was based on 
a strong extension of the role of the state in the economy, through the creation of the 
three areas of the economy and the nationalisation of the copper mines. It also 
radicalised the agrarian reform, and set out to keep part of the expropriated lands in 
state hands. In this sense, it followed the reference point of the Socialist alternative. 
However, the maintenance of the liberal democratic system gave the project a ‘Social-
Democratic welfare’ flavour. While including the social and economic dimensions of 
modernity, its main focus lay on the empowerment and mobilisation of the masses.  
4.2 Riding the Chilean Road 
Like the project of the Christian Democrats, the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ was 
implemented with a strong emphasis on the state. Simultaneously, it was highly 
ambivalent towards that same state. The political polarisation made the position of 
technocrats more difficult, though, while state planning took highly ambitious forms 
which never materialised. Meanwhile, the competition between the Left, Centre, and 
Right intensified up to the point where the institutional order breached. Despite the 
enormous pressure on the government to adapt the project in order to regain grip on 
the polarisation that took place in the country, Allende was unable to successfully 
moderate the ‘Chilean Road’.  
4.2.1 State, Technocracy and Planning 
The implementation of the project of the UP implied the expansion of three key 
features of the previous government: the state, the influence of the technocracy and 
planning. Compared to their role under the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, these three features 
became increasingly politicised, and this made the position of technocrats more 
difficult. The instrumental use of the state and the economy for the achievement of 
political goals also hindered the ‘technical’ implementation of the project. Despite these 
pressures, the project of the UP formed a ‘logical’ next step in this ‘era of planning’ 
(Góngora 1987: 288) 
                                              
45 For instance, Gonzalo Vial argues the existence of a ‘secret plan’, by which the UP sought to enforce 
revolutionary restructuring despite its limited political powers. According to Vial, this strategy consisted 
of rapid nationalisations, followed by a sharp rise in remunerations for the majority of the population, 
even though this would eventually create runaway inflation. The final step would be to seize the moment 
(just before inflation set in), making use of the euphoric atmosphere among the people, who, grateful for 
their newly acquired wealth, would pass a constitutional reform in a plebiscite, giving the UP full powers 
while remaining within the boundaries of legality (Vial 2005: 76-88). Even though such a ‘secret plan’ 
may well have been evaluated within some sectors of the UP, it should be noted that it was never 
implemented.  
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The Chilean Road and the State  
The state was central to the UP’s strategy in several ways. Not only was socialism to be 
constructed by means of the election of a Marxist government, but the state was also to 
be a prime actor in the transformation of the economy. The nationalisation of the 
copper mines, the creation of the Social Property Area, and even the agrarian reform 
constituted a rapid and fundamental extension of the state, both in size and in 
content.46 In this sense, control over the state was seen as crucial for the project of the 
Left. Although control over the executive by no means implied control over the whole 
of the state, Allende and the more moderate sectors of the UP considered a gradual 
approach viable, in which the state would be viewed as a conglomerate of several 
institutions (military, judiciary, bureaucracy and so on) that could be penetrated and 
taken over once power over the executive had been obtained (Bitar 1986: 25-27). 
However, just as Frei had to defend his emphasis on the state to the more conservative 
sectors of the PDC (‘I do not want a state tutelage’), Allende was confronted with 
profound anti-state sentiments from the radical sectors of his coalition. 
In the traditional conceptualisation of the state by the Left, it was considered a 
bulwark of bourgeois interest, not only serving the capitalist classes in Chile and 
abroad, but also structurally blocking the liberation of the proletariat. In this 
conceptualisation, the ‘bourgeois state’ could never be used as a framework for a 
transition to socialism, because it was fundamentally incompatible with it (Silva Solar 
1971: 221). This line was followed by the Socialist Party, which had formally 
proclaimed, in its 1967 Congress, that: ‘only through the destruction of the 
bureaucratic and military institutions of the bourgeois state can the socialist revolution 
be consolidated’ (Socialist Party 1967). Furthermore, several doubts arose regarding the 
gradual approach that was followed by Allende, which sought to take over the different 
state institutions one by one after having gained executive power. Many considered this 
a vulnerable strategy, as the opposition would remain in control of certain key elements 
of the state (such as the military) and use its powers to defeat the UP. ‘If in Chile’, 
Socialist leader Clodomiro Almeyda argued,  
determined and revolutionary politics […] take power, counterrevolutionary 
violence would present itself one way or another. Either it would be through a 
coup d’état by a faction of the Armed Forces, incited by the CIA, or it would be 
through an invasion of marines to protect the copper mines (Almeyda 1967). 
Despite these accusations, the state-oriented character of the Chilean Road to Socialism 
was consequently defended by Allende, arguing that the state, being in the hands of the 
Unidad Popular, now served the interests of the revolution: 
I know that the word “state” causes a certain apprehension. This word has been 
much abused, and is often used to discredit a just social system. Don’t fear the 
word “state”, because you, all of us, form part of the state, of the People’s 
                                              
46 The state was by no means a small actor in Chilean society before the UP. In 1970, the Chilean state 
had already become the country’s largest single employer, and also controlled about two thirds of all 
investments (De Vylder 1976: 211). 
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Government. Working together, we should improve it and make it efficient, 
modern and revolutionary (speech by Salvador Allende 1970a).  
In an interview in 1972, when the conflict on the use of the state within the UP reached 
a peak, Allende attacked the line followed by the radical sectors of his coalition, arguing 
that:  
the administrative institutions of today’s state do not act on behalf of the 
dominant classes, but on behalf of the workers and of the continuity of the 
revolutionary process. Therefore, we should not be consider to destroy what is 
now an instrument to act (…) in the interest of Chile and its working masses 
(quoted in Corvalán 2001: 160).  
The conservative historiography on the Allende period has maintained that the UP 
fundamentally took an anti-state position, based on the Marxist-Leninist argument that 
a class-less society would not need a state. For instance Mario Góngora has emphasised 
this point, arguing that if the UP defended the state, it was from tactical considerations, 
not for ideological reasons. The Allende government, Góngora claims, intended to 
remain within the formal boundaries of the state system until this strategy was 
completely exhausted, maintaining until the last moment the appearance of legality 
(and with it, support from pro-democratic forces) before eventually planning a complete 
socialist takeover (1986: 290). Gonzalo Vial argues in a similar vein, stating that from 
the beginning, a ‘secret plan’ existed that would use legal measures to push the system 
to a crisis, and then make use of that crisis in order to put an end to the democratic 
state and install a Soviet-style socialism (2005: 80). Finally, Cardemil states that Allende 
never saw a fundamental conflict between the insurrectional path and the institutional 
path, and that he viewed pluralism and bourgeois legality as ‘respectable — and 
discardable — as far as they serve their purpose’ (1997: 360). 
This position is not generally shared among historians and social scientists, 
however. Most scholars agree on the argument that the downfall of the UP government 
in 1973 was the result of the coalition’s continued (if ambivalent) adherence to the 
state, not its rejection of it. Coming from the Left, Moulian (1997: 166) argues that the 
UP could, in the end, not triumph, because the ‘institutional road’ was in reality not a 
viable option, while the coalition was not prepared to follow the road of ‘traditional 
revolution’. Similarly, Roxborough, O’Brien and Roddick claim that it was the position 
on the state — seeing no fundamental incompatibility between the revolutionary process 
and the ‘bourgeois state’ — that proved fatal for the UP (1977: 73).47 De Vylder (1976: 
211) argues that the state’s powers and functions were essential to the UP in the process 
of transition to socialism. Rather than seeking to destroy the state, the Allende 
government made use of it in the same fashion as previous governments had done for 
decades, but stretching its productive, developmental and corporative functions to the 
limit. The main differences, De Vylder argues, lay in the extra dimensions that the UP 
added to the role of the state as motor of development and industrialisation, namely 
compulsory planning and poder popular. Salazar and Pinto add to this analysis the 
                                              
47 See also Jocelyn-Holt (1998: 110), who follows more or less the same line of argument.  
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argument that the collapse of the ‘developmental state’, which took place under the 
Allende government, was by no means the result of its political strategy. The UP 
government, Salazar and Pinto suggest, did not attack the state — on the contrary, it 
followed the same state-oriented line that had characterised the governments since 
1925, bringing to the light the terminal crisis that the state was in. The Left became 
caught in a position it had not foreseen: it had become the sole administrator of the 
final crisis of the state of 1925, a crisis that would take place in any case, with or 
without the UP (1999a: 67-68). Finally, Jocelyn-Holt stresses that even though there 
may have been anti-state sentiments within the UP (and there certainly were), in the 
end the state was never seriously in peril. The destruction of the state through the 
‘insurrectional path’ of radical Socialist Party leader Carlos Altamirano, Jocelyn-Holt 
argues, existed mainly discursively within the UP, but never became an integral part of 
the Chilean Road to Socialism. It could have taken place; there were endless discussions 
on the ‘two paths’ that the UP could follow (the institutional path and the 
insurrectional one), but in the end the choice was postponed, while the project 
proceeded largely (although not completely) within the boundaries of legality (Jocelyn-
Holt 1998: 124-125).  
While the UP may not have been fundamentally adverse to the state, it certainly 
made instrumental use of it. In the political conflict that came to characterise the 
implementation of the Left’s project of modernisation, legality became increasingly 
jeopardised. Unable to pass legislation through Congress, Allende made use of legal 
loopholes, governed by decree, and took the habit of afterwards legalising tomas and 
expropriations that had been originally illegal and which had been incited by workers 
supporting the UP. As will be seen in section 4.2.2, this particularly bothered the 
Christian Democrats, who saw their ability to pressure the UP greatly reduced as long as 
parliament was bypassed.48  
Regardless of the UP’s disposition towards the state, the project of the Left was a 
highly state-oriented project. It consisted mainly of a rapid expansion of the state, by 
means of the construction of the Social Property Area (including the nationalisation of 
the copper mines) and agrarian reform. Initially, 91 companies were selected for the 
transfer to the Social Property Area, and later this number climbed to 253 (Vuskovic 
1973: 51; Roxborough et al. 1976: 94). Compared to the total number of private 
enterprises in Chile, this scarcely amounted to some 20 per cent in 1973, while the 
                                              
48 In many ways, the presidency of Allende resembles that of nineteenth century president Balmaceda, 
who also sought to bypass a hostile Congress, in order to be able to set forward his project of 
modernisation. In the case of Balmaceda, his project consisted of large-scale public works, which could 
only be financed by extending the role of the state in the booming nitrate business in the north of the 
country. As in the case of the copper under Allende, much of the nitrate business was in the hands of 
foreign entrepreneurs, who firmly resisted all attempts to increase state taxation. Meanwhile, in the face 
of fierce Congressional opposition, Balmaceda resorted to radical rhetoric and the by-passing of 
parliament. In the end, the conflict could not be resolved within the legal system and a violent civil war 
broke out. Having lost this war in 1891, president Balmaceda, like Allende some eighty years later, 
committed suicide (Loveman 2001: 155-160). For a detailed overview of the Balmaceda government by a 
contemporary observer, see Bañados (2005).  
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official projection for 1976 was 30 per cent. However, it was not the amount but the 
importance for the economy and, above all, the technical sophistication of the firms 
that counted. Through the construction of the Social Property Area, the state gained 
power over the most influential and advanced industries in the country, obtaining 
substantial surpluses from them while controlling all key sectors of the economy (Ibarra 
1973: 61). This made the state the prime (and almost monopolistic) actor in the 
implementation of the Chilean Road, just as had been the case in the Revolution in 
Liberty (Rojas 1987: 162).  
Apart from being state-centred, the Chilean Road was basically a top-down project. 
Even though the political discourse surrounding the project continuously stressed its 
‘popular’ character, it was the political elite of the Left that, having taken over the 
executive, implemented it using the powers of the state. Illustrative in this respect is the 
absence of a discourse on ‘class conflict’ during this period. The discourses (from both 
sides) on the political struggle were focused on ‘Left’ and ‘Right’, suggesting that all 
relevant actors were situated within the political arena of the state (Salazar and Pinto 
1999a: 67). The fact that toward the end of the UP government non-government-
controlled participation boomed, in the form of illegal tomas and insurrectional 
activities, does not detract from the elitist and top-down character of the Chilean Road. 
This form of participation, although disruptive and potentially dangerous, was 
tentative, fragmented, and did not constitute a mature strategy. The ‘insurrectional 
path’, claiming to be a valid alternative to the Chilean Road, remained, up to 1973, 
embryonic and mainly discursive, as the nearly absent resistance to the 11 September 
coup illustrated (Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 125).49  
 
Planning 
State planning (planificación) played a central role in the implementation of the Chilean 
Road. It even acquires Soviet-style features such as six-year planning, even though this 
never reached the levels of dominance of the USSR. In form, it largely followed the 
institutional and organisational line that the previous government had set out. In 
content, however, planning never became successful under the UP, due to the 
independence of state organisations, the participation of the workers in the Social 
Property Area, and the political polarisation of technical policy-making.  
Right after the elections, a national planning system was set up to formulate and 
implement economic policies for the short, mid- and long term.50 At the highest level of 
this system, a National Development Council was created, consisting of ministers, 
government officials, and workers’ representatives. This consultative council discussed 
medium and short-term development planning, while the National Planning Office 
                                              
49 For a detailed analysis of the UP’s position on the state and its consequences, see Rojas (1987) 
50 In the previous elections, the Left had formulated thorough economic plans in advance. In fact, during 
the 1964 election, the Left had created an office for economic planning (OCEPLAN), which, according 
to some, was an unofficial precursor of the ODEPLAN. However, in 1970, the Left had few hopes of 
winning the elections, and decided that all attention should be focused on the campaign. As a result, no 
attempts were made to develop economic policies in advance (Montecinos 1998: 52). 
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(ODEPLAN) functioned as its technical secretariat. More important than the National 
Development Council, however, was the Executive Economic Policy Committee, in 
which the President of the Republic had a seat, together with the Finance Minister and 
the Economics Minister, as well as the Planning Minister, who functioned as a technical 
advisor. Once again, ODEPLAN functioned as a technical secretariat. Finally, 
ODEPLAN itself was divided into two main divisions, one concerned with general and 
national planning, and one working exclusively at the regional level (Martner 1973: 69). 
This institutional organisation is indicative of the subordinate role that ODEPLAN 
came to play under the UP. Even though ODEPLAN remained important in the 
planning process, it was not able to overcome a heritage from the Frei regime, namely a 
relative weak position in relation to the Ministries of Economy and Finance. In the case 
of the Christian Democrat government, this weakness was countered by the close ties 
between ODEPLAN and the presidency. In the case of the UP, ODEPLAN was kept at 
a much larger distance from the President. It was by no means a centralised planning 
institution which could function autonomously, but rather played an advisory role for 
the different ministries as well as the National Development Council and the Executive 
Economic Policy Committee. Moreover, in 1972, when the economy began to 
destabilise, it completely lost its role as coordinator of economic policy, a function that 
was taken over by economists working for the Executive Economic Committee 
(Montecinos 1998: 10). However, as Gonzalo Martner, Allende’s Minister of Planning, 
argued in 1972, this did not mean ODEPLAN was a powerless institution, as close 
cooperation with the Treasury guaranteed a certain level of efficient planning:  
The Planning Office proposes the overall framework and the global projections 
for the forthcoming year to the Treasury and puts forward its idea of what the 
level and composition of public investment should be. At the same time (…) 
there is already coordination at ministerial level when the preliminary budgetary 
work is being carried out. Since the process of preparing the budget in Chile is a 
long one, (…) there are many opportunities for discussions on the criteria that 
are used for determining priorities. For example, at one point, Treasury officials 
did not attach importance to the housing programme until ODEPLAN showed 
the advantage of increasing house construction (Martner 1973: 71).  
State planning under Allende was by no means unambitious. In 1971, a sixteen-volume 
economic plan was published, containing a global plan at the national level as well as 
plans for each of the country’s twelve regions. This six-year plan contained projections 
at different levels of completion, from rough sketches to detailed and elaborate plans, 
dealing with issues ranging from industrial and agricultural policies to road transport, 
energy distribution and tourism. In the fields of industry, mining, fishing, and 
agriculture in particular, detailed policies were formulated which were projected to yield 
specific (and quantified) increases in production. For instance, copper production was 
projected to increase by 60 per cent, cereal production by 31 per cent and cattle 
production by 43.7 per cent. Furthermore, it contained detailed investment plans for 
the creation of, among other things, nine milk plants (with a total production of 7.3 
million litres of milk and 36,500 kilos of butter annually), four chicken slaughterhouses 
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(with a total production of 4.5 million kilos of chicken), and a diesel motor plant (with 
a yearly production of 15,000 units) (Summary of the Six Year Plan 1971: 295-303).51  
Despite the ambitious targets of state planning, it never developed into an efficient 
and streamlined form of economic organisation. As Nove (1976: 66-76) argues, one of 
the main causes of the failure of planning was that most of the state’s enterprises 
continued to function autonomously. ODEPLAN and CORFO came to compete 
between each other, while increasing internal disagreement at the level of central 
control within the UP began to characterise policy- making.  
At the same time the creation of the Social Property Area in practice related poorly 
to state planning. Workers in the Social Property Area were repeatedly told that they 
were now free and no longer subject to the rule of others, a principle which did not 
relate well to the centralised decision-making that is essential to state planning. As a 
result, their input had to be included in the planning process, limiting the possibilities 
for top-down centralised planning. Instead, planning was done globally, while detailed 
planning took place only in certain strategic sectors (mainly industry and agriculture) 
(Martner 1973: 73).  
The biggest problem of state planning, though, was that it implied balanced, mid- 
and long-term policies that were targeted to the optimal functioning of the economy. 
For large sections of the UP, this was not a priority, as economic policies were 
considered to be subordinate to the direct political needs of the UP, that is, the rapid 
expansion of the government’s support base in view of an imminent confrontation with 
the opposition. As a result, the technical approach that characterised state planning was 
increasingly politicised, and significantly diminished the role of planificación under the 
Allende government.52  
 
Technocracy 
The detailed projections that characterised the Six Year Plan, as well as its highly 
optimistic outlook, expecting for instance annual growth rates of 7 per cent a year, 
bring to light another key aspect of the implementation of the Chilean Road: its 
technocratic nature.53 These projections, however economically sound, disregarded the 
political and social realities of the country, and were exclusively based on the economic 
                                              
51 As Martner (1988: 269-273) shows, even projections for the year 2000 were worked out, indicating the 
number of industrial complexes in the different production areas for all regions.  
52 The UP’s Minister of Economy Carlos Matus later used his experiences with state planning to become a 
theoretical specialist on the theme. In his Adiós, Señor Presidente (Goodbye, Mister President) he analyses the 
different functions and modalities of planning. For Matus, planning is indispensable for a government, as 
it is a determining factor in its capacity to fulfil its project. Planning, he argues, is the mediation between 
the future and the present, which allows governments to look forward when no true predictions can be 
made. It also strengthens governments in their capacities to react to unforeseen events, to learn from the 
past, and to apply knowledge to direct action (Matus 1998: 21-32).  
53 Under the previous governments of Alessandri and Frei, average economic growth had been 3.7 and 3.9 
per cent respectively (Meller 2000: 23) 
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and technical analysis of technocrats in and around the government.54 In many ways, 
technocrats played key roles in the project of the Left, but at the same time they were 
regarded with suspicion by the political actors in government.  
As Verónica Montecinos shows in her study on economists in Chile, Allende 
continued the ascending trend of economists in the government. Like Frei, he followed 
the bureaucratic-advisor model, appointing technocrats to key positions in the 
bureaucracy (Montecinos 1998: 9). His trust in economy as a science was high, and he 
placed enormous trust in his economic teams. In contrast to Frei, though, he was not 
closely involved in economic policy-making. Rather, he appointed to high posts 
economists with whom he had personal ties, and subsequently only intervened in their 
work when problems arose. A case in point was Pedro Vuskovic, head of the School of 
Economics of the University of Chile, who was personally asked by Allende to become 
Minister of Economics, despite the fact that he was not a Socialist Party member (ibid., 
pp. 53-55).  
The prominent role of technocrats in the Allende government was not 
unproblematic, however. Under the UP, public posts were distributed along party lines, 
and based on party loyalty and political importance rather than on professional merit 
(Silva 2007). Independent appointments, based on loyalty to the programme, did not 
combine well with this cuoteo system, even though most técnicos were oriented towards 
the Left. Politically ‘neutral’ economists were appointed only rarely Furthermore, 
economics was never central to the debates within the UP, as all policies were viewed in 
highly politicised terms, and economists were often treated with suspicion. Economics 
had never been the forte of the Chilean Left, and the few Left-wing economists who 
participated in the UP tended to be theoretically weak, with the exception of those 
coming from MAPU and the Christian Left, who rapidly gained respect among the 
economic teams of the government. Finally, the tendency of the técnicos not to 
maintain formal party linkages proved unfavourable, forcing most of them (including 
Vuskovic) to join parties of the UP. 
In the end, the position of economists and other técnicos became increasingly 
difficult. The anti-technocratic attitude that had characterised the UP programme 
(‘More advisors? No! (…) We will not have any more advisors in Chile’) became 
increasingly strong as political conflict escalated. Independent economists became easy 
scapegoats for political conflicts, and the técnicos themselves interpreted criticism from 
the parties as a proof of political ignorance and excessive ideological zeal. The role of 
técnicos as described by Petras (1969: 355), combining ‘[r]adical ideology without radical 
action’ became increasingly pressured as the demand for radical action rapidly gained 
power.55 Montecinos argues that as political struggles between the UP and the 
                                              
54 For example, the projections for industrial output completely ignored the predictable drop in 
investment by industrial elites, who were unsure about the short-term future of their companies (De 
Vylder 1976: 62).  
55 The conflict between technocrats and politicians did not originate in ideology, as most técnicos of the 
UP were ideologically very close to the different coalition parties. Moreover, as Meynauld (1968: 15) has 
pointed out, the role of the technocracy lies not so much in the determination of objectives, but rather in 
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opposition intensified, traditional economic policies were no longer useful. In the 
course of 1972 and 1973, economic policy became increasingly politicised, leaving little 
or no room for technocrat management. A more critical assessment comes from Ascher 
(1984), who claims that the rapid deterioration of the economic process under the UP 
government was either indicative of the ‘absence of the technical competence of the 
economic policymakers’ (p. 238), or of their ‘anti-technical romanticism’ (p. 252). 
Whatever the explanation, though, the fact remained that the technocrats of the UP 
became increasingly marginalised towards the end of the Allende government.56  
A good example of the hybrid role of technocracy under Allende may be found in 
the person of the Minister of Economics, Pedro Vuskovic. Vuskovic combined 
elements of technocracy and political radicalism in a highly original fashion. Coming 
from ECLA, he was well trained in technical policy-making, and could by no means be 
charged with incapability. Furthermore, he was an independent, explicitly positioning 
himself outside the party structures (and the accompanying pressures). In fact, his lack 
of party involvement eventually cost him dearly in 1972, when rising criticism of his 
policies was left unmatched by party support, and he was transferred to CORFO. 
However, in his policies Vuskovic followed an all but technical line, pursuing populist 
strategies that created large disequilibriums. In fact, anticipating an imminent 
confrontation between the government and the Right, Vuskovic used his political 
autonomy to pursue economic policies that served, in his own words, ‘principally (…) 
to amplify and consolidate the power of the workers’ (quoted in Valenzuela 2003: 100). 
In other words, Vuskovic made use of his technocratic role in order to follow strategies 
that were more radical and politicised than the UP programme had originally envisaged 
(Montecinos 1998 56).  
A different strategy was followed by Agrarian Minister Jacques Chonchol. Having 
been a prominent member of the PDC, MAPU candidate for the presidency, and 
finally a co-founder of the Christian Left, he can hardly be seen as politically ‘neutral’ 
or even formally independent. However, Chonchol sailed a highly independent course 
within the UP, regularly stressing that he was not a politician but a technician. Indeed, 
being an agronomist by training, Chonchol had never been involved in parliamentary 
politics and had made his entry into politics from the Institute of Agricultural 
Development (INDAP). His MAPU candidacy for the presidency was largely based on 
his popularity as an ‘outsider’, who was not associated with traditional politics 
                                                                                                                                        
the choice of priorities in the course towards those objectives. In the case of the UP, the technocrats were 
challenged by the political sectors because of their technical and rational approach towards the project, 
which was considered a blockage to the instrumental use of the economy for the achievement of short-
term political goals. 
56 An interesting inside view on the experience of technocrats in the Allende government comes from 
Edward Boorstein, a North American economist with revolutionary sympathies who joined the Allende 
government as an economic advisor. It is notable that in his book the author describes in some detail the 
technical measures that were taken by his team in the period up to mid-1972. Perhaps illustrative for the 
change in position of economic policy-makers, he remains silent on the economic and technical policy-
making he was involved in after this period and focuses exclusively on political developments. See 
Boorstein (1977).  
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(Roxborough et al. 1977: 66). Within the UP, his party involvement served his 
independent and technical position in two ways. First of all, it guaranteed a certain 
support base within government, as ministerial posts were divided along party lines. 
Intra-coalition negotiations would considerably strengthen his position in times of 
crisis. Second, his knowledge of the struggles that took place within the political arena 
gave Chonchol the advantage of being able to steer clear of political controversy within 
the coalition and to integrate political analysis into his actions. In other words, 
Chonchol was able to maintain a certain independence and a technical style of 
management by doing precisely the opposite, becoming fully embedded in the political 
party system.57  
4.2.2 Political Competition and the Chilean Road 
While political competition had already been fierce during the Christian Democrat 
government, under the UP the competition between the Left, the Centre, and the Right 
reached unprecedented heights. The UP mounted strategies that were intended to 
increase its support base at the cost of the Right and the Centre, while at the same time 
it half-heartedly attempted to gain support from the PDC. This strategy seemed to be 
successful during the first year of Allende’s government, but turned against the UP after 
1971. Meanwhile, the Right went into a state of shock after Allende’s election, and was 
only able to regain the initiative with the 1972 October strike. After that it set out to 
follow a confrontational course which was targeted to the destruction of the UP by all 
available means. In the process, the foundations for its own project were set in place. 
Finally, the Christian Democrats were ambivalent towards the UP. Initially following a 
course of action based on ‘loyal opposition’, the party became increasingly critical of 
the strategies that were being used by the Left. This was given form by simultaneously 
setting up a strong political competition with the Left and attempting to reach an 
agreement with it on crucial topics. As attempts (from both sides) to reach agreements 
failed time after time, the PDC slowly assumed a hostile position. In the end, the 
political stalemate could not be resolved within the legal system, and the PDC 
withdrew its last lifeline from the UP.  
 
The UP Strategy 
Political competition was a central feature in the implementation of the Chilean Road, 
focused on the expansion of the support base of the Left. This was in part an 
ideological strategy, as the support of certain sectors of the middle classes was 
considered essential for the success of the Chilean Road (Roxborough et al. 1977: 75). 
                                              
57 In the end, though, Chonchol’s strategy did not survive the increasing chaos and conflict within the 
UP. His own party, the IC, had rapidly radicalised and started to take positions close to those of the MIR. 
When in October 1972 Allende integrated military officers into his cabinet in order to secure his support 
base and institutional stability, the IC vehemently rejected this step, and subsequently withdrew 
Chonchol from his ministerial post, apparently much to his regret, as the following week a IC 
announcement stated that his dismissal was not ‘unconditional’. However, he was never to return to the 
Allende government.  
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Practical considerations were, however, just as prevalent. Having gained the presidency 
with a minority vote, and controlling only 42 per cent of the seats, the Allende 
government faced a strong opposition majority in Congress.58 As De Vylder (1976: 46-
56) argues, the support for the opposition was numerically superior, and therefore more 
powerful in the elections, but otherwise heterogeneous and, especially in the first phase 
of the UP government, relatively passive. The support base of the UP was in contrast 
smaller, but much better organised (mainly consisting of the unionised industrial and 
mining workers), giving the UP the tactical advantage of mass movement support to 
compensate for its electoral minority.59 Given the fact that the opposition would never 
allow for the full project of the UP to be implemented, the government had no choice 
but to prioritise expansion of its support base at the cost of the opposition’s 
constituency. De Vylder stresses the use of the economy in this respect. Through 
populist redistributionist policies, the UP sought to gain support from groups that 
could possibly be won over. This redistribution was partly to be financed through rapid 
expansion and reactivation of the economy, mainly through income policies, increased 
public expenditure and monetary and price policies (ibid., pp. 53-60). In this sense, the 
economic policies of the UP were indeed, as Minister of Economy Pedro Vuskovic 
stated, ‘subordinate, in their context, shape, and form, to the political need to increase 
Popular Unity’s support’ (Vuskovic 1973: 50).60 
The UP also used political strategies in its attempts to broaden its support base. The 
first step was to destroy the economic basis of the elites through the agrarian reform 
and the creation of the Social Property Area. It was thought that through these 
measures the Right would lose its support base. As Roxborough, O’Brien and Roddick 
argue, this was a false assumption, as much of the power of the bourgeoisie remained 
present within the existing state institutions. Even more complicated were the dealings 
with the middle classes, whose support was considered essential for the success of the 
Chilean Road - at least from the perspective of the moderate sectors of the UP. They 
were approached in two ways. First of all, Allende and the Communists strove to 
negotiate with the Christian Democrat Party about possible compromises and forms of 
cooperation. Even though the more radical sectors of the UP (as well as the 
                                              
58 The elections were won by Allende with 36.3 per cent of the vote, while conservative candidate 
Alessandri followed with 34.9 per cent, a difference of only 39,175 votes. The Christian Democrat 
candidate Tomic received 27.8 per cent. 
59 Jaime Ruiz-Tagle (1973: 157) argues that the constituency of the UP was one of its problems. The 
Allende government proposed large-scale redistribution. However, the support base of the UP consisted 
mainly of organised labour, not exactly the poorest sections of society, as 50 per cent of the organised 
workers were part of the country’s richest half. True redistribution would in effect hurt their interests, and 
this may help to explain the radical demands for wage increases from precisely those sectors.  
60 The UP’s economists argued that income redistribution mainly served economic purposes, as it was 
considered to increase demand and subsequently revitalise economic growth. However, authors such as 
De Vylder (1976: 54), Meller (2000: 32) and Bitar (1979: 40) claim that this was merely a discursive 
legitimisation, as the economic policies were indeed fully subordinated to the political strategies of the 
UP. In contrast, Ascher (1984: 248), Roxborough et al. (1977: 78) and Oppenheim (1999: 56) emphasise 
the seriousness of the UP’s intents of revitalising the economy, arguing that the two strategies were 
considered to be mutually reinforcing.  
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conservative wing of the PDC) did not agree with this strategy, it remained a central 
feature of the UP government. Second, a campaign was set up to convince the middle 
classes that they would not suffer (and probably profit) under the Chilean Road, 
pointing to the disproportionate concentration of capital in the hands of national and 
international monopolies. The middle classes, especially small business owners, it was 
argued, would profit from the increased role of the state in the economy, and the 
monopolies would be eradicated without generating too much disturbance (1977: 74-
78).  
During the first year of the UP government, the implementation of the project — 
and the subsequent increase in the support base — was highly successful. Significant 
advances were made with the implementation of the project, as the copper mines were 
nationalised, by means of a constitutional reform bill that was supported by the PDC, 
and the agrarian reform was greatly intensified.61 The creation of the Social Property 
Area was also successful. Between December 1970 (when Allende assumed power) and 
January 1972, some 130 companies were transferred to the state (De Vylder 1976: 145). 
Initially, the UP procured them through negotiations, buying the entire stocks of 
companies such as the monopoly steel producer. Later during the year the government 
increasingly resorted to requisitioning on the basis of a 1932 law (which had been 
adopted during the 12-day Socialist Republic) allowing for state takeover of firms that 
were mismanaged or otherwise malfunctioning (Roxborough et al. 1977: 89). The main 
reason for this change of strategy was the fact that the Right (as well as the conservative 
Christian Democrats), feeling highly threatened by the nationalisations, began to 
mount a united campaign, forcing the government to use legal loopholes rather than to 
proceed through parliamentary negotiations (Bitar 1979: 72-74). Finally, the economy 
performed more than well. In 1971, GDP growth rose to 8 per cent, the highest rate 
since 1950. Inflation fell by a third, and unemployment dropped from 5.7 per cent to 
3.8 per cent. Moreover, income distribution improved notably; and in particular the 
low-wage blue collar workers received substantial improvements, up to 39 per cent 
(Meller 2000: 33). 
As a result of this successful first year, the support for the UP grew substantially. In 
the municipal elections of April 1971, the UP gained 48.6 per cent of the vote, an 
increase of 8.7 per cent compared to the 1967 municipal elections (Valenzuela 2003: 
104). It was probably in this period, when the Right and Centre had not yet united in a 
powerful opposition, that the UP was at the peak of its popularity. As De Vylder (1976: 
79) argues, this probably would have been the right moment for the UP to call for a 
plebiscite in order to dissolve parliament and install the unicameral ‘People’s Assembly’ 
that the programme envisioned, following more or less what Vial labels the UP’s ‘secret 
plan’. The inability of the UP to push that strategy forward is illustrative of the complex 
                                              
61 During the first six months of the Allende government, approximately 1.5 million hectares of land were 
expropriated, about half of what the previous government had achieved in six years. By the end of 1972, 
virtually all lands qualified as eligible by the 1967 reform law had been expropriated (Oppenheim 1999: 
55-56). 
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way in which political competition took place under Allende. The radical sections of 
the UP, mainly the PS, strongly advocated the plebiscite as a means of destroying the 
power of the bourgeoisie at one stroke. Allende and the Communist Party, in contrast, 
feared it would alienate those sectors of the PDC that could still be won over, and 
vetoed the plan. From this moment on, the ambivalence within the UP on the matter 
of political competition increasingly came to characterise its policies and discourses. As 
a result, it became more and more difficult for the moderate sectors of the opposition 
to follow a coherent line in dealing with the UP. 
After the first successful year, the UP’s strategies collapsed, however. The economic 
advances that had been made soon turned out to be disastrous in the longer term. 
Increased consumption pushed up imports, while gains in productivity stalled. At the 
same time basic consumer goods became increasingly scarce, leading to galloping 
inflation towards the end of 1971. The economic model that had been chosen by the 
UP, consisting of the combination of rapid rises of real wages (and, as a consequence, 
consumption) with a similarly rapid increase in production, was clearly exhausted by 
the end of 1971. Idle production capacity, largely responsible for the increase in 
production during the first year of the UP, had been taken up, and a negative trade 
balance, supply problems, and political upward pressures on wages soon led to 
galloping inflation and widespread shortages. Furthermore, production output declined 
as a result of poor management of the Social Property Area as well as increasing social 
unrest (De Vylder 1976: 91-107). The main consequence of the failure of the UP’s 
economic strategies was the intensification of political competition through the 
unification and strengthening of the opposition. For the Right, the economic crisis was 
the proof that the Allende government would lead the country into an abyss. More 
importantly, however, the lack of supplies and economic uncertainty specifically 
alienated the ‘petit bourgeoisie’, small shopkeepers and entrepreneurs, precisely the 
sectors of the middle classes that the Allende government sought to win over 
(Valenzuela 2003: 108). As a result, the expansion of the urban support base of the UP 
stalled, or went into reverse.  
In the countryside, a similar trend took place. As has been argued in the previous 
chapter, agrarian reform not only served goals such as increased productivity and social 
justice, but also the expansion of the support base of the governing parties (Falcoff 
1991: 113; Scully 1992: 161). This political need turned out to have a crucial influence 
on the nature of the agrarian reform policies. Rather than focusing on productivity 
gains, by which the increased demand for agricultural products could be cushioned, the 
government prioritised the enlargement of the reformed sector, hoping that it would 
strengthen its rural support (Falcoff 1991: 108).62 As a result, social conflict in the 
countryside rapidly intensified. Landowner resistance radicalised, as well as agitation by 
the radicalised rural movements. Nevertheless, the traditional latifundio virtually ceased 
                                              
62 In fact, even after 1972, the UP still did little to increase production, and even took counter-productive 
measures, such as doubling the value of agricultural imports between 1970 and 1973, at artificially 
reduced prices (Falcoff 1991: 108).  
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to exist by the end of 1972. Politically, the competition (now limited to the UP and the 
PDC, as the Right had lost most of its power base) turned to the question of ownership. 
The UP pressed for collective forms of ownership, even though the productivity of the 
lands that were organised through the state’s Agrarian Reform Centres (Centros de 
Reforma Agraria, CERA) was significantly lower than that of privately owned lands, and 
had less support from the peasantry (ibid., pp. 106-108). As a result, the PDC, 
promoting private landownership for the reformed sector, was able to maintain 
considerable support.63 In the Congressional elections of March 1973, the results of the 
competition in the countryside became clear: the UP had made impressive gains in 
terms of support, receiving 37 per cent of the rural vote, compared to 29 per cent in the 
1970 elections. However, the opposition (mainly the PDC) remained a substantial 
majority. The UP’s advances in expanding its rural support base had been significant, 
but not as successful as was hoped (De Vylder 1976: 203; Falcoff 1991: 113). 
 
Competition from the Right  
The position of the Right under the Unidad Popular was determined by two main 
factors. First of all, by the profound crisis under the government of Frei, after which it 
had regrouped in the National Party (Partido Nacional, PN) in 1967. This period of crisis 
had served to mobilise the Right into an efficient and confrontational opposition to the 
Left. Second, despite this renewed militancy, the Right still lacked a project. The neo-
liberal project was still very much under construction, being formulated in the 
economy department of the Catholic University by a select group of intellectuals, but 
by no means enjoying widespread conservative support. Similarly, the gremialista 
movement, which would also come to play a decisive role in the project of the Left, was 
marginal and confined to the Catholic University. Being unable to propose a viable 
modernising alternative to the Chilean Road to Socialism, the Right took an extremely 
defensive position. As a result, the PN followed a strategy of full confrontation and 
obstruction, with a clear awareness that the Right was facing extinction as a socio-
economic class.  
The Right, which had anticipated a victory, went into a state of shock after the 
elections. Sectors of the Right, in cooperation with the CIA, initiated half-hearted 
attempts to keep Allende from actually assuming office.64 One of the possible scenarios 
                                              
63 The ironic situation arose that a Christian Democrat bill proposing a broadening of the agrarian 
reform, extending it to farms between 40 and 80 basic irrigated hectares, was vetoed by Allende, because 
of the stipulations that the lands were to become private property and that compensation was to be paid 
in cash (Falcoff 1991: 106).  
64 During and after the 1970 elections the CIA actively supported the Right and supported attempts to 
block Allende from winning the elections and assuming office. This took place along the lines of two 
strategies, the infamous ‘track one’ (mainly consisting of propaganda, support for the campaign and 
economic pressures), and ‘track two’ (attempts to gain support for a coup d’état before Allende took 
office). In total, about one million dollars were spent in the process, while CIA estimates indicate that the 
Allende campaign received some 350,000 dollars from Cuba. However, as Falcoff (1991: 199-250) shows, 
the United States was never a decisive actor in this period, or during the remainder of the Allende 
government. This study will therefore only address the role of the US where necessary.  
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was to have Congress choose Alessandri instead of Allende (Congress was still to 
appoint the President), who would subsequently resign and leave the way open for Frei 
to be appointed President after new elections (Bitar 1986: 37; Oppenheim 1999: 39). 
However, this strategy, fashioned by Alessandri himself, was rejected by the Christian 
Democrats.65 In addition, the Right sought to destabilise the country by spreading an 
atmosphere of fear, claiming that the UP would be unable to handle the economy and 
suggesting that the situation called for a coup d’état. As Garretón and Moulian (1978: 
20-220) argue, the lack of success of these strategies soon provoked more radical 
propositions, which no longer remained within the boundaries of constitutional 
institutionalism. On 10 September, Patria y Libertad (Motherland and Freedom) was 
founded, a paramilitary group that would become a significant actor toward the end of 
the Allende government. Furthermore, two days before the congressional vote on the 
presidency, Commander-in-Chief General René Schneider was killed during an 
attempted kidnapping. This attack was rapidly uncovered as an unsuccessful attempt by 
right-wing extremists to influence the vote by blaming the Left for the kidnapping (Bitar 
1986: 37; Sigmund 1977: 123).  
After the inauguration of Allende, the Right, and especially the industrial elites, 
entered more or less a state of paralysis. Awaiting the uncertain fate of their properties 
(as the scope and speed of state expropriations had not yet been defined), they halted 
investments and withdrew capital from their firms. Besides that, they were disoriented 
and divided about a possible counter-strategy, as the National Party and the 
conservative Christian Democrats blamed each other for the ascendance of Allende. At 
the same time the failed attempt to kidnap General Schneider served to mute the 
opposition of the Right (Oppenheim 1999: 54). However, in the course of the first year 
opposition from the Right (albeit still poorly coordinated) became increasingly 
articulate. It revolved around two main ideological issues: the defence of the 
institutional order and of private property (Correa 2004: 267).66 The means of mass 
communication, mostly in the hands of the Right, were used intensively to attack the 
government on those issues. In particular the interventions by the government in the 
media, occasionally closing down newspapers and radio stations for some days, mostly 
after the publication of an allegedly libellous article or during a state of emergency, was 
cause for widespread outrage among the right-wing media. The emotional reaction of 
the Right on such occasions, Roxborough et al. (1977: 106) argue, was indicative of their 
level of fear of the UP, viewing the Allende government as a Moscow puppet seeking to 
transform Chile into a Soviet-style totalitarian state, by force if necessary. As the French 
                                              
65 As PDC party president Senator Benjamin Prado argued in the discussion of the Alessandri proposal, it 
would amount to ‘telling 35 percent of the electorate that you may participate in the elections, but you 
may not win. You can come in second or third, but not first’ (quoted in Sigmund 1977: 118).  
66 In fact, conservative historiography has since then largely been centred on the issues of institutional 
order and property rights. See for instance Brahm’s ‘Propiedad sin Libertad: Chile 1925-1973 (1999), which 
argues that from 1925 on the right to property has slowly deteriorated, and was in a complete crisis 
during the governments of Frei and Allende.  
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author Suzanne Labin, in her extremely conservative analysis of the Allende 
government, puts it:  
The supreme goal of the UP in Chile, and one it shares with all Marxist-Leninist 
parties, was to absorb and control the whole population, from the cradle to the 
grave, and to direct and channel all its activities (…) As such absorption and 
control became tighter and tighter and more all-embracing, it aimed and hoped 
to achieve a total control of the people’s minds. This would produce a universal 
brainwashing that would lead to a unanimity of opinion, a total enslavement of 
the souls of the people and a complete regimentation of their bodies (1982: 62). 
Against such a peril the only viable strategy was defence, and in view of the stakes (the 
survival of the Right as a social-economic class), defence took the form of highly 
aggressive and constant attacks on the government, propaganda and manipulation and 
distortion of information, all with the intention of creating an atmosphere of fear. This 
strategy was successful, Roxborough et al. argue, in the sense that large sections of the 
Right began to develop a highly distorted view of the actual situation in Chile (for 
instance assuming that the UP was seriously preparing for an armed confrontation). 
Falling ‘victim to their own propaganda’, the Right intensified their opposition to the 
government more and more (1977: 107).  
However, as Stallings (1978: 137-141) shows, it was not the Partido Nacional that 
took the initiative but the gremios (the conservative guilds and other intermediate 
employers’ organisations). The result was the so-called ‘October Strike’ in the same year, 
when lorry drivers, shopkeepers, factory owners, and students, later joined by 
professionals (such as teachers and doctors), laid down their tools for weeks.  
The October Strike (in fact it was more of a lockout by the gremios) proved crucial 
for the development of the Chilean Road in three ways. First, it signified a turning 
point for the UP. Before the strike, the government was on the offensive, even though 
the euphoria of the first year was rapidly evaporating. However, after the strike, the UP 
never regained the initiative, and mainly reacted to the initiatives of the opposition 
(Stallings 1978: 141). Second, the strike led to spontaneous tomas and provoked factory 
takeovers by UP-supporters that were clearly illegal and served to infuriate the 
opposition, including the middle classes and the PDC, even further (Moulian and 
Garretón 1978: 77-78). Finally, it forced Allende to incorporate military officers in his 
cabinet as a means of ensuring institutional stability. While the presence of the military 
served the purpose of restoring order, it also provoked the radicalisation of sectors of 
the Armed Forces, who considered it a form of treason.67  
The October Strike also had a decisive influence on the construction of the project 
of the Right itself. It put the gremialista movement on the map as a serious political 
                                              
67 In particular the figure of Commander in Chief General Carlos Prats, who joined the Allende 
government, was controversial, as he was well-known for his anti-oligarchic and progressive views. Vial 
(2005: 117) argues that Prats’ presence in the UP government was not merely a case of a military officer 
attempting to avoid civil war at all costs, for if it were so, he would have included the Right in his 
deliberations. In failing to do so, Vial claims, his position in the government became a political position, 
not an institutional one. As a result, Prats not only served the UP, but also breached the military’s 
institutional position as a neutral force.  
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movement, at the cost of the National Party, which had taken no part in the strike. As 
has been seen in the previous chapter, the conservative gremialistas, led by student 
leader Jaime Guzmán, gained influence in the late 1960s. Having started out as an 
insignificant student movement, it had proved to be able to participate at a national 
level in the October strike. Also, the figure of Guzmán, who started to appear regularly 
on television in this period, gained nation-wide influence as a political figure. As a 
result, the gremialistas would be among the first and most prominent civil groups to be 
contacted by the military after the 1973 coup to participate in the project of the Armed 
Forces. 
The strike was also decisive for another group from the Right that had been 
relatively obscure until then. This group consisted of the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’, who 
were conservative economists of the Catholic University who had obtained their post-
doctoral degrees at the University of Chicago. Having adopted the radical neo-liberal 
views of Milton Friedman and others, this group had quietly been developing economic 
doctrines at the University. During the October Strike, however, they were contacted by 
the Navy, which was investigating the possibilities of a military coup, and was looking 
for an economic foundation for a future military government. As a result, the Chicago 
Boys produced an economic programme called El Ladrillo (The Brick), which would later 
become the foundation of the neo-liberal project of the military regime (CIDOC 
interview 1, 1992).  
 
Competition from the Centre 
The competition between the Left and the Christian Democrats was a crucial factor for 
the Chilean Road to Socialism, as the support of the middle classes was considered 
essential for the success of the project by the moderate sectors of the UP. Being the 
UP’s main rival in reformism, the attitude of the PDC (divided into a conservative and 
a progressive wing) may best be described as shifting from cautious sympathy to open 
hostility, gradually moving away from a role as broker for the UP and increasingly 
isolating the government in the process (Scully 1992: 166-167). The negotiations 
between the Centre and the Left in parliament intensified and ended in conflict over a 
technicality. In the end, the inability of the legal system to arbitrate in this conflict 
provoked the downfall of the project of the Left.  
During the 1970 elections, the Christian Democrat candidate Tomic ran with a 
programme that in many ways resembled the programme of the UP, with an electoral 
discourse that was difficult to distinguish from that of the Left.68 This strategy had two 
electoral repercussions: it split the non-Marxist parties, because the Right was still 
rancorous about the PDC’s agricultural reform and Tomic was a completely 
                                              
68 Fundamentally, the Tomic programme proposed to accelerate and extend the reforms of the Frei 
government, especially through nationalisation of the copper mines and intensification of the agrarian 
reform. Furthermore, it proposed state control for the financial sectors and Chilenización of foreign trade 
(PDC programme 1970). The Tomic programme did not, however, envisage large-scale expropriations in 
the industrial and agrarian sectors, but rather proposed workers’ ownership and control over substantial 
sectors of industry and business (Bitar 1986: 31-32).  
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unacceptable candidate to them, and it weakened the UP, as much of the progressive 
vote was captured by the PDC (De Vylder 1976: 28).69 As a result, the Right, favourite 
before the elections, came second, while the Left only won with the smallest of margins, 
and the divisions within the PDC deepened because of the electoral defeat.  
The question of Congressional approval (usually a mere formality) of the election 
outcome raised serious discussions within the PDC. Out of fear of a split in the party, 
the PDC leadership allowed Allende to assume the presidency, but only after the UP 
signed a ‘statute of democratic guarantees’ (ibid., p. 30). The UP showed little reluctance 
to sign the guarantees, which were, in the words of Allende, ‘not only constitutional 
principles, but a moral commitment to our conscience and our history’ (quoted in 
Sigmund 1977: 119). In fact, the statute more or less confirmed what Allende had 
always adhered to publicly, stressing the values of constitutional democracy, plurality, 
and the independence of the Armed Forces, the Judiciary and the press. Having allowed 
Allende to assume power, the PDC remained relatively benign to the new government 
for some months, for instance not supporting the National Party in submitting 
constitutional accusations against two UP Ministers (Vial 2005: 90).  
In 1971, two opposed developments took place in the relations between the PDC 
and the UP. First, the April municipal elections were a bitter defeat for the PDC, which 
gained only 25.7 per cent of the vote compared to 35.6 per cent in 1967 (Valenzuela 
2003: 104). As a result, the conservative camp, led by Eduardo Frei, retook the 
leadership of the party, marking a strong move to the right. This move was reinforced 
by the assassination in June of former PDC Minister of Interior Edmundo Pérez 
Zújovic by a splinter from the MIR, apparently in belated revenge for the Puerto Montt 
massacre of 1969. The swing to the Right of the Christian Democrats was reinforced in 
July, when a group of influential party leaders deputies, members and senators, with the 
notable exception of Tomic, formed a new movement, the Christian Left (Izquierda 
Cristiana, IC), which joined the UP (de Vylder 1976: 80). As a result, the PDC was left 
to its conservative sectors. 
Second, two senators of the PDC, Juan Hamilton and Renán Fuentealba, advanced 
a bill that was intended to create a compromise between the Centre and the Left. It was 
a constitutional reform bill, regulating the formation of the Social Property Area, 
Private Property Area and the Mixed Area, a central feature of the Chilean Road for 
which still no legal basis existed, and which could only be institutionalised with the 
support of the PDC.70 The proposal consisted of three main provisions. First, it 
                                              
69 Tomic’s electoral strategy was initially based on the idea of an alliance with the Left. However, the 
already radicalised competition between the Centre and the Left, as well as rancour within the UP over 
the PDC’s camino propio, blocked such cooperation. As a result, the traditional tripartite electoral division 
was maintained (Valenzuela 2003: 84).  
70 As Moulian and Garretón (1978: 63) argue, the bill had as its main objective to draw the creation of the 
Social Property Area into the legal system. So far, the UP had advanced without proper legal foundation, 
making use of the re-discovered law on requisition from the Socialist Republic of 1932, legal loopholes, 
and presidential prerogatives. Under these circumstances, the PDC’s chances of forcing the UP to make 
changes in the process were minimal; this is why the PDC repeatedly sought to bring the matter within 
the legal arena.  
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formalised the existence of the three property areas, in line with the UP programme. 
Second, it stipulated that congressional approval should precede the nationalisation of 
each individual company. Finally, it stated that control over the companies was to be 
passed to the workers themselves, not to the state, with some exceptions, such as the 
copper mines. For the PDC, the bill had the obvious advantage of transferring power 
from the executive to Congress, as well as minimising the role of the state in the Social 
Property Area. For the UP, the advantage lay in a legal and institutional formalisation of 
the massive nationalisation process it was undertaking.  
However, there were many obstacles to the approval of the Fuentealba-Hamilton 
bill. The definition of a list of companies to be nationalised was problematical, as the 
opposition sought to minimise the Social Property Area. At a more fundamental level, 
the workers’ control over nationalised companies was unacceptable to the UP, as it 
would marginalise the role of state planning in the economy, and would still allow for 
semi-capitalist market incentives and profit-sharing (Roxborough et al. 1977: 108-109). 
Furthermore, it would take away many of the executive’s powers in the creation of the 
Social Property Area and transfer them to Congress, where the opposition held a 
majority (Bitar 1986: 74-75).71 
The bill was approved in February 1972 by the united opposition in Congress, with 
the support of several UP delegates for specific articles, such as the guarantee that small 
and middle-size companies would remain in the Private Property Area (Corvalán 2001: 
261). Allende sent it back to Congress, though, after having vetoed some of its 
provisions. By then, however, the PDC had completed its turn to the Right and had 
become much closer to the PN.72 As a result, the Fuentealba-Hamilton bill became the 
symbol of the political conflict between the government and the opposition in 
Parliament. Congress overruled Allende’s vetoes, but the government argued that this 
could only be done with a two-thirds majority (as it concerned a constitutional 
amendment), and not by a simple majority.73 This ‘technicality’ could not be resolved. 
The government attempted to send it to the Constitutional Court for arbitration, but 
this path was blocked by the opposition, which claimed that the court did not have 
competence in this case (Corvalán 2001: 261). The stalemate appeared to be broken 
                                              
71 Scholars such as Roxborough, O’Brien and Roddick (1977: 108), Corvalán (2001: 261), and Bitar (1986: 
75) suggest that the Fuentealba-Hamilton bill was merely an attempt to reduce the executive powers of 
the UP and to obstruct the creation of the Social Property Area in Congress. On the other hand, 
conservative historian Vial (2005: 132) stresses the point that the Right was shocked by the possibility of 
an agreement on this bill, and only supported its approval out of fear of losing the support of the PDC. 
This would indicate that the bill went far beyond parliamentary scheming and could constitute a serious 
compromise between the UP and the PDC. It would also be indicative of the role of broker the PDC was 
still prepared to play in late 1971.  
72 For instance, the PDC and the PN supported each other’s candidates in the complementary elections in 
Colchagua and Linares, as well as in the constitutional accusation made by the opposition against 
Minister of Interior José Toha (Vial 2005: 91) 
73 As Valenzuela (2003: 130) argues, this conflict could have been avoided if Congress had been able to 
negotiate and pass changes to the bill instead of just approving or rejecting it after Allende’s partial 
vetoes. Ironically, it had been the Christian Democrats themselves, under the Frei government, who had 
taken away such powers from Congress, on the assumption that they would be re-elected in 1970.  
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when the PDC and UP engaged in serious (and secret) negotiations on the bill. Despite 
strong opposition from the Right, the PDC considered that a resolution of the conflict 
was essential for the maintenance of social order. As Fuentealba puts it:  
This legal conflict runs the risk of producing a confrontation. If this continues 
and no accords are reached, conflict will come; conflict in the streets, conflict 
over power by groups, manifestations (…) A period of agitation will come in 
this country the consequences of which, we fear, and which could be grave for 
the tranquillity of the country and the normal development of the democratic 
process (quoted in Valenzuela 2003: 132) 
The main issue continued to be the list of industries to be nationalised. This matter 
came to hinge of the paper industry, a monopoly industry that the UP wanted to 
nationalise. The PDC radically rejected this, arguing that state ownership of the paper 
industry would constitute a grave infringement of freedom of speech, as the 
government would control the paper supply of the opposition press. After long 
deliberations, the PDC and UP, both under increasing pressure from their radical wings, 
called off the negotiations, letting the bill continue its course (Roxborough et al. 1977: 
109-110). 
In May of 1973 the case provoked a profound institutional crisis, which would lead 
to the end of the parliamentary attempts to resolve the conflict between the 
government and the opposition. Allende succeeded in asking the Constitutional Court 
for arbitration on the question of the two-thirds majority or simple majority that 
Congress would be need to overrule Allende’s veto on the amendments to the 
Hamilton-Fuentealba bill. However, the Constitutional Court declared itself 
incompetent to make a decision in the case. The Controlaría (Controller’s Office) did 
not decide in favour of either side, but blocked Allende’s attempt to pass only the 
sections of the bill which had the support of both the government and the opposition 
(Vial 2005: 133). As a result, no formal institution was left to break the stalemate. The 
Chilean political system, renowned in Latin America for its legalism and 
institutionalism, proved unable to resolve a profound conflict that hinged on a mere 
technicality. This signified the end of the parliamentary attempts to create a broader 
support base for the project of the Left. From this moment on, the Centre, which had 
time and again emphasised the need to stay within the legal system, started to move 
away from an institutional solution to the political conflict.74  
Following the declaration of the Constitutional Court, Frei announced that he was 
no longer prepared to collaborate in any way with the UP (Roxborough et al. 1977: 286). 
The PDC started steering towards a golpe blando, that is, the military taking peaceful 
control of the government. To this end, it followed an obstructionist strategy, both in 
Congress and outside it, collaborating with the Right in the initiation of large strikes 
and lock-outs, both in the cities and in the countryside. By this time there was no 
                                              
74 Of course, a decision by the Constitutional Court would not have given a guarantee of a peaceful 
resolution to the radicalised competition between the Left and the Centre. However, it would have 
created an institutional way out for the three areas of the economy. At least, it would have postponed the 
PDC’s decision to support a military takeover.  
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doubt that the combined opposition was, in the words of Roxborough, O’Brien and 
Roddick, ‘preparing for a showdown’ (ibid., pp. 206-210).  
However, amidst the general chaos and street violence that characterised Chilean 
society around this time, one final attempt was made to reach some form of consensus. 
In July, on the invitation of the Roman Catholic Church, PDC party President Patricio 
Aylwin agreed to negotiate with the UP. After an auspicious beginning, the negotiations 
turned into a dialogue de sourds. Allende, focusing on the judicial and constitutional side 
of the conflict, agreed to fully accept the Christian Democrats’ position on the 
Fuentealba-Hamilton bill, with the purpose of resolving the legal void that had 
characterised the creation of the Social Property Area. Aylwin, in turn, demanded that 
the military be incorporated in the government, not only at the highest levels, but also 
in the lower echelons, which would virtually imply an abdication by the UP 
government. The negotiations broke off on this issue. Allende intended to save what he 
could by appointing military in the government some days later, but the PDC remained 
adamant in its demand that the military should be incorporated at all levels. By this 
time, the Christian Democrats were no longer prepared to function as brokers 
(Corvalán 2001: 260-268).75 
4.2.3 Slipping off the Road: the Adaptation of the Project 
The development of the project followed a pattern similar to the Revolution in Liberty. 
After an initial period of rapid progress, the project entered in a period of conflict, in 
which its implementation was increasingly troubled by outside as well as inside forces. 
This phase was characterised by increasing opposition, internal division and social 
unrest, and ended in a severe political crisis. After this crisis, the government lost the 
initiative, and the implementation of the original project came to a halt. The 
government was forced to make a choice between stepping on the brake and pushing 
the project forwards. While Allende attempted to do the first, other sections of the UP 
did the latter. In the end, Allende lacked the relative autonomy from his political allies 
he needed to enforce a consistent adaptation of the ‘Chilean Road’, which eventually 
led to the downfall of the project.  
 
Economic Adaptation  
On the economic level, several attempts were made to adapt the project. As mentioned 
above, economic performance rapidly dropped after the first year, as inflation, shortages 
and decreased production began to reinforce each other (De Vylder 1976: 87-111). The 
                                              
75 Different interpretations circulate on the motivations of the Christian Democrats during these 
negotiations. Authors such as Corvalán (2001: 267-268) and Garcés (1986: 315) claim that the PDC 
purposely torpedoed the negotiations, because by then Frei had set his mind on a military coup. In 
contrast, Valenzuela (2003: 162) and Falcoff (1991: 268) argue that the delegation of the PDC feared that 
Allende, famous for his negotiating skills, would stall, or deceive them. This fear, combined with the 
tremendous pressure coming from the conservative wing of the party, strengthened their demands for 
large-scale military incorporation in the political arena, safeguarding the UP’s compliance with the results 
of the negotiations. 
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economic team of the UP, however, was divided between correcting the situation by 
balancing the economy, and rapidly pushing forward with the implementation of the 
project (Meller 2000: 37). The matter became the cause for intense debates in June of 
1972, during a large UP conference in the Santiago suburb of Lo Curro. On the one 
hand, the PS, supported by the IC, pushed for a radicalisation of the programme, under 
the motto avanzar sin transar (moving forward without resignation). Apart from the 
intensification of poder popular, the PS proposed further large-scale nationalisation, and 
economic readjustment through redistribution of wealth, meaning that the soaring 
inflation was not to be corrected by compensation for the workers only. Economic 
stabilisation, the PS argued, would be counterproductive, as it would slow down the 
pace of political advancement and strengthen the position of the Right. On the other 
hand, the PC, supported by the Radical Party and the Allende sector of the PS, pleaded 
for consolidar para avanzar (to consolidate in order to advance), that is, getting inflation 
under control, giving guarantees to small business owners, seeking agreements with the 
PDC, and bringing poder popular under institutional rule (Furci 1984: 126-129). As the 
conference remained undecided, it was up to Allende to enforce a decision. In defiance 
of his own party, he pushed the balance towards the moderate camp. He rejected the 
idea of intensifying the political project at the cost of the economy, and decided to 
reopen negotiations with the PDC on the Fuentealba-Hamilton bill. Furthermore, and 
most importantly, he announced a shift in his cabinet. Minister of Economics Pedro 
Vuskovic, the independent hardliner of the radical camp, and Finance Minister 
Américo Zorilla were replaced with two moderates, Carlos Matus and Orlando Millas 
(Roxborough et al. 1977: 127).  
The change in the economic team did not produce the desired results, however. 
Attempts to implement cohesive and balanced policies were nipped in the bud by the 
October strike. After the strike, economic policy-making became characterised by a lack 
of coherence and decisiveness (De Vylder 1976: 87-88; Stallings 1978: 144; Meller 
2000: 37). At first, the government prioritised social order over economic recovery and 
delayed the formulation of a new economic plan. Furthermore, in December 1972, 
Finance Minister Millas, attempting to manage shortages of basic foodstuffs and curb 
the black market, announced the ‘distribution’ of thirty basic consumption goods. As a 
result, demand for the products in question rose steeply, and the image of ‘state 
rationing’ only served to antagonise the opposition. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
infrastructure, and wide-scale opposition, the distribution plan never materialised 
(Meller 2000: 44-45; Stallings 1978: 145).76 Only in March 1973 were new economic 
strategies defined. However, despite verbal adherence to economic recovery, nothing 
much was undertaken until late June, when the government came up with a sixteen-
point, detailed plan, the first cohesive plan that was implemented since the UP’s initial 
                                              
76 To the horror of the opposition, distribution was to be carried out by neighbourhood consumer 
committees (Juntas de Abastecimientos y Precios, JAPs), which had been set up by the UP during the 
October strike in order to force shopkeepers to maintain official prices and proper stocks of merchandise. 
The JAPs were notoriously partisan and known to favour UP voters over members of the opposition. 
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strategy (Roxborough et al. 1977: 128-130). However, by then economic chaos, social 
unrest, and political conflict had reached uncontrollable levels.77  
 
Political Adaptation 
The adaptation of the project of the Left became highly problematical because of the 
existence of strong internal opposition within the UP, which had started to implement 
an alternative project. This opposition set in motion a grass-roots form of poder popular, 
which proved to be beyond the reach of the government, and could not be adapted by 
the moderate sectors of the UP. 
It was the MIR, working outside the UP but maintaining close relations with the 
Socialist Party, which took the initiative for this second form of poder popular. Initially 
maintaining a sceptical but supportive position towards the Chilean Road after the UP’s 
electoral victory, the MIR changed its strategy towards the end of 1971. Considering 
that the institutional path had been exhausted (as the problems for the UP, both 
economical and political, were mounting), the MIR retook its confrontational and 
revolutionary course. This alternative mainly consisted of the creation of local forms of 
grass-roots power, both in the cities and in the countryside, that eventually were to 
destroy the institutions and powers of the state, and installing a ‘Revolutionary 
Government of Workers and Peasants’, as well as ‘People’s Assembly’ (Corvalán 2001: 
174). To this end, MIR sought to unite a ‘Revolutionary Left’, which included large 
sections of the Socialist Party, the MAPU-Garretón, and the majority of the IC, 
excluding the PC, the Radical Party, and the Allendista camp of the PS. As a result, the 
creation of poder popular envisaged the cooperation of a large section of the UP in the 
creation of an alternative to the Chilean Road to Socialism.  
The first step towards the creation of poder popular took place in Concepción, by no 
coincidence the main bulwark of the MIR, where in July of 1972 a ‘People’s Assembly’ 
was created, with the support of most of the parties of the UP except the Communist 
Party. Despite the broad support for this initiative, Allende moved quickly to suppress 
it, considering it a danger for the institutional path. The next step was the creation of 
so-called ‘industrial cordons’ (cordones industriales) during the October Strike. During the 
weeks of the strike, local workers’ organisations, supported by the MIR and sectors of 
the UP, took control of closed down factories (which had not been listed for 
requisitioning) in order to ensure their production. At the same time the logistics on 
transport, inputs and distribution were taken over by local community groups, ranging 
from mothers’ centres to student associations, popularly called ‘community 
commandos’ (comandos comunales). However, after the strike, the factories were not 
                                              
77 One of the causes of the failure to achieve coherent economic policies, Nove (1976: 66-76) argues, was 
that planning, the prize feature of the economic model, failed, as most of the state’s enterprises 
continued to function autonomously. ODEPLAN and CORFO came to compete amongst each other 
while increasing internal disagreement at the level of central control within the UP began to characterise 
policy-making. At the same time the workers of the Social Property Area were repeatedly told that they 
were now free and no longer subject to the rule of others, a principle which did not relate well with the 
centralised decision-making that is central to state planning.  
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returned to their owners, and most of the cordones remained in place.78 In the 
countryside, similar developments took place, through the creation of so-called 
‘peasant’s councils’, which were intended to emerge as a form of alternative power for 
the Left (De Vylder 1976: 204). Even though none of the parties of the UP (or, for that 
matter, the MIR), were able to transform the loosely organised poder popular into a 
viable alternative to the Chilean Road, it certainly served to weaken and jeopardise the 
project (Roxborough et al. 1977: 182). Furthermore, the illegal nature of the poder 
popular and its violent rhetoric (and, at times, practice) fed the fears of the opposition 
that the Chilean Road in reality was pretence for a revolutionary takeover. 
Despite the grass-roots operations of the MIR and the radical sectors of the Left, 
Allende and his moderate camp sought to adapt the ‘Chilean Road’ in several respects. 
First of all, and as a direct result of the October strike, the military were incorporated in 
the government. All three heads of the branches of the Armed Forces, as well as of 
Carabineros, were installed as Cabinet Ministers. The reasoning behind this move was 
that military presence in the government would serve as a guarantee to the opposition 
forces that institutional order was to be maintained (Bitar 1986: 137). The main military 
figure in this new cabinet was General Carlos Prats, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 
who became the new Minister of Interior. Prats moved swiftly, not only restoring order 
within a month, but simultaneously searching for possibilities to reduce the level of 
political conflict in the country. In the end, though, military intervention in the 
government was successful in restoring and maintaining social order for some months, 
but counterproductive in several other ways. First of all, the intra-coalition conflict 
between the PS and the PC radicalised over the issue: the Communists argued that it 
would help to gain the support of the middle classes, while the Socialists claimed that it 
slowed down the transition to Socialism. Second, it infuriated sectors of the military, 
who considered Prats’ line of conduct as a form of collaboration with the enemy, or, at 
least, as a breach of the institutional neutrality of the Armed Forces, a matter of high 
importance to the Chilean military. When in addition Prats’ strategy proved to have 
little success, the number of officers inclined to a coup rapidly increased (ibid., p. 139).79 
Among the Right, Prats increasingly came to be seen as a supporter of the Chilean 
Road, rather than as a neutral military man. Even though he never publicly adhered to 
the UP, he did take an openly anti-oligarchic position, and excluded the Right from 
negotiations about a possible solution for the UP government. As a result, his presence 
in government served to antagonise the Right even further, rather than to appease it 
(Vial 2005: 117). In March 1973, after the Congressional elections, the military 
                                              
78 In June of 1973, after an abortive military coup against the government, the cordones proved to be very 
powerful, simultaneously seizing over 350 factories in defence of the government (Stallings 1978: 147) 
79 Vial (2005: 119) argues that the resentment within the military towards Prats’ participation in the 
government was greatly reinforced by his independent attitude towards the Armed Forces. Rather than 
consulting the military staff on his course of action in the Allende government, Prats followed his own 
line.  
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retreated from the government, despite pressure from Allende to stay (Roxborough et al. 
1977: 201).80 
The second attempt to reverse the tide was the so-called Millas plan, named after 
Minister of Economy Orlando Millas. It consisted of a law on the Social Property Area, 
which was generally thought to be acceptable to the Christian Democrats. The law 
proposed the return to the owners of about 200 small and medium-size firms that had 
been requisitioned during the October strike, while another set of firms that had been 
illegally requisitioned would be transferred to the Social Property Area, in some cases in 
negotiation with the owners. Once again, however, the attempts made by the UP 
government to mend relations with the opposition were blocked by the internal 
divisions within the coalition. The Millas plan met with rejection by not only the 
Socialist Party but also the MAPU and the Christian Left. In an attempt to save the day, 
Millas suggested that the firms would, instead of being added to the Social Property 
Area, be transformed into workers’ cooperatives, which at least in part followed 
Christian Democrat demands. By then, however, the plan had lost all support 
(Roxborough et al. 1977: 174).  
Third, the government repeatedly sought to gain the support of the Christian 
Democrat Party. In June of 1973, Allende even appealed to the primate of the Catholic 
Church, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, to pressure the PDC to re-open the 
negotiations. However, as has been shown in Section 4.2.2, time and again the 
negotiations broke down, largely (although not exclusively) as a result of the internal 
resistance to an agreement within the UP itself.  
Finally, by mid-1973, polarisation within as well outside the UP peaked. The PS, by 
now in close collaboration with MIR, and supported by the IC and MAPU-Garretón, 
openly rejected any strategy which involved negotiations with the Christian 
Democrats.81 Allende, together with the Communists, Radicals and MAPU-OC, 
continued feverishly to negotiate with the Christian Democrats and broaden the base of 
the Chilean Road. However, the PDC had lost hope of a peaceful solution, and called 
for military intervention. In the streets, both MIR and Right-wing Patria y Libertad 
attempted to provoke, through terrorist attacks, the outbreak of an open civil war. 
Allende’s last attempt to break the stalemate was to call for a plebiscite and let the 
people decide. The idea was quickly discarded by the PS, IC and MAPU-Garretón, who 
argued that the best way to move forward was to await the imminent military coup, 
which undoubtedly would lead to a popular counter-coup, after which the transition to 
Socialism could be advanced without the support of the middle classes. As PS leader 
Carlos Altamirano put it, in a speech delivered on 9 September:  
                                              
80 In August, amidst economic and social chaos, Prats re-joined the UP government. By then, however, 
his support within the military had sharply diminished. After only two weeks, Prats resigned, both from 
government and as Commander-in-Chief (Vial 2005: 138-143).  
81 After the Congressional elections, MAPU proved to be utterly divided into a moderate and a radical 
camp, and the party split into a section led by Oscar Garretón, which held positions close to MIR (its 
motto was ‘to win the civil war!’, in reaction to the PC slogan ‘no to civil war!’) and a moderate section 
called the workers’ MAPU (MAPU Obrero-Campesino, or MAPU OC). 
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The Socialist Party has stated that there can be no dialogue with those who are 
leading our fatherland into economic chaos. (…) The Socialist Party considers 
that the Right can only be overwhelmed by the unstoppable force of the united 
people (quoted in Corvalán 2001: 272).  
Although there is considerable evidence that Allende eventually wanted to call the 
referendum after all, even though this would probably split the UP, no indication exists 
of the degree of seriousness of such a plan. As Prats’ memoirs indicate, Allende 
intended to organise a country-wide referendum with two days’ notice (Falcoff 1991: 
284). Either way, by now it had become too late, as on 11 September, the military took 
over the country in a violent coup.  
In conclusion, the October Strike formed a breaking point for the ‘Chilean Road’. 
After the strike, the Allende government lost the initiative, trying to, in the words of 
Stallings (1978: 144) ‘survive on a day-to-day basis, of reacting to the initiative of 
others, of floating some trial balloons and pulling them down as they encountered 
rough going’.82 The government attempted in many ways to adapt its project, mainly by 
changing the economic team, reaching an agreement with the PDC, incorporating the 
military in his government, and by disarticulating the radical sectors of his coalition. All 
four strategies failed, however, while the grass-roots form of poder popular gained 
influence well outside the reach of the government. In the end, Allende government 
did not have the moving space it needed in order to change course.  
4.3 The Legacy of the Chilean Road 
Like the other projects in this study, the project of the Left was not a free-standing 
object in Chilean history. As Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt has argued, it was the product of a 
‘process that stretches back to the beginning of the twentieth century, reaches a peak in 
the early 1970s, and stretches forward in time, maintaining influence up to today’ 
(interview with Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt on 26 April 2004). Neither did it take place in a 
vacuum. The socio-political situation of the country in 1970 had been largely 
determined by the legacy of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, as has been shown in section 
3.3. It was in this context that the UP started to implement its project, based on its 
ideological foundations and developmental doctrines. As has been argued above, the 
implementation of the project was strongly influenced by factors such as the use of the 
state, technocracy and planning, as well as political competition with the Centre and 
Right. The ability of the government to adapt the project under the pressures of civil 
society was also a determining factor in the development and downfall of the project. 
                                              
82 Stallings (1978: 231) argues that after the October strike, the Allende government had been reduced to 
what she calls a ‘care-taker regime’, similar to the Frei regime after 1967. Even though the term remains 
largely undefined, it suggests a passiveness that does not reflect the frantic attempts by the government to 
create circumstances that would enable it to reignite the project. In the case of the Revolution in Liberty, 
the project had definitely been stalled, as the government had made a marked ideological turn to the 
Right. This ideological shift did not take place, or at least not as definitively, in the Allende government. 
Up to the last days of the government, Allende and the PC frenetically sought possible ways out for the 
Chilean Road, hardly a ‘care-taker attitude’.  
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All these factors contributed, in different ways, to the definition of the legacy of the 
‘Chilean Road to Socialism’.  
Like the Revolution in Liberty, the project of the UP was modernising on the 
economic, social, and political levels. On the economic level, ambitious steps were 
made, through populist economic policies as well as the creation of the Social Property 
Area, to improve the general socio-economic position of the poor. This process 
collapsed, however, in the second year of the government, and eventually the economic 
legacy of the UP was characterised by economic crisis as well as runaway inflation. 
Despite this failure, the project of the Left was able to leave a lasting legacy in the form 
of the agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the copper mines. At the social level, 
the Chilean Road more or less followed the path of social integration and improvement 
of living conditions that had been set in motion by the PDC. However, the UP’s focus 
on organised labour, as well as the economic crisis that came to characterise the last two 
years of the government, limited the impact of social modernisation for the ‘marginal 
masses’. At the political level, modernisation took the form of the empowerment of the 
working classes through poder popular. However, this process provoked so much unrest 
that its legacy became a negative one, which has been observable in the subsequent 
projects, and which consisted of avoiding the mobilisation of the masses.  
 
Economic Modernisation 
During the first year of the UP, the government set out to implement a series of 
measures that were targeted to improving the economic position of the poor, especially 
the working classes. These measures included wage rises and other forms of income 
redistribution, which not only improved the living conditions for large sections of the 
population, but were also considered to be beneficial for economic growth (Loveman 
2001: 250).83 However, due to several reasons, this strategy failed. 
As has been pointed out in section 4.1.2, the developmental doctrines of the UP 
were heterogeneous, ranging from a complete rejection of capitalism to proposals that 
followed the structuralist argument. As a result, the economic strategy of the UP 
remained relatively unclear (Montecinos 1998: 54). In addition, due to the instrumental 
political use of the economy, which had been the explicit purpose of Economy 
Minister Pedro Vuskovic, economic policy-making did not take a long-term view, but 
focused on the short term only. The técnicos of the UP, as well as the planning 
departments, did not have enough autonomy from the political sectors to be able to 
impose their views. As a result, economic policy-making came to be completely 
subordinated to the political competition between the government and the opposition, 
and economic equilibriums were no longer preserved. In combination with the 
strategies of the opposition and US enterprises, which sought to delegitimise the 
government by damaging the economy, this course of action proved to be disastrous. 
                                              
83 It was argued, in a classic Keynesian way, that income redistribution and the provision of work would 
lead to an increase in demand which would generate extra investment in the productive sectors (Loveman 
2001: 250).  
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The economic legacy of the UP therefore came to be characterised by the images of 
long lines of people in front of empty stores, as well as by a galloping inflation that 
peaked at well over 300 per cent in 1973. 
In two important economic areas, though, the UP was successful. The agrarian 
reform, itself a legacy the UP inherited from the Christian Democrats, was intensified 
and nearly completed by 1973. The success of this programme is attributable to several 
factors. First of all, it was based on the agrarian reform laws which had been enacted by 
the Right in 1962 and by the Centre in 1967, and therefore possessed a legal status. 
Second, it had a majority in Congress, as the Christian Democrats maintained their 
support for the reform. Third, its implementation took place relatively autonomously 
from the extreme polarisation that characterised other areas of the project of the Left. 
Even though legal loopholes were often used in the implementation of the reform, in 
particular the provision that the state could intervene in rural enterprises in the case of 
work stoppages, in general the agrarian reform was implemented in a technical, top-
down, and legal manner (Loveman 2001: 251).  
As a result, the agrarian reform came to be one of the most important legacies of the 
UP, and would prove to be a lasting one. After the coup, the Right returned only some 
30 per cent of the expropriated lands to their previous owners, specifically those which 
had been expropriated using illegal takeovers and legal loopholes, leaving the bulk of 
the reforms in place. The legality of the reforms, their broad support among the 
population, as well as the fact that they originated in the PDC rather than in the UP, 
played a large role in this course of action. However, of even greater influence was the 
fact that the agrarian reform was beneficial to the project of the Right. The agrarian 
reform was essential for the transformation of the rural sector to a competitive, market-
oriented sector. The maintenance of the traditional structures in the countryside would 
have made such transformation virtually impossible, and the power of the landed elites 
would have been a bulwark that would have been difficult to overcome, even for the 
military government (Silva 1987).  
The other lasting economic legacy of the UP was the nationalisation of the copper 
mines. This, too, had been implemented by means of a legal parliamentary trajectory, 
and had been approved in Congress with the support of the Christian Democrats and 
the Right. Like the agrarian reform, it was not reversed by the military government, and 
in fact became a cornerstone of the neo-liberal project of the Right. The relatively stable 
inflow of capital from the mines allowed the military regime to privatise large sections 
of the economy without impairing the basic functioning of the state itself. In this sense, 
two of the main legacies of the UP, the agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the 
copper mines, came to be foundation pillars of the neo-liberal project of Pinochet, 
contributing to the formation of a new phase of Chilean modernity. 
Finally, the division of the economy in the three areas produced an un-wanted 
legacy. As the nationalisation of large sections of the economy came to be associated 
with the galloping inflation, shortages and waiting lines, and economic crisis, it strongly 
delegitimised direct state intervention in the economy.  
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The UP and Social Modernisation 
Social integration was an important element of the Chilean Road, because the 
incorporation of the ‘excluded masses’ was, apart from a morally desirable goal, also an 
electoral strategy, as the newly included social groups could be tied to the government 
through clientelistic policies. However, this strategy was limited in its success, for two 
reasons. First, the UP had its support base mainly in organised labour, and it was mainly 
for those groups that the government had to offer benefits. Although labour 
organisation expanded somewhat under the Allende government, this expansion was 
not spectacular, as most industrial sectors had already been well represented by 1970 
(Valenzuela 2003: 114). As a result, the UP’s focus on labour left the urban excluded 
groups relatively untouched, and open to radicalisation by extreme Leftist groups such 
as the MIR. In the countryside, the support base of the UP could be more successful as 
the UP targeted the growing number of landless peasants, the inquilinos. However, even 
though the UP could count on considerable success in the countryside, it was never 
able to match the electoral results it obtained in the cities (Scully 1992: 159). Second, 
the policies that were targeted to achieve the incorporation of marginal groups were 
gravely affected by the economic decline that the country experienced after 1971. A 
good example is the UP’s housing programme. In 1971, the government began with the 
construction of no less than 73,000 housing units, and a programme of infrastructural 
improvements that was directly targeted to the poblaciones. However, by late 1972 only 
some 29,000 houses had actually been built, while many projects were left unfinished 
due to a lack of funding and materials (De Vylder 1976: 55, 70). As a result, the legacy 
of social modernisation under the UP remained very limited.  
 
Political Modernisation: Poder Popular 
One of the most specific legacies of the Chilean Road, reflecting the political 
dimension of modernity in a radical way, was the power-sharing programme of the 
poder popular. Based on the legacy of the Christian Democrat promoción popular, the UP 
sought to create forms of popular political participation which were to be guided from 
above. However, the project rapidly derailed and turned into a serious threat to the 
Chilean Road itself. This was the result of several factors in the conception and 
implementation of the poder popular. First of all, the internal divisions within the UP 
held different views on what poder popular should be. The Allendista-sector of the UP 
conceived it as a paternalistic power-sharing programme, which specifically gave the 
workers influence in the Social Property Area. The radical sectors of the UP and the 
MIR, however, envisaged poder popular as the creation of a second power base, 
functioning relatively independently of the executive. Secondly, the internal 
competition within the UP blocked a controlled implementation of poder popular. 
While Allende had prevented the creation of a ‘People’s Assembly’ by the MIR, and 
tried to maintain control over the increasing social unrest, he was unable to stop the 
agitation and mobilisation of the urban and rural p
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As a result, the creation of the cordones industriales and the spontaneous (and, at 
times, violent) takeover of companies and farms confirmed the sense of fear and chaos 
that was experienced by the middle classes and the Right, legitimising more radical and 
illegal forms of opposition.84 In contrast to Frei (and perhaps in attempting to avoid the 
mistakes that had been made by the Christian Democrats), Allende chose not to act 
repressively, letting poder popular increasingly undermine social order as well as his own 
government. The political legacy of the UP therefore became based on an image of 
chaos and fear, and an awareness among the Centre and Right that this should never 
happen again. 
 
The UP’s Legacy for the Political System 
The experience of the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, its collapse, and the subsequent 
military coup had a profound influence on the three political actors in Chile, and this 
was of great importance for the development of the project of the Right.  
For the Left, the process was initially perceived as a political confrontation in which 
the democratically elected government had been defeated by the fascist enemy. From 
the late 1970s onwards, however, a more critical position towards the role of the Left 
itself was formed. This provoked a process of ‘ideological renovation’ in the Left that 
eventually would facilitate the construction of a viable democratic alternative to the 
military regime. 
For the Christian Democrats, the legacy of the Chilean Road led to a profound 
crisis. In the final months of the UP government, the PDC radically opposed the 
project of the UP, and eventually openly promoted military intervention in order to 
oust Allende. After the coup, the PDC leadership reiterated its support for the military 
government in clear terms. As Frei put it, in a letter written on 8 November 1973:  
We are convinced that the Armed Forces haven’t acted out of ambition. (…). 
Their failure now would be the failure of the country and would leave us up a 
blind alley. Therefore the Chileans, in an immense majority, and independent 
of partisan considerations, want to help, because they believe that only on that 
condition can peace and liberty be re-established in Chile (Frei Montalva 1973). 
However, the support for the military regime was based on the assumption that 
democratic order would soon be restored and that it would be able to play a key role in 
it. This proved to be a miscalculation, as the military maintained and expanded their 
power and gave the Christian Democrats little influence. Meanwhile, the Christian 
Democrats suffered an ideological crisis, as there could be little doubt that the crisis of 
1973 had been partly the result of their project of modernisation. As a result, for several 
years the PDC helped to legitimise the military regime, even though it criticised the 
regime’s Human Rights violations. This lasted until 1975, when it became clear that the 
Human Rights situation was not improving, and that a return to democracy was not 
envisaged in the short term. The emergence of the Chicago Boys and gremialistas, and 
                                              
84 For an analysis of Left-wing rhetoric on violence, and the growth of fear among the Chilean Centre and 
Right, see Brahm (2003). 
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the formulation of a new project of modernisation, this time by the Right, eventually 
pushed the Christian Democrats into the corner of the opposition.  
The Right was also strongly influenced by the experience of the Chilean Road to 
Socialism. Initially committed to the institutional framework of the democratic system, 
it had slowly moved, after 1966, to an outright authoritarian and antidemocratic 
position, prioritising stability and social order over all other values. Moreover, the 
agrarian reform, as well as the expropriations in the industrial sector in the creation of 
the Social Property Area, had been felt by the Right as a ‘near-death experience’, as the 
entrepreneurial class as such faced near extinction by 1973. Moreover, the social unrest, 
political radicalisation, and the instrumental use of the state by the Allende government 
had discredited the political system for large sections of the Right and the military. As a 
result, the military coup was considered by the Right as an ultimate rescue, and was 
duly appreciated as such.  
This had a particular impact on the introduction of the neo-liberal project in 1975. 
Under the Alessandri-government (1958-1964), the Right had vehemently, and 
successfully, resisted the government’s attempts to liberalise sectors of the market, as 
state protection was considered as much more in the interests of the landowners and 
entrepreneurs. After 1973, however, gratitude towards the military pushed the Right 
into completely accepting a neo-liberal project that radically outweighed the Alessandri-
proposals, and in many ways severely hurt its economic position. Without the 
experience of the Chilean Road to Socialism, this new project of modernisation would 
have encountered strong resistance from a sector of society that could hardly be 
overlooked by the military government.  
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Chapter 5 
Neo-liberal Modernisation: The Silent Revolution 
In the developing world, modernisation and authoritarianism have been two closely 
tied phenomena. Processes of modernisation alter the traditional patterns of social 
stratification, while still no adequate institutions exist that can channel or moderate the 
increased interaction between the different social groups. As a result, rather than 
interacting through the institutional order, social forces seek to resolve their conflicts in 
direct confrontation (Huntington 1968: 197-198). Guillermo O’Donnell (1977: 56) adds 
to this analysis the element of economic crisis, which has accompanied the process of 
political change in some of Latin America’s most rapidly modernising countries 
(including Chile). According to O’Donnell, the combination of the radicalisation of 
political demands, social conflict and economic crisis eventually leads to the formation 
of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian military regimes. These regimes, which are supported by 
the economic elites, have as key characteristics the political and economic exclusion of 
the popular classes, their ‘de-politicisation’, and the ‘normalisation of the economy’ 
through technocratic decision-making (O’Donnell 1999: 38). However, in the case of 
Chile the Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism regime of Pinochet itself developed a project 
of modernisation which matched the scope and radical nature of its predecessors, and 
which would become known under the name ‘The Silent Revolution’.  
Like the previous projects, the project that was implemented under the military 
dictatorship consisted of an ideological as well as a developmental current. These 
currents were based on specific interpretations of what modernity should be, 
emphasising certain elements while rejecting others (section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). The 
project only gained its final form some two years into the government, when the two 
currents were brought together under the supervision of the Head of State, and were 
implemented making extensive use of the state, technocracy and state planning (section 
5.1.3 and 5.2.1). The political competition between the Right, Centre, largely taking 
place outside of the formal political arena, produced an ideological change among the 
opposition which facilitated the construction of a new project of modernisation, that of 
the Concertación (section 5.2.2). In contrast to Frei and Allende, Pinochet himself 
remained at a considerable distance from both the ideological and developmental sides 
of the project, taking a much more pragmatic position towards it than his predecessors. 
As will be shown in this chapter, this relative autonomy of the regime vis-à-vis its civil 
support groups allowed for a timely intervention and adaptation of the project when it 
went into crisis after 1981. As a result, the project did not disintegrate or stagnate during 
the crisis, as the previous projects had done, but was able to regain strength and even 
recover (5.2.3). Even when the project of the Right was replaced in 1990 by a new 
project of modernisation of the Centre-Left, it left many strong traces in Chilean 
modernity (section 5.3).  
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5.1 The Construction of the Project 
The project of the Right was based on two ideological currents. On the one hand, the 
so-called gremialistas envisaged a conservative order which was adverse to many aspects 
of modernity, but took a very pragmatic line towards others. On the other, the neo-
liberal ‘Chicago Boys’ sought to create a market-oriented society, based on a liberal 
interpretation modernity, in which the economic dimension of modernity was 
emphasised in a specific and exclusive manner. Even though the two movements held 
disparate positions on many issues, they were able to join forces and compromise in the 
areas of conflict. The final result was a project of economic modernisation, political 
authoritarianism and exclusive social integration through the market.  
5.1.1 The Gremialistas and Chilean Conservative Modernity 
The gremialista movement was set up in 1965 by a young law student of the Right, 
Jaime Guzmán, as a student body competing in the elections of the Law Students’ 
Centre of the Catholic University. From the outset, the movement was highly 
successful; the divisions within the parties of the Right, the call for a conservative 
answer to the reforms of the Christian Democrat Party, and the movement to the Left 
by the Christian Democrat youth, had created a void on the Right that the gremialistas 
could fill. The movement rapidly gained influence, winning, in 1968, the elections of 
the Student Federation of the Catholic University and spreading to other universities. 
In particular the figure of Guzmán, an eloquent and sharp debater who made regular 
appearances in the print media and on television, was important in the rise of the 
gremialista movement. His high profile in the national debates and his close ties with 
the corporate world and intermediate bodies such as the National Society for 
Agriculture (Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, SNA) and Society for the Stimulation of 
Production (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, SOFOFA), created broad support for the 
movement, which could be mobilised in the opposition to the Allende government. As 
a result, in the few years of its rise before the 1973 military coup, gremialismo was able to 
develop into a serious alternative to the existing National Party or the semi-fascistic 
Patria y Libertad movement (Huneeus 2001: 339-340).  
The central themes of the gremialista movement were based on the more 
conservative interpretations of nineteenth-century social Christian thought.1 They put 
strong emphasis on the humanistic individual, family, intermediate groups and natural 
order. Originally basing themselves on corporatist doctrines, they soon developed a 
specific and highly original conception of society. The gremialistas’ ideal fundamentally 
consisted of each group in society taking its ‘natural’ place and being subordinated by a 
higher authority which is responsible for the common good.2 As political activities 
                                              
1 Jaime Guzmán, who can be seen as the ideological founder and leader of the movement, was himself 
deeply inspired by the writings of conservative historians such as Jaime Eyzaguirre and Osvaldo Lira. 
2 Gonzalo Rojas, long-time gremialista leader and director of gremialista periodical Realidad, emphasises 
that the movement was based on certain doctrines, but not on a true ideology. ‘Jaime Guzmán always 
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imply going beyond the ‘natural’ place of each intermediate group, the gremialistas 
radically rejected the political activities of all entities that were not political in nature:  
The essence of gremialismo consists of the affirmation that each intermediate 
group should be true to its own particular objective, through which it 
contributes to a free and creative society (…) As a consequence, gremialismo 
rejects the political activities of any neighbourhood, regional, or work-related 
entity whatever, as well as those intermediate groups which are not political in 
foundation and objective (Guzmán 2003: 3). 
In the gremialista conception of society, the state should let the intermediate groups be 
autonomous in the fulfilment of their goals, and focus on the areas in which they fail to 
function satisfactorily. The state is thus the ‘promoter of the common good’, and 
should provide the conditions through which all citizens will be allowed to achieve the 
fulfilment of their personal goals in the best possible way.3 The relation between the 
state and the intermediate groups, and between the groups themselves, is subsidiary in 
nature: 
No higher organisation in society may legitimately assume the attributes or 
actions of a lower organisation, because higher organisations are created in order 
to realise what the lower ones cannot achieve (…) In this way, the legitimate 
field of action of the state or of intermediate organisations begins where the 
room for action of lower intermediate organisations or of individuals ends (ibid., 
p. 5).4  
As a result, a ‘natural order’ takes shape under supervision of the state. This order 
implies a very moderate role for politics, as the intermediate bodies limit themselves to 
their own purposes and objectives. The gremialistas therefore originally rejected 
democracy as a possible form of political organisation, and emphasised the need for 
‘authority’ to maintain the social order. In turn, they proposed a ‘monarchical’ form of 
government, based on one man’s authority. As Guzmán and Novoa put it:  
The monarchical or one-person aspect seems necessary to us. (…) It is necessary 
for the function of government, as this requires an intellectual coherence and 
unity, combined with a defined style, which is much more difficult to generate 
in a collegial body. It is not without cause that the unity within a collegial body 
is simply accidental, or relational, while that of a person is substantial. The latter 
                                                                                                                                        
said that gremialismo could not be an ideology, because it didn’t seek, in theory or practice, to resolve all 
the problems of society’ (interview with Gonzalo Rojas, 9 May 2006). This may have been the case for its 
direct political agenda, which initially limited itself to the organisation of the Catholic University. 
However, the underlying image of society (consisting of intermediate groups which fulfil their particular 
purpose, under the authority of a higher power) may well be seen as a true ideology.  
3 This conception of the state as the promoter of the common good echoes much of that of the 
socialcristianos. As Pilar Vergara (1985: 59) points out, the two currents were based on the same origin, 
namely the social doctrines of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century. Even though both focused 
on many of the same themes (intermediate groups, natural order, the family, and the state as rector of the 
common good), in many ways they developed into ideological opposites.  
4 Originally, Guzmán based his ideas on the corporatism of Francisco Franco. However, as soon as he 
entered university, he developed the doctrine of the subsidiary state and came to reject all forms of 
corporatism (Guzmán 2003: 11).  
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is, and will always be, fundamentally more perfect than the former (quoted in 
Cristi 2000: 29).  
Despite its authoritarian outlook, gremialismo by no means completely rejected 
modernity. It was highly critical of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and of 
liberal democracy, but did not close the door to all things modern. Based on the idea of 
‘Latin American conservative modernity’, it argued for a mix between the Hispanic 
authoritarian ‘organic’ order of society and specific elements of modernity.5 For 
instance, the gremialistas placed a strong emphasis on the capacity of science to 
transform society. The modernising influence of science is positive, Guzmán argues, 
and should therefore be protected. Once science becomes ‘politicised’, it loses its power 
of transformation. As a result, the university should refrain from all political activity, be 
it for the Right, Centre, or Left (Guzmán 2003: 14-15).6 As gremialista ideologist 
Gonzalo Rojas puts it:  
Gremialismo was modernising in the sense that it sought to ensure that 
institutions like the university remain true to science as a motor for 
modernisation. Science should not be contaminated by ideology, because then 
it loses its capacity to transform society. (…) In this aspect, the gremialistas 
maintained a modernising discourse (interview with Gonzalo Rojas 9 May 
2006). 
In other areas, too, the gremialistas were open to elements of modernity. In the areas of 
the right to property and the freedom of enterprise, Guzmán took extremely liberal 
positions, viewing state intervention in these areas as an unacceptable attack on the 
freedom of the individual.7 So, while on the one hand proposing an authoritarian state, 
Guzmán stressed the importance of economic freedom.  
Despite the gremialistas’ adherence to authoritarian rule and even one-man rule, they 
rejected any form of personalistic leadership. As the Declaration of Principles of the 
Military government (which was mainly written by Guzmán, and which reflects the 
deep influence of the gremialistas on the military government) stated, government 
should be guided by ‘Portalian inspiration’, and emphasise the non-personalistic nature 
of command.8 Guzmán considered personalistic rule or caudillismo to be ‘alien to our 
                                              
5 Pilar Vergara labels the gremialista ideology ‘medieval’, suggesting that was completely anti-modern 
(1985: 59). This does not do justice to the internal complexities of an ideology which started using 
Franco (who definitely was authoritarian, but simultaneously modernising) as its main example, and later 
formed a highly successful alliance with Chile’s neo-liberal civil elite. As Luis Corvalán (2001: 57; 59) 
argues, conservatism as a political and philosophical current may constitute ‘a critique of modernity, 
without necessarily being anti-modern in all ways’. 
6 The anti-political approach toward higher education was a field in which the gremialistas clashed with 
the conservative National Party, which intended to create a university of the Right.  
7 Not coincidentally, these were the main areas that had come under pressure during the governments of 
Frei Montalva and Allende.  
8 As has been shown in Chapter 2.3, the ‘Portalian state’ consisted of a conservative compromise between 
tradition and modernity. On the one hand it was based on the modern republican state and on formal 
democracy, and on the other on an authoritarian style of leadership and the maintenance of the 
traditional order. Essential in this model is that authority is never ‘personalistic’. The executive should be 
held by the ‘best’ in order to define the common good, and authority should never by tied too closely to 
the personality of the leader, as was the case of the many caudillo’s (local warlords) in other Latin 
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idiosyncrasy’ (Declaración de Principios 1974). Furthermore, he considered personalistic 
rule to be unsustainable in the long term, as it would eventually lead to irresolvable 
problems of succession. In contrast, authority should be based on rationality, in ‘service 
of the common good’, and founded on a ‘new and modern institutional order (…) 
which captures the profound changes that the contemporary age has produced’ (ibid.). 
In short, the gremialistas proposed an authoritarian institutional order, rational, 
impersonal, and non-political in nature, as the most fitting answer for the Chilean 
trajectory towards modernity. In this order, the balance between the state and civil 
society should be maintained through poder social, or ‘social power’, consisting of ‘the 
ability of the intermediate bodies of society to develop with legitimate autonomy 
towards the achievement of their specific targets’ (Declaración de Principios, 1974).9 
Through this ‘social power’, the individual could be protected against the powers of the 
state, while simultaneously it provided him with a linkage to the state. In this way, the 
gremialistas created an alternative to the representative and participative functions of the 
liberal democratic model (Pollack 1999 : 55). 
However, as will be seen in section 5.1.3, Guzmán’s authoritarian order did not 
necessarily take the form of a dictatorship. In the light of the problems that 
dictatorships experience in their succession of rule, Guzmán came to reconsider his 
position on one-man rule, and proposed a ‘limited’ and ‘protected’ form of democracy, 
in which the role of the Left would be reduced. This ‘Portalian’ idea, based on the mix 
between modern democracy and the Latin American authoritarian tradition, came to be 
promoted by the gremialistas as the most stable form of non-personalistic authoritarian 
rule.10 
In the field of economic organisation, the gremialistas also took an ambiguous 
position towards modernity. Like the Christian Democrats, they positioned their 
doctrines as alternatives to both modern liberalism and Marxism (Vergara 1985: 59). 
Liberalism in the economic field, Jaime Guzmán argued, would lead to ‘an economy 
without morals’, which would seek to liberate society from ‘all transcendental and 
organic concepts, and of all its profound and total Christian sense’ (quoted in Cristi 
2000: 59). On the other hand they vigorously rejected the Marxist alternative, which 
they considered ‘the most dangerous expression of totalitarianism of our times’ 
                                                                                                                                        
American countries. Precisely the combination of authority and non-personalistic rule was considered to 
have brought about the ‘Estado en forma’, the state in good shape in nineteenth century Chile, which 
would become the central theme of the new constitutional order as it was set up by Guzmán.  
9 It is noteworthy how close the conceptions and language of the Centre, Left, and Right are. The poder 
social of Guzmán is reminiscent of the poder popular of the UP, and the intermediate groups of the 
gremialistas to those of the PDC. Even though the ways in which these notions are interpreted widely 
differ, they clearly share a focus on the re-arrangement of the relations between the state and the citizens 
in a modern society as well as similarities in terms of conceptualisation and discursive use.  
10 As will be seen in section 5.2.3, Guzmán’s ideal of a ‘protected democratic order’ came to clash with 
Pinochet’s ambitions for a personalistic dictatorship in the early 1980s. Even though Guzmán was able to 
push forward most of his agenda, his relationship with Pinochet became very complicated, and he 
became increasingly bitter and reactive. This is why Carlos Huneeus speaks of ‘Guzmán’s frustrated 
utopia’ (Huneeus 2007).  
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(Guzmán 2003: 7). The Christian Democrat alternative, based on ‘communitarianism’, 
was viewed in a similar way by Guzmán, as it would lead to ‘totalitarian collectiveness’.  
Despite its critique of liberalism, the position of gremialismo on the economy shared 
some of the neo-liberal prescriptions. The gremialistas’ views on the economy consisted 
of a free market, based on the notions of the right to property and free enterprise. They 
also stressed the subsidiary role of the state, like neo-liberals (see section 5.1.2). 
However, the subsidiary role of the state in the gremialista perception was quite different 
from the neo-liberal one. For the gremialistas, the state should be subsidiary to the 
‘intermediate bodies’, and not, as neo-liberal theorists argue, to the free market. The 
difference may seem trivial, but it is important, as the neo-liberal conception of a 
subsidiary state produces an individualistic society which is fundamentally rejected by 
the gremialistas. Furthermore the gremialistas far from supported the notion of a ‘night-
watch’-state or laissez-faire policies. They envisioned a strong role of the state within the 
economy. Apart from regulating the markets through the control of abuse or the 
formation of monopolies, the state was considered to fulfil the role of planner:  
The acceptance of free initiative should not be understood as a negation of the 
active and principal task that the state fulfils in the economic realm. (…) A 
modern economy demands that the state fulfils a planning role for general 
economic activity. What is essential, though, is that such state planning does 
not assume hypertrophic levels, closing the road for the brave contribution of 
private initiative, but that it is oriented towards converging with it and 
complementing it (Declaración de Principios, 1974). 
Furthermore, the gremialistas were adamant in their emphasis on the redistributive role 
of the state. The ‘common good’, they argued, could not be achieved without active 
state intervention, albeit within the context of the subsidiary role of the state. Rather 
than being based on direct income redistribution, state intervention was initially 
focused on the expansion of the bases of property. Through the social policies of the 
state, the workers would be able to gain access to property and the means of 
production. Consequently, as the ‘Declaration of Principles’ states, Chile would 
become a ‘society of proprietors, not of proletarians’ (Vergara 1985: 47). When this 
path did not prove to work, though, the gremialistas proposed more traditional forms of 
redistribution. As Guzmán emphasised in 1986, Chilean society needed a stronger:  
role of the state in redistributing wealth, basically by means of taxes that are 
higher for those who have more, with the goal of channelling them through 
subsidies or social benefits towards the poor (quoted in Cristi 2000: 167).11  
In short, the original gremialista ideology was an authoritarian alternative to the 
democratic trajectory towards modernity that the country had followed and which had 
entered in crisis under Allende. Like the Christian Democrat and UP ideology, it was a 
                                              
11 It should be noted that never in the implementation of the neo-liberal model in Chile have the 
redistributive functions of the state completely vanished. In particular the person of Miguel Kast, head of 
ODEPLAN and both Chicago Boy and gremialista, was crucial in prioritising poverty reduction policies. 
Under Kast, the first ‘map of extreme poverty in Chile’ was created which provided detailed and 
segmented information on the issue of poverty, and which offered clear policy suggestions. 
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critique of modern liberal democracy. Rather than proposing a simple dictatorship, 
though, it promulgated a long-term model for non-personalistic and institutionalised 
authoritarian rule. Simultaneously, it limited the democratic notions of representation 
and participation to a corporatist model in which intermediate bodies such as the 
gremios played a pivotal role. Even though they strongly adhered to the notions of 
individual freedom and a subsidiary state, key values of modern liberalism, during the 
first years of the dictatorship the gremialistas still were very far from embracing a truly 
neo-liberal model, which would imply the withdrawal of a central, corporatist role for 
the gremio and the negation of the redistributive functions of the state. As will be shown 
in section 1.3, though, the gremialistas were able to adapt their views according to the 
circumstances, allowing them to play a crucial role in the implementation of the 
project.  
5.1.2 The Chicago Way: Reaching Modernity through the Market 
The project of the military government contained, like the previous projects, an 
element of ‘imported ideology.12 This time, it was the economic and developmental 
theory that was taken from abroad and adapted to local circumstances. Already in the 
1950s, sectors of the Right were looking for a doctrine that could replace the hegemonic 
Keynesian doctrines of the era. They turned to the School of Economics of Chicago 
University, where Professor Milton Friedman was elaborating and rejuvenated a version 
of classical liberal theory, popularly labelled neo-liberalism. Like structuralism and 
dependencia, neo-liberalism was not just about finding economic solutions for economic 
problems — it was a blueprint for social and economic relations and ordering for society 
that would resolve the problems that had been brought about by the trajectory which 
modernity had taken up to then. As a result, it was both a critique of and a proposal for 
modernity.13  
This turn of the Right towards neo-liberalism was initiated by the same institution 
that had brought forth the gremialista movement, the Catholic University in Santiago. 
In 1955, the Department of Economics of the university signed a covenant with the 
Chicago School of Economics, which allowed Chilean students to complete their 
postgraduate studies in Chicago. This programme was set up for academic reasons, for 
the training of future university professors, but also had a broader goal in mind. Certain 
sectors the Right considered that the underdevelopment of Chile was the result of 
incorrect economic policies, especially the high degree of state intervention in the 
                                              
12 For the case of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, the ‘imported ideology’ was the socialcristianismo which had 
been based on the work of Jacques Maritain, and in the case of the ‘Chilean Road’ is was socialism that 
had been adapted to the Chilean context.  
13 As Huneeus (1998) points out, based on Ralf Dahrendorf, neo-liberalism shows strong similarities to 
Marxism. Rather than being just an economic theory, it is a weltanschauung, and approaches the whole of 
society from the viewpoint of the economy. It considers citizens to be consumers, politics to be subject 
to the rules of the market, and the bureaucratic institutions to be like private enterprises that have to 
maximise efficiency. 
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economy since the creation of CORFO.14 It was therefore the aim of the covenant to 
create a body of ‘other’ economists that, through their adherence to classical orthodoxy, 
would be able to reverse the tide of state intervention and state planning.15 Through 
their research, they were expected to influence the ‘modern’ and ‘dynamic’ sectors of 
Chilean society and change the country’s economic trajectory (Valdés 1995: 129). This 
strategy proved to be visionary: after the crisis of the Right in the 1960s, and especially 
during the opposition to the UP government, a growing consensus emerged that an 
alternative should be created for the planned economy system. The Chicago Boys 
turned out to be precisely the technocratic elite that could spearhead the eventual 
implementation of such an alternative (Tironi 1990: 132).16  
As a result of this programme, the Economics Department of the UC became a 
veritable bulwark of neo-liberal economic theory, as the Department of Law had 
become for the gremialista movement.17 Hardly noticed at first, the Chicago Boys 
became increasingly important in the University, even though their visionary outlook 
was only recognised by a few. Until the military coup, the economic arena continued to 
be dominated by the ECLA’s paradigm of state intervention and economic planning. 
Even after the fall of the Allende government, recognition was not instantaneous: the 
Chicago Boys officially presented their alternative programme to the Navy on the day 
of the coup, but it would be almost two years before they were allowed to implement it 
fully (Huneeus 2000: 396).  
Neo-liberalism promoted a model of modernity that was roughly based on the 
example North American economic liberalism, but took the logic of liberalism to an 
extreme. It argued that it would create superior patterns of modernity than the 
Keynesian models had done, not only in the economic dimension but also in the 
political and social dimensions. Only through a neo-liberal transformation, the 
                                              
14 In this sense, the Right followed the general trend in Chile to increasingly emphasise the importance of 
economics as a discipline in the achievement of national development. However, the interest of the Right 
in an alternative economic strategy also held political connotations, as the growing state influence in the 
economic realm was considered by some sectors to be a first step toward a communist takeover. See Da 
Silveira (1966).  
15 The hegemony of ECLA’s prescriptions in the region, through its ‘structuralist’ and dependencia theories 
drew the attention of neo-classical economists in the USA, who vigorously began to attack this new 
promulgator of Keynesian and state-oriented economic policies. It is therefore no coincidence that the 
most radical neo-classical school, the Chicago School of Economics, set up an exchange programme in 
the same city where ECLA had its seat. See Valdés (1995: 98-99).  
16 The support of the Right for the neo-liberal project was not unequivocal. Since the creation of 
CORFO, important industrial and business sectors had become dependent on the state and proved to be 
unable or unwilling to abandon state protection (Muñoz 1986: 102-105). Attempts by the Alessandri 
government (1959-64) to reduce the links between the state and business had failed due to a lack of 
support from the entrepreneurial sectors (Montecinos 1998: 19).  
17 The Chicago Boys thus became the third key elite group that had sprung into existence at the Catholic 
University (UC) in a short period of time, after the gremialistas in 1966 and MAPU a year later. 
Interestingly, the success of the UC in political elite recruiting was not accompanied by the production 
of Presidents: in the period 1930-1999, only one Chilean president originated from the UC (Frei 
Montalva), while the Universidad de Chile produced ten and the Military School two. See Gazmuri 
(2001).  
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defenders of the model argued, could Chile’s ‘integral crisis’ and the country become 
truly modern (Taylor 2006: 7). 
Like the structuralist and dependencia theories, neo-liberalism was centred on the 
notion of rational and efficient economic organisation. Obviously, the three paradigms 
took diverging views on how such organisation should be achieved: structuralism 
proposed a mix between free market rationalities and state protection for the infant 
industries, combined with state planning and state-led industrialisation. Dependency 
theories advocated a strong state domination of the important sectors of the economic 
sphere. Neo-liberalism completed the circle, pushing the free market forward as the 
most rational and efficient organiser of economic activity, and marginalising the state as 
an actor.18 Based on the classical notion of man as being a ‘utility maximising animal’, 
that is, a rational, calculating individual, who will seek to maximise his interest within 
the opportunities that are open to him, neo-liberal theorists such as Milton Friedman 
argue that the market would allow for optimal freedom and economic activity for all.19 
Compared to state-led economies, Friedman claims, a market-led economy is superior 
in coordinating the complex economic activities that are characteristic of modern 
societies. In fact, he states, a market-led society provides a higher level of individual 
representation, because it allows for more diversity: 
The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to 
require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on 
the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system 
of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the colour of 
the tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what colour the majority 
wants and then, if he is in the minority, submit (Friedman 1962: 15). 
The fact that the free market optimises the coordination of economic activities, as well 
as individual freedom, does not, in Friedman’s view, imply that no government is 
necessary. Government — the state — will be essential for the fulfilment of certain basic 
tasks in society. However, its role would be subsidiary, as most of its functions can be 
performed by the market. This implies that economic freedom produces political 
freedom: 
Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men. 
The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a 
monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. (…) By removing 
the organisation of economic activity from the control of political authority, the 
market eliminates this source of coercive power (ibid.). 
                                              
18 The work of the liberal philosopher F.A. Hayek in particular has been crucial in arguing that state 
planning is ineffective, disruptive and a fundamental threat to individual freedom, be it in the shape of 
Fascism, Communism or a Social-Democrat welfare-state. See Hayek (1986).  
19 One should be careful not to equate the Chicago School of economics with the work of Milton 
Friedman exclusively. As will be seen in section 5.2.1, Chicago School economists such as Nobel Prize 
winner Theodore Schultz shared the neo-liberal outlook of Friedman, but with a much stronger focus on 
human capital, and also influenced some of the Chicago Boys. However, Friedman is by far the greatest 
influence on the Chicago Boys in general.  
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This does not mean, however, that neo-liberal theory sees no role for democracy - it just 
claims that individual liberty is not so much the result of political organisation but of 
economic freedom. As a result, democracy does not equal liberty, just as 
authoritarianism does not automatically curb it. Liberty in the neo-liberal view comes 
from the market, so a market-oriented authoritarian system may well be preferable over 
a state-oriented democracy that interferes on all levels of human behaviour. As Hayek, 
another founding father of neo-liberalism, put it in his famous ‘the Constitution of 
Liberty’, when comparing the democratic with the liberal ideal: 
The difference between the two ideals stands out most clearly if we name their 
opposites: for democracy it is authoritarian government; for liberalism it is 
totalitarianism. Neither of the two systems necessarily excludes the opposite of 
the other; a democracy may well wield totalitarian powers, and it is conceivable 
that an authoritarian government may act on liberal principles (1976: 103).20 
In short, neo-liberalism promotes a model of modernity in which virtually all processes 
in society perform optimally, and in which the highest levels of individual freedom can 
be achieved. Economically, it claims to achieve the highest levels of development, as 
the market is superior in the allocation of capital and labour. Socially, it provides 
equality of opportunity (on an individual basis), but not necessarily equality of 
outcomes. However, it argues that the market provides the best access to goods and 
services, and that therefore neo-liberalism promotes social well-being. Finally, at the 
political level it claims to create a society of freedom, in which the governmental model 
(democratic or authoritarian) is of minimal importance, as individual liberties are 
guaranteed by the market, not by the state.  
Neo-liberal theory holds an extremely tight definition of the idea of a subsidiary 
state. Friedman discerns only three main areas in which the state should intervene in 
society. First of all, the state should act as a rule-maker and an umpire; that is, it should 
define the general conditions that regulate the relations within society, and function as 
an arbiter if those conditions are challenged. Key areas that demand such state 
intervention are the definition of property rights and the maintenance of the monetary 
system. Second, the state should perform those functions that are ‘technically 
monopolistic’ or create what Friedman calls ‘neighbourhood effects’. ‘Technical 
monopoly’ refers to areas of exchange where competition is intrinsically unviable or 
impossible, such as in railways or telephone networks. The ‘neighbourhood effects’ refer 
to those functions for which it is unviable to charge or recompense individuals for the 
influence it exerts on them. The third reason for state action would be paternalism: the 
                                              
20 Both gremialismo and the Chicago Boys were strongly influenced by the work of Friedrich Hayek. 
However, both also differed from Hayekian theory on key issues. His individualistic liberalism was 
unacceptable to the gremialistas (at least until the late 1970s, see section 5.2.3), and Hayek openly resisted 
the revolutionary attitude of Friedman and the Chicago Boys. In an interview with the Chilean 
newspaper El Mercurio, Hayek accused the Chicago Boys of ‘rationalist constructivism’: ‘We are liberals 
who attempt to renew, but we adhere to the old tradition, which can be improved, but cannot be 
fundamentally changed. The opposite is to fall into rational constructivism, with the idea that it is 
possible to construct a social structure that is conceived by man and implemented according to a plan, 
without taking into consideration evolutionary cultural processes’ (quoted in Góngora 1986: 303).  
 195 
state should take care of those who cannot take that responsibility themselves, for 
instance psychiatric patients, or, to a certain extent, children. However, this does not 
include areas such as education, or provisions for the poor or elderly. According to 
Friedman, such functions could be performed better by the market than by the state, 
and with fewer ‘neighbourhood effects’ (Friedman 1962: 22-36).  
Chicago-school neo-liberalism was not imported into Chile without adaptations. It 
was adjusted by the Chicago Boys to fit the Chilean circumstances as well as the 
idiosyncrasies of the Chicago Boys. A good example of this adaptation is El Ladrillo, the 
Chicago Boys’ 1972 programme, which they secretly wrote at the demand of the navy 
in anticipation of a coup d’état against Allende (Huneeus 2000: 405).21 El Ladrillo was 
not an integral blueprint for society, but rather a set of concrete strategies to resolve the 
country’s economic crisis. It set out from an analysis that was strikingly similar to that 
of Jorge Ahumada fifteen years earlier, and which bore similarities to the UP 
programme as well. First of all, it argued that the problems of Chile’s development had 
been the result of the country’s modernisation since the 1930s: rapid population growth 
and subsequent urbanisation, combined with strong advances in health care and basic 
education, had created a booming demand for housing, work, security and social 
welfare. Subsequently, these demands were strengthened by the increased social 
organisation at the grass-roots level as well as at the level of the unions, creating 
substantial tensions within society. Second, in El Ladrillo it was also argued that 
redistribution of wealth could never accommodate the demands of the people - only 
high levels of sustained economic growth would be able to overcome this 
developmental crisis of the country. And thirdly, only an integral approach to these 
problems of modernisation could yield substantial results, as partial or sectoral strategies 
were likely only to aggravate the situation (El Ladrillo 1992: 20-22).22  
In terms of solutions, El Ladrillo largely followed the neo-liberal prescriptions as 
they had been formulated by the Chicago school: decentralisation of the economy by 
disconnecting it largely from the state, monetary control, removal of trade barriers, 
flexibility of labour relations, and abolition of fixed prices. However, in some key 
regards the Chicago Boys deviated from neo-liberal orthodoxy. First of all, even though 
they maintained the notion of subsidiarity, they allocated the state a large role in the 
regulation of the market:  
                                              
21 Roberto Kelly, the unofficial leader of the Chicago Boys, recalls how El Ladrillo was conceived: ‘It 
started in October of 1972, when the truck drivers started their work stoppages, and Allende went abroad, 
to Russia, or Libya, I don’t recall. (…) We were discussing with Admiral Merino the options for removing 
Allende from power. However, Merino said: ‘This is stupidity! How are we going to govern a country 
that is completely destroyed - we don’t even know how to govern! We will get ourselves into a jam and 
everyone will blame us for the chaos.’ Then I said: ‘Well, what if I present you with a plan that shows 
that the country has a way out?’ ‘Ok’, Merino replied, ‘but where is that plan?’ Then I went back to 
Santiago and talked to Emilio Sanfuentes [a leading Chicago Boy, GvdR], and asked him: ‘How long will 
it take you to make a plan?’ ‘Thirty days’, he replied. (…) Thus began the construction of El Ladrillo’ 
(CIDOC interview 1, 1992).  
22 It is this similarity to the analysis of the previous projects that led Mario Góngora to define the neo-
liberal project as the third phase of the era de las planificaciones globales (age of global planning). See 
Góngora (1986: 294).  
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We estimate that the state should have the superior management of all of the 
economic system, the definition of global goals, the determination of the 
institutional context, the establishment of mechanisms of planning and control, 
the development of infrastructure and those activities in which the social 
benefits outweigh the private benefits, etc (El Ladrillo 1992: 33). 
Second, El Ladrillo maintained the notion of state planning, albeit on a different level 
from the previous projects:  
We consider economic policy to be an active function of the government. But 
as in the management of a company, the directors and executive board are not 
occupied with executing operations in detail. They establish guidelines, 
determine goals, coordinate resources, and control by means of exception; that 
is, they dedicate resources to those aspects in which the plan has derailed and 
has not been successful; thus, too, the participation of the state should be 
centralised and operate by means of exception. This way, the enormous 
potential resources that the State holds can be used with high efficiency and the 
mechanism of planning can acquire its true relevance (El Ladrillo 1992: 33-34).  
Finally, the Chicago Boys, after stressing that only economic growth and education can 
eradicate poverty on the long run, emphasised the need for state intervention in poverty 
relief, income redistribution and basic forms of social welfare. Apart from investment in 
housing (including subsidies for certain low-cost housing), and benefits for the 
unemployed, the Chicago Boys proposed direct subsidies for poor families as well as 
progressive taxes:  
[The tributary system] will be the most important tool to impede excessive 
concentration of wealth and/or income. To this end, a progressive system of 
taxes on interest, property and inheritance will be used (El Ladrillo 1992: 143-
144).  
These deviations from Chicago orthodoxy can be explained in several ways. First of all, 
El Ladrillo probably was not a ‘Declaration of Principles’ for the Chicago Boys, but 
rather a somewhat pragmatic set of economic strategies to counter the economic crisis, 
after a (then still hypothetical) military coup had taken place (Huneeus 2000: 406). As 
the result of such a coup was still unknown, the strategies that the Chicago Boys 
formulated should be applicable in most of the conceivable scenarios, and therefore not 
be too controversial. They should also include a strong role for the state in order to 
safeguard social order after the coup. Second, the Chicago Boys were far from a 
homogenous group: there were at least two ‘generations’ of them, with different 
gradations of adherence to neo-liberal views. By the time El Ladrillo was written, it was 
the gradualist group (which included some Christian Democrats) that dominated the 
team, backed up by representatives of the industrial and agricultural sectors (Silva 1996: 
74-75).23 Finally, it was the ideological background of the Chicago Boys themselves that 
restrained them from following the Chicago example to the letter. Their conservative 
                                              
23 The division between the ‘first’ generation and ‘second’ generation (actually only a few years apart) of 
Chicago Boys became highly visible in the different policies they implemented under the military 
dictatorship. The first generation took to gradualism, in the period 1973-1975, while the second 
implemented the neo-liberal agenda in a most radical way after 1975.  
 197 
and religious outlook led them to stress social justice and the role of the state in poverty 
reduction, even if that was not a part of the economic theory they adhered to.  
Some of the adaptations made by the Chicago Boys to the orthodox neo-liberal 
theory were never to be implemented and were soon forgotten. However, as will be seen 
below, they never fully conformed to the Chicago orthodoxy, and were mixed with 
proper ‘Chilean’ elements, such as prioritising poverty reduction and maintaining some 
of the planning functions of the state.24 
5.1.3 Constructing the Silent Revolution: The Convergence of the Chilean Right  
The project of the Right was based on the conversion of the gremialistas and the 
Chicago Boys under the supervision of Pinochet. However, the prominent presence and 
crucial influence of both the gremialistas and the Chicago Boys in the formulation and 
implementation of a Right-wing modernisation project was far from obvious at the time 
of the military coup. There were more groups of the Right that were prepared to 
cooperate with the Junta in the creation of a new institutional order. In particular the 
former National Party (which had voluntarily disbanded three days after the coup) also 
competed for participation in the new government. The military, which lacked a 
definitive government project apart from a loosely defined doctrine of National 
Security, was initially eclectic in its approach and accepted support from diverse sides 
(Pollack 1999: 51, 53).25 However, there were several reasons why the Junta eventually 
preferred the gremialistas and the Chicago Boys over the other groups. First of all, the 
military, deeply mistrustful of the political game, wanted to marginalise all political 
parties and the groups that they considered to have powerful vested interests. Since the 
gremialistas as well as the Chicago Boys had never engaged in formal politics, and had 
no ties to specific economic conglomerates, they were seen as ‘clean’ and independent.26 
This did not mean they lacked a historical pedigree, though: the Chicago Boys 
constituted a resurrection of the principles of nineteenth-century liberalism, while the 
gremialistas revived the notions of authority and order that were inherited from Diego 
Portales (Fontaine 1988: 103). Finally, their shared and enthusiastic opposition to the 
UP government had made a good impression among the military, as well as their 
intellectual capacities and their professionalism.27  
                                              
24 Among the deviations from neo-liberal orthodoxy is the peg between the dollar and the peso, which 
was introduced in 1979 in order to control the still problematic inflation (Ffrench-Davis 2003: 93).  
25 This eclectic approach is demonstrated by the fact that the military invited several members of the 
PDC to participate in economic policy-making. The cooperation between the Christian Democrats and 
the Junta was short-lived, however, as profound differences of opinion arose on issues such as human 
rights and the return of democracy (Valdés 1995: 17).  
26 Because of their independence from the traditional conservative sectors, the Chicago Boys and 
gremialistas have been dubbed neoderecha, or New Right. See Fontaine (1988) and Pollack (1999).  
27 Both groups had direct access to the military as well. As has been seen in section 5.1.2, the Chicago 
Boys had access to Admiral Merino through Roberto Kelly. Similarly, Jaime Guzmán was active as an 
advisor to Air Force General Gustavo Leigh. Apparently, Pinochet became intrigued, and somewhat 
worried, by the endless stream of proposals and projects that Leigh put forward after the 1973 military 
coup. Initially, Pinochet feared that this was an indication of excessive ambition on the part of the Air 
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The gremialistas had the additional advantage of emphasising Catholicism, which 
could provide the project of the regime with an ethical foundation and legitimisation. 
Furthermore, they were keen on institutionalising authoritarianism and ensuring its 
long-term sustainability. Finally, due to their all-encompassing conservative ideology, 
they could serve as a binding force for the different civilian groups that supported the 
regime (Pollack 1999: 56).  
The Chicago Boys, in turn, offered the regime an economic strategy that not only 
promised rapid recovery but also sustained and intensified development.28 As Eduardo 
Silva (1996) argues, economic growth is a top priority for authoritarian regimes, 
especially in times of crisis. Regimes therefore generally seek the support of key sectors 
of private capital, in order to start the process of recovery. The broadness of this 
‘civilian coalition’ is dependent of the level of exclusion and authoritarianism that is 
imposed by the regime. Therefore, a highly exclusive government such as that of 
Pinochet could suffice with a narrow coalition which would impose its programme in 
spite of broad resistance among economic circles, given that this ‘narrow coalition’ had 
enough influence to control and nourish the developmental strategy it proposed (Silva 
1996: 22). The Chicago Boys, with their ideological tightness and close links to the 
country’s main economic conglomerates, were an excellent example of such a ‘narrow 
coalition’. In addition, their strategy was attractive to the regime because it was opposite 
to the economic policies the UP had followed.29 The most important element that they 
offered, however, was the stress they put on the scientific nature of their programme. By 
portraying their project as ‘objective’, ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’, the Chicago Boys 
offered the regime a strategy that was not contaminated with political ideology or 
sectoral interests. It was what they called ‘modern economic science’ (Vergara 1985: 99). 
This fitted the military’s goal to do away with the politiquería (political mess) it so 
despised.30 Additionally, the radical approach and unbreakable belief in the objectivity 
and scientific method of the Chicago Boys made them a vanguard group that could be 
used by the military to implement a project of modernisation that would provide the 
regime with future legitimacy (Fontaine 1988: 104; Constable and Valenzuela 1991: 
                                                                                                                                        
Force general, but later he realised that Leigh must have had a personal advisor. When asked about it, the 
Air Force indicated that it concerned Jaime Guzmán, ‘that young man from television’ (Soto 2001: 181).  
28 The Chicago Boys were characterised by their almost unlimited optimism about economic 
development and growth. Only two years after the first neo-liberal reforms were implemented, in 1977, 
Labour Minister José Piñera declared that by the year 2000 Chile would have ‘a GNP similar to that of 
Belgium’. In 1980 he corrected himself, by stating that in 1990 Chile would already be considered a 
‘developed country’ (quoted in Arriagada 1998: 85). Pinochet himself also contributed to this optimism, 
arguing in 1979 that ‘by 1985, 1986, all workers can have a house, a car and a television set’ (quoted in 
Jocelyn-Holt 1998: 188).  
29 For the military, a particularly attractive aspect of the neo-liberal ideology was its individualistic 
outlook. The individualisation of society would strongly weaken the ability of opposition groups to 
mobilise the population against the regime (Pinedo 1997: 5).  
30 Additionally, it gave the Chicago Boys the advantage of disqualifying the opposition to their plans as 
ideological, ignorant, or out of group interest. Often these oppositional forces were compared to the 
dogmatic resistance to modernisation that existed in the Middle Ages (Valdés 1995: 31).  
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171).31 Once again, modernisation became strongly connected with science. With the 
support of Chicago Boys as well as the gremialistas, Pinochet was able to transform his 
regime into what Carlos Huneeus calls a ‘developmental dictatorship’, which combined 
authoritarian rule with modernisation, similar to late-nineteenth century Prussia or 
Spain under Franco (Huneeus 2000: 46).32 As a result, Chicago Boy and Minister of 
Economy Pablo Baraona could claim in 1977 that the country had adopted an: 
economic model that is inspired on our ‘Portalian’ tradition, founded in 
modern economic science, and exemplified by the nations that have achieved 
an accelerated development in this age (Baraona 1977: 303).  
The fact that the Chicago Boys and gremialistas were placed in a prime position in the 
implementation of the project did not mean that their position was automatically 
ensured. They still had to compete, not only among each other, but also with other 
groups of the Right, mainly the leaders of the former Partido Nacional, and the small 
but influential group of collaborators of former conservative President Arturo 
Alessandri, who had much influence in business sectors (Huneeus 2000: 154). The 
relations between these groups and the military government were closely conditioned 
by the level of usefulness they had for the regime. As a consequence, the 
implementation of the project was characterised by, as well as steered by, the changes in 
the relations between the civil groups and the military. However, before the 
implementation of the project is analysed, another key element of the project needs to 
be addressed: the slow but sure fusion between the two civil groups.  
As has been seen above, the Chicago Boys and gremialistas were founded on 
different ideological currents. Nevertheless, they converged rapidly, because of several 
shared experiences and developments. First of all, the student siege of the Catholic 
University in 1967, demanding university reforms, united them. Although for different 
reasons, both the Chicago Boys and the gremialistas resisted the toma and kept their 
departments open (Valdés 1995: 201-217; Huneeus 2000: 336-341).33 Second, in the late 
1960s the two groups started to cooperate in the exposition of their ideology in 
                                              
31 Even in retrospect, the Chicago Boys have denied that their ‘scientific approach’ contained elements of 
ideology and civil engineering. Hernán Büchi, for instance, argues that the difference between the 
Chicago Boys and the UP lies precisely in the ‘neutral’ approach of the first and the constructivism of the 
latter: ‘in contrast to the socialist government, which literally aspired to create a New Man and change the 
structures of society, Pinochet’s government has not created anything that differs substantially from the 
most healthy political habits of this country. (…) The great modernisations of the military government 
were alien to all foundational delirium. They were wise elaborations, realistic, of great common sense and 
practical content (…) In this sense, the Chilean experience had nothing to do with constructivism or 
social engineering’ (Büchi 1993: 21). 
32 For a short but interesting comparison between the ‘developmental dictatorships’ of Franco and 
Pinochet, and especially the use of technocrats in the implementation of their projects, see Huneeus 
(2000: 54-56).  
33 The gremialistas opposed the toma out of ideological considerations, mainly because of its anti-
authoritarianism and Marxist inspiration, but fundamentally because they resisted the ‘politicisation’ of 
the university. The Chicago Boys, in turn, did not object to reform, but had recently implemented a 
reform at the Escuela Económica themselves, and therefore saw no need to participate in the toma. See 
Soto (2001: 120-124). 
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periodicals such as Portada, which was set up in 1969 and in which contributions were 
made by gremialistas such as Jaime Eyzaguirre and Jaime Guzmán as well as Chicago 
Boys such as Pablo Baraona and Emilio Sanfuentes (Cristo and Ruiz 1992: 106).34 The 
role of the conservative El Mercurio (the largest newspaper of the country) was crucial as 
well, as it divulged the ideology of the gremialistas and other sectors of the Right on 
political and social issues, and the economic views of the Chicago Boys in the famous 
Economic Page (Soto 2000: 49).35 Third, the joint opposition of both groups to the 
Allende government had an enormous influence on their eventual fusion. Finally, 
several of the Chicago Boys, such as Miguel Kast, also participated in the gremialista 
movement.  
On the basis of this joint trajectory, as well as their shared professional history, 
Carlos Huneeus makes a point of stressing the similarities between the Chicago Boys 
and the gremialistas (Huneeus 1997: 9; 2000: 428). However, it should not be forgotten 
that their cooperation in political issues had been unable to bridge the disparities they 
had at the ideological level. On many key issues the two groups held incompatible 
views, and these might jeopardise the long-term implementation of the project if left 
unresolved.  
The main ideological differences between the two groups lay in two areas: the 
contradiction between individualism and collectivism, and the meaning of the notion 
of subsidiarity.36 Up to the late 1970s, the gremialistas remained adamant in their 
rejection of liberal capitalism, because of its inherent individualism and lack of moral 
foundation. They maintained their collective worldview by prioritising the gremios and 
the other intermediate bodies as prime constituents of society (Cristi 2000: 76).37 As a 
result, their view of a subsidiary state remained tied to the ‘intermediate bodies’ rather 
                                              
34 In 1972, the group of intellectuals from both camps that had set up Portada created a new magazine, 
Qué Pasa, in which neo-liberal and gremialista views were combined as well. However, both magazines 
suffered from ideological dualism, as the two currents regularly were incompatible. The solution to this 
problem was to have the Chicago Boys publish on economic topics only, and have the gremialistas restrict 
themselves to the political and social (Cristo and Ruiz 1992: 109).  
35 The newspaper El Mercurio played a leading role in the diffusion of liberal doctrines, the elaboration of 
developmental ideas, and the adaptation of those ideas by the economic and political elites, without 
being tied to one specific current within the Right. For a profound analysis of this role between 1955 and 
1970, see Soto (2003). 
36 A third possible contradictory element had been resolved before the implementation of the project of 
the Right, namely the traditionalist and corporatist positions of gremialista inspirers such as Jaime 
Eyzaguirre, who had promoted a government in the style of the Salazar and Franco regimes in Portugal 
and Spain. This traditional corporatism was markedly anti-liberal and up to a high level anti-capitalist, 
and therefore almost totally contradictory to the neo-liberal views (Cristi and Ruiz 1992: 76-77). 
However, by the late 1960s Eyzaguirre had moderated his corporatism, including in it elements of a 
‘social market economy’ and the ‘defence of the liberty of the individual’. This ideological shift was the 
result of opposition to the state-oriented government of Frei and of the project of the Left, which led 
Eyzaguirre to moderate his resentment towards liberalism (ibid., p. 126).  
37 Guzmán parted from his teacher Eyzaguirre by arguing that the individual has ‘metaphysical priority’ 
over social organisation, for instance stating, in the Declaración de Principios, that ‘man is the goal of all 
societies’. This did not, however, imply an embrace of liberalism: Guzmán claimed that the only way in 
which man can achieve his goals is through social organisation, whether it be through the family, gremios, 
the Church, or the state (Cristi 2000: 75-76). 
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than to the market. In the gremialista conception, the state should not be subsidiary to 
the market, but to the gremio. Finally, the gremialistas maintained a strong emphasis on 
redistribution of wealth through the state (Pollack 1999: 34-35).  
It was not until the project was well into its implementation that the two groups 
finally came to fuse, mainly due to an ideological turn made by the gremialistas. In the 
late 1970s Guzmán came to embrace liberal capitalism as it was promoted by Hayek, 
with its strictly individualist foundations. The reason for this rather sudden change lay 
in the success of the neo-liberal model after 1977, which caused a doctrinal crisis within 
the gremialista camp. Having blindly supported the Chicago Boys so far, the gremialistas 
found that they could no longer maintain an ideology that was incompatible with the 
successful and now hegemonic neo-liberal theory. Either they could maintain their 
traditional ideological foundations, and consequently marginalise themselves from the 
Chicago Boys (as well as from power), or they had to adapt their views. Guzmán, who 
was well-known for his pragmatism, opted for the latter solution (Cristi 2000: 162).38 As 
a result, the gremialistas slowly turned away from several core values in their ideology: 
the central role of the gremio and other ‘intermediate bodies’ in society, their specific 
interpretation of the subsidiary role of the state, and the redistributive role of the state. 
This was defended by arguing that the ‘intermediate bodies’ had served their purpose in 
facing state-oriented and totalitarian governments such as that of the UP, but now had 
become obsolete (Vergara 1985: 170; Pollack 1999: 67). Similarly, the redistributive role 
of the state was now replaced by a stress on economic growth as the main motor for 
poverty reduction and social justice (Cristi 2000: 163). Jaime Guzmán, who had 
criticised capitalist consumer societies for years, even came to argue that fundamentally, 
consumerism is not necessarily the same as materialism:  
It is essential to understand that consumerism is nothing more than a 
consequence or manifestation of the true evil, which is materialism. 
Materialism, however, has a moral dimension that has nothing to do with 
having more or fewer options for consumption or welfare (Guzmán 1980: 8).  
The strategy of adaptation by the gremialistas was successful: the two groups now 
became ideologically as well as politically intertwined, and ended up merging, in 1983, 
in one political party, the Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata 
Independiente, UDI).  
The fusion between the Chicago Boys and the gremialistas was essential for the 
success of the project. In the previous projects, the developmental and political aspects 
of the project remained much more at a distance. Under Frei, the structuralist 
economists and Christian Democrat ideologists collaborated, but with considerable 
tensions, and only through the mediation of Frei himself. Under Allende, dependencia 
certainly served to underpin the Vía Chilena al Socialismo, but had relatively little 
bearing on the actual policy process, whereas the structuralist policy-making that did 
                                              
38 Another contributing factor was that the gremialistas’ notion of a society guided by free and 
independent ‘intermediate bodies’ and the idea of poder social had been largely ignored or even repressed 
by the military government and therefore became an unviable project (Vergara 1985: 88).  
 202 
take place was far from popular among the political ideologues of the project. Now, 
however, the ideological and developmental currents of the project actually fused into 
one new movement, which was able to project one all-encompassing, coherent, and 
modern model of society. This was a ‘new democracy’, which was presented by 
President Pinochet in a speech at Chacarillas in 1977. The ‘new democracy’ was to be 
‘authoritarian, protected, integrating, technical and of authentic social participation’ 
(speech by Augusto Pinochet at Chacarillas 1977).39 This amounted to a return to 
democracy, but under the tutelage of the armed forces and based on the ‘essential 
values of nationality’. It was intended to integrate and unite the ‘great Chilean Family’, 
thus ending a ‘class struggle that does not, and should not exist’. Furthermore, its 
‘technical’ nature would contribute to the stability of the model, as main policy 
decisions were to be made by professionals, not by politicians, and the ‘margins of 
ideological debate would be reduced to its due proportions’. Finally, the objective of 
‘authentic social participation’ was achieved through the notion of subsidiarity of the 
state and the freedom of the market (ibid.). In short, the project of the Right consisted 
of an authoritarian and limited form of democracy, with a reduced arena for political 
decision-making, and with a central role for the free market. Based on Latin American 
‘baroque modernity’ in the political and social area, and on the Liberal example in the 
economic field, it mixed Diego Portales and Adam Smith into one model of modernity. 
Once again, the project was both a critique of the country’s trajectory towards 
modernity as well as a proposal for modernity itself. In the perception of the regime, 
the crisis of 1973 was a crisis of the state rather than the result of just a bad Marxist 
government. In a key article published in the gremialista magazine Realidad, Guzmán 
argued that political modernisation had been the cause of the breakdown of the 
Chilean democratic system. The Chilean democratic system had been stable as long as 
it was exclusive and elitist, as it had been in the nineteenth century. The entry of the 
middle classes, in the early twentieth century, led to a rapid deterioration of the system. 
The implementation of universal suffrage in 1958, extending the electorate by one-
third, had, according to Guzmán, been the final blow. ‘Democracy’, he argued, ‘can 
only function in a serious and stable fashion in countries that have reached a significant 
and general degree of material well-being as well as cultural progress’ (Guzmán 1979b: 
16). In developing countries such as Chile, where an extension of the electorate cannot 
be absorbed by an increase in benefits for the newly added groups, populism and 
Marxism thrive, radicalising the population without being able to provide it with a 
significant increase in their well-being. As a result, Guzmán argues, whether it be in 
1964, 1970, or some other date, the downfall of the system had been inevitable anyway 
(ibid.).40 
                                              
39 This ‘new democracy’ had earlier been proclaimed and presented by ministers of the regime. However, 
the Chacarillas Speech is usually considered to be the formal announcement of the model, because it 
included a time schedule and trajectory for the gradual return to democracy. See Baraona (1977). 
40 The same argument has been put forward in detail by the former leader of the extreme-Right 
organisation Fatherland and Freedom, Pablo Rodríguez. According to Rodríguez, Chile moved from an 
aristocratic government to a mesocratic government to a ‘people’s government’ - all three with the 
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The solution for this crisis of modernisation lay in the creation of a new model, in 
which the majority of the population would be well represented, and which, as a 
consequence, would not lead to radicalisation and political outbidding by political 
parties. Only a profound modernisation of the economy and society at large would be 
able to allow for such a system. By conferring the representation of the population on 
the market rather than on the political parties, and by creating increased general well-
being through rapid economic growth, the neo-liberal project would create a framework 
for modernity in which there would once again be room for a democratic political 
system. As Guzmán argues,  
We can attain a high level of cultural development and stability, but now of the 
masses, not just of the elites as it was until the first decades of this century. Only 
if this objective is achieved can the democratic regime once again be 
implemented in our Fatherland (ibid., p. 17).  
In this way, the political framework of the gremialistas and the economic model of the 
neo-liberal Chicago Boys provided solutions for what the Right perceived to be the 
negative consequences of modernisation in Chile. Like the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ and 
especially the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, the project that was constructed by the 
Right attracted considerable attention outside Chile, and was viewed as an exemplary 
model for modernisation. As Stepan puts it: 
Pinochet’s Santiago was not going to Washington, London, or Chicago. 
Reagan’s Washington, Thatcher’s London, and the University of Chicago 
economists were going to Santiago to see the future (Stepan 1985: 323).  
Once again, the revolutionary turbulence of the Chilean post-1964 political system had 
produced a highly original, radical and typically Chilean project of modernisation.  
5.2 The Implementation of the Project 
The implementation of the project followed, roughly, four phases. In the two years after 
the coup, heterodox neo-liberal policies were pursued by the more moderate Chicago 
Boys. Meanwhile, the gremialistas worked on a first ideological foundation for the 
dictatorship, through the Declaración de Principios. After 1975, however, the more 
orthodox Chicago Boys, led by Sergio de Castro, initiated a series of radical economic 
reforms, which, after 1977, produced rapid and sustained economic growth. This 
‘Chilean Miracle’ was accompanied by a series of less strictly economic reforms in 1979, 
called the ‘seven modernisations’. Simultaneously, the authoritarian model was 
entrenched by the gremialistas, through the ‘Chacarillas’ speech of 1977, and, at the 
                                                                                                                                        
appearances of democracy but only representing one specific class, and excluding large sections of the 
population in the process: ‘The liberal-democratic system is unable to produce anything else than class-
based governments, which are in itself fractioned, unilateral and inharmonious. True democracy, in the 
modern sense, can only be created if we are capable of finding an institutional system that expresses the 
people without factions or spiteful discriminations’ (Rodríguez 1985: 315). For a critique of this 
argumentation, especially on the destabilisation of the Chilean political system before 1973, see: 
Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986: 191-198). 
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height of the period, the 1980 constitution. After 1981, though, economic crisis and 
increasing social unrest, combined with an increasingly ‘personalistic’ style of 
government by Pinochet, delegitimised both the Chicago Boys’ economic policies and 
the gremialistas’ path to a ‘protected democracy’. As a result, both groups were 
marginalised from the main decision-making process, and a period of ‘apertura’ 
(opening) was initiated under the former Partido Nacional leader Sergio Onofre Jarpa. 
After 1985, though, the two groups, now united in one party, regained much of their 
influence, and initiated the final phase of the project, consisting of a second period of 
economic bonanza, combined with a transition to a ‘protected democracy’ under the 
tutelage of the military. 
Like the previous projects, the project of the Right was characterised by its emphasis 
on the state in its implementation, as well as of technocracy and state planning. In this 
case, however, the technocratic implementation of the project reached unprecedented 
heights. State planning, even when it changed considerably in focus, was also 
particularly successful. Meanwhile, even when formal political competition was not 
allowed under the military regime, the interaction between the projects of the Centre, 
Left, and Right continued, provoking the formulation of a new project of 
modernisation, this time of the Christian Democrats and the Left. Finally, the project 
of the Right encountered, like its predecessors, a moment in which it faced the choice 
between ‘stepping on the brake’ or risking losing control over the social order. In this 
case, however, the government was able, thanks to its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the 
supporting civil groups, to adapt the project in a successful way.  
5.2.1 State, Technocracy, and State Planning 
The project of the Right was ambivalent towards the state. On the one hand, it sought 
to reduce the role of the state in society by implementing a neo-liberal free market 
economy. On the other, it needed the power of the state in order to achieve a reduction 
in its influence. Meanwhile, its technocratic basis became so strong that a true 
replacement of the traditional political elite with a new technocrat elite took place 
(Silva 1991). Finally, state planning changed in nature. It no longer focused on the 
industrial production by the state, but rather on the coordination of all state 
investments, combined with the organisation of the government’s poverty reduction 
policies.  
 
Withdrawing the state through the state 
The project of the Right initiated a new phase in the development of the Chilean State, 
at both the levels of its size as well as its functions in society. It sought to destroy what 
Sergio de Castro (1976: 228) called the ‘perverse role that the state has had in the past’, 
and to re-found the state on the basis of market efficiency. This was not just a reaction 
to the state-oriented nature of Chilean politics in the past. It was also considered that 
the reduction in the size and influence of the state was a sine qua non for economic 
development. As Finance Minister Jorge Cauas stated:  
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The obsolete state-orientation of our country must be changed drastically. We 
have not come to this conclusion just by observing the extreme inefficiency that 
the Chilean state has shown in the past, but also because we believe that the 
private sector is much more effective in the development of productive activities 
(Cauas 1975: 209).  
The most apparent result of the project of the Right for the state was its downsizing: 
between 1973 and 1979, public spending was cut by almost half, while about 20 per 
cent of state workers were dismissed (Tironi 1998: 68; Vergara 1981). In a second wave 
of privatisations, between 1985 and 1989, around 30 of the country’s main companies 
held by the state were sold on the market. In total, hundreds of corporations, sixteen 
banks, and over 3,600 individual plants for agro-industry and mining as well as real 
estate were privatised (Collins and Lear 1995: 49-53).41  
On the level of state functions, a similar reduction took place. To begin with, the 
idea of seeing the state as the motor of industrialisation was abandoned, ending the so-
called ‘developmental state’ that had existed since the creation of CORFO in 1939. The 
state withdrew from the developmental arena, leaving it to the market to develop a 
healthy industrial sector.42 Second, the state’s regulating functions in the economy were 
largely reduced. Finally the state lost its role as welfare-state through the abolition of 
subsidies, educational and housing projects and the removal of its corporative functions 
(Vergara 1985: 81).  
However, for several reasons the reduction in both the size and the role of the state 
never reached the levels that neo-liberal orthodoxy proclaimed and its enemies 
denounced. First of all, the first ‘wave’ of privatisations, in the 1970s, concerned the 
companies and industries that had been nationalised under Allende, and these cases 
were ‘de-nationalisations’ rather than true privatisations. Similarly, some of the 
privatisations that took place after 1985 concerned banks and financial institutions that 
had been taken over by the state during the crisis of 1982-1983 (Huneeus 2000: 440-1).43 
Second, the radical withdrawal of the state from the economy was partly reversed due to 
the same crisis. Even though the state did not return to its former ‘productive’ role, it 
became more regulatory and active in areas such as promoting internal savings, 
investments and exports (Tironi 1998: 89). Thirdly, despite all privatisations, the 
military government kept a key industry in public hands, namely the copper mines, 
which had been Chilenised under Frei and nationalised under Allende. This served the 
double purpose of providing the state with the financial power it needed to secure 
control over society and to ensure the support of the military, which were granted 10 
per cent of copper income annually (Collins and Lear 1995: 53). Finally, the Chilean 
                                              
41 These two waves of privatisations have been severely criticised for benefiting certain economic groups 
only, and allowing for an unprecedented concentration of capital in the hands of a tiny section of the 
population, at the cost of the state and population at large. See: Dahse (1979) and Mönckeberg (2001).  
42 Jaime Gatica (1989) shows that the withdrawal of the state did not produce a thriving and competitive 
industrial sector, as had been expected, but on the contrary led to a process of de-industrialisation and 
rapidly growing unemployment. For the military regime, however, this outcome was positive, as it nearly 
eliminated the industrial proletariat as a potential oppositional group. 
43 For an analysis of the crisis of 1982 and its consequences, see section 5.2.3. 
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state continued to play a significant — if insufficient — role in poverty reduction. Social 
spending, which had dropped drastically with the implementation of the project in 
1975, regained substance after 1977, even reaching levels of 28 per cent above the 1970 
per capita level (Vergara 1990: 43).44 As a result, the Chilean state was never reduced to 
a ‘night-watch’ state or a subsidiary state in a narrow Friedmanian sense. Its reduction in 
size was considerable, but largely a compensation for its rapid expansion under the UP 
government, and eventually at least a third of the Chilean economy remained in state 
hands (Correa et al. 2001: 296).45 
The Chilean state never lost much of its strength either. Even though it was 
considerably reduced in size, it held a firm grip on many processes that took place in 
the country. Apart from state control being a prerequisite for the survival of a military 
regime, the actual implementation of the neo-liberal model actually required a powerful 
state in order to resist the protests coming from society. As a result, the state could only 
withdraw itself from society insofar as it simultaneously strengthened its position vis-à-
vis civil society (Stepan 1985: 320). As Vergara (1986: 106-108) argues, this power was 
obtained in three ways. First of all, the reduction in economic power was offset by an 
increase in political power of the state, through an extreme concentration of power in 
the executive. Second, the state had acquired an important position at the ideological-
social level. This was not achieved directly, through the dissemination of a coherent 
ideology, but by mentoring the ideological and cultural realms, leaving it to affiliate 
civilian groups such as the gremialistas to spread the cultural messages and values. 
Finally, the position of the state vis-à-vis society was enhanced through the neo-liberal 
reforms themselves. Policies such as the 1979 Labour Plan, which severely limited the 
worker’s rights to collective bargaining and unionisation, led to a process of social 
fragmentation and atomisation, strengthening the amount of government control over 
society (Stepan 1985: 323). Furthermore, the government was able to achieve a high 
degree of independence in its actions. Vergara (1985: 87) emphasises the level of 
autonomy the state managed to achieve in relation with the Chilean civilian elites. The 
experience of the UP government and its attacks on the industrial, commercial and 
agricultural elites had generated such levels of gratitude towards the military regime that 
it allowed the state to function relatively independently from, or even in conflict with, 
the interests of the traditional economic elites. This independence is illustrated by both 
the industrial liberalisation (which hurt the interests of large sections of the economic 
elites) and in the dealing of the military government with the agrarian reforms of the 
previous governments.46 
                                              
44 The regime’s social spending and poverty reduction policies were limited in their scope by the neo-
liberal rationale. As they were not to distort the system of prices, they could only take place indirectly, 
through subsidies, taxes, tax reductions or the creation of cheap labour (Vergara 1985: 81). See also: 
Vergara (1990). 
45 One significant factor in limiting the reduction of the size and role of the state was the resistance of 
important sectors within the military, who were convinced that a strong and influential state was a 
prerequisite for national security (Correa et al. 2001: 296). 
46 Only the illegally nationalised land was returned to their original owners by the military regime, 
amounting up to one-third of all the reformed land. Of the remainder, ten per cent was reserved for the 
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In the economic realm, the power of the state also remained considerable, despite 
the numerous privatisations and its reduction its size. In ten years’ time, the number of 
public employees was reduced from 700,000 to 550,000, while the proportion of the 
GNP that was in state hands remained more or less the same, signifying a higher relative 
output and increased efficiency (Constable and Valenzuela 1991: 189). This became 
particularly clear during the economic crisis of 1982-3. Facing a crisis that was as 
profound as unexpected, and which led to massive protests, the military government 
made extensive use of the capacities of the state in order to maintain social order and 
ensure its position. These included direct and large-scale interventions in the economy. 
The state took over the ballooning debts (in total some $16 billion) of large businesses 
which were threatened with shutdown, and nationalised twelve of the country’s 
nineteen banks which were on the verge of bankruptcy (Collins and Lear 1995: 33; 51). 
The efficiency and strength of the state in this period is even more accentuated if one 
takes into consideration that this rapid and massive expansion of the state was not 
accompanied by an expansion in the number of state workers - between 1980 and 1985, 
the number of state employees declined steadily (Larraín and Velásquez 1986: 23).47 In 
short, the Chilean state was very successful in changing its role in society. Even while it 
was no longer an ‘entrepreneurial state’, it maintained a strong and guiding influence on 
the economy. The role of the state in Chile’s economy had become characterised, as 
Marcus Kurtz (2001) has argued, by ‘state developmentalism without a developmental 
state’.  
 
Concluding, under the project of the Right, the role of the state was ambiguous, 
reflecting both the anti-state neo-liberal discourse and a relatively high level of state 
coordination and control.48 As Tironi (1990: 138) argues, it shared this characteristic 
with the project of the Left, which, from an opposite angle, had claimed the death of 
the ‘bourgeois state’, while simultaneously expanding its size and functions 
                                                                                                                                        
state, 30 per cent was sold off, and another 30 per cent was divided among the campesinos, who had held 
the land in collective hands until then. So rather than reversing the Agrarian Reforms of the Frei and 
Allende governments, the military regime ended up reinforcing and formalising most of them. This put a 
definite end to the traditional socio-economic relations in the countryside and allowed for a rapid 
modernisation of agriculture. Furthermore, it assured the regime that the formerly highly influential 
agrarian elites would not return to reclaim their influence in government (Correa et al. 2001: 296; Silva 
1987).  
47 The expansion of the state in this phase was so massive that opponents of the regime mockingly spoke 
of a ‘Chicago Road to Socialism’. In terms of the influence of the state, the comparison was true enough: 
in 1983, the state control over the economy rivalled that of the Allende government in 1983 (Collins and 
Lear 1995: 51). For a profound analysis of the development of the state between 1980 and 1985, see: 
Larraín and Velasquez (1986).  
48 In fact, within the military there had been quite some resistance to the neo-liberal model and the 
reduction of the state, for two reasons. First, because the military had historically been state-oriented 
from the outset, considering a reduction of the state as a hazard for the regime, and second, because the 
Estado Empresarial (Entrepreneurial state), which had been set in motion by a fellow military man, 
General Ibáñez, still possessed substantial support among high officers. Only after 1978, when Pinochet 
had removed his strongest contender, General Gustavo Leigh, from government did this military 
opposition to his neo-liberal course end. See Valdivia (2001). 
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considerably. Whereas Frei had attempted to reassure the population that he did not 
seek an all-controlling state (‘I do not want tutelage of the state’), and Allende had 
defended his use of the ‘bourgeois state’ to his supporters (‘do not fear the word 
“state”’), the Chicago Boys attempted to reconcile the still powerful role of the state 
with their specifically anti-state discourse. They did so by stretching the idea of the 
subsidiary state and by re-introducing, ironically, a notion that had been used by the 
UP to legitimise state intervention, that of a mixed economy. As director of 
ODEPLAN, Roberto Kelly, put it:  
The national economy is mixed-modern, and therefore both the state and the 
private sector have a role in it. The principal function of the state is to 
permanently stimulate and orient the action of the private sector towards the 
achievement of the great national targets, using as instruments the different 
policies it elaborates, executes and controls. (…) It is for this reason that in these 
years the state has concentrated its efforts in order to assure the public of 
adequate services in housing, nutrition, health care, education and social 
security. As a result, the level of social spending compared to the total of public 
spending has risen from 27.9 per cent in 1973 to 53.6 per cent in 1978, 
demonstrating in realities how the principles that guide the Government are 
materialised (Kelly 1978: 375).  
This so-called ‘modernisation of the state’ stressed a radical improvement in the 
functionality and efficiency of state action. This discourse became highly popular 
among Chicago Boys and other policy-makers and was included in a series of reforms 
known as the ‘seven modernisations’, which were implemented in 1979. It included 
matters such as decentralisation, reduction of bureaucratic processes, rationalisation and 
judicial reforms. Fundamentally, though, it sought to reorganise the functions of the 
state in order to make it more efficient, technical and modern, and to rearrange society 
accordingly. As José Piñera put it in 1979:  
The seven modernisations seek to introduce spaces of individual freedom for 
the Chileans that up to now have been unknown, (…) to articulate the voice of 
the experts in the eminently technical decisions that are adopted by 
governments, and, in short, to transform Chile into a modern country (quoted 
in Vergara 1985: 217).  
As a result, modernisation became intrinsically tied to the state and the transformation 
of the functions it fulfilled in society. On a higher level, however, modernisation 
became a synonym for the transformation of society itself, through the reformulation of 
the role of the state in relation to the market and civil society. As will be shown in the 
next chapter, the discourse on the ‘modernisation of the state’ was maintained integrally 
after the restoration of democracy, and became one of the leading doctrines that was 
adopted by the Concertación.  
 
Technocracy 
While technocracy rapidly gained in power and institutional influence under Frei, and 
remained able to withstand stiff resistance under the Allende government, it reached 
unprecedented levels under the military dictatorship (Silva 2007). Even more, it became 
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one of the founding principles of the new institutional order that was implemented by 
the authoritarian government. In 1974, the Declaración de Principios promoted the 
construction of:  
a technified society, in which the words of those who know have prevalence 
over the different denominations.49 
However, in the first years the regime did not structurally resort to technocrats, but 
rather relied on the gremialistas and the business elites. Only after 1975 did the 
‘technified society’ take shape by the rise of what Pinochet called ‘the most capable 
persons’ and ‘experts’ to the decision-making process, who would ‘reduce the margins 
of the ideological debate to their just proportions’ (quoted in Vergara 1985: 117). 
However, the regime’s conception of the new institutional order as eminently technical 
did not imply the complete abolition of politics. As Minister of Economy Pablo 
Baraona argued, the political realm should be reserved for the moral guidance of 
society, while the remainder of policy-making should be technical in nature and 
execution:  
Our new democracy should be (…) technical, in the sense that the political 
system cannot take decisions on technical matters but is limited to the 
dimension of values, leaving to the technocracy the responsibility of using 
logical processes in order to resolve problems and to offer alternative solutions 
(Baraona 1977: 305). 
The regime’s emphasis on technocracy reflects its desire to ‘depoliticise’ society. As 
O’Donnell has argued, the supposedly rational and neutral prescriptions of the técnicos 
were considered to serve as an antidote for the social and political tensions in society. 
More in general, they served to repress the ‘irrational’ popular demands for social 
justice and to fortify the ‘normalisation of the economy’ on a neo-liberal basis 
(O’Donnell 1999: 38-49; 1982: 60-62).50 Linked to this point, the regime’s desire to 
create a restricted and conservative social order was facilitated by the ascendance of 
technocracy. In the Chicago Boys’ conception, the technocrats, as well as the markets, 
limit the public arena and the space for political deliberation. As a result, the ‘scientific’ 
technocracy served as a buffer for the future politisation of society (Vergara 1985: 133). 
Second, it echoes the nineteenth century ‘Portalian’ ideal, celebrated by the Chilean 
Right, in which the country is ruled by the best qualified (in Portales’ words, ‘men who 
                                              
49 Centeno (1998) argues that technocracy negates the ‘political’ and places absolute value on the 
scientific ‘objective truth’. As a result, it tends to minimise political process at the expense of 
representation but to the benefit of ‘efficient’ and ‘scientific’ decision-making.  
50 O’Donnell (1973) identified the technocracy as one of the main allies of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 
regimes, to which the Pinochet regime would be counted, who were particularly instrumental in creating 
policies which would put an end to the economic, political and institutional crises that had been the 
original reason for the military to intervene. As Silva (1993: 203) points out, O’Donnell’s argument has 
been contested for the case of Chile. In contrast to what O’Donnell anticipated, in Chile the technocracy 
was not used to deepen the industrialisation process, but rather to dismantle the national industry. Also, 
Silva argues, the reference to the ‘original crisis’ (the economic, political, and institutional crisis that had 
provoked the military takeover) was emotionally and politically difficult for some Chileans to accept. As 
a result, the study of the role of technocrats in Chile soon moved into the background. 
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are true models of virtue and patriotism’), under the leadership of an authoritarian 
President. In addition, the scientific and rationalistic approach of the technocrats, 
operating under authoritarian leadership, echoed the nineteenth century ideals of 
progress, and especially the influence of positivism, giving the regime an air of 
modernisation and historical legitimisation. Finally, Silva (1993c: 208-9) emphasises 
that the dominant position of the technocratic elites was not only the result of their 
discursive qualities, but also of the potential for social transformation of their 
programme. The neo-liberal revolution they set in motion not only produced economic 
results but also promoted individualism and competitive relations between individuals. 
As a result, the collective outlook of social organisation in Chile rapidly gave way to a 
more individualistic orientation. This impressive process of social transformation would 
come to be known as the ‘Silent Revolution’.  
Institutionally, the notion of the state as a ‘technical organism’ was given shape in 
the 1980 constitution, by creating several bureaucratic bodies that functioned 
independently of the political arena and remained outside civilian control. Apart from 
the Armed Forces, who exercised the role of ‘guarantor of the constitution’, this applied 
in particular for the Central Bank, which was to regulate the country’s economic 
balances autonomously, without direct influence from the executive (Tironi 1998: 73).  
With the ascendance of the Chicago Boys and the dominance of ODEPLAN in the 
country’s political institutions, technocrats moved from semi-obscurity to become 
highly visible and legitimate actors. Obtaining a high profile through public 
appearances and interviews in newspapers such as El Mercurio, they became widely 
known as the champions of economic modernisation. Furthermore, as Montecinos 
(1998: 65) argues, with their revolutionary and expansive attitudes they were 
incorporated into all fields of decision-making, replacing for instance lawyers in the 
formulation and implementation of policies in non-economic areas such as health care 
and education. Silva (1991: 397-8) shows, however, how closely the appreciation of 
technocrats was tied to the success of their economic policies. The government’s 
support for the Chicago Boys became very strong during the first boom of the neo-
liberal model, and after the collapse of the model in 1981 Pinochet continued to 
support Minister of Finance Sergio de Castro for more than a year. In April of 1982, 
though, Sergio de Castro was replaced, and Pinochet moved away from technocrat 
leadership by incorporating former National Party leader Sergio Onofre Jarpa in his 
cabinet. After several years of low profile for the Chicago Boys, they were reinstated in 
1985 with the appointment of Hernán Büchi as Minister of Finance. The fact that he 
was a relative newcomer and not known by the general public to be a Chicago Boy was, 
at this stage, an advantage.51 In fact, as will be seen in the next section, in the course of 
                                              
51 After several years of economic growth, Büchi’s star had risen so high that, besides being recognised as 
a brilliant economic manager by both friend and foe, he had regained popular support for technocrats in 
general and the Chicago Boys in particular. In 1989, Büchi’s candidacy for the presidential elections of 
the following year (the first technocrat to be a presidential candidate in the country’s history) did not 
surprise anyone, and most political commentators agree that his failure to win the presidency was to be 
attributed to his close ties to Pinochet, and not to his technocratic outlook (Silva 1991a: 398).  
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the dictatorship technocracy came to be adopted not only by the political allies of the 
regime, but also by its opponents.  
The rational and ‘scientific’ approach of the military government’s technocrats did 
not mean that they were without political colour, even though they would have been 
unwilling to admit it. Just as the technical teams of the Frei regime had often been 
sympathetic towards the project of the Christian Democrats, and the técnicos of the 
Allende government had been Marxist in orientation, the Chicago Boys used their 
neutral status to actively legitimise the military regime. As Huneeus (1998: 15-17) 
argues, the claim that their project was politically neutral (because the market is neutral) 
and that their measures were merely ‘technical’ proved to be untrue in several aspects. 
Their technical contribution was closely tied to the political development of the regime, 
as Pinochet’s political strategies were highly dependent on economic success. 
Additionally, several economic reforms had political intentions, such as the 1979 
Labour Reform, which, besides making the labour market more flexible, had the clear 
intention of weakening the labour movement and the workers’ position vis-à-vis the 
employers. Similarly, the ‘de-industrialisation’ that took place as a result of the neo-
liberal reforms served to weaken the opposition by the formerly powerful industrial 
unions (Oppenheim 1993: 145; Gatica 1989). Furthermore, the economic reforms of 
the Chicago Boys could never have been implemented without the context of an 
authoritarian regime that centralised authority, excluded and repressed large sections of 
society, and only benefited certain minority elites. And finally, it was direct repression 
by the military in the period 1982-3 that allowed the survival of the neo-liberal project. 
Concluding, even though the technocrats of the military regime portrayed themselves 
as fundamentally a-political and neutral, the conception, implementation and survival 
of their project were intrinsically tied to the political side of the dictatorship, including 
the repression and other aspects that the Chicago Boys were trying to avoid being 
associated with. This became particularly clear in the 1988 referendum, in which the 
Chicago Boys unconditionally and unanimously supported Pinochet. 
 
Planning 
The concept of planning under the Chilean neo-liberal project is apparently a 
contradiction in terminus. Neo-liberal founders such as Hayek and Friedman had 
dedicated large sections of their work to a critique of planning, considering it one of the 
core contradictions of freedom and economic liberty (Hayek 1986; Friedman 1962). 
However, the Chicago Boys maintained the notion of planning as a central feature of 
their economic strategy. Already in El Ladrillo, they argued in favour of state planning:  
In general, the argument that is used in favour of unrestricted state 
intervention is the need to plan the whole of activities of the country. We 
concur with that need. However, it must be made clear that planning should 
have clear objectives in terms of economic growth, and that in the achievement 
of its goals, use can be made of indirect mechanisms and incentives in order to 
direct the use of productive resources (El Ladrillo: 31).  
 212 
In fact, the Chicago Boys argued, under Frei and Allende planning was poorly targeted 
and, as a consequence, inefficient:  
In Chile, planning has been a word that lacked both content and precision and 
which has been used to establish mechanisms for control, that existed for the 
purpose of control and control only, and not of the efficient direction of 
productive resources (ibid.).  
However, planning under the Chicago Boys took a different form than under the 
previous projects. As Lechner (1999: 44) shows in his study on the functions of the state 
in neo-liberal modernity, the coordinating role of the state is transformed, rather than 
simply diluted. Becoming only one of the actors amid an arena of decentralised 
institutions and functional systems, rather than the ultimate expression of authority, the 
state can no longer fulfil the role of ‘formulating and executing social consensus’, that 
is, the production of the ‘common good’. However, its role is transformed to that of 
‘conductor’, coordinating the interdependence of the different functional systems at 
work according to its vision of what the common good should be. This transformation, 
which according to Lechner corresponds with a re-evaluation and appreciation of the 
state in Latin America after the 1980s, was initiated in Chile in the mid-1970s, with the 
interpretation that was given to planning by the technicians of the military regime. 
Rather than intervening directly in the economy through a system of productive and 
other targets, and holding the state directly responsible for the fulfilment of those 
targets, a more flexible and open form of planning was introduced. Using indirect 
means such as incentives which would not interfere in the price system, the state was to 
exert structural influence over the economy, without asphyxiating private enterprise and 
the free market. In the optimistic terminology that is characteristic of planners (Marxist, 
neo-liberal or otherwise), ODEPLAN director Robert Kelly explained the system as 
follows: 
In conformity with the principles of the Government and with the social-
economic history of the most prosperous nations in the universe, I emphasise 
that our scheme of development and planning lies largely in a system of 
incentives. In conformity with the principles of the Government and the social-
economic history of the most prosperous nations of the universe, both great 
and small, Chile will achieve its development not by means of a system of rigid 
targets (…) but through the entrepreneurial and creative action of all citizens, 
under the direction and the flexible incentives of the Government. Through 
different policies, like fiscal policies, price regulations, exchange rates, tariffs and 
others, the State exercises an important indirect control over the decentralised 
areas of the economy (Kelly 1976: 288-9) 
There are several reasons why planning came to be so central in the project of the 
Right. First of all, the process of transformation from a state-oriented to a market-
oriented economy created a need for control, especially in the light of the enormous 
economic imbalances and staggering inflation. Second, the Chicago Boys ascent to 
power was conditioned by their success, and as a consequence they were under great 
pressure to achieve a maximal result. As a result, they were in need of the necessary 
tools to guarantee success. Finally, the military (and especially Pinochet), who ruled on 
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the basis of a tight system of balances and counterbalances, made sure that sufficient 
state control remained in existence, in case the project of the Chicago Boys needed to 
be adapted or revoked (Fontaine 1988: 105).  
Once again, ODEPLAN became the centre of the state’s planning activities. If under 
Frei and Allende it had mainly fulfilled an accessory function, under the military regime 
it became the most important economic policy institution. This was not self-evident 
from the start, however. CORFO also remained a strong actor with substantial 
influence in the ministries of Finance and Economy, and partly fulfilled similar roles.52 
However, as Carlos Huneeus shows, there were several reasons why the balance turned 
towards ODEPLAN. First of all, CORFO lacked the human and economic resources it 
needed to fulfil its functions and to direct the large number of state businesses it had 
under its control, to which over 400 enterprises had been added during the Allende 
government. Second, CORFO suffered from a contradictory mission: its main target to 
organise state-led industrialisation was incompatible with the neo-liberal policies that 
the Chicago Boys were to implement. Finally, poor CORFO leadership and a lack of 
transparency in the process of restitution of nationalised enterprises contrasted strongly 
with the efficiency and clear policies of the ‘ODEPLAN Boys’, whose work became so 
positively known that it attracted great interest even from abroad (1997: 31-32).53  
Under the Chicago Boys, and especially after the first, gradual phase of the project, 
ODEPLAN developed into the country’s most influential economic institution, 
planning and executing the key elements of the neo-liberal project. The self-confident 
and aggressive attitude of the Chicago Boys, who expanded their auditing, rationalising, 
and controlling activities to a wide range of bureaucratic and administrative institutions, 
soon gave ODEPLAN control over a large portion of the state apparatus. Soon all 
investment plans from ministerial departments (including those of non-economic 
ministries such as Education and Infrastructure), as well as from local governments, 
were to be approved by ODEPLAN before they could be turned in to the Ministry of 
Finance (ibid., p. 33). Apart from allowing effective economic planning and state 
modernisation, Constable and Valenzuela argue that the dominance of ODEPLAN also 
                                              
52 The competition between CORFO and ODEPLAN also reflected institutional competitiveness within 
the armed forces: ODEPLAN fell under the protection of the Navy, and CORFO under that of the 
Army.  
53 Roberto Kelly, the first ODEPLAN director under the military regime, recalls how the planning office 
was put to the test by a hostile Pinochet in May 1974: ‘I received a paper from a police officer, in an 
envelope, which read, in red ink: “What is the purpose of ODEPLAN? The director is asked to explain 
this before the Government Junta. Signed: Pinochet.” (…) [At the meeting,] I did the introduction, and 
then all sectors were presented by my colleagues. Whenever one of them had finished, Pinochet would 
ask: “And where is the Plan of National Development?” I would say, “We’ll come to that in a minute”. 
But once another of my colleagues finished his presentation, Pinochet would once again ask: “And what 
about the Plan of National Development?” (…) We stayed there all the afternoon, until, around nine 
o’clock, they threw us out and stayed in the room themselves. Many of us felt down, and said: “They tore 
us apart in there”, and wanted to go. (…) However, about an hour later, I received a phone call from 
Admiral Merino, who told us: “I call to congratulate you. Of all the presentations that have been given 
here, this was the best. We have reprimanded Pinochet for the way he treated you. Go ahead and keep up 
the good work’ (CIDOC interview No 2, 14 April 1992).  
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provided the military government with a tool to get a grip on the still massive 
bureaucracy (1991: 187). As a result, opposition to the ODEPLAN hegemony became 
useless (Montecinos 1998: 33).  
Apart from planning and controlling the functions of the state apparatus, 
ODEPLAN fulfilled three main functions. First of all, it designed and implemented the 
key economic reforms of the project: the privatisation of the health care and pension 
system, as well as dismantling the entrepreneurial state through the privatisation of 
state-owned firms. Second, it became the ‘institutional headquarters’ of the Chicago 
Boys. ODEPLAN’s central role in the coordination of state policies gave the Chicago 
Boys a home in the heart of the decision-making process. From this home-base, they 
could discuss the future and debate about the course of the neo-liberal project. 
Simultaneously, ODEPLAN functioned as a springboard: it stimulated and supervised 
the recruitment and training of professional personnel who would later take up 
important functions within the authoritarian government, thus contributing to the 
technocratisation of the policy process as well as consolidating the position of the 
Chicago Boys in all branches of the government (Silva 1991a: 392). Finally, ODEPLAN 
served as the ‘social conscience’ of the Chicago Boys, analysing the income influence of 
the economic reforms in detail, and setting up elaborate programs to combat extreme 
poverty. Chicago Boy Cristián Larroulet emphasises that ODEPLAN’s emphasis on 
poverty reduction was not a true deviation from neo-liberal orthodoxy: 
ODEPLAN had an economic policy and a separate social policy, which was 
very important for the military. Both policies had to work together. From the 
beginning, we were aware that the market would not resolve the problem of 
poverty. You could argue that this was not a Friedman-like posture. However, 
you should be careful to equal the Chicago School with Friedman. Many at 
ODEPLAN were influenced by Theodore Schultz, the first Nobel Prize winner 
of the Chicago School, who was very concerned with issues such as Human 
Capital and poverty. The originality of the approach of ODEPLAN lay in its 
focus on extreme poverty (interview with Cristián Larroulet 4 May 2006). 
Apart from giving the neo-liberal project a ‘popular’ face, which actually created an 
important popular support base for the Right which exists up to this day, the emphasis 
on poverty reduction also reflected the religious and social engagement that was 
characteristic of large sections of both Chicago Boys and gremialistas, and which was 
driven by the fact that most of the economic programme benefited the rich at the cost 
of the poor (Silva 1991a: 463, Huneeus 1997: 5).54  
                                              
54 ODEPLAN came to be very much influenced by its director Miguel Kast (1978-80), who, apart from 
being a intelligent economist, was known as an enthusiastic motivator and recruiter of new talent. 
Further, his deep religious convictions and gremialista outlook were reflected in the remarkable emphasis 
he laid on the elaboration and implementation of poverty reduction programmes. After his early death in 
1983, Kast became something of a myth for both gremialistas and Chicago Boys, as a symbol of the 
successful amalgamation of both Roman Catholic orthodoxy and economic neo-liberal modernity. For 
an interesting combination of eulogy and biography on Kast, see Lavín (1986). 
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5.2.2 Political Competition and the Construction of an Alternative 
Even though with the installation of the military regime formal political competition 
had ended, the projects of the Chilean Right, Centre, and Left continued to interact 
under the influence of the project of the Right. In a way similar to the previous 
projects, the outcome of this interaction produced the key parameters for the 
implementation of the project that was to come. In the interaction and competition 
between the three projects, three main processes can be discerned. First of all, most of 
the Left went through a slow and painful process of ideological reorientation and 
moderation as a result of the success of the neo-liberal project. Second, the PDC slowly 
reoccupied its position of pragmatic centrist party, and realigned with the Left in order 
to present a serious and viable alternative to the authoritarian project. Third, both the 
Centre and the Left went through a process of profound technocratisation, which 
produced a high degree of continuity at the level of policy-making between the project 
of the Right and the Concertación.  
 
The ‘Renovation of the Left’ 
The so-called ‘renovation of the Left’ was a slow process that took most of the sixteen 
years of the dictatorship to complete. It consisted of a moderation of the Socialist Party 
and other UP-parties, the embracing of the democratic system, and a renewed 
orientation towards centre-left politics as well as towards the Christian Democrat Party. 
It was combined with an opposite movement within the Chilean Left: the radicalisation 
of the Communist Party, eventually leading to the marginalisation of the latter. 
In the first years after the coup, the Chilean Left was in disarray and showed little 
ideological movement. The emphasis lay on regrouping and the construction of 
oppositional structures, which was complicated by the diaspora that the Chilean Left 
had undergone as thousands of its leaders now lived in exile. Ideologically, the former 
UP parties showed a high degree of continuity in identifying the Right as ‘fascist’. As 
Moulian (1997: 257-9) shows, this name was not only factually incorrect, but also 
served to veil the true nature of the regime rather than to disclose it. During these years, 
up to the end of the 1970s, the use of the term ‘fascist’ made it impossible for the Left 
to recognise that the military dictatorship was more than just a repressive machine, and 
that in fact it was setting in motion a project of radical capitalist modernisation. This 
was enhanced, Moulian argues, by two tendencies within the Chilean Left. First, a 
traditional orientation to the state led the Left to interpret the neo-liberal restructuring 
as a purely destructive process, as it diminished the role of the state. Second, a 
‘catastrophic’ view of all capitalist endeavours led it to believe that the capitalist 
revolution would rapidly implode (ibid., pp. 261-2). These views could, however, not be 
maintained in the light of the neo-liberal model’s success in the years after 1977. Under 
pressure of these new realities, the Chilean Left slowly came to reinterpret its history as 
well as its future. Two discussions served to provoke the ‘renovation’ of the Left: the 
reasons for the downfall of the UP, and the Left’s adherence to democracy. Up to the 
late 1970s, the general view was that the UP had failed, because it had been unable to 
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concretise the vía armada (armed road) in face of the right-wing opposition. This view 
is, for instance, defended by exiled PS leader Carlos Altamirano:  
It was very difficult to develop an armed strategy in the course of the process, 
not to say extremely difficult. But the peaceful road, in turn, was impossible 
(1977a: 35).  
Soon, however, more critical accounts were elaborated by socialist intellectuals, not 
only focusing on the errors that had been made by the UP, but also attacking the 
ideological course it had followed. These intellectuals severely criticised the Leninist 
approach of the UP, which, through its focus on state power, had closed the door to 
pluralism and mass participation. They argued in favour of a re-orientation of the Left, 
away from the state and more toward grass-roots and civil society organisations.  
The debate surrounding the appraisal of democracy also contributed strongly to the 
renovation of the Left. This debate was strongly influenced by the project of the Right, 
as the experience of authoritarianism and repression provoked a reappraisal of 
democracy among the Chilean Left. As the later PS-leader Jorge Arrate argued in a 
newspaper article in 1982:  
Authoritarianism as it has been implemented in Chile has had the influence of 
consolidating anti-authoritarianism among the Left, which also implies the 
rethinking of the model of socialism it proposes and its position regarding 
individual liberties (Arrate 1983: 93).  
Another factor that triggered a process of renovation was exile. The dispersion of 
socialist leadership around Latin America and Europe had a profound influence on the 
ideology and self-image of the Left. In particular the experience of the ‘real existing 
Socialisms’ in Eastern European countries, and contacts with more moderate European 
socialist parties, contributed to this ideological reorientation. As Silva argues, not only 
the ideological position of the European socialists became an example for the Chilean 
Left, but also their dedication to the common good:  
Many Chilean Socialists have made public their recognition of, even admiration 
for, the way governments and oppositions in Western Europe have been able to 
achieve agreements with a high degree of responsibility. Contrary to their 
previous experience in Chile, they discovered it was possible to conduct a loyal 
opposition and that there is definitely such a thing as the general interest of the 
Nation, something that in the past had been labelled as a manipulative weapon 
of the bourgeoisie (Silva 1993b: 97, italics in the original) 
One of the most emblematic cases was PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, who, 
after having lived in both the German Democratic Republic and France, came to re-
evaluate the democratic model (which he earlier had dismissed as a form of bourgeois 
domination) and the failures of the UP (Walker 1986: 180). According to Altamirano, 
the UP had shown a poor understanding of the ‘specificities’ of Chile’s political and 
social evolution, especially its long tradition of the rule of law, its democratic 
institutions, and the subordination of the military to civilian rule. This tradition, he 
argued, was set in motion by Diego Portales, and had remained influential even after 
the breakdown of the Portalian state in 1891, up to 1973. In this sense, Altamirano 
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claimed, ‘Allende was the historical continuation of Portales, and Pinochet his negation’ 
(quoted in Walker 1986: 179).55  
 
Dissent, Convergence, and the Creation of an Alternative 
The process of ideological renovation within the Left produced tensions that would 
lead to ruptures as well as realignments. These processes would eventually set the 
political parameters for the formulation and implementation of an alternative project of 
modernisation. 
In 1979, the process of renovation led to the division of the Socialist Party. A more 
radical section of the party, led by Clodomiro Almeyda, attempted to take control, 
which resulted in a split. The Almeyda-section, which was in the majority both in the 
‘external’ and in the clandestine ‘internal’ party organisation, resisted the ideological 
renovation and maintained a Marxist-Leninist course, oriented to cooperation with the 
Communist Party and the Eastern European countries. In turn, the Altamirano-sector, 
which later became known as the PS-Nuñez, became the focus of socialist renovation 
during the 1980s (Roberts 1994: 11). 
While the PS-Almeyda maintained its radical ideology and the PS-Nuñez underwent 
a process of moderation, the Communist Party moved completely in the opposite 
direction. Whereas under the UP the PC had taken the moderate side, consistently 
arguing in favour of collaboration with the centre and maintenance of the democratic 
system, in the late 1970s the communists moved towards a radical position. Increasingly 
re-orienting itself to its Leninist roots, the PC increasingly distanced itself from several 
former central theses of the UP. It declared, in 1977, that revolution could not take 
place while allowing liberties to its enemies; that a revolution could never succeed 
without a dictatorship of the proletariat, and that it was not necessary to gain a majority 
before a revolution could be started (Corvalán 2001: 363). In the early 1980s, the PC 
completed its ideological shift to the Left by declaring a política de rebelión popular de 
masas (politics of mass popular rebellion) through armed insurgency. To this end, it set 
up a military branch, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Patriotic Manuel Rodríguez 
Front, FPMR) which was to gain support through violent action, and anticipated 
mobilising a general uprising against the regime.56 
According to Walker (1986) the different trajectories of the sections of the Left 
cannot be completely reconciled with the experiences of repression and exile under the 
dictatorship. Authoritarian rule, Roberts (1994) adds, does not automatically modify 
political beliefs and tactics within the opposition. Internal culture and organisation, he 
argues, are a decisive factor in the process of political learning. In the case of the PS, the 
party’s ideological autonomy, its openness towards external influences, and its tolerant 
                                              
55 This argumentation and reference to Portales is notable, as it attempts to reclaim the figure of Portales 
for the Left, while traditionally it had been an icon for conservative historiography, especially the notion 
of the ‘Portalian state’ and the existence of a specific Chilean tradition.  
56 Despite this ideological turn, the PC maintained its position on the need to create broad alliances, 
including with the Centre. However, such a broad alliance was now only one of the simultaneous 
strategies that the PC followed, and which included an armed road as well. 
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tradition towards dissenting views within the organisation facilitated the party’s 
interaction with political forces and made it highly adaptable. The Communist Party, in 
contrast, remained ideologically fixated with a narrow Marxist-Leninist course and 
suffered from a closed organisational structure, which, additionally, did not allow for 
the formulation of dissenting proposals. As a result, a process of ‘renovation’ was 
blocked, while the party became increasingly isolated and ideologically radicalised as a 
result of its political defeat and a lack of oppositional strategy.  
Apart from these internal factors, there were several external developments that 
contributed to the radicalisation of the PC. First, the Christian Democrats refused to 
cooperate with the Communist Party in any way in attempting to restore democracy. 
This effectively blocked all hope for a broad alliance in which the PC could participate. 
Second, the prospect that the military government would institutionalise its regime 
through the 1980 plebiscite pressured the communists into taking up a more radical 
position. Finally, the success of the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979 indicated that 
armed insurgency could well be successful, and was taken as an example by the Chilean 
communists, despite the numerous differences between the two cases (Corvalán 2001: 
364).  
In the early 1980s, when economic crisis soon provoked popular unrest and massive 
demonstrations, the Left remained utterly divided. In 1983, the Altamirano-sector 
formed the Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance, AD) with the Christian 
Democrats, who had up to then been unwilling to cooperate with the PS and PC in a 
broad alliance, but now found a more moderate partner in the ‘renovated’ Left. 
Together, they used the mass mobilisations of the period 1983-1985 as a lever in an 
attempt to negotiate a transition to democracy. Meanwhile, the PS-Almeyda and the PC 
saw the popular mobilisation mainly as a first step towards a more radical phase of 
armed insurgency (Roberts 1994: 13). As long as the demonstrations continued, both 
sections remained hopeful, despite their many differences. However, due to the success 
of the economic recuperation after the appointment of Büchi as Minister of 
Economics, as well as to the internal divisions within the opposition, the mass 
mobilisations faded away in mid-1986.  
The Almeyda-faction of the PS started to move towards the centre in 1987, under 
pressure of both the Left and the Right. The pressure on the Left had rapidly increased, 
as the government had announced a plebiscite for the following year in which the 
population would be able to vote Pinochet out of office. On the one hand, unforeseen 
events proved once again to be decisive, as the discovery of a massive arms arsenal of 
the FPMR, and a failed assassination attempt on Pinochet by the same organisation, led 
to a new wave of intensive state repression, strengthening the regime in its position. It 
also provoked outraged reactions from the PS-Nuñez (as the moderate Altamirano 
section was now called) and the PDC, pressuring the PS-Almeyda to distance itself 
radically from the violent road. On the other, it was the success of the project of the 
Right, in the form of the rapidly recovering economy and the renewed political strength 
of the regime, which convinced the Almeyda section that Pinochet could not be forced 
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out of office. In the end, it opened up to the renovated ideology and opted to 
participate in the oppositional coalition and 1988 plebiscite.  
The late entry of the PS-Almeyda into the ‘renovated camp’ had important 
consequences for the Centre and the Left. It strengthened the position of the PDC, 
which had converted itself into the leader of the opposition. It also strengthened the 
PS-Nuñez, which had long been the ‘little brother’ of the PDC in the moderate 
opposition, but now took the leadership of the socialist renovation. On the whole, it 
disqualified radicalism and rewarded moderation and consensus, values that since then 
have been characteristic for the Concertación. Finally, it completely marginalised and 
isolated the Communist Party, which, apart from having lost all political allies, saw 
itself even excluded from Congressional representation after the return of democracy. 
Although this provoked intense internal dissent, the party proved unable to translate its 
frustration into a move towards the centre, and has remained isolated since (Roberts 
1994: 8-15).57 In the end, the individual ideological trajectories of the different sectors of 
the Left had produced the framework for the creation of an alternative project of 
modernisation.  
 
The Technocratisation of the Opposition 
The construction of an alternative project of modernisation was also determined by a 
process of ‘technocratisation’ of the opposition. Once again, this was the result of the 
interaction between the Right, the Centre and the Left. As Patricio Silva (1991) argues, 
the repression by the regime forced opposition leaders to work in research institutes and 
NGOs (often financially supported from abroad) that were left relatively untouched by 
the government.58 In those institutions (such as the PDC-based CIEPLAN or the more 
socialist-oriented FLACSO), they were able to voice their criticism of the regime, on the 
condition that it took the form of small-scale academic publications. This way, the 
professional políticos were forced to take up a more scholarly and academic style, and to 
work in the context of theoretical debates rather than political dogmas. As a result, the 
leaders of the opposition rapidly ‘technocratised’, placing intellectual capacities and 
pragmatic solution-making over party policies and intra-party competition. Working 
together in so-called equipos técnicos, they worked out common diagnoses and strategies 
for the future. As a result, they were able to eliminate the historical differences between 
                                              
57 For a detailed account of the process of renovation as well as the isolation of the PC, see Arrate and 
Rojas (2003b: 307-440) 
58 The preference for and high esteem of technocrats among the regime were exemplified by the relative 
freedom economists and other técnicos had in criticising the government. Alejandro Foxley recalls how as 
a prominent economist he was able to criticise the government in ways that others could not: ‘I wrote 
columns in the magazine Ercilla and later in Qué Pasa. Later, people who had worked for the military 
regime told me: “Listen, you were really intolerable back then. Your criticisms were terribly harsh, you 
knew no nuances”. Looking back, I agree with them. When I read what I wrote in that period, I find it 
reasonable, but based on a reason that went beyond economic analysis. We were filling a void: the 
people who were doing politics were unable to criticise the regime, and furthermore we were filled with 
all kinds of pent-up emotions (…) We were a legitimate vehicle for criticism because we were economists, 
because we enjoyed international status. That is why we could talk about things others couldn’t and 
criticise the regime’ (CIDOC interview with Alejandro Foxley, undated).  
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the different parties of the Concertación, but also come up with a coherent common 
programme that transcended party lines and forged a profound consensus within the 
coalition. Additionally, the ‘technocratisation’ of the opposition turned out to reinforce 
the process of moderation and renovation of the Left. Working with public opinion 
studies which were carried out by their own NGOs, the leaders of the Left became 
aware that their traditional perceptions of public opinion in Chile did not reflect 
reality. For instance, the vast majority of the population turned out to reject any form 
of political violence and radicalism in general. Furthermore, it became clear that in 
contrast to the perception of the opposition, a large section of the population 
supported the military regime. And finally, the Chileans still strongly identified with 
the country’s democratic tradition. This information was highly influential in 
moderating the Left and pushing it towards accepting the democratic path towards the 
end of the dictatorship (Puryear 1994: 137).  
In this context, it is important to stress the leading role of leaders of both MAPU 
and the Christian Left. Whereas under the PDC they had played a vanguard role in 
creating a mix between the socialcristianismo and socialist theory, and later had filled key 
positions as the UP’s main intellectuals, now they were at the forefront of the 
renovation of the Left (Roberts 1994: 10).59 An original as well as enlightening 
explanation for this phenomenon is provided by the political scientist Catherine Hite. 
In her study on the leaders of the Chilean Left, she distinguishes four ‘cognitive 
orientations’ among them: political party loyalist, personal loyalist, political thinker, 
and political entrepreneur. Whereas the first two are mainly based on the level of 
loyalty to the political party and figures such as Salvador Allende, the ‘political thinker’, 
according to Hite, represents those leaders who have ‘consistently focused on ideas and 
intellectual debates, who have tended to privilege ideas over political party program’ 
(2000: 127). Their work, often highly significant in academic circles, has often been of 
lesser significance to the parties themselves. Political entrepreneurs, finally, are those 
leaders who combine a strong grasp of political ideas with strategies that produce 
successful coalitions and leadership. Rather flexible in their ideology, they are able to 
construct alliances, and their party loyalty is subordinate to the success of multi-party 
platforms. According to Hite, MAPU and IC, which combined powerful intellectual 
networks with a vanguard revolutionary position, were highly attractive parties for 
political entrepreneurs. As a result, these parties played a central role in both the 
renovation of the Left as well as in the transition to democracy. Furthermore, Hite 
argues, political entrepreneurs from the MAPU and IC put their mark on the political 
culture of the coalition between the PDC and the renovated Left, by stressing 
consensus, the downplaying of political conflict, and modernisation (ibid., pp. 185, 192-
5). 
                                              
59 Some IC and MAPU members made a stronger break with their revolutionary past than others. In the 
1980s, intellectuals such as Eugenio Tironi and José Joaquín Brunner rejected not only radical Leninism, 
but also Socialism in general, and attempted to reorient Chilean socialism in a moderate, social democrat 
style (Roberts 1994: 11).  
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The Christian Democrats Return to the Centre 
The PDC followed a much more consistent trajectory under the influence of 
competition between the Left and Right, consisting of a slow but steady return to the 
centre of the political arena. Having supported the coup of 1973, sections of the PDC 
offered the regime their services and attempted to negotiate a return to democracy with 
the most moderate military sections. When this proved to be impossible, the party 
distanced itself from the government, sharply criticising the ongoing human rights 
violations and the permanent nature of the regime. Up to the early 1980s, the party 
took a solitary course in its opposition to the regime. This was for two reasons. First, the 
Christian Democrats were still very much affected by the memory of the UP 
government, and were apprehensive to join hands with a Left that did not show any 
serious signs of ideological re-orientation. Second, the party enjoyed a relative 
autonomy under the dictatorship; its previous opposition to the UP and close ties to 
the Church gave it a high prestige, which the military government did not find easy to 
suppress. This relative autonomy would be endangered if the PDC openly took sides 
with the former UP parties (Moulian 1997: 254).  
However, the party reached a crossroads with the death of party leader Eduardo Frei 
in 1982. As Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986: 211) argue, the sudden demise of the 
great party leader was a blow as well as an opportunity for the party. Frei was apart from 
the most prominent opposition leader, a constant reminder of the past. Not only was 
he deeply mistrusted by the Left because of his opposition to the UP, but large sections 
of the Right also resented his role as the ‘Kerensky chileno’, the Chilean ‘Kerensky’, which 
had paved the way for ‘Socialist totalitarianism’ in the country. After his death, the new 
leadership was able to cast off the camino propio politics of the past (after intense 
internal discussions), and focus on structural coalition-forming with the (renovated) 
Left.60 As a result, the party was able to regain the centre of the political field, and, 
through its relatively strong organisational structure combined with its high legitimacy, 
to assume the leading position among the oppositional parties. Its increasing technocrat 
nature, and close connections with the political entrepreneurs of its former members in 
the MAPU and IC, also gave the party a new pragmatic and flexible outlook, without 
weakening its programmatic strength (Walker 1993 180-1).  
Concluding, the competition, however informal, between the Right, the Centre, 
and the Left facilitated the creation of a Centre-Left, academically oriented opposition 
which would prove able to formulate a viable alternative project of modernisation. 
5.2.3 Adaptation of the Project  
Like its predecessors, the project of modernisation of the Right experienced a severe 
crisis that threatened its very existence. In the period 1982-5, economic crisis and 
persistent social unrest (mainly in the form of mass demonstrations) delegitimised the 
                                              
60 In this sense, a PDC without Frei proved to be just as dangerous to the regime as one with him, or even 
more so. If the repeated, and substantiated, accusations of Frei’s death being a secret service murder are 
true, than it was a serious miscalculation on the part of the regime. See Jorge Molina (2002).  
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neo-liberal project and seriously challenged the authoritarian model. At the same time 
the rise of a broad, democratic, oppositional coalition seemed to ensure a rapid, if 
negotiated, transition to democracy, as had taken place in the other Latin American 
countries that had been ruled by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead 1986: 6). However, in contrast to the previous projects, the 
project of the Right succeeded in overcoming this crisis by effectively adapting to the 
new circumstances. Utilising the high level of autonomy of the executive in relation to 
its supporting civilian groups, and sailing a highly pragmatic and incremental course, 
the government was not only able to survive, but also to reignite its project of 
modernisation, albeit with adaptations. 
The crisis followed a pattern similar to that of the governments of Frei and Allende. 
After a period of successful modernisation, rapid economic contraction impeded the 
continuation of the implementation of the project. Simultaneously, social unrest, partly 
as a consequence of ideological opposition and partly resulting from the economic 
crisis, became a serious threat to the government. As a consequence, the government 
was forced to choose between further modernisation and maintaining social order. In 
the case of the Revolution in Liberty, Frei opted for the latter, but, having antagonised 
both the Right and Left, was unable to gain sufficient support for a new moderate path 
of modernisation. The Chilean Road to Socialism followed the same pattern: under 
pressure of economic crisis and social unrest, Allende attempted to moderate the 
project by gaining the support of the Christian Democrats. However, the radicalisation 
of the UP’s Left flank, as well as deep mistrust by the PDC, impeded such a settlement, 
which contributed to the downfall of the government.  
For the project of the Right, the crisis started in 1981, when it became clear that the 
Chilean economy was severely affected by the debt crisis that had struck Latin America. 
As it turned out, the ‘Chilean Miracle’ was standing on feet of clay, as the financial 
sector was over-indebted, the productive capacities of the economy had been weakened 
and unemployment remained relatively high. Furthermore, the openness of the 
economy made it extremely vulnerable to external influences. As a result, Chile 
experienced the greatest set-back of the region, with its GNP falling 14.5 per cent in 
1982-3 (Huneeus 2001: 508). Additionally, from 1983 on, the opposition succeeded in 
mobilising the general dissent (even among sectors that had previously been in favour 
of the regime) into massive demonstrations against the government. As a consequence, 
the regime faced a double crisis: on the one hand, the failure of the economic project of 
the Chicago Boys, one of the legitimising foundations of the regime, and on the other, 
and as a result from the first, widespread dissent among the population at large, 
including the middle classes, which was focused into action by a increasingly broad and 
well-organised opposition.  
The reaction of the military government was twofold: on the one hand, radical 
Chicago Boys policies were abandoned by the regime and replaced by more pragmatic 
ones, including some that had opposed the strategies of the previous years. On the 
other, the government moderated its position towards the moderate opposition, 
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creating some room for political activities. The success of this double strategy became 
clear around 1986, when the demonstrations faded, the economy regained its strength, 
and the regime was once again able consolidate its power over society.  
 
Maintaining Relative Autonomy 
The question of why this approach was successful in overcoming the crisis and pushing 
forward its project can be approached on different levels. To start with, one possible 
approach focuses on the different alliances that were formed in this period, and their 
relative success in imposing their agenda. This analysis can be seen from two 
perspectives: that of the regime and that of the opposition. Eduardo Silva (1996: 173-
192) follows the perspective of the different economic groups that supported the 
regime. He argues that a ‘pragmatic neo-liberal coalition’, existing of industrial and 
other ‘fixed asset’ capitalists (in contrast to the ‘liquid asset capitalists’ of the financial 
world, who favoured a hard-line neo-liberal course) were able to moderate the project 
enough to ensure its survival. This coalition had been built up in the previous years 
around the Confederación de Producción y Comercio (Production and Commerce 
Confederation, CPC), a powerful entrepreneurial organisation, and had produced 
detailed alternative strategies for the project. However, by 1983 they were far from 
strong enough to enforce their will on the military regime. Therefore, Silva argues, their 
success is the result of several interconnected processes. First of all, the acute crisis of 
liquidity in the Chilean economy made a return of the neo-liberal hard line highly 
improbable and therefore strengthened the pragmatic alternative. Second, the pragmatic 
neo-liberal coalition succeeded in overcoming many of its internal differences, 
increasingly positioning itself as a cohesive and ideologically solid actor, which offered 
the government a set of well thought out and cohesive policies.  
Two final developments were decisive in creating success for the pragmatic neo-
liberal coalition, Silva argues. First, it was approached by the rapidly growing opposition 
in an attempt to join forces. As this strategy seemed to work, at least initially, Pinochet 
saw himself forced to appease the pragmatic coalition in order to avoid the creation of a 
broad oppositional coalition that would have enough strength to enforce a transition to 
democracy. Finally, in his attempts to make overtures to the pragmatic neoliberals, 
Pinochet removed many of the hard-line Chicago Boys and replaced them with more 
moderate technocrats. These technocrats slowly opened up the process of policy-
making to organised business, thus creating a platform that allowed the pragmatic neo-
liberal coalition to translate its demands into actual policy.  
In a similar civil-society analysis, but from the perspective of the opposition, 
Eugenio Tironi argues that the nature of the opposition was mainly to blame for the 
survival of the regime. The weak organisation and coalition-building of the opposing 
forces, Tironi argues, soon produced signs of fatigue among the demonstrators. As a 
result, instead of unifying into one broad, multi-class oppositional movement, the 
demonstrations soon fragmented and lost their cohesiveness, while their focus 
increasingly moved from the middle-class areas to the peripheries. As a result, the 
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middle class watched with apprehension the roadblocks and violent street clashes 
between marginal youth and the police force, and rapidly withdrew its initial support 
for the opposition out of fear of social chaos:  
What had started as a multi-class and peaceful manifestation, increasingly 
transformed into a global revolt of the excluded (…) As a result, the middle 
classes, up to then largely favouring the opposition, started to re-evaluate their 
position. In fact, the cost of Pinochet’s presence soon became less than the 
social threat that was present in the protest (1998: 84).  
While the civil society approach gives valuable insight into the success of alliances 
between different actors, it does not explain the role of the state. At that level, the 
notion of ‘relative autonomy’ is particularly helpful. Already 1973 O’Donnell argued 
that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were characterised by a high ‘relative autonomy’ 
of the state vis-à-vis other actors in society. The destruction of the previous political 
structures and relationships during and after the coup created a space in which the state 
could act more or less independently from the civil society actors. This did not only 
concern the opposition, but also those actors that were supportive of the government. 
As a result, the regime created both the space and time to implement its project of 
national restoration and modernisation, even if supportive groups were negatively 
affected by it. The military’s self-image as the ‘incarnation of a rationality transcending 
the myopia and avarice of particularized interests’ did not even exempt the liberal 
technocrats, who functioned as the civic backbone of the bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes, and who regularly had to negotiate their space to move (O’Donnell 1973b: 
193; Foxley 1984: 32).  
Relative autonomy became an important feature of Chilean authoritarianism, as it 
allowed the regime to implement a highly radical project of modernisation that had 
negative repercussions for important sectors of the industrial and business elites. During 
the crisis of 1982-3, though, it gained particular value as it became a key to the survival 
of the regime. It allowed the military government to move away from the two civilian 
groups it had become so closely attached to, the gremialistas and the Chicago Boys. It 
also allowed for the return of these groups to the centre of political power when the 
military saw fit.  
The relations between the gremialistas and the military had already become strained 
before the crisis of 1982, as a result of the increasing personalisation of power by 
Pinochet. The gremialistas, under the leadership of Jaime Guzmán, emphasised the 
gradual implementation of the ‘new institutional order’ that had been projected in the 
1980 constitution and which consisted of a democracia protegida y tutelada (a protected 
democracy under tutelage of the military). Pinochet, however, interpreted the success of 
the constitutional plebiscite as a personal triumph, and rapidly consolidated his 
position as dictator, intensifying the repression of the moderate opposition and 
postponing the implementation of the transition to a protected democracy (Huneeus 
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2001: 501-7).61 The refusal of Pinochet to continue the path of transition to democracy 
led to the resignation of gremialista Minister of Interior, Sergio Fernández. From this 
moment on, the gremialistas become increasingly isolated, especially when, during the 
social unrest of 1983, former PN-leader Sergio Onofre Jarpa was installed as Minister of 
Interior. The choice of Jarpa, who was a radical opponent of the gremialistas, is 
indicative of the degree of autonomy that the government exercised towards its civilian 
support groups, even while it still needed civil support. 
Jarpa set in motion a strategy of apertura (open approach towards the opposition) 
towards the opposition, allowing for a limited return from exile for moderate 
opposition leaders, as well as a softening of the censorship laws. Furthermore, Jarpa 
initiated negotiations with the moderate opposition. These steps were met with strong 
resistance by the gremialistas, who rejected any strategy that involved negotiations with 
the opposition. Even though Jarpa’s strategy never materialised in an agreement of any 
kind, it created a climate of negotiation and moderation that was essential for the 
military government to survive. Following Dahl’s assumptions that if the expected cost 
of repression increases, and that of toleration decreases, an authoritarian government 
will be more probable to tolerate the opposition, the military government used its 
relative autonomy towards the gremialistas in order to appease the Centre (Dahl 1971: 
15; Huneeus 2001).  
In the case of the Chicago Boys, the government followed a similar path. However, 
the military government clearly had more difficulty in distancing itself from its 
economic champions than from the gremialistas. After the economic crisis had started, 
Pinochet protected Sergio de Castro for almost a year, despite widespread criticism of 
his orthodox policies. Only when Fernández resigned in April of 1983 did Pinochet 
seize the moment to replace De Castro as well. Subsequently, the economic strategies 
of the government became markedly more heterodox, and the Chicago Boys saw their 
influence on economic policy largely reduced. The peg between the dollar and the peso 
was released, certain import tariffs were reinstated, and the state actively intervened in 
the financial sector, nationalising banks and other institutions that were on the verge of 
bankruptcy. As a result, what Ffrench-Davis has called the ‘pure phase’ of neo-liberalism 
was succeeded by a phase of ‘relative pragmatism’ (2003: 36). This pragmatism was 
mainly targeted at overcoming the economic crisis and restoring normality in the short 
term. However, as Larraín and Velásquez (1986: 112) argue, the large-scale state 
intervention in the period of crisis had produced structural changes in the relations 
between the state and the economy that could not easily be reversed. As a result, even 
after 1985, when the economy rapidly recovered under the successful direction of 
Minister of Finance Hernán Büchi, pragmatism and heterodoxy had become integral 
                                              
61 According to Huneeus, the personification of power took the form of three symbolic measures: the 
return of the presidential office to the restored La Moneda; a simultaneous change in presidential 
protocol, replacing the informal style of interaction in the presidential office with a military and 
extremely formal style; and the building of a luxurious presidential country house, in the words of 
Huneeus, ‘more fitting the style of sultanic dictatorships than the moderation that has been characteristic 
of the residents of the La Moneda Palace’ (2001: 502).  
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features of the economic policy-making process. Like the gremialistas, the Chicago Boys 
regained a strong role in government after the crisis had ended, but both had to face the 
fact that during their marginalisation from power the rules of the game had changed.  
In conclusion, the relative autonomy that the state held vis-à-vis both the 
gremialistas and the Chicago Boys allowed the government to take the measures that 
were needed to overcome the crisis and adapt the model, even if after the return of a 
certain level of normality both groups were largely reinstated in their respective roles. 
 
Pragmatic Decision-Making 
Moving away from the level of inter-actor relations and to the level of political strategy, 
but still linked to the notion of relative autonomy, is the decision-making process that 
took place under the military regime. Marcus Kurtz (1999: 401-423) stresses the point 
that in contrast with the revolutionary discourse of the Chicago Boys, claiming to 
implement a coherent and integral project, the actual policy-making process of the 
regime was incremental in nature. Torn between the need to create economic growth as 
well as to impose political restructuring — two often contradictory goals — the military 
resorted to short-term solutions instead of long-term consistent strategies. As a result, 
the outcome of the government’s policies was the result of a chain of pragmatic 
decisions rather than elaborate planning.  
This incremental approach helps to explain the success the regime had in 
overcoming what seemed to many to be a terminal crisis. The steps that were taken by 
the regime were not just targeted to increase economic growth, but also — or mainly — 
to gain support for the government among dominant economic circles. Making use of 
the relative autonomy of the state, and focusing on gaining the support of a ‘pragmatic 
neo-liberal coalition’, the government took a hybrid course, sometimes in line with the 
neo-liberal model, and sometimes deviating from the model. Keeping a distance from 
his dogmatic civil allies, Pinochet was able to balance his course, prioritising strategic 
political considerations over ideological or strictly economic considerations. As has 
been indicated above, this pragmatic course eventually led to a change in character of 
the neo-liberal project. However, as Kurtz argues, this was unintentional:  
This new form of neo-liberalism emerged more out of short-term political 
calculations than deliberate design (1999: 421). 
After 1985, these adaptations started to pay off, not just in terms of economic recovery, 
but also in the form of a second boom period in which a new wave of privatisations was 
combined with a much more pragmatic and socially-oriented focus by the regime.  
A similar pragmatism can be discerned in the regime’s dealing with the opposition. 
In particular Jarpa’s apertura exemplified the strategic and short-term nature of 
Pinochet’s policies in this period. For Jarpa, the strategy of moderating the regime and 
negotiating with the opposition was the beginning of a change in regime style, moving 
away from an all-exclusive regime to a more open form of authoritarian rule. For 
Pinochet, however, the apertura signified merely a strategic withdrawal that was to be 
reversed when the opportunity arose. As a consequence, the regime did not back up 
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Jarpa’s strategies with a less repressive attitude towards the opposition; on the contrary, 
it rapidly intensified state violence, putting Jarpa’s credibility at stake. Additionally, it 
did not allow Jarpa to negotiate a deal with the opposition or a change in regime. As a 
result, the apertura failed as a long-term strategy to strengthen and prolong the regime’s 
life-span through moderation and cooperation with the opposition.62 In 1985, policies 
were reversed and Jarpa was replaced. As a short-term strategy, however, it was highly 
successful. The repeated talks with the opposition that took place in 1983, when the 
crisis was at its deepest, served to buy the regime time. By the time the talks failed, four 
of the five biggest demonstrations had already taken place, and social unrest 
increasingly withdrew to the poblaciones. Meanwhile, the opposition had been deeply 
divided about the negotiations and proved unable to regroup afterwards. In other 
words, it was Pinochet’s pragmatism and instrumental use of Jarpa’s apertura that had 
allowed the regime to overcome the most difficult months of its existence (Huneeus 
2001: 520).  
5.3 The Legacy of the Project: Economic, Social and Political 
Modernisation 
In many ways, the ‘Silent Revolution’ was able to leave a powerful legacy of 
modernisation that would remain influential throughout the first three governments of 
the Concertación. At the economic level, modernisation had been defined by the 
memory of crisis under the UP, the implementation of the neo-liberal project of the 
Chicago Boys, and its successful adaptation to a more pragmatic course in the 1980s. 
Despite the fact that economic modernisation had been extremely exclusive, it had 
produced increased material wellbeing for large sections of society, and possessed such a 
high level of legitimacy that it proved irreplaceable. Politically, the creation of an 
authoritarian order based on the notion of Latin American conservative modernity 
proved successful at well. Despite the fact that Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite, the 
gremialistas had succeeded in implementing a lasting model that prevented a return to 
the pre-1973 political order, and which amounted to a ‘limited and tutelary democracy’. 
At the social level, a true ‘silent revolution’ had taken place, as the traditional 
orientation of Chile’s social sectors towards collective forms of action had been 
replaced by individual competition. Similarly, a strong reorientation from the state 
toward the market, and from ideological ideas to consumption had come to characterise 
the mentality of large sections of Chilean society. Even though the ‘Silent Revolution’ 
had been as exclusive at the social level as it had been at the economic, the social 
transformations it produced would prove to be lasting legacies.  
 
 
 
                                              
62 Jarpa himself, in retrospect, does not acknowledge such a conflict of interest between himself and 
Pinochet in this period. For his view on the matter, see Arancibia et al. (2002)  
 228 
Economic Modernisation: from a State to a Market Economy 
The most conspicuous economic feature of the project of the Right was the 
transformation of the economy. Having been oriented towards the state since the 
1930s, it was reoriented to the market in a rapid and profound way. This resulted in 
rapid economic growth in the 1970s, but also in a profound crisis at the beginning of 
the 1980s. After 1985, however, the successful adaptation of the economic model 
restarted economic growth, which even reached double digits by 1989 (Ffrench-Davis 
2003: 36). As a result, the legitimacy of the model remained high, and this made it 
extremely difficult for the new government to replace it.  
Despite the Right’s euphoria about economic growth, modernisation and 
development, some critical remarks can be made about the performance of the Chilean 
Miracle, as it came to be known. Ffrench-Davis (2003: 30-40) shows that even though 
the neo-liberal period clearly had its periods of rapid expansion, it also suffered from 
serious recessions. If these periods are taken together, GNP growth averages only 2.9 per 
cent on a yearly basis, a meagre result, especially if it is recalled that under Frei GNP 
averaged 4 per cent per year. Of course, the economic chaos that the Right inherited 
from the UP period should be taken into consideration. However, the most serious 
contractions of the economy under the dictatorship took place in the 1975 and 1982, 
that is, years after the coup. Some other indicators show similar patterns. Investment, 
for instance, had dropped from 19 per cent under Frei to 16 per cent under Allende. 
Contrary to what could be expected, it did not recuperate in the years following the 
coup, but remained stable until 1981, after which it dropped by another three points. 
Only after 1985 did investment rise significantly, although it only finally reached the 
level of the 1960s in 1989 (Stallings 2001: 47).  
Furthermore, the economic modernisations of the Chicago Boys had badly hurt 
several sectors of the Chilean economy. Towards the end of the regime, most of the 
country’s traditional industries had vanished, and few new industries had emerged 
(Gatica 1989: 8). In the countryside, the market-oriented transformations had virtually 
destroyed all the traditional agricultural structures. Not willing to reinstate the old rural 
elites and practices, Pinochet maintained most of the agrarian reforms. However, the 
opening of the markets produced severe blows to several sectors of agriculture. In the 
end, the modernisation in the countryside led to more effective farms, foreign 
investment, and orientation towards exports, features that were celebrated by the 
Chicago Boys. However, the social and economic costs of this adaptation were high 
and produced substantial economic exclusion (Silva 1991b: 30). As Oppenheim (1993: 
156) argues, the process of transformation in the countryside was more or less 
emblematic for the other sectors of the economy as well. In all economic sectors, the re-
orientation towards the (international) market created competitive and efficient 
companies, but often at a high social cost. As a result, large sections of the population 
remained excluded from economic neo-liberal modernity. Finally, the modernisation 
and transformation of the economy produced a small but extremely powerful economic 
elite. This was not exclusively the result of free market logic, though. The process of 
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privatisation, especially in the 1980s, was extremely beneficial to several business 
conglomerates that had close ties to the regime, as state companies were sold far below 
the market price (Mönkeberg 2001: 12). 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the success of economic modernisation became a 
clearly visible feature of Chilean society. This process was euphorically heralded by 
Chicago Boy Joaquín Lavín in his book Chile: A Quiet Revolution. In this bestselling 
title, Lavín argues that Chile had become a country with more jobs, more competitive 
enterprises, and well integrated in the global movements of modernity. Furthermore, its 
inhabitants were rapidly becoming better educated, informed, and enjoyed the benefits 
of a consumer society: more choice of products, more culture, and, in particular, more 
technology:  
Until a short time ago, all baths in the United States were white and all 
telephones black. But mass society (…) came to an end, giving way to diversity 
(…) [I]n Chile, baths are white or light blue, or any other colour. Telephones 
have hundreds of different shapes and sizes - which may be chosen by the 
costumer - and car buyers decide from dozens of different makes. Women work 
or study (1988: 170). 
In a subsequent joint publication with Luis Larraín, Chile: Sociedad Emergente, Lavín 
notes the rapid growth in the number of inhabitants of Santiago who spend their 
summer at the beaches near Viña del Mar, the rise of small-scale enterprises in the 
shanty-towns, and an increase in the life expectancy of the Chileans, in short,  
the dynamism of a modern country, competitive, efficient, creative, integrated 
in the world, and with a new mentality, which is the result of the ‘Silent 
Revolution’ which it has experienced (Lavín and Larraín 1989: 11).  
Echoing the voice of the nineteenth century liberals, Lavín and Larraín claim that 
through this ‘Silent Revolution’ Chile has definitively been ‘parted from the trilogy of 
socialism, bureaucracy, and economic stagnation that characterises many Latin 
American countries’, and that it, in turn, reflects much more the emerging countries in 
Asia: Taiwan, South Korea and Japan (ibid., p. 162).63 
In many ways, though, the ‘Silent Revolution’ proved to be a failure by its own 
standards. Repeatedly the Chicago Boys had insisted that neo-liberal reform would 
create ‘popular capitalism’, through ‘the spread of property’, with the end goal of 
creating, in the words of the Declaration of Principles, a ‘society of proprietors, not 
proletariats’ (Huneeus 2001: 447). This ideal of creating a sort of ‘middle class 
consumer society’ proved, by the late 1980s, to be an illusion. Lavín’s observations on a 
‘Silent Revolution’ were not untrue: a social transformation had indeed taken place that 
increasingly created access to work, consumption, and the like. What Lavín failed to 
recognise, though, was that this process was largely limited to a small section of society, 
                                              
63 In this sense, Mario Góngora’s thesis that the state formed the nation proved once again true. Whereas 
originally the emergence of the state had defined the formation of the Chilean nation, now it was the 
retreat of the state which transformed it, creating new cultural patterns and general outlooks, based on 
individualism and market thinking rather than on collectivism or an orientation to the state.  
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the upper and the middle classes. In a reply to Lavín, the sociologist Eugenio Tironi 
severely criticises the model for its social repercussions. In his book, fittingly called ‘The 
Silences of the Revolution’, he argues that the project of modernisation of the Right 
had taken place at the cost of large sections of society. Instead of creating a middle-class 
consumer society, it divided the country into two: one large group of the excluded, 
consisting of the popular and formerly lower middle classes, and a small section that, in 
his words, ‘has been able to completely incorporate itself into modernisation’ (Tironi 
1988: 87). While the second group had full access to the new patterns of production 
and consumption that the Silent Revolution had created, the first group became 
completely excluded from those patterns. Graphically comparing the poblaciones to the 
South African townships, Tironi shows the other side of the Silent Revolution. In the 
población of La Pintana, for example, in 1985 there was only one telephone per 22 
thousand inhabitants, and while in the same year the number of cars in the wealthy 
neighbourhood of Providencia had risen to 697 per thousand inhabitants, the number 
in the población of La Granja was 15 (ibid., pp. 28-29).  
All in all, the social policies of the Right had produced mixed results. Despite 
optimistic statistics by ODEPLAN, there was ample proof of a general deterioration in 
living standards for most Chileans. By 1990, over 40 per cent of the population lived in 
poverty, of which around 14 per cent in extreme poverty (Olave 1997: 187). 
Meanwhile, inequality had reached heights that were unprecedented for the second half 
of the twentieth century. In many ways, the Silent Revolution was a revolution that was 
based on social exclusion rather than on ‘popular capitalism’.64 Nevertheless, Lavín’s 
optimism was not completely without foundation. Towards the end of the 1980s, when 
economic growth recovered rapidly and employment boomed, even the large, excluded 
sectors of the population began to be infiltrated by the changing patterns of 
consumerism and material modernisation. Tironi affirms that despite poverty and 
joblessness, in 1988 85 per cent of the pobladores possessed a TV set and 73 per cent 
owned a radio (1988: 73). The secret of this contradiction lay partly in the emergence of 
credit cards that were provided by large stores and which allowed the customer, even 
the poorer ones, to repay consumer goods in monthly instalments. If for the majority of 
the population the prospect of high consumption and middle class standards of living 
remained dim, at least some tangible aspects of such a lifestyle had come within reach. 
In an embryonic sense, Lavín turned out to be correct when he triumphantly claimed in 
1989 that:  
modernisation (…) extends much further than just the business sector. It 
reaches other sectors and more people. It transforms culture, work, education 
and scientific knowledge. It profoundly modifies life in the poblaciones of 
Santiago. It transcends ideologies. Modernisation is of Left and Right (1989: 
14).  
                                              
64 The socio-economic performance of the Silent Revolution has been widely studied. See for instance: 
Vergara (1985 and 1991); Ffrench-Davis and Stallings (2001); Angell and Pollack (1993). 
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As a result, the legacy of economic modernisation of the regime consisted of both its 
success and its failure. On the one hand, the economic successes of the neo-liberal 
model made it almost impossible to replace. The opposition was well aware that the 
future legitimacy of the government would lie largely in its economic performance. 
This specifically applied to the Left, which knew that it would have to overcome the 
images of economic chaos under the UP and prove that it could govern in a responsible 
manner. By 1990, the only conceivable way of guaranteeing economic growth would be 
by maintaining the current model, rather than trying to replace or fundamentally alter it 
with unknown results. In addition, it was clear that any attempt to touch the 
foundations of the neo-liberal model would lead to violent (and economically 
damaging) responses by the entrepreneurial sector, as well as to political opposition 
from the Right, which would block any attempt to reform other sectors as well. As a 
consequence, much to the sadness of sectors of the Left, but also of the Christian 
Democrats, the regime’s neo-liberal model was maintained as a lasting legacy for the 
Concertación. On the other hand, the economic legacy of the military regime consisted 
of the high level of poverty and exclusion among the population. The economic 
exclusion of a large part of the population not only constituted a moral and economic 
challenge, but could also lead to political problems. The return of democracy would 
certainly lead to a rise in expectations among the poor of the country, which could lead 
to mobilisation and the radicalisation of popular demand. As a result, the legacy of 
poverty and exclusion came to be one of the main challenges for Chilean modernity in 
the 1990s.  
 
The Political Legacy: Creating a Limited Democracy 
On the political level, the Right was also able to create a legacy that would leave a 
lasting imprint on Chilean modernity. It consisted of the continuation, after the return 
to democracy, of the authoritarian order that was set up under the regime. The 
gremialistas, seeking to avoid a return to pre-1973 political relations after the end of 
Pinochet’s rule, constructed a political model which they entrenched in the 1980 
constitution. This model, based on the idea of Latin American conservative modernity, 
set limitations on the elbowroom of the future democratic governments. As a result, a 
‘limited democracy’ was created that ensured a moderate and centrist course of action 
from governments of the Concertación.  
These limitations consisted of what Manuel Antonio Garretón (1989) has labelled 
‘authoritarian enclaves’. These are not the same as what Stepan called ‘military 
prerogatives’. Military prerogatives refer to the attempts of the military to impose 
restrictions on the democratic system in order to achieve certain privileges or maintain 
institutional influence (Stepan 1988: 93). Authoritarian enclaves, in contrast, refer to a 
broader maintenance of the authoritarian model under the democratic regime. Apart 
from protecting the military against possible repercussions, and guaranteeing its 
supervisory institutional position, authoritarian enclaves seek to institutionalise key 
elements of the authoritarian order in the democratic system.  
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In the case of the project of the Right, the authoritarian enclaves were not just a last-
minute resort of the regime to protect its institutions and interests. The gremialista had 
been working on the construction of a lasting political order since the beginning of the 
regime. Arguing that with the downfall of the military regime the political order might 
also collapse, they successfully argued in favour of an eventual return to democracy, but 
with the maintenance of certain key authoritarian features. These features were mostly 
incorporated in the 1980 constitution, with the exception of some specific military 
prerogatives that were implemented in the period of the transition itself.  
The main authoritarian enclaves consisted of several provisions. First of all, a 
number of ‘designated senators’ were to be appointed by the outgoing regime, 
favouring the Right in the Senate. Second, a binominal electoral model was 
implemented, influencing the electoral process in two ways. It forced political parties to 
group together in party coalitions (thus limiting the possibilities of future camino propio 
governments, and assuring consensus-based policies), and it favoured the second 
winning coalition in the elections (again favouring the Right, but also assuring that 
policies would have to be broadly carried in Congress). Third, it suppressed parties that 
favoured class struggle or acted ‘against the family’. Finally, it gave the military 
considerable prerogatives. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces could not be 
removed by the civilian government, the military held an important presence in a 
National Security Council, and the military were given the official status of ‘protectors 
of the democracy’. It also formalised the 1978 amnesty for human rights violations that 
had taken place between 1973 and 1977. During the transition, further leyes de amarre 
(tie-up laws) assured the military of increased amnesty and financial protection. After 
these final safeguards were effectively installed, Pinochet remarked that ‘everything will 
remain atado y bien atado (tied up and well tied up) under the loyal surveillance of our 
Army’ (Loveman 2001: 307). In 1989, Pinochet could argue that the purposes of his 
regime had been achieved: 
We have completely fulfilled the task that we took on ourselves on 11 
September 1973 to reconstruct the political, institutional and social-economic 
order in agreement with the authentic spirit of our race! The mission that was 
defined on that memorable day has been completely accomplished! (speech by 
Augusto Pinochet 1989).  
The political legacy of the Right was not uncontested. However, for several reasons the 
nature of the transition to democracy gave the regime a strong preponderance. First of 
all, the regime had initiated the transition itself, by constitutionally invoking the 1988 
plebiscite. Second, after 1986 the moderate opposition had concluded that the regime 
would not leave office as the result of mass demonstrations, and therefore decided to 
follow the rules of the constitution and await its chance in the plebiscite. Third, the 
economic recovery after 1985 and the subsequent boom in consumption gave the 
regime renewed legitimacy. Finally, the memory of the chaos and economic crisis of the 
last years of Chile’s democracy had made many Chileans fearful of a return to 
democracy. In short, the military regime still possessed a high degree of legitimacy and 
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support, not just among economic elites, but also among large sections of the 
population, 44 per cent of which had voted for Pinochet in 1988.  
These circumstances amount to what Linz and Stepan (1996: 205-218) call the 
pattern of the ‘highest level of institutional constraint’ for transitions to democracy, 
typical of an outgoing authoritarian regime which is united and hierarchical, and which 
enjoys wide support from influential civil allies. Such circumstances allow the outgoing 
regime to impose severe restrictions on the process of transition, and additionally retain 
a presence in the shadows of the state. Another key factor in the lasting legacy of the 
authoritarian model was the existence of a constitution. By having to play by the rules 
that had been set out by the military regime, the opposition had very little opportunity 
to extend its influence and eliminate the authoritarian enclaves. As a result, Linz and 
Stepan argue, the Concertación, guessing that it could not get the necessary support in 
the Senate, the judicial system, or other institutional platforms, decided to settle the 
matter in by largely accepting the status quo. This logic was strengthened by the need 
to implement its socio-economic programme, for which it needed right-wing support in 
the Senate. As a result, the choice between further modernisation and political conflict, 
possibly leading to instability, was decided in favour of the former.  
There are also other elements that contributed to the specific outcome of the 
Chilean transition. Peeler (2004: 61; 65) stresses the role of both the moderates within 
the military regime and the opposition. Transitions in which moderates of both camps 
form an alliance, Peeler argues, create ‘elite settlements’, in which the outcome of the 
process is carefully negotiated between the different actors. Even though Peeler does 
not find a true ‘elite settlement’ in the case of Chile, he argues that it was at least a tacit 
pact, which consists of a general agreement between the Right and the Concertación 
about the general course of the latter’s political project.  
Moulian (1997: 355-6) emphasises the need to negotiate certain aspects of the 
constitution before the return to democracy and the role of the moderate Right in this 
process. The 1980 constitution allowed for relatively easy amendments in the period 
before the return of democracy. After the new democratic government had taken 
power, though, it would become very difficult to implement constitutional reform, as it 
required special quorums in Congress. As a result, the opposition had no choice but to 
negotiate with the regime certain adaptations that were essential for creating a more or 
less manageable situation for the new government.65 The role of Renovación Nacional, 
the moderate and pro-democratic party of the Right, was crucial in these negotiations. 
In fact, Moulian argues, the situation occurred that the regime was not so much 
negotiating with the opposition but more with Renovación Nacional. Apparently willing 
to remove the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ from the constitution, RN appointed itself to 
mediate between the opposition and the regime. However, according to Moulian the 
willingness of Renovación Nacional to adapt the constitution was only limited to 
                                              
65 These amendments specifically concerned the number of designated senators, the abolition of an article 
that outlawed parties that favoured class struggle or acted against the family, and the binominal electoral 
system. Of these three, only the first two were changed to the desires of the Concertación.  
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removing the most radical parts of the authoritarian enclaves. Fearing that an overtly 
authoritarian constitution would easily be delegitimised, they assisted in ‘softening it 
up’ while leaving the authoritarian core intact. As a result, the strategy of the RN 
limited the negotiations to mere details, ensuring the continued existence of the 
authoritarian model.  
Jocelyn-Holt emphasises the compliant role of the opposition. Instead of seeking to 
replace the whole regime, including its authoritarian constitution, amnesty laws for 
military, and so on, the opposition had satisfied itself with replacing Pinochet only. As 
a result, they had allowed the authoritarian institutional order to remain intact under 
civilian rule. It was a ‘consensual transition’, Jocelyn-Holt claims, and as such not a true 
transition at all. Even though there may not have been an explicit agreement between 
the regime and the opposition, for several reasons the opposition was willing to settle 
for a tacit one. The longevity of the regime, fear of a return of the chaos of the past, 
and a certain habituation (and even internalisation) of the authoritarian model had 
steered the opposition towards this ‘consensual transition’, privileging continuity under 
the flag of change. As a result, the political leadership changed after the 1988 plebiscite, 
but the institutional order remained in place. It became a ‘civil-military regime’, starting 
in 1973, and stretching forward in democracy. Consequently, the choice for or against 
Pinochet in the plebiscite lost most of its meaning. It became, in the words of Jocelyn-
Holt, a mere choice of brands:  
[t]hey converted the difference between the Sí and the No in something that 
was not very different from the difference between Pepsi Cola and Coca Cola. 
In the end, they reduced a matter that demanded profundity to a mere option 
between brands (1997: 215).66 
Finally, Silva (1999) focuses on the element of fear in explaining the nature of the 
transition. Based on O’Donnell’s contention that the ‘perception of threat’ among the 
economic elites is a key factor in the conception and implementation of bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes, he argues that in the case of Chile, the perception of threat had 
been particularly influential. First of all, fear spread much further than just among the 
economic elites, and deeply affected the middle classes, which, as has been shown in 
the previous chapter, were key actors in the downfall of the government of the UP. 
Second, Silva argues, fear is not only a factor that explains the military coup, but also 
the behaviour of the Right, and much of the middle classes afterwards, and especially 
during the transition. The trauma of political polarisation, civil unrest, and economic 
crisis remained very present in the consciousness of large sections of the Chilean 
population. This was enforced by the regime’s continuous propaganda, legitimising its 
repressive nature by hyperbolically exposing the evils, true or untrue, of the previous 
government. Furthermore, the boom in consumption in the periods 1978-81 and 1986-
89 gave the middle classes another cause for fear, namely that the economic 
performance of a democratic regime might cause them to lose their newly gained 
                                              
66 For a critical analysis of the Chilean intellectual thinking on the transition, focusing on intellectuals 
such as Jocelyn-Holt, Brunner, Tironi and Moulian, see Javier Pinedo (2000).  
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standards of living. As a result, the population refused to support a change of regime, 
even during an economic crisis, if there was no viable alternative present, as remained 
clear during the mass demonstrations of 1983-4. Finally, the development of these 
demonstrations, rapidly radicalising and projecting images that could have come from 
1973, strengthened the fears of change among the middle classes. All these factors, Silva 
argues, contributed to a consensus among the opposition that a moderate strategy, 
based on cooperation, renovation and the creation of a viable alternative, was the only 
way to end the dictatorship (1999: 171-196). 
 
The Legacy of Social Modernisation 
The ‘Silent Revolution’ produced new patterns of social practices that strongly 
influenced Chilean patterns of modernity in the 1990s. The reorientation to the market 
instead of to the state proved to be deeply internalised by the Chilean population. 
Whereas in the 1960s, as Hofstede (2001) has shown, Chileans were characterised by 
their collectivist outlook, in the 1990s they proved to have become particularly 
individualistic (Marras 2001: 520-522). Additionally, the role of the individual in 
society had been transformed from that of a ‘citizen’ to that of a ‘consumer’. This 
process was initiated in the ‘consumption boom’ of 1978-81, and reaffirmed after 1985. 
As a result, the regime proved to be successful in muting civil society by replacing the 
values of political freedom and participation by those of consumption and economic 
freedom. This process was reinforced by the fear that was generated by the repression of 
the military regime, and by the traumatic recollections many Chileans held of the 
political radicalisation and economic chaos under the UP (Silva 1999: 174-180).  
Towards the end of the military regime these developments were not very clear. The 
protests of 1983-1985, the 1988 plebiscite, the downfall of the military regime, and the 
subsequent presidential elections of 1989 generated an atmosphere of optimism and 
involvement, which did not seem to indicate that the Chilean population had become 
apolitical or apathetic. However, as soon as democracy had been reinstated, and the 
new democratic government had survived the turbulence of the first few years, Chileans 
turned away from most forms of political participation. In fact, Chile’s political culture 
would become characterised by political apathy (especially among the young), 
passiveness, and a focus on individual competition in the market rather than collective 
bargaining with the state (Oppenheim 1993: 198; Riquelme 1999: 276-278). As Tironi 
argues, this is a consequence of the internalisation of the neo-liberal reforms of the 
military regime:  
In our society the logic of consumption (I choose and pay in the market for the 
most advantageous alternative, and demand that I get exactly what I pay for) has 
been internalised at an individual level (…) Consumers generally act in a 
solitary fashion. This is why in our society we no longer see the collective 
organisations of the past. The preferred weapon of the consumer is not politics, 
which is the weapon of the citizen. The consumer defends himself by 
complaining in the media (1999: 227-228).  
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Chileans have passed, Tironi argues, from a society in which the state was the dominant 
player in the 1970s, to a state in which enterprise took the lead in the 1980s, to a society 
in which the protagonist is the consumer in the 1990s (ibid.). To a large extent, this 
transformation has been a result of the process of social modernisation that took place 
under the project of the Right.  
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Chapter 6 
Growth with Equity: Modernity and the  
       End of History?  
How are we to interpret the era of the Concertación governments in the light of the 
competing projects of modernisation that have so drastically changed the path of 
Chilean modernisation? Is this a fourth project of modernisation, constructed out of 
the competition and interaction of the previous projects, and a bridge to future projects 
of modernisation in the long line of Chile’s trajectory towards modernity? Or is it a 
synthesis, a crystallisation of the patterns of modernity that were produced by its 
predecessors? Should we see the project of the Concertación as the end of the 
competition and interaction between the projects of the Centre, Left, and Right, and as 
such as an ‘end of history’, to use Fukuyama’s famous phrase? 
In this chapter, I will argue that both may be true. On the one hand, the project of 
the Concertación is clearly a project of modernisation that shares most of its 
characteristics with its predecessors. Like them, it is based on examples and dimensions 
of modernity that emphasised certain aspects of the modern, while ignoring others (see 
section 6.1.1). This orientation was once again supported by a new theory of 
development, which was specifically created and adapted to fit the Chilean context 
(section 6.1.2). The ideological and developmental currents were once more united 
through the supervision of the President (section 6.1.3). In its implementation the 
crucial role of the state as the motor of modernisation became clear once again, as well 
as the extensive use of technocracy and state planning (section 6.2.1). Political 
competition between the Centre, Left and Right played a central role in the 
development of the project (section 6.2.2). Finally, it too had to deal with the question 
of how to adapt the project in the light of public dissatisfaction - even though, as will 
be seen, this process followed other lines than in the past (section 6.2.3).  
On the other hand, the project of the Concertación may well be seen as an ‘end of 
history’. This can be approached on two levels. First, more or less in line with 
Fukuyama’s reading, the era of the Concertación has come to be characterised by a 
transversal consensus on the general development of Chile’s political, economic, and 
social structures. In consequence, no longer competition exists between different 
proyectos de país (country projects) In this sense history, understood as an ‘end point of 
ideological evolution’, has come to an end (Fukuyama 1992). This approach will be 
discussed in section 6.2.2. Second, we can view the project of the Concertación as a 
synthesis between the projects of the Centre, Left and Right. Just as interacting waves 
may form stable patterns of standing waves, the projects of the Centre, Left and Right 
have settled, or crystallised, into a more or less fixed model, el modelo chileno (the 
Chilean model). Elements from all three sides hold each other in balance, so to speak. 
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As a result, the model cannot be adapted easily, as the removal of one element may 
lead to the collapse of the entire structure (section 6.3).  
These two arguments may seem contradictory, as the interpretation of the project of 
the Concertación as a new project of modernisation suggests temporality, and the idea 
of an ‘end of history’ does not. However, I will attempt to show that they may in fact 
be reconcilable, and will end this chapter with some considerations on the future of the 
Chilean trajectory towards modernity and the possible end of its ‘end of history’. 
6.1 The Construction of a New Project: Growth with Equity 
The project of modernisation that was set in motion by the Concertación coalition 
(consisting mainly of the centrist Christian Democrat Party and the progressive PPD 
and PS) largely consisted of the same elements as its predecessors: a political ideology 
and a developmental theoretical foundation, which were blended into one all-
encompassing programme. However, in contrast to the previous projects it was also 
characterised by a high level of pragmatism.  
6.1.1 The Concertación Coalition and Modernity 
The notions of modernity and modernisation have been a driving force for the four 
governments of the Concertación coalition. All of them have stressed, both discursively 
and in political practice, an almost obsessive drive towards the modernisation of 
Chilean society in a relatively short period of time. However, during the sixteen years of 
Concertación governance, the interpretation of what modernity is or should be has 
undergone considerable changes - while once again certain aspects of the modern were 
clearly prioritised over others. It is therefore necessary to analyse the shifts in the views 
of the Concertación on modernity, while simultaneously stressing the elements of 
continuity between them.  
Three different phases can be discerned in the understanding of the notion of 
modernity by the different governments of the Concertación. First, the Aylwin 
government (1990-1994) was dominated by the logic of the transition. As a result, it 
focused on the restoration of democracy and the general reinsertion of Chile into the 
international community. Second, the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-
2000) emphasised technological progress and the modernisation of the state. Finally, 
the Lagos government (2000-2006) initially following the focus on technology of its 
predecessor, but made a shift halfway through its mandate by emphasising the creation 
of a welfare system. This line has been followed by the government of Bachelet (2006-) 
as well.  
 
Democratisation: the Return to Modernity 
In the ideological thinking of the Concertación in the late 1980s, democracy was the 
central element. Having lived through sixteen years of dictatorship, democratisation was 
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the first and most important objective that had to be achieved. As a result, the creation 
of a ‘modern democracy’ was acclaimed by all sectors of the Concertación.  
The notion of democracy as a key element in the construction of Chilean 
modernity is interesting as it reflects a fusion between the past and the future, or, in 
Aylwin’s terminology, a ‘re-encounter with the past’ (speech by Patricio Aylwin 1989). 
In the Chilean self-image, the country had been an example of the modern at the 
political level since the mid-nineteenth century, as it had been able to sustain its 
democratic structures while most other Latin-American countries were unable to 
follow.1 Moreover, as has been argued before, the notion of deepening democracy had 
played a fundamental role in the construction of modernity in projects of the Christian 
Democrats and the Left.2 From this perspective, the transition to ‘modern democracy’ 
in Chile in the 1990s equated with a return to the country’s pre-1973 democratic 
modernity.3 As Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle would put it in 1993, Chilean modernity could 
be constructed out of a mix between the past and the future: 
We are in the conditions to realise a synthesis between modernity and our own 
traditions, without imposing it from above, and to make way for more 
egalitarian ways of life, work, and social coexistence (speech by Eduardo Frei 
Ruiz-Tagle 1993).4 
This amalgamation of the country’s democratic past and future gave modernity a 
particularly historical content, while simultaneously downgrading the authoritarian 
government to an ‘intermezzo’, a hiccup in the continuous line of Chilean democratic 
modernity. In other words, it emphasised how modern the country had been and how 
modern it would be, while de-articulating how the country’s path towards modernity 
had changed in course during the 1970s and 1980s.  
However, the Centre-Left’s approach to ‘democratic modernity’ had changed 
considerably after sixteen years of authoritarian rule. The critique of ‘formal democracy’ 
which had characterised the projects of the Centre and the Left in the 1960s and early 
1970s, and their proposals for ‘true democracy’ on the basis of extensive power-sharing 
between the state and the population, had given way to a full acceptance of ‘formal 
democracy’ in an almost Schumpeterian sense (Silva 1993c: 215). Despite a discursive 
adherence to participation and an open decision-making structure, Chilean democracy 
                                              
1 As with most national self-images, the ‘Chilean democratic tradition’ is both true and false. In particular 
the authoritarian style of Chile’s democracy, its oligarchic nature, authoritarian intermezzos and other 
shortcomings have been strongly criticised by several authors, who have claimed that the Chilean 
‘democratic tradition’ has in fact been a myth. See Portales (2000, 2005), Rodríguez (1985). 
2 Both the Christian Democrats and the UP had stressed the need to achieve ‘true democracy’ instead of 
Chile’s ‘formal democracy’. See sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.1. 
3 This ‘pre-1973 democratic modernity’ not only consisted of a formally democratic system, but also of 
the rule of law, certain degrees of citizenship that were unknown in other Latin American countries, and 
a broadly shared respect for state institutions and the state in general. 
4 It is indicative of the academic nature of the governments of the Concertación that they followed, in 
their discourse, the latest academic approaches on matters such as modernity. Already in the early 1990s, 
the Concertación clearly differentiated between modernisation and modernity, and argued that 
modernity and traditions could function together in a hybrid form. Both arguments had quite recently 
been debated in academic circles concerned with matters of modernity. See section 1.2.  
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under the Concertación came to be characterised by its top-down nature and its 
presidentialism - two features that belonged to its history as much as its democratic 
nature. This change in approach to democracy by the Centre and the Left was the 
consequence of a process of political learning, as the experiments in the past had clearly 
shown the dangers of popular participation (Weeks 2002: 397). However, it was also 
directed by the political realities of the day: by 1990, it had become clear that it would 
be extremely difficult — if possible at all — to do away with the ‘authoritarian enclaves’. 
Furthermore, the broad popular support that still existed for Pinochet limited the space 
for the new government to move. As a consequence, there was little point to look even 
beyond the restoration of a simple liberal democratic model.5 As a result, under the 
Concertación, the political dimension of modernity remained more or less limited to 
the return to formal, and even Schumpeterian, modernity.  
 
Modernisation under the Aylwin Government 
As has been shown in the previous chapters, the projects of the Centre, Left, and Right 
had been founded on a critique of modernity. Based on this critique, their projects were 
focused on the creation of ‘alternative modernities’, in which the perceived downsides 
of modernity would be resolved. In the case of the Concertación, the creation of such 
an alternative was strongly restricted by two factors: the ideological renovation of the 
Left and the politica realities of the transition towards democracy. 
Instead, the notion of social justice, which had been the moral guideline of the 
Christian Democrats in particular, was moved forward as the most prominent point on 
the agenda of the Concertación. The socio-economic exclusion that had been produced 
under the neo-liberal project of the Right was considered to be the country’s most 
pressing problem. However, as Silva (1993b: 104-5) shows, the idea of justicia social was 
stripped of its political and ideological connotations. Presenting it as a national 
problem that could only be resolved with the support of all sectors of the population, 
the Concertación placed the problem of social justice in the context of a general 
process of modernisation. The existence of large marginal social sectors, the 
Concertación argued, was not just ethically wrong, but also a fundamental obstacle for 
the prospect of Chile becoming a truly modern country.6 
As a consequence, much like the Christian Democrats had done some twenty-five 
years earlier, an attempt was made to find an alternative to both raw capitalism and a 
state-led economy. However, as will be seen in section 6.2.1, this was by no means an 
ideological alternative based on notions such as communitarianism or socialcristianismo. 
                                              
5 The phrase ‘Chile’s re-encounter with history’ gained historical value and has been used on several 
occasions since. For instance, in 2004 it was re-used by President Ricardo Lagos to celebrate the 
constitutional reforms that had ended with most of the authoritarian enclaves: ‘we are gathered here 
today to celebrate, solemnly celebrate, Chile’s re-encounter with its history’ (speech by Lagos 2004). Two 
years later, Michelle Bachelet paraphrased it when arguing, during her inaugural speech, that she was the 
personification of the ‘re-encounter between the Chileans’, as she, like many others, had been a victim of 
the hatred of the past (speech by Michelle Bachelet 2006).  
6 This argument echoed much of the structuralist perspective of the Christian Democrats, who argued 
that development was only possible through the integration of the marginal masses. See section 3.1.2. 
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Essentially, the ‘alternative modernity’ that the Concertación offered consisted of a 
technical ‘third way’, in which the free market remained in place but would be 
regulated by the state in such a way that substantial income redistribution would 
become possible (Fermandois 2005: 506). In this way, the social element of Social 
Democrat welfare modernity and the economic element of Liberal modernity were 
combined in such a fashion that they would be able to reinforce each other.  
Despite the Concertación’s orientation towards modernity, it remained, like its 
predecessors, ambiguous towards the modern, shifting between a Social Democratic 
welfare model and the Liberal variant. In particular the free market model and its 
expressions such as consumerism and materialism worried certain sectors of the Centre-
Left. In a famous phrase, Aylwin declared in 1993 that he considered the market to be 
‘cruel’ and that he would not set foot in a mall, a new phenomenon in Chile in those 
years.7 As he argued in 2002:  
Maybe I am just old-fashioned. I come from another generation, another Chile. 
I do not feel comfortable in modernity, in a modern society, with all the 
individualism and consumption that seem to be in fashion nowadays’ (interview 
with Patricio Aylwin 26 April 2002).  
Sectors of the Left also felt uncomfortable with the maintenance of the neo-liberal 
model. In 1991, Clodomiro Almeyda, leader of the more radical sector of the PS, half-
heartedly defended the ‘third way’ course of his government by arguing that it would 
slow down the process of capital accumulation and allow for some level of social 
investment:  
It is true that regulation through intelligent planning might produce a lower 
rhythm of accumulation of capital (…). [T]he attempt to guide the economy, 
and even the market itself, in function of human needs, will permit the growth 
of what is more important: the value of the use of the richness that man 
generates, or in other words the capacity to satisfy those needs that allow the 
people to live in conditions that correspond with his dignity (speech by 
Clodomiro Almeyda 1991) 
However, other sections of the Concertación felt quite comfortable with the capitalist 
foundations of the new model for modernity. The new patterns of consumption and 
materialism, they argued, would provide the lower classes with access to middle-class 
lifestyles that previously would have been unthinkable. As Brunner argues 
retrospectively, consumption, credit cards and malls have produced a true social 
revolution:  
                                              
7 Aylwin’s phrase ‘the market is cruel’ came to be a something of a running joke among his political 
contenders, who invented several variations on the theme: ‘Aylwin thinks the market is cruel, but he 
implemented it nevertheless’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 238; San Francisco 2002: 17). In his memoirs, Aylwin 
argued that he intended to show that on the one hand, the market can generate tremendous affluence, 
but that it is very unjust in distributing it. Continuing, he refined his position on the malls: ‘I saw the 
mall as the expression of modernism, which would lead to massive consumerism, and in that phase I was 
struck by the progressive disappearance of the traditional small merchant, who could not compete’ 
(Serrano and Ascanio 2006: 276-7). 
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If you talk of a revolution in consumption, you would be wrong to thing that it 
is taking place in the highest classes of society, among the people who take their 
holidays in the Fiji Islands. In reality, the revolution is taking place in the other 
corner of society, among a large sector which is now able, for the first time, to 
go on vacation in Chile. They have never been able to leave their población, and 
now they go, at the weekends, in an old 1978 Renault maybe, but they take 
their children and go to the beach. That is the true revolution (interview with 
José Joaquín Brunner 21 March 2002).  
As a consequence, the position of the Concertación regarding an alternative modernity 
based on the idea of regulating capitalism was ambivalent. However, this did not lead to 
intra-coalitional conflict during the first half of the 1990s. A high level of pragmatism, 
combined with the conclusion that the political realities did not allow for a more 
radical approach, facilitated the broad acceptance of the model.8  
 
New Perceptions of Modernisation: the Governments of Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Lagos  
While Aylwin’s government had largely been focused on dealing with the legacies of 
the past, the Frei government was able to look forwards. It did so by emphasising 
modernisation on the infrastructural and institutional levels (Fuentes 1999: 207-8). 
Frei’s presidential campaign Los Nuevos Tiempos (The New Times) showed the same 
optimistic imagery of modernity as the ‘La Alegría ya Viene’ (Happiness is Coming) 
campaign of the Concertación for the plebiscite five years earlier. It took place in the 
context of elections in which the ideological differences between the presidential 
candidates were subordinated to their personality, and in which ‘difficult themes’ were 
avoided (Angell and Pollack 2005: 43). As a result, the Concertación used ‘general’ and 
optimistic images of modernity that left most ideological themes open and focused on 
the future. As Frei Ruiz-Tagle put it: 
Los Nuevos Tiempos was a campaign motto that reflected the discussion in Chile 
on when the transition ended. We used the motto ‘the new times’ to say that 
the transition was over and we had entered normality, that we as a country were 
able to confront the processes of globalisation that we faced. Now, with the 
transition terminated, what we needed to do was to enter a process of 
modernisation, of modernisation of the state, which before had not been 
possible (interview with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle on 22 April 2002).  
In its practice, the presidency of Frei Ruiz-Tagle was based on a profoundly technical 
and material perception of modernity. It became characterised in particular by the so-
called ‘modernisation of the state’, an overdue but highly technical operation, with the 
explicit objective to ‘make of the state a true agent of progress’ (Cañas 2003: 27). This 
reform included an increase in transparency of the bureaucracy, improvement of 
services, and application of new technology, especially IT and internet services, and 
                                              
8 There also existed a consensus that if Chile wanted to be modern, a certain price would have to be paid. 
‘Chile is part of the modern world’, Frei Ruiz-Tagle argued in 1994, ‘and therefore cannot escape the 
problems of that modern world’ (speech by Frei Ruiz-Tagle 1994). In general, even when sectors of the 
Concertación considered mass consumption, credit cards and malls to be negative by-products of 
modernity, few actually sought to repress or mitigate them.  
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systematised human resource management.9 Furthermore, the path towards modernity 
under the Frei Ruiz-Tagle government came to be characterised by physical 
modernisations such as infrastructural projects, mostly on the basis of state-private 
cooperation.  
Frei’s emphasis on technological and physical modernisation was initially continued 
by Lagos. Stressing in his 2000 presidential speech that in 2010 Chile should be ‘fully 
developed and integrated’, and that ‘all Chileans, male or female, must be incorporated 
into the modern world’, Lagos pinpointed high technology as the main motor of this 
process of modernisation. Digital connectivity received special attention: during the 
speech Lagos referred to the Internet fifteen times, and assured Congress that the 
Chilean state ‘will put itself at the global vanguard of connectivity’ (speech by Ricardo 
Lagos 2000). However, a year or two into his mandate Lagos made a new turn in the 
Concertación’s agenda for modernisation. The AUGE (Acceso Universal con Garantías 
Explícitas, Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees) plan, that was introduced by 
Lagos in 2003 and was implemented in 2005, provided the Chilean population with 
state-sponsored treatment for the most frequent and dangerous illnesses. Besides 
AUGE, Lagos inaugurated the project Chile Solidario (Solidary Chile), to be carried out 
by the planning office MIDEPLAN, which was to create a welfare system for the 
poorest sectors of society. Even though they were not openly defined as such, AUGE 
and Chile Solidario were the first steps towards the creation of a ‘welfare state’ in Chile.  
This notion of creating a ‘European-style’ social security network was continued by 
Bachelet. Putting forward an Agenda Pro-Equidad (Pro-Equity Agenda), she has intended 
to mitigate the negative effects of the neo-liberal model on the distribution of wealth in 
the country. To this end, she has emphasised the value of citizenship and the re-
orientation of the citizens towards the state for the fulfilment of their needs and the 
creation of a better society:  
I was the candidate of the citizens. Now I will be the President of the citizens. 
Chile requires new politics for a new citizenship. I will be the President of a 
much better Chile. More modern, more egalitarian (speech by Michelle 
Bachelet on 11 March 2006). 
With this Bachelet has added a traditional dimension of the political dimension of 
Chile’s modernity, popular participation, to the neo-liberal and consumerist patterns of 
modernity that had become so characteristic of Chile under Growth with Equity. 
Meanwhile, though, she has maintained the technical and top-down style of 
government that has characterised the previous governments of the Concertación. If 
successful, this approach might be able to replace the ‘techno-Schumpeterian’ 
democratic model of the Concertación (Silva 1998a: 87) with a ‘techno-participative’ 
one.  
                                              
9 For a deeper analysis of the modernisation of the state and the role of the state during the governments 
of the Concertación, see section 6.2.1. A similar project of modernisation under the Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
government was the Judicial Reform, which was targeted to improving the juridical infrastructure and 
replacing obsolete and dysfunctional procedures. See Correa (1999: 303-312). 
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6.1.2 Neo- Structuralism: the Past in the Present?  
In the 1980s, a new developmental paradigm arose in Latin America in response to the 
then dominant neo-liberal theories of development. As in the case of structuralism and 
dependencia, the development of this ‘neo-structuralism’ was initiated in Chile, although 
it was influential in many Latin American countries.10 It was simultaneously elaborated 
at different think-tanks of the opposition in Santiago, such the CEPAL, but in 
particular at the Christian Democrat-oriented Corporation of Economic Investigation 
for Latin America (CIEPLAN). As has been shown in the previous chapter, in the late 
1970s opposition economists (mostly Christian Democrat) started to criticise the neo-
liberal model and propose alternative strategies (Silva 1991a: 401-403). Roughly based 
on structuralist theory, they proposed a greater role for the state in the process of 
development (Muñoz 1982: 571-2), participation of organised labour in the decision-
making process (Foxley 1982: 524) and in general a more open, pragmatic and less rigid 
approach to economic decision-making (Ffrench-Davis 1982: 567). However, they 
adopted the neo-liberal emphasis on the supply side (in contrast to the neo-Keynesian 
focus on demand) as a key element of development:  
[T]he heart of development lies on the supply side: quality, flexibility, the 
efficient combination and utilisation of productive resources, the adoption of 
technological developments, an innovative spirit, creativity, the capacity for 
organisation and social discipline, private and public austerity, an emphasis on 
savings and the development of skills to compete internationally. In short, 
independent efforts that are undertaken from within to achieve self-sustained 
development (Sunkel 1993: 20-21). 
Apart from attacking the ruling neo-liberal paradigm, however, these economists also 
developed a critique of the structuralist theories themselves. In one of the first articles 
that systematically described the neo-structuralist approach, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 
targeted two main shortcomings of structuralism: its lack of concern with short-term 
solutions and its excessive linkage of national development with planning. According to 
Ffrench-Davis, these shortcomings were mainly due to the analytical approach of 
structuralism, exclusively focusing on the extremes that existed in the economic policy-
making spectrum, such as arbitrary protectionism versus total free trade. As a result, it 
paid very little or no attention to pragmatic solutions, such as finding alternative 
mechanisms for promoting investment, regulating foreign trade and the creation of 
more productive jobs (Ffrench-Davis 1988: 38). This critique was confirmed in a special 
CIEPLAN publication on neo-structuralism in the same year.11 In her contribution, 
Nora Lustig stressed that in order to remain a valuable current in alternative economic 
thinking, structuralism should adopt short-term strategies:  
                                              
10 Perhaps the most influential Latin American proponent of the neo-structural paradigm has been former 
dependency-advocate Fernando Cardoso, who, as president of Brazil (1995-2003) practised a neo-
structuralist economic policy.  
11 In 1991, Patricio Meller published an English version of this CIEPLAN publication under the title ‘The 
Latin American Development Debate’. See Meller (1991).  
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An alternative school of thought cannot remain seated with its arms crossed 
during processes of galloping inflation, using as an argument that its solution 
would only be attainable though fundamental changes, the results of which 
would only become clear in the long run’ (Lustig 1988: 47).12  
Others, like Cepalino Fernando Fajnzylber, strongly criticised the idea of ‘inward-
oriented growth’ that had been promoted by structuralism, and emphasised the need to 
create a durable, ‘authentic’ competitiveness in the periphery, based on technological 
progress and institutional reform (Fajnzylber 1988; 1989). Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, neo-structuralism came to be defined as deeply dependent on structuralism, 
maintaining the combination of abstract and historical elements in its analysis, and 
drawing on the works of authors such as Pinto, Ahumada, Furtado, Prebisch and 
Sunkel.13 It emphasised the inclusion of the population in the socio-economic realm, 
redistribution of income, and a strong, if limited, role for the state. However, it added 
to these analyses a systematic attempt to formulate economic policies that were to be 
effective in the short term. Furthermore it focused on the maintenance of:  
macroeconomic equilibriums, the coordination of short-term and long-term 
measures, initiatives aimed at ensuring that the public and the private sectors 
will act in concert with one another, [and] the building of structures of 
production and management which will ensure a greater degree of equality 
(Ffrench-Davis 1988: 39).  
Like its predecessors, it was a vanguard theory, home-made by some of the finest 
economic elites of the time, and adapted to the local circumstances. It, too, would 
become an exemplary paradigm for other countries within Latin America and beyond, 
as it came to be a ‘model’ that rose above both neo-liberalism and traditional state-
orientation.14 However, in one specific feature it differed fundamentally from its 
predecessors: it rejected social engineering and utopianism as a means for achieving its 
goals. Having learned from the errors that had been made by structuralist policies in the 
                                              
12 Lustig also argues that this old error of structuralism was in fact repeated by the neo-liberal orthodoxy, 
which pursued ‘structural change’ in the form of the liberation of the markets. In the implementation of 
this ‘structural change’, the neo-liberals did not bother with the local circumstances and the nature of 
their implementation, as they focused exclusively on the long-term boom they would generate (Lustig 
1988: 47).  
13 Also in their sense of timing, structuralism and neo-structuralism were closely related, as both 
advocated development strategies that had already been set in motion years earlier. In the late 1950s, 
structuralism confirmed the import substitution strategy that had been set in motion in the two decades 
before; similarly, neo-structuralism supported the free market and export-oriented economic model that 
had been implemented in the mid-1970s as the central motor of development, although with some 
adaptations.  
14 Many of the neo-structural strategies would become popular worldwide in the form of the ‘third-way’ 
policies that were implemented in the 1990s by presidents such as Clinton, Blair, Schröder, Cardoso and 
Kok. However, ‘third-way’ policies are generally characterised by a highly unclear and poorly defined set 
of policies, while in the Chilean case a coherent, if heterodox and pragmatic, theory lay at the basis of 
governmental policies. As a result, there is some difference of opinion on the question of whether Chile 
is an example of a ‘third way’ country. Fermandois (2005: 506) argues that it is, while Alejandro Foxley 
(2001: 102) claims that the European ‘third way’ is quite different from the Chilean experience. A ‘third 
way’ position is taken by Taylor (2006), who argues that in Chile, the ‘third way’ has been profoundly 
adapted to the local circumstances.  
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past, as well as from the mistakes that had been made by their neo-liberal heirs, the neo-
structuralists argued against a simplified and standardised approach to the economy and 
development. Instead, they promoted the increase of ‘uncertainty’ in economic policy-
making. First, they did so by amplifying the number of variables taken into account in 
the analysis of development processes. Factors which were previously taken to be 
constants, such as the rate of poverty, the institutions, science and technology, were 
now to be taken as variables, creating more complex and diffuse images that better 
reflected the complexities of reality (Griffith-Jones and Sunkel 1987: 235). Second, neo-
structuralism stressed a heterodox approach to economic policy-making, rejecting pre-
conceived standard recipes and solutions, and emphasising a practical approach instead. 
Unlike neo-liberal theory, which claimed that in all the same cases, the same solutions 
apply, neo-structuralism argued that solutions could vary according to the point in time 
and local institutional circumstances (Ffrench-Davis 1988: 40). In short, as Guillermo 
Larraín pointed out, rather than claiming to have all the answers, neo-structuralism 
emphasised uncertainty and a creative but never-ending path of finding practical 
solutions for complex situations (Larraín 2005: 69).15 As a result, it did not provide a 
blueprint for modernity, as neo-liberalism had done. Neither did it propose a clear and 
unambiguous path towards full development, like structuralism. Rather than being a 
true developmental theory, then, neo-structuralism was an approach, or a general set of 
guidelines, which could be filled in according to the local circumstances.  
Underlying this approach to economic policy-making was a profound sense of 
pragmatism. In a sense this was not new; it was already discernable in the second phase 
of the neo-liberal project under Minister of Finance Büchi, but now it came to be one 
of the foundations of the economic model. Nor did it remain limited to it: as will be 
seen in section 6.1.3, the whole project of the Concertación came to be characterised by 
a profoundly pragmatic approach to policy-making.  
Neo-structuralism was conceived and elaborated mainly as a criticism of the neo-
liberal paradigm. Through the construction of an alternative to neo-liberalism, the neo-
structural economists hoped to create a viable economic model for Latin America that 
would be able to combine sustainable development with a more equal distribution of 
wealth. However, rather than creating an antithesis of neo-liberalism, neo-structuralists 
sought to harmonise the key themes of structuralist thought with the realities of a 
globalised world, and, in the Chilean case, an existing neo-liberal model. In doing so, 
they blended elements of both worlds, making neo-structuralism somewhat less than a 
full-blown alternative to neo-liberalism (Gwynne and Kay 2004: 263).16  
The main differences between neo-liberalism and neo-structuralism lie in the 
relations between the market, the state and civil society. Whereas neo-liberalism argues 
                                              
15 For a short overview of the structuralist roots of neo-structuralism and the model of the Concertación, 
see: Larraín (2005: 37-69). 
16 Dependencia, the ‘other’ influential paradigm for development, was not integrated into the neo-structural 
doctrines. Its anti-capitalism and hostility towards the international markets, together with its associations 
with the economic failures of the UP, had de-legitimised it as a viable economic current (Fermandois 
2005: 489).  
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that the market can never lead to structural disequilibriums, and as a result state 
intervention is unnecessary and disruptive, neo-structuralism claims that the market 
does produces such disequilibriums, and that the state should play a regulatory role in 
order to correct them (Muñoz 1993: 18). This is not to say that the state should be the 
motor of development through state-led industrialisation; neo-structuralism views the 
market and the state as complementary and assigns to the state a limited, if important 
role. The state has to be strong enough to regulate the market, but also small enough to 
leave room for the market, as private enterprise is considered to be the motor of 
development (Osorio 2003: 136). Furthermore, the neo-structuralists take a much more 
diffuse position towards market liberalisation and the opening of markets. Although 
they follow the neo-liberal argument that open markets and free trade are essential for 
economic growth, they warn against generic policies, and advocate selective and 
differentiated approaches, in which certain sectors receive more protection than others, 
and regional trade is favoured over global trade (Ffrench-Davis 1988: 41-2). Finally, in 
contrast with their neo-liberal counterparts, neo-structuralists emphasise the need for 
redistribution of wealth through the state, as well as the strengthening of civil society, 
which is viewed as essential for the stimulation of the necessary transformations that 
will lead to development (Osorio 2003: 137). As a result, the market and the state 
become interdependent, as the state needs economic growth for redistribution, and the 
market needs increased buying power from the poor in order to grow.  
Towards the end of the dictatorship, the new paradigm of neo-structuralism had the 
additional value of providing the opposition with a viable economic theory. Once 
again, the creation of a serious alternative political project came to be closely tied to the 
adoption of a vanguard theory of development, which was elaborated by local experts 
and which was of the highest scientific standards (Puryear 1994: 146). The influence of 
neo-structuralism was highly visible, as important neo-structuralist economists kindly 
lent their hand in a large number of oppositional publications. Although the new 
paradigm developed slowly, only becoming clearly defined towards the end of the 
1980s, authors such as Osvaldo Sunkel, Alejandro Foxley, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, 
Patricio Meller, and Oscar Muñoz came to be influential neo-structural economists who 
played important roles in the Centre-Left opposition.17  
The adoption of neo-structuralism by the pre-Concertación opposition was a 
relatively slow process. From only the formation of the Democratic Alliance on, a tardy 
but steady adoption of the main neo-structural propositions becomes visible. In the 
                                              
17 Some of the central theses of neo-structuralism had been developed earlier, in the 1970s. Sergio 
Molina, for instance, emphasised as early as 1976 that social investment should come from economic 
growth rather than from active income redistribution. In a publication that envisioned what Chile would 
look like in 2010, he argues that the future success of the country is the result of this approach: [This] is 
not to say that the rate of economic growth was not important. On the contrary, it was a necessary 
condition in order to have effective redistribution in terms of higher consumption of goods and services 
by the poorest sectors. It was also essential in preventing this relative improvement from taking place 
without creating overly conflictual social tensions, which would have arisen if it had been necessary to 
drastically reduce the standard of living of the relatively more favoured social sectors (Molina 1976: 392).  
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1983 Manifiesto Democrático (democratic manifest) of the Concertación’s predecessor, 
the Democratic Alliance, the state is still presented as the main actor in post-
authoritarian Chile, and little continuity with the neo-liberal model is projected. Three 
years later, the 1986 Bases de Sustentación del Régimen Democrático (Bases of Sustainability 
of the Democratic Regime) of the same coalition argues for a more mixed model: 
We consider that a modern society in search of development and a better 
assignment of resources cannot do without the market, social cooperation, and 
state action, through for instance planning. 
Finally, in the 1989 Programa Básico de Gobierno of the Concertación, continuity with 
the status quo is emphasised in a clearly neo-structural and pragmatic tone:  
We commit ourselves to an economy which develops in such a fashion that it is 
possible to take long-term decisions, which is an indispensable condition for a 
dynamic development, without taking excessive risks through sharp disequilibria 
or brusque changes in command. Therefore, we commit ourselves to stability in 
the rules of the game and the guidance of the macroeconomic variables, 
compatible with gradual and foreseeable change. (…) the programme that we 
hereby present to the judgement of the country sets the limits of change for the 
first democratic government. 
During the Concertación era itself, the development of the interpretation of neo-
structuralism by the subsequent governments can be divided into two phases. Up to 
1997, the model remained highly successful, both in terms of economic growth and in 
the redistribution of wealth and the reduction of poverty. As a result, the neo-structural 
paradigm faced little criticism and experienced few fundamental adaptations. After 
1997, however, the strong negative influence of the Asian crisis on the Chilean 
economy brought to light the model’s high vulnerability to external shocks. The rapid 
decline in economic growth, combined with the stagnation in the figures of poverty, led 
to a storm of criticism, from both the Left and Right. As a result, the model was 
adapted along two separate lines. On the one hand, more emphasis was laid on 
maintaining monetary discipline and showing fiscal responsibility by the state, in an 
attempt to appease the opposition as well as to reassure foreign investors. This line of 
action is best represented by the superavit estructural, the structural surplus of one 
percent of the state budget, which was introduced in 1998 by the Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
government and has been maintained since then.18  
On the other hand, the element of social investment and redistribution has been 
reinforced, especially with the presidency of Ricardo Lagos. Making good use of the 
                                              
18 The emphasis on fiscal discipline and long-term stability has remained a priority ever since. However, it 
has also pushed its limits. In 2006, the Bachelet government decided to dedicate the extra state income 
from the booming copper prices to the formation of an international stabilisation fund, intended to 
stimulate innovation, instead of spending it on the many pressing social demands, with the argument 
that in the future, falling copper prices might lead to structural fiscal deficits (speech by Bachelet 2006b) 
However, protests, strikes and tomas by secondary students, in May and June 2006, which were broadly 
supported by the population despite their at times violent nature, seem to show a sense of national 
frustration with what may be considered an over-cautious fiscal policy (La Tercera 6 June 2006; Patricio 
Navia weblog 29 May 2006).  
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little room that was left within the boundaries of monetary and fiscal discipline, La 
Moneda intensified its efforts to invest in structural poverty reduction, education, and 
the creation of some sort of a ‘welfare state’, although in an embryonic form. The 
AUGE plan, the attempts both by the Lagos government as well as that of Bachelet to 
reform the pension system, and the law setting limits to labour flexibility that is 
currently being debated in Congress, are indications that the last two governments of 
the Concertación are serious in their attempts to combine their increased fiscal 
discipline with an intensification of their social policies. 
6.1.3 The Project of the Concertación: Growth with Equity 
The Concertación’s political ideology, modernising drive, and developmental approach 
merged into a project of modernisation that went beyond a set of strategies and formed 
a detailed and coherent approach to the country’s challenges for the 1990s and beyond. 
In fact, it grew to become something of a ‘model’ that could be exported and used as an 
example for other countries in the region, at least in the perception of some.19 
Furthermore, it has been surprisingly successful, despite several serious setbacks and 
differences of opinion within the Concertación. Its stability is also surprising: although 
there have been some shifts in focus and priorities during the last sixteen years, the core 
project of the Concertación has remained fundamentally unchanged since it was first 
implemented in 1990. As such, it has outrun the military government’s neo-liberal 
project, which lasted for fifteen years after its implementation in 1975, and still there 
seems to be no end in sight. Without a doubt, the project of the Concertación, 
Crecimiento con Equidad (Growth with Equity) will enter Chile’s history books as one of 
the most successful projects of the last two centuries (Navia 2004: 67-68). 
The basic assumption of the project was surprisingly simple. It claimed that growth 
and equality could be compatible and even mutually reinforcing. This was not an 
obvious argument at the time and contradicted the classic dictum of economics that 
economic growth and a better income distribution cannot be achieved at the same 
time. Moreover, the country’s recent history had proved clearly that growth and 
equality were related in a zero-sum way. As many clearly remembered, redistribution of 
wealth under the UP had wrecked the economy, while economic expansion under 
Pinochet had plunged large sections of society into poverty. Nonetheless, the 
Concertación argued that this was not a necessary outcome. Given certain 
circumstances, it was argued, economic growth, even within the context of the free 
market, could generate increased equality and higher standards of living for all. 
Simultaneously, growth depended on the increasing social and economic participation 
of the poor. As President Aylwin argued, in 1990, in a meeting with employers’ 
organisation ENADE:  
                                              
19 Few Chilean politicians would dare to suggest openly that the Chilean model is exemplary for the 
region. However, many commentators point to Chile’s socio-economic system as an important model for 
Latin America and, implicitly, some politicians have hinted the same (Fermandois 2005: 513-515). 
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Today, Chile is achieving important economic results and simultaneously 
stimulating equality in the social area. For me and my government, this is an 
ethical and political imperative. But it is also one of the conditions for long-
term stability, and, as a result, of the economic success of productive activities 
(speech by Patricio Aylwin 1992).  
In short, it was argued that growth and equity were not opposites but in fact two sides 
of the same coin: without the integration of the excluded masses, no sustained 
economic growth could take place, while at the same time the inclusion of the poor 
could only be achieved through rapid economic growth.20 This went further than the 
simple ‘trickle down’ theories from the neo-liberal court, which argued that economic 
growth would automatically raise standards of living through, for instance, increased 
demand for labour. In the vision of the Concertación, the state would play a 
fundamental role in the redistribution of the wealth that was generated by rapid and 
sustained economic growth. The state should regulate the markets and simultaneously 
implement large-scale social policies - but never go so far as to curb the expansion of 
the economy. As a result, the government, if it wanted to achieve serious poverty 
reduction, would have to foster the macro-economic equilibriums, while the 
opposition, comprising the entrepreneurial sectors, would have to support social 
redistribution if it wanted to ensure economic growth. In this sense, the Concertación 
was able, at least on a discursive level, to transform a historical zero-sum game into a 
win-win situation.21 
The conceptual originality and logic of Crecimiento con Equidad involved a 
fundamental ambiguity, however. Whereas crecimiento is a clear term and well 
understood, equidad seems to be a word that is much more open to various 
interpretations. Meaning both ‘equity’ and ‘equality’, it seemed to allow for at least two 
different readings.22 As ‘equity’, it would suggest integration of the population, with 
access to the basic benefits of the state for all, in order to achieve equality of 
opportunity and lives with dignity for all. As equality, it would suggest a much more 
socialist, or social-democrat, understanding, which would imply a big reduction in 
economic inequality and a state-sponsored network of social services in the style of the 
European welfare states. The first interpretation followed more or less the notion of 
social justice of the Christian Democrats and the line of argument of Frei’s ‘Revolution 
in Liberty’, while the second would appeal much more to the Socialist sectors of the 
Concertación (Oyarzún 2006). As will be shown in section 2.2, this conceptual 
                                              
20 The Christian Democrat and structuralist influence in this argument is very clear, as it follows more or 
less the same lines of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ almost thirty years earlier. The main difference is that 
after thirty years of socio-economic experiments, the combination of economic growth with social 
redistribution had now become acceptable to both the Left and Right-wing sectors.  
21 Obviously, the project of the Concertación went much further than a simple allusion to combining 
growth with equity. Elaborate plans were designed for areas such as health care, education, infrastructure 
and so forth. However, all these policies fell under the same logic: that of combining the expansion of 
the free market with increased social justice (Programa Básico de Gobierno) 
22 Like English, Spanish has two different words for equity and equality (equidad and igualdad). In daily 
speech, however, equidad is used much more often, representing both values.  
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vagueness would become a significant source of conflict within the Concertación, but 
would on the other hand provide the ideological space which the parties of the 
coalition needed in order to cohabit together.  
The project of modernisation that was set in motion by the Concertación echoed 
the optimism that had characterised the projects of the Christian Democrats and the 
UP, but without the element of class confrontation. It was original, mixing elements 
that were considered by many to be contradictory, in this case a free market economy 
and state regulation. Finally, the project of the Concertación, was, just like its 1964 and 
1970 counterparts, very well defined and detailed, dealing with a full range of themes 
(including women’s rights, the position of the Mapuche population and environmental 
issues), and providing a sound technical and economic base for the new government. 
(Angell 2005: 25).23 However, in several aspects it moved away from its predecessors, 
putting, to a certain degree, an end to what Góngora has labelled the Age of Global 
Planning. Two elements are crucial here: the pragmatic approach of the Concertación as 
well as of their project, and the emphasis on consensus and transversal cooperation.  
 
Pragmatism 
The pragmatism that has come to characterise the Concertación had been developing 
for years before Aylwin came to power in 1990. On the one hand, this was a response 
to the political realities of the time. With almost half the population in support of the 
military regime, a certain level of pragmatism would be essential for political survival. 
On the other hand, however, pragmatism was based on ideological considerations. As 
has been argued in the previous chapter, the PDC had lost much of its hard line after 
the death of Eduardo Frei, while the Left underwent a slow and multi-faceted process of 
renovation from the late 1970s on. These processes produced a new political culture 
among the Centre and Left which was characterised by a rejection of utopianism, social 
engineering and unilateral and exclusive proyectos de país:  
Democracy implies the rejection of the spirit of messianic utopianism, that is, 
the notion that it is possible to achieve, within a relatively short time, an 
absolute objective, a perfect society and political system, and that the greatness 
and imminence of this achievement allow for the exercise of unlimited power 
(Democratic Alliance 1986).  
Instead, the Concertación resorted to what it called ‘modern politics’, a mix between 
intellectualisation and pragmatism, that was considered to be more rational and 
                                              
23 There exists an interesting difference between the programme for the 1988 plebiscite and that for the  
1988-9 presidential campaign. While the latter was founded on an elaborate political and socio-economic 
programme, the first almost completely lacked one. Eugenio Tironi, one of the campaign organisers, 
explains this lack of content as follows: ‘If you look at the campaign for the NO you notice that it never 
had a programmatic content, it never said: “This is what we are going to do with the economy, with 
work, with democracy”. That wasn’t part of our contract with the people, which said only two things. 
First, that la alegría ya viene (happiness is coming), and second (…) vote SÍ if you want Pinochet to carry 
on for another eight years, or vote NO so that some time free elections will take place, when you can 
vote for any candidate’ (Tironi 2002: 163).  
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effective than the ideologies and intuitive politics of the past.24 As Alejandro Foxley 
argued in 1991, a form of ‘modern politics’ had emerged among the opposition in the 
1980s, which is ‘less ideological, more flexible, understands the modern world better 
and is thus more adaptable, more inclined towards agreement’ (quoted in Puryear 1994: 
131). Although this new style was supported throughout the Concertación, its leaders, 
probably aware of the fact that pragmatism is essential for politicians, but should never 
be acknowledged, tended to go to some lengths to avoid the word itself, and instead 
used phrases such as ‘modern politics’ or ‘non-ideological thinking’ (Pinedo 2000: 189). 
As Aylwin put it:  
What Chile demands of us is to conserve the good, correct the bad and improve 
the mediocre. That is the only efficient method to advance towards the noble 
and just objective of bringing together reality and ideal (speech by Patricio 
Aylwin 1990). 
However, there were some who were more open in their appreciation of pragmatism as 
a foundation for the politics of the Concertación. An especially valuable contribution 
in this context comes from José Joaquín Brunner, who explicitly promoted pragmatism 
as the basis for the ‘modern politics’ of the Concertación.25 Arguing that pragmatism 
constitutes by no means the absence of values or of ideals, but that it emphasises taking 
responsibility for the consequences of policies rather than just for its intentions, he 
claims that it should be the basis for modern politics: 
The ethics that underlies pragmatism (…) are the ethics of responsibility, which 
probably are the only ethics compatible with politics in a modern sense 
(Brunner 1991: 32).  
Pragmatism, Brunner continues, is desirable for several reasons. First, of all it is 
egalitarian in the sense that it chooses the best strategy, after considering all options, 
without precluding certain solutions. Second, it is tolerant of, if not favourable to, a 
diversity of views, as it thrives on the choice between several options. Furthermore, 
while recognising the importance of ideologies, pragmatism avoids over-ideologisation. 
Rather than simply proclaiming ideological truths, pragmatism defends ideals within 
the context of the possibility of their realisation. Finally, it avoids the trap of making 
‘religious icons’ out of what are essentially policy tools: 
[pragmatism] does not glorify the state nor does it need to ‘believe’ in the 
market. Instead, it asks itself what effects would be produced by certain actions 
of the state, or what consequences would be the result of the functioning of the 
market under certain circumstances. (…) Only pragmatism is able to combine 
                                              
24 Puryear (1994: 131-153) shows how the intellectualisation of the opposition had created what 
Boeninger would call the ‘modernisation of politics’, in the sense of an new political style that was both 
pragmatic and academic, and which was shared broadly among the parties of the Centre and Left, 
excluding the Communist Party.  
25 Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt (1997: 231) argues that this pragmatism has a historical pedigree, as both the 
Revolution in Liberty and the Chilean Road to Socialism chose to implement their radical reforms from 
within the framework of liberal institutionalism. This is certainly true; however, the pragmatism that 
Brunner alludes to concerns rather the process of decision-making than the strategic planning of the 
project.  
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conflicting interests, to argue rationally in uncertain situations, and subject 
ideologies and ideals to the possibilities that are offered by reality (ibid., pp. 33-
34).26  
Obviously, such outspoken adherence to pragmatism did not reflect the positions of 
the more leftist or conservative sectors of the Concertación, and rather reflects the 
centrist position in the Concertación. However, in general, pragmatism came to be a 
central feature of both the Concertación itself as well as of its project and, as will be 
shown in section 6.2.2, turned out to be a key factor in its success.27  
 
Building Consensus 
The other characteristic of the project of the Concertación was its emphasis on 
consensus. Having learned from the three camino propios that the Centre, Left, and 
Right had taken in the past, and with which each had intended to implement its own 
model disregarding their minority position, the Concertación now sought a model of 
governance that would avoid polarisation and create broadly supported policies. Here 
again, exile proved functional in the re-orientation of the opposition. Having 
experienced the models of democratic governance that were used in Europe, a wide 
interest arose among the opposition in the consensus models that had been developed 
there (Silva 1993b: 97).28 Important figures such as Alejandro Foxley, Edgardo 
Boeninger and Nobert Lecher came to be influenced by the ‘consociate democracies’ of 
countries such as Belgium, where consensus and pragmatism were promoted as a means 
                                              
26 Other important academic figures from the opposition also contributed to the debate on pragmatism, 
or, as it was called in the early 1980s, realism. For instance Flisfisch (1984: 21-23) argues that realism is 
the only founding political principle that is adequate in a society in which all actors are interdependent, 
and in which the materialisation of the goals of one political sector does not necessarily benefit society as 
a whole. In turn, Lechner (1984: 2-4) ties the notion of realism to that of time, not only in the sense of 
intending to construct now a society that will be better in the future, but also in the sense of a realist 
allocation of available time: only so much can be done in the given time, so a realist assessment has to be 
made of what time allows to be done.  
27 For Jocelyn-Holt, the pragmatism of the Concertación is the direct result of the modernising drive of its 
leaders, and reflects opportunism rather than ideology. ‘Our most recent history has had one goal only, 
the desire to modernise ourselves; but those who have intended to direct the process did not fully 
anticipate the consequences or the course this process has taken. Therefore, at the end of the day, and in 
spite of the clear images of the future they originally presented and still claim for themselves, they have 
had to accommodate themselves to a trajectory that in all ways reveals more surprises and frustrations. 
The result can be seen by the zigzagging and pragmatism they have been forced to engage in’ (1997: 225). 
28 There were internal processes that were important for the rise of consensus-thinking, too. In an 
interview with the historian Patricia Arancibia, Alejandro Foxley argues that the censorship during the 
early years in CIEPLAN, between 1976 and 1979, was crucial in this respect: ‘[w]e had been writing for 
three years and no-one read us, no-one. We wrote, and wrote and kept what we wrote. In the end one 
starts to ask more profound questions: what is going on in this country? Why can we not understand 
each other, why can’t we have a dialogue? And one comes out of the trenches and says: we have to try 
and understand each other. There we started to construct a very simple idea, that a country has to be 
thought by everyone, has to be worked by everyone, has to be constructed by everyone. And from that 
came the obsession with consensus that was so characteristic of the Aylwin government’ (CIDOC 
Interview with Alejandro Foxley, undated).  
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(however limited) to overcome profound internal divisions.29 These cases were studied 
intensively in Chile, Tironi recalls:  
We came from a tradition in which coalitions had a strong ideological 
foundation, that is, they were based on an agreement on certain principles and 
certain final objectives, not on procedures and direct targets, as is the European 
practice. Many of us ended up studying those cases in depth, and that changed 
our perspective on how to construct society (Tironi 2002: 162).  
As with pragmatism, the notion of consensus had been extensively and academically 
developed within the think-tanks of the opposition. As early as 1983 prestigious 
scholars such as Pinto started to chart the main elements of consensus among the 
opposition, as well as its limits, creating an early outline of the main areas of agreement 
within the opposition and, later, the Concertación (Pinto 1983: 116-119). In the same 
year, Lechner, coming from FLACSO, stressed the need to approach consensus not as a 
form of ideological agreement, but as an agreement on procedures and short-term goals. 
The idea of consensus as ideological agreement is, Lechner argued, a ‘utopia’. However, 
it should never be discarded, as it represents the ‘impossible through which the best 
things possible become visible’ (1983: 2).  
The idea of consensus eventually got its best form in the creation of the 
Concertación, and, more specifically, its name Concertación, in which the word ‘concert’ 
has the same meaning as in the nineteenth-century ‘Concert of Europe’. Rather than 
indicating ideological homogeneity or unity, it suggested a variety of views that were 
oriented in the same direction, yet from different perspectives. As the Programa Básico de 
Gobierno (Basic Government Programme) of the Concertación stated: 
The Concertación that we have reached does not imply that any of the signing 
parties abandon their respective historical long-term projects, or their ideals and 
visions of society, which they are free to propose to the country once the period 
of the transition is over.30  
Much of the success of the Concertación can be attributed to this form of consensus, in 
which unity and variety are mixed in a non-explicit way. In fact, just as the word 
‘equity’ remained successfully undefined in the ‘growth with equity’ motto, so the 
conceptual vagueness of Concertación gave the Centre-Left coalition just enough 
direction and freedom to allow for differences while maintaining one general course. 
This allowed for former adversaries such as the PDC and the left-wing of the PS to 
construct a long-term relationship, in which differences of opinion were allowed within 
the framework of a more general agreement. It also promoted the spirit of pragmatism 
                                              
29 Indicative of the importance that was attributed to consensus and consociation is the table of contents 
of Alejandro Foxley’s book Economía Política de la Transición, published in 1993. The five chapters of the 
book are titled: ‘University Dialogues’, ‘Economic Dialogues’, ‘Dialogues with Entrepreneurs’, ‘Dialogues 
with Social Organisations’ and ‘International Dialogues’ (Foxley 1993).  
30 The Programa Básico de Gobierno defined the transition as the ‘consolidation of democracy and the 
initial implementation of policies oriented towards growth with equity’, implying that after the Aylwin 
government had been installed and had started its project, the founding parties of the coalition would 
not be held to ‘coalition discipline’ in the ideological area.  
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within the Concertación, as the parties were well aware that a politicised or highly 
ideological approach within the coalition would undermine its stability (Tironi 2002: 
162). As will be argued in section 2.2, it was precisely this mix between agreement and 
diversity that allowed the Concertación to adapt its strategies and to remain coherent as 
well as flexible in the long term. 
The emphasis on consensus of the Concertación was not limited to its coalition-
building; it was a central feature of its project as well. It was considered that growth and 
equity would not be a feasible project if it was not espoused by a broad range of social 
and political actors (Silva 1993b: 104). As a result, consensus was sought for the policies 
the Concertación intended to implement, both with the opposition of the Right as well 
as with important social partners such as employers and labour unions. Under the 
government of Patricio Aylwin, who was particularly well-known for his pragmatic 
disposition, this ‘consensus-politics’ reached unknown heights. Sensitive issues such as 
the 1991 fiscal reforms were not debated openly in Congress, but discussed privately 
with representatives of the parties of the Concertación and of opposition party 
Renovación Nacional, as well as representatives of the employers’ organisations and 
labour unions. Only when these meetings, which were often held in private offices in 
downtown Santiago, had been concluded successfully, was the project sent to Congress 
(Bickford and Noé 1998: 52).31 This consensus-oriented style of policy-making served 
several purposes. Roughly based on the consociate democratic models that had been 
studied in depth for countries such as Belgium, as well as on the political realities of the 
transition, it was a model that minimised political conflict and created governability in 
politically deeply divided countries (Moreno 2006: 121-127). In this way, polarisation 
and ideological conflict were avoided while at the same time the decision-making 
process was exercised by representatives of large sectors of society, yet in an atmosphere 
of technical cooperation rather than politicised confrontation.  
The European-style transversal consensus politics of the Concertación did not last 
very long, though. It was highly characteristic of the Aylwin government, but under Frei 
the number of actors consulted for policy-making, both inside and outside the 
Concertación, was greatly reduced, as Frei tended to rely mainly on a small circle of 
advisors, the so-called ‘iron circle’ (Fuentes 1999: 204; 208).  
Lagos followed Frei’s style very closely, initiating a group of advisors called the 
segundo piso (second floor, because of their closeness to the presidential offices on the 
second floor of the La Moneda palace), which turned out to be something of a ‘shadow 
government’, reinforcing Lagos’ personal and authoritarian style of government, but 
still from within the parameters of Concertación consensus (Navia 2004: 280-282). 
                                              
31 The dark side of this ‘consensus-politics’ was that it more or less bypassed Congress, and, as such, the 
representation of the people in the policy-making process. This highly elitist and cupulista (oriented 
towards the party elites) style of governing had been a familiar feature of Chile’s political system since 
Portales; however, the need for consensus and high governability in the early 1990s had given it a new 
impetus (Lechner 1985).  
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6.2 Growth with Equity: The Implementation of the Project 
The implementation of the project of the Concertación has been characterised by a 
highly technical approach. Political pragmatism has been prioritised over ideological 
purity and internal consensus-seeking over political confrontation. The Concertación 
has largely been able to overcome the traditional dichotomy between state and market 
by giving the state a regulatory role. Additionally, the political competition between the 
government and the opposition has diminished strongly. Finally, the technical outlook 
of the Concertación has allowed it to slowly and successfully adapt its project before 
public dissatisfaction became problematic. 
6.2.1 State, Technocracy, and Planning in ‘Growth with Equity’ 
Under the Concertación, the state contracted in size, but simultaneously gained 
strength in order to effectively regulate the markets and reduce poverty levels. Even 
though the notion of state planning was maintained, it lost its dominant position and 
became exclusively oriented on the implementation of social policies. Meanwhile, the 
‘political’ and the ‘technocracy’ fused into a new blend, which proved to create a basis 
of successful and stable governance.  
 
The Regulating State 
As with the previous projects, the state played a crucial role in the implementation of 
the project of the Concertación. Once again, too, it was used in an ambivalent and 
even conflictual way. Frei Montalva had sought to implement a paternalistic and top-
down programme while rejecting ‘tutelage by the state’. Allende tried to carry out a 
revolution by means of the state, which was seen by many of his companions as the 
main obstacle for the revolution, and Pinochet attempted to reduce the state by means 
of the state itself. As Guillermo Larraín argues, the model of the Concertación also 
suffers from such an internal contradiction. On the one hand, the logic of ‘private 
solutions for public problems’ (the motto of the neo-liberal think-tank Libertad y 
Desarrollo) was widely accepted and implemented by the Concertación, as the Chilean 
state under the Concertación prescribes free market solutions even for traditionally 
state-dominated areas such as health care, education and infrastructure. On the other, 
the state in Chile was still deliberately fortified, holding a relatively high presence in the 
economy, and collecting for instance a higher level of taxes than any other Latin 
American country (2005: 73-74). Moreover, under the Concertación the state 
underwent contradictory movements in size and influence. It contracted due to a series 
of privatisations that were implemented in the 1990s. Following the free market logic of 
the Chicago Boys, and not suffering from the hesitations of the military regime to 
privatise ‘strategic’ institutions such as ports and airports, the Concertación privatised 
the last infrastructural enterprises that were left under state control. Although the 
governments of Aylwin and Frei Ruiz-Tagle followed different logics in the process of 
privatisation itself, the underlying logic of ‘private solutions for public problems’ of the 
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Chicago Boys was clearly continued under democratic rule. It was considered a conditio 
sine qua non for modernisation, as the state did not have sufficient funds to improve its 
enterprises itself through large-scale and long-term investments. Only private 
investment was considered to bring about the much-needed modernisation of the 
country’s infrastructure and institutions (Oppenheim 1999: 252).32  
On the other hand, the state apparatus expanded due to the creation of a series of 
new institutions, mainly in the field of poverty reduction and other social policies. In 
particular during the government of Patricio Aylwin so many new institutions and 
government agencies came into existence that it reminded observers in the USA of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal (Loveman 2001: 318). As a result, the state changed form and 
shape rapidly under the Concertación, on the one hand shedding what was left of its 
‘traditional’ enterprises, such as basic services and infrastructure, and on the other 
assuming more than ever the role of provider and protector of the weakest sectors of 
society. As Waissbluth (2006: 13-14) argues, under the Concertación the Chilean state 
came to resemble Bobbit’s notion of a ‘managerial market state’, a state model which 
resembles the social-democrat states of North-Western Europe. Simultaneously, it has 
left behind the only true example of what Bobbit labelled an ‘entrepreneurial market 
state’, namely Chile under the military regime. The main difference mainly exists in the 
level of state protection for the weakest sectors of society.33 
Another apparent contradiction regards the role of the state in society. The 1973 
coup had put an end to the so-called Estado empresarial, the entrepreneurial state (or the 
Estado productor, the producing state), which had come into existence in the 1930s and 
which attempted to achieve development (and even a certain level of welfare) through 
an active role in the economy as a producer. Under the military government, the state 
had taken on strong neo-liberal features, combined with an authoritarian character. 
With the return of democracy and the implementation of ‘Growth with Equity’, 
though, the Chilean state acquired a regulatory role. The ‘regulatory’ state looks 
critically at the functioning of the markets in areas such as ‘natural monopolies’ (such as 
sewerage, infrastructures and electricity), the exploitation of natural resources and fields 
that are essential for development, such as education. When the markets fail in these 
areas, the state aims to correct them, without taking over those functions itself (Muñoz 
1993: 151-152; Larraín 2005: 84-87). In fulfilling this tutelary role, the state is able to 
guarantee good services and products on the free market without having to maintain a 
                                              
32 Lois Hecht Oppenheim notes two main areas in which the logic of privatisation under the 
Concertación differed from that of the military government. First of all, it prioritised public interest over 
private gain, demanding certain guarantees regarding access, price and quality of the goods and services 
that were privatised. These demands were strictly monitored for utilities such as electricity and water. 
Second, the state demanded a reasonable price for its enterprises, instead of selling at the lowest 
conceivable price, as had been done during the military regime. In many cases, like the privatisation of 
the sewerage system, the state maintained influence in the new enterprise through a certain interest (in 
the case of sewerage, 35 per cent) and a veto right (1999: 250-252). See also Moguillansky (2001).  
33 Philip Bobbit, a neo-conservative advisor to the White House, has set out his views on the 
‘entrepreneurial market state’ and the ‘managerial market state’ in his work The Shield of Achilles (2002).  
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large state apparatus. As a result, it is able to allocate much of its resources to its social 
policies. As former president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle puts it:  
There are many people who argue that public services such as water and 
electricity should be kept in state hands. However, the state has limited 
resources, and one has to choose. We have privatised those sectors, but with 
regulations. Now the state budget in Chile represents only about twenty-one per 
cent of the economy. In no European country is state spending less than thirty 
per cent. Nevertheless, we have been able to spend more than sixty per cent of 
our budget on social policies. We have been able to reduce poverty from forty 
per cent to twenty per cent. We have been able to set in motion an educational 
reform that will greatly improve the social situation in the mid-term. This could 
be done because we have made good use of our resources (interview with 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 22 April 2002).  
In this sense, the Concertación has been able to overcome the dichotomy ‘state’ and 
‘market’. The regulatory role it created for the Chilean state has been so successful that 
some have come to see it as a resurgence of Alberto Edwards’ famous Estado en Forma 
(Rodríguez 2002: 10). However, it should be noted that much of the success of the 
regulatory state in Chile has been the result of the fact that it never became completely 
regulatory. The copper mines, ‘Chilenised’ under Frei, nationalised under Allende, and 
never privatised during the dictatorship, have been a major source of income for the 
Chilean state, with which it was able to implement most of its social policies. During 
the 1990s, the export of copper soared to well over one-third of all exports, making the 
Chilean state the country’s single largest exporter (Ffrench-Davis 2003: 288). So, while 
much of the success of the Chilean model has depended on the regulatory role of the 
state, it would not have been at all possible if the state had not remained one of the 
country’s biggest producers. In fact, the argument could be made that the Chilean state 
has become something of a ‘copper state’: even though taxes are generally higher in 
Chile than in other Latin American countries, the state remains highly dependent on 
copper income for its social spending.  
The ‘regulating state’ shifted in focus considerably during the three governments of 
the Concertación. As has been argued in section 6.1.1, these governments each 
followed particular understandings and conceptualisations of modernity. Aylwin 
followed the logic of the ‘re-encounter with history’, that is, the return to democracy, 
the rule of law, citizenship, and minimal life standards for all, Frei emphasised 
technological and physical modernisation, and Lagos expanded the basis of citizenship 
into the socio-economic realm, laying the foundation for a basic welfare system. In all 
three cases, the state followed suit. Under Aylwin, the state grew considerably in 
institutions geared towards the implementation of social policies, and was focused on 
the creation of basic services for the population, such as housing, sanitary services and 
so on. During the Frei government, the activities of the state were directed to 
infrastructure and technological advances, while simultaneously the state sought to 
reinforce its position in relation to the private sector by concentrating its attention on 
the regulation of the markets. Under Lagos, and especially after 2002, a new expansion 
of the state’s functions (but not its apparatus) is noticeable, targeted towards the 
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creation of social safety-nets for the poorer sections of society, and to the creation of a 
basic ‘welfare-state’. Up to now, this line has been continued by Bachelet, who has 
repeatedly stressed her goal to ‘consolidate the bases of a modern, efficient and 
sustainable welfare state’, which should be in function around the Bicentenario (speech 
by Michelle Bachelet on 17 June 2006). The outspoken nature of Bachelet’s position 
toward the state, however, is new. Up to now, the Presidents of the Concertación have 
been very careful not to present their projects as state-oriented, because of the negative 
connotations the state has acquired in recent decades. Bachelet is the first to openly 
advertise more state intervention, albeit within the parameters of the Concertación’s 
neo-structuralist framework:  
There are failures in the market that block innovation. Let there be no doubt: 
we need more state. More state resources, more public-private coordination. (...) 
[M]y vision is a strong state, dynamic, which protects its citizens and gives them 
the tools they need in order to compete in equality of opportunity. All this the 
market will not do. It will be done by the state (speech by Michelle Bachelet 
2005).  
Under the Concertación, modernisation and the state have become mutually 
dependent. As has been shown in the previous chapters, this was the result of an 
increasing trend to critically monitor the state and to modernise the state itself in order 
to improve its functioning as motor of modernisation. This process started with Frei 
Montalva, who considered the improvement of the state through planning and 
increased cooperation between the different institutions a prerequisite for 
modernisation. Under Allende, the state was rapidly expanded in order to facilitate the 
process of modernisation that was being implemented through the state itself. During 
the military regime, state reform was considered vital for the success of the economic 
modernisation programme of the Chicago Boys, and as a result, the state underwent the 
famous ‘seven modernisations’. Up to this point, the modernisation of the state in order 
to facilitate modernisation through the state only took place in the form of incidental 
projects. Under the Concertación, though, the modernisation of the state became an 
on-going process, as the state continuously had to adapt to its new and often conflicting 
modernising role in society. Thus the ‘modernisation of the state’ came to be a constant 
factor after 1990. It comprised a series of divergent reforms which were initiated under 
the Aylwin government, intensified under Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and continued under Lagos.  
The logic behind these ‘modernisations’ differed under these three governments. 
Under Aylwin, they were focused mainly on facilitating the goals of the ‘Growth with 
Equity’ programme which, for instance, required fiscal reforms to finance its social 
projects. Under Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the ‘modernisation of the state’ shifted both in content 
and in priority. It had become clear that the conflicting roles of the state required 
profound reforms in order to maintain a certain level of governability. As a result, Frei 
made the modernisation of the state one of his top priorities, spawning a large number 
of reforms and discourses through which the word ‘modernisation’ became almost 
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equivalent to ‘modernisation of the state’.34 Moreover, modernisation acquired an 
international (not to say U.S.) flavour, as it came to be defined in the terminology of 
the corporate sector as well as of the rising ‘good governance’ discourse that was being 
promoted by international NGOs. It became synonymous with efficiency, 
rationalisation, transparency and technification, using concepts that were associated 
with the modern, US-style corporate world, such as ‘benchmarking’, ‘result-oriented 
management’, and ‘human resource management’ (Silva 1993c: 214). As Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
argued in 1995, the ‘Chilean state can consider itself modern if the people who 
approach public services receive attention of high quality and worthy treatment’ 
(quoted in Cañas 2003: 2). Simultaneously, these reforms reflected the attempts by the 
Concertación to deal with the conflictual roles that the Chilean state had to play in 
‘Growth with Equity’: in order to let a small state be efficient as a regulator, it needs to 
be highly efficient; in order to maintain authority and credibility it needs to be 
transparent.  
Frei’s agenda of modernisation of the state was initially not continued by Lagos, 
who limited the project to digital government only. However, a corruption case in 
2002, involving Lagos in a corruption case surrounding his former position as Minister 
of Public Works, and a subsequent scandal over the ‘overpayment’ (sobresueldos) of 
politicians, forced Lagos to take up the modernisation agenda again. In 2003, with the 
aid of think-tanks like CEP and several of the opposition, he implemented a new series 
of reforms, following the same ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘NGO’ logic as that of Frei Ruiz-
Tagle. Focusing on ‘modernisation of the state, transparency and promotion of growth’, 
Lagos initiated one of the largest state reforms of Chilean history (Waissbluth 2006: 55-
56). But at the same time, Lagos sought to implement something of a ‘welfare state’, 
through projects such as the AUGE Plan. Once again an apparent (but perhaps not 
substantive) contradiction seems to characterise the Chilean state: on the one hand, its 
‘modernisation’ has made it increasingly more ‘corporate’ and more ‘North American’ 
in its internal logic, and on the other, these modernisations have been used to pursue 
more ‘state-oriented’ goals such as the implementation of a basic, North-West European 
welfare state. Nevertheless, the underlying idea remains the same: modernisation takes 
place through the state, and in order to facilitate modernisation, the state itself should 
be modernised first.  
To end this section on the state, it is interesting to note that under the 
Concertación the state has taken up the particular role of promoting modernity. As 
Jocelyn-Holt (1997: 282-285) argues, the market of image, branding and advertisements 
has become a key factor in the success of the ‘Chilean Model’. Whether it is cosmetics, 
clothes, the advertising market (which, for instance, more than doubled between 1993 
and 1995), or the promotion of Chile’s democratic and economic model, it is clear that 
                                              
34 The government’s discourse has been so successful that many Chileans tend to equate modernisation 
with ‘modernisation of the state’. Even government agencies seem to have missed the semantic 
differences, see: www.modernizacion.cl, a state sponsored website that exclusively deals with the 
modernisation of the state.  
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‘image building’ has become a prime feature of Chile under the Concertación. Tironi 
(1999: 87-102) agrees with this view: in the 1990s, Chilean politics has had to adapt to 
the logics of mass communications, in which the promotion of image is of more 
importance than conveying content. Advertising, image building and branding have 
penetrated all sectors of society under the Concertación, and the state has been one of 
the first institutions to adapt to this new logic, by becoming the main promoter of 
Chilean modernity. This has mainly been done by the think-tank Pro Chile, which has 
set up, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several extensive 
promotional campaigns that have presented Chile as a highly modern country. 
One of the most emblematic examples of this kind of nation-branding was the 
iceberg that was towed to the world fair in Seville in 1992. It was a campaign that 
promoted Chile in a spectacular way, but above all it promoted the Chile that Chile 
itself aspired to be: ‘cool’, sober, technically advanced and efficient - in other words, 
profoundly modern. This modernity was implicitly contrasted with the images that 
surround other Latin American countries: tropical, frivolous, technologically backward 
and corrupt. The message of the iceberg was very clear: Chilean modernity is more 
closely related to England or Germany than to Bolivia or Brazil (Subercaseaux 1997: 
7).35 The iceberg was by no means an isolated project: it formed part of a broad nation-
branding campaign that was being supported by the Chilean state in order to improve 
the international image of Chile after the dictatorship.36 Since 2000, the tone and 
content of Pro-Chile’s campaigns have changed considerably. Instead of the 
triumphalistic discourse on modernity and regional exceptionalism, they have 
increasingly stressed the Latin American character of Chile, focusing on themes such as 
solidarity and concern for the welfare of the region. This change seems to be the result 
of pressures from the Left which resisted the monolithic approach to Chilean society 
(exclusively white and Western) of the campaigns, as well as of negative reactions from 
neighbouring countries such as Bolivia (Peña 2003: 15-26).  
 
Technocracy 
Under the Concertación, the technocracy once again was a central actor in the 
implementation of a project of modernity. However, the role that technocrats played 
during the era of the Concertación differed substantially from the one they played in 
earlier projects. During the Revolution in Liberty, technocratic influence had mainly 
taken the form of asesores técnicos, small groups of technical advisors who reported 
directly to the President. Because of their bad reputation in Leftist circles, these asesorías 
                                              
35 In this sense, this nation-branding campaign echoed much of the images of modernity that were 
popular in Chile during the nineteenth century.  
36 Fermandois (2005: 425-491) shows how the military regime became profoundly isolated worldwide, and 
even lost support from countries that were expected to be sympathetic, such as Franco’s Spain and the 
United States. The only sector of Chilean society that was successful in creating a positive image abroad 
was the business sector, which could boast the successes of the ‘Chilean miracle’. As the success of this 
sector was limited, the Chilean state took it upon itself, after the return to democracy, to ‘re-insert’ Chile 
into the international community. 
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were only partially continued under the government of the Unidad Popular; instead, 
technocracy came in the form of key figures in government, who, despite their 
ideological outlook, sought to maintain some relative autonomy for their technical 
approach. During the military regime, technocracy took the form of a separate team of 
policy-makers, which did not just give advice but which ran the entire economy and 
were involved in all fields of policy-making.37 With the rise to power of the 
Concertación, technocracy once again changed face. On the one hand, the asesores 
técnicos returned, but now in the form of NGOs and think-tanks, which through their 
investigations supported government policy-making. On the other hand, an interesting 
mix occurred between the technical and the political. As has been shown in section 
5.2.2, during the dictatorship the opposition was forced to work from academic think-
tanks, which were left relatively untouched by the regime. As a result, the leaders of the 
opposition, typically coming from the traditional political sectors, underwent a process 
of ‘technocratisation’ in the sense that they started to apply scientific models and 
approaches to political realities (Silva 1991a: 401).38  
Even though the rise of a new, hybrid, political class, both political and technocrat, 
did not please everyone, by the late 1980s it became clear that this mix had achieved a 
high level of legitimacy among the opposition.39 It came to be seen as the ‘modern’ way 
of doing politics: ‘technical’ politicians working in think-tanks on the basis of academic 
materials. Its first, and perhaps largest, success came in the campaign for the ‘NO’, in 
1988, which was largely directed from the academic centres of the opposition, based on 
the opinion polls and surveys that were carried out there (Puryear 1994: 150-159). 40 
Under the Concertación, technocracy has followed several trends. First of all, the 
technocratisation of politics has had a crucial influence on the functioning of the 
Concertación itself. It has allowed the parties of the coalition, despite their sometimes 
quite fundamental ideological and political differences, to be able to maintain their 
shared horizon. Their technocratic outlook has developed into something of a ‘meta-
                                              
37 In this sense, the Chicago Boys resembled the so-called científicos, technocrats avant la lettre, who served 
under Mexico’s Porfirio Díaz, with the explicit purpose of modernising society on the basis of rationality 
and positivism (Silva 1996).  
38 Not all leaders of the opposition partook in this technocratisation. Especially the older generation, 
which had spent decades in the political system, found it hard to adapt; even though it recognised the 
need and value of this ‘modern politics’. A good example is Patricio Aylwin, who was able to lead a 
highly technical cabinet, but who also recalls that he, in a 1988 debate with Hernán Büchi, had to pass a 
note to Edgardo Boeninger asking what Büchi meant with the word ‘fax’ (Serrano and Cavallo 2006: 32). 
39 As Montecinos and Markoff show, there existed substantial resentment to the emerging politicians-
technocrats within the Concertación, as some considered that ‘the governing coalition has followed the 
‘American’ style of pragmatism. This pragmatism is not going to lead to a stable social equilibrium: the 
model lacks ideological and cultural contents. Chile is being transformed into Puerto Rico!’ (1993: 18) 
40 Puryear shows that the process of technification was at times remarkably explicit during the campaign. 
From August 1987 until the plebiscite, opposition leaders came to weekly sessions at the CED (Centro de 
Estudios del Desarrollo, Development Study Centre), a think-tank that was affiliated with the PDC, to 
receive classes on political strategies and campaigning, on the basis of academic materials. PDC leader 
Gabriel Valdéz remembered: ‘I remember seeing all the party chiefs (…) sitting back there, and Martínez 
giving them classes in politics. Classes! There were people who had been senators, deputies, sitting there 
in classes, all taking notes’ (1994: 146-147). 
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language’, a logic that transcends the conflicts within the coalition and allows for 
cooperation despite disagreement (Silva 1998a: 83). It permits the parties of the 
Concertación to keep their separate identities and ideological outlooks, as in the end all 
of them know they will make policy largely on the basis of technocratic considerations. 
As a result, the Concertación has been able to maintain unity in diversity, and this has 
been one of the keys of its success during its rule. The contrast with the opposition is 
clear and instructive in this regard: ideologically, the differences between UDI and 
Renovación Nacional are minimal compared to those between, for instance, the 
conservative wing of the PDC and the radical wing of the PS. However, the Right seems 
to have been unable to transform its technocrat style, which had been so successful 
under the dictatorship, into a ‘meta-language’ of its own. This has contributed to the 
deep animosity between the parties of the Right. Instead of mounting a joint and 
dynamic opposition, they have spent most of the last years in bitter and extremely 
damaging internal fights, up to the point of (false) accusations of paedophilia and child 
abuse. In a speech on the possibilities of creating a stronger right-wing coalition, the so-
called Alianza Popular, UDI party leader Pablo Longueira attributed this failure to 
cooperate and create consensus of the Right to the ‘lack of the technical capacity of the 
Concertación to create unity’ (speech by Pablo Longueira 2006).  
Second, the technocrat nature of the Concertación is reflected in an almost 
obsessive drive to select political leaders (in particular ministers) on the basis of 
intellectual and academic excellence. Already in 1990, Aylwin claimed that he would fill 
his cabinet with ‘the most capable’ in their specific technical field (Silva 1991a: 405, 
409). Even though under Frei Ruiz-Tagle political pedigree and party representation 
once again gained ground, his government was also characterised by a high level of 
academic expertise. After 2000, the emphasis on professionalism and excellence 
prevailed (Navia 2004: 251). Lagos incorporated many new faces in his cabinet that 
were almost exclusively chosen on the basis of professional capacities, and Bachelet, 
when discussing the composition of her future cabinet some days after the 2006 
elections, argued that ‘the most important thing is that they are the most capable 
women and men’ (La Prensa, 20 January 2006). The cabinet that Bachelet put together 
in March 2006 was an example of this ‘academisation’ of Chilean politics. Seventy per 
cent of the ministers speak English fluently, while the majority have obtained PhDs at 
prestigious universities around the globe, mostly in the United States (La Nación, 11 
March 2006).41 The important thing here is that the adjectives ‘capable’ and ‘best’ refer 
almost exclusively to intellectual and technical capacities, and seem to be largely 
disconnected from political knowledge and experience. Choosing political leadership 
on the basis of non-political considerations echoes something of a ‘Portalian’ logic. 
However, whereas Portales argued for selection of government members for their moral 
                                              
41 Obviously, the dictatorship played a crucial role in the large number of international PhDs that were 
obtained by the Concertación leadership, as many of its members spent several years abroad, whether 
voluntarily or out of necessity. The same goes for the orientation towards English. In comparison, only 
about ten per cent of the cabinet members of the other Latin American countries speak English (La 
Nación 11 March 2006).  
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standing, ‘men who are true models of virtue and patriotism’ (Portales 1822), now 
‘virtue’ and ‘patriotism’ have been replaced with ‘excellence’ and ‘technical capacity’.  
The third main characteristic of the mix between technocracy and politics in Chile 
has been the continued influence of think-tanks on the Concertación. As Silva (1991: 
409) argues, think-tanks, which played a crucial role in the construction of the project 
of the Concertación under the dictatorship, have not lost their influence on Chilean 
politics. Instead, their influence has increased since the restoration of democracy. 
Think-tanks such as CED, FLACSO, CIEPLAN and others have maintained strong 
relations with the governments of the Concertación. Partly this is due to the fact that 
almost all top officials of the Concertación worked at those centres during the 
dictatorship. But the strongest influence of these academic think-tanks has been their 
continuing monitoring and debating of current public policies, which has provided the 
governments of the Concertación, as well as the opposition, with a constant source of 
reflection and feedback. Through their work they play a significant role in creating 
stability and continuity, and stimulate the development of the country in two ways: 
their shared technocrat outlook allows the political parties to communicate in a shared 
language, and their academic networks strengthen Chile’s internationalisation and 
integration in the world (Fermandois 2005: 508).42  
The extent of the demand for academic feedback on policy-making can be deduced 
from the creation of several new think-tanks which serve specific sectors of the 
Concertación. The oldest is Chile21, which was set up by Lagos in 1995 and depicts 
itself as a ‘progressive think-tank’, reflecting the line of the PS and the more progressive 
side of the PPD. Recently, though, Lagos also inaugurated ProyectAmerica, in which the 
more pragmatic socialists, and in particular the former MAPU leaders, have their 
academic arena. Finally, and almost at the same time as the ProyectAmerica, Expansiva.cl 
was founded, serving the more conservative wing of the Concertación, featuring 
members such as former advisor of President Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Jorge Rosenblut and 
columnist Patricio Navia. All three of them are of a highly academic nature, have 
almost exclusively members with a PhD (obtained abroad), and are closely tied to 
specific sectors of the Concertación (Silva 2007).43  
The rise of think-tanks under the Concertación is indicative of the changing role of 
political parties. No longer are the parties able to function as the centres for ideological 
policy-making, in the way for instance the PDC could do in the 1960s. Their function 
as broker for affiliate organisations has also diminished rapidly. Furthermore, the role of 
                                              
42 The opposition has created think-tanks as well: the neo-liberal Instituto Libertad y Desarollo (Freedom 
and Development Institute), connected to the UDI, and the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Centre of Public 
Studies), of moderate liberal signature, are the most important. In addition, the much less influential 
Fundación Jaime Guzmán is focused on keeping the gremialista tradition alive. Although of little political 
relevance, a number of foundations have also been erected around the figure of former presidents: 
Fundación Frei, in honour of both Eduardo Frei Montalva and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, two foundations 
named after Salvador Allende, the Fundación Pinochet which celebrates the work of the former dictator, 
and the Corporación Justicia y Democracia that has been set up in honour of Patricio Aylwin.  
43 These three think-tanks also share a ‘virtual’ nature: most of their work takes place through online 
publications on their websites. See: www.expansiva.cl, www.chile21.cl, and www.proyectamerica.cl.  
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the media has strongly influenced the way politicians identify with the political parties. 
Candidates tend to present themselves as representatives of the coalition rather than of 
a party (although their party affiliation is well known), or they ‘go it on their own’, 
emphasising only their own personality and keeping a distance from all collectives. 
Often they have their own headquarters, teams and think-tanks to support their 
campaigns, bypassing the parties in the process (Angell 2003: 100-102). This was seen 
most explicitly at the 1999 elections, when the candidate of the Right, Joaquín Lavín, 
presented himself as a capable technocrat rather than as an experienced politician. This 
image was so appealing to the general public that it contributed greatly to the success of 
his campaign, which almost brought him to the presidency (Silva 2001: 31-35).  
Finally, technocracy has never been without its discontents. As has been shown in 
Chapter 3, as early as 1960 Frei Montalva was forced to defend his use of technical 
advisors. Most often, the criticisms focus on the lack of transparency that comes with 
technocrat decision-making, as well as on its association with the military regimes in 
which it made its first public appearance. And indeed, the mix between technocracy, 
neo-liberalism and democracy seems to have been at the cost of a participative, 
Rousseauian value of the democratic model, and in favour of a more formalistic, 
Schumpeterian style of governance (Silva 1997: 75). Others have pointed to the difficult 
relations between technocracy and modernity and their influence on modernisation. 
Mayol (2003), for instance, has argued that technocracy resembles a ‘false prophet of 
modernity’. In proclaiming a better world, based on rationality, science and certainty, 
technocracy has taken up the role of prophet, working from its secular church, the state. 
However, as Mayol claims, in the end technocracy falls short of producing true 
modernity:  
Technocracy has taken up the role of a prophet, but a disenchanted prophet 
that does not offer guidance, but merely performs its functions. Technocracy is 
the prophet that offers solutions for everything, but is absent when it comes to 
the deepest problems. (…) It has set itself up as a prophet in order to announce 
a new world, a salvation, of ‘optimalisation’ and certainty. It promises an 
impersonal reign of analytic models and a new class of scientist-priests at its 
service. But modernity was not that promise. An ‘operational logic’ is the 
complete opposite of the emancipating ideals of man as the constructor of his 
own history (Mayol 2003: 119).  
Does Chilean technocracy resemble the image that is created in this quotation? Is it, 
rather than a prophet of modernity, an obstacle to it, because of the discrepancies 
between its ‘operational logic’ and the deeper values of modernity? Or, in other words, 
has the undeniable hegemony of technocracy in Chile robbed its politics of its most 
fundamental task: to guide the country into modernity on the basis of values and ideas, 
rather than models and calculations?  
The answer to these is complex. There can be no doubt that technocracy under the 
Concertación has maintained much of the triumphant and prophetic tone that it 
acquired during the dictatorship. Many technocrats have proclaimed the full 
modernisation of Chile within a short span of time, but with an extremely thin 
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interpretation of what modernisation is. Usually, modernity (or ‘full development’, as 
many politicians refer to it) is conceived in terms of economic growth and national 
income. Techno-politicians such as Alejandro Foxley have repeatedly claimed that 
within a limited number of years Chile will be a ‘fully developed country’, but in fact 
only refer to the country’s GDP, which they anticipate to reach the level of the poorer 
European countries (Foxley 2001: 42). Brunner confirms this interpretation:  
When someone from the Concertación argues that around the Bicentenario 
Chile will be a ‘fully developed country’, they refer to the per capita income, 
that’s all. It is a metaphor, a symbol, nothing else (interview with José Joaquín 
Brunner on 18 April 2002).  
In this sense, Mayol’s argument seems to be true. Chile’s technocracy presents the 
publicly attractive images of modernity, while in reality this modernity is exclusively 
limited to its economic dimension.  
Nonetheless, technocracy in Chile has another face, too. It should not be forgotten 
that under the Concertación technocracy has not functioned alongside the political 
elite, nor fully replaced it, but has mixed with it, or to put it a better way: Chile’s 
political elites of the Centre-Left have undergone a profound process of 
technocratisation. As a result, rather than representing a sort of ‘Chicago Boys’, or 
Porfirio Díaz’ científicos, Chile’s technocrats are politicians, too, coming from a political 
background and often cherishing their ideological values.44 As has been argued above, 
technocracy has become a meta-language for the Concertación, but that does not 
necessarily mean that it has lost its political base. The attempts of the governments of 
Lagos and Bachelet to create a welfare state are emblematic in this sense. In the 
Concertación’s Chile, each government has had to relate to its party members in 
parliament as well as to the opposition, and even though a technologic discourse may 
well be highly legitimate, they have had act politically in order to survive. In sum, even 
though Chilean politics has lost most of its populist character and has assumed a highly 
technocrat style, it has remained political in essence. Viewing technocracy simply as a 
‘false prophet of modernity’ does not do justice to the complexities of the roles it plays 
in the Chilean political arena.  
  
Planning 
The new, regulatory role of the state under the Concertación did not mean an end for 
planning. On the contrary, soon after Aylwin took office, the Planning Office, 
ODEPLAN, which had always suffered from a poor institutional setting, was 
reorganised into a full-blown ministry, called MIDEPLAN (Ministerio de Planificación, 
Ministry of Planning). It did not resume the roles of direct economic and productive 
planning as it had done under Frei and Allende, but was rather charged with:  
the design and application of national and regional development policies, plans, 
and programmes, (…) to propose targets for public investment and to evaluate 
                                              
44 For a comparative analysis of technocracy in Chile and the científicos of the Porfirio Diaz regime in 
Mexico (1876-1910), see Silva (1996).  
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State-financed investment projects, and to harmonise and coordinate the 
different initiatives of the public sector targeted at the eradication of poverty 
(Article 1 of Law 18.989 creating MIDEPLAN) 
As a result, the new mission of MIDEPLAN was similar to that of ODEPLAN under 
the military government, namely to harmonise and coordinate public investment with a 
special focus on poverty reduction. In order to justify its new ministerial status, a series 
of institutions concerning social policy were brought under MIDEPLAN responsibility, 
such as the Fondo de Inversión Social (Social Investment Fund, FOSIS), the Comisión 
Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (National Commission for Indigenous Development 
CONADI), and the Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (National Institute for the Youth, 
INJUV).  
The new institutional position of MIDEPLAN was expected to give it, in the words 
of its first director Sergio Molina, ‘the governmental authority (…) to exercise the 
powers that are necessary to fulfil its functions’ (quoted in Cantero 2000: 1). However, 
this turned out to be something of a miscalculation. Due to its many new tasks much of 
the attention of MIDEPLAN became focused on the implementation of social policies 
rather than the coordination and harmonisation of state investment and programmes. 
Furthermore, during the Aylwin government it was considered that a special institution 
coordinating the different ministries would possibly become a problem in itself, as it 
would limit the cabinet’s control over government spending. The issue of control and 
coordination of social spending was debated thoroughly during the Aylwin 
government, and MIDEPLAN was never in a position to occupy a leading position. 
When it was finally decided to create a Ministerial Committee to oversee and 
coordinate social spending, its presidency was given not to MIDEPLAN but to the 
Ministry of Finance. As a result, MIDEPLAN came to be mainly occupied with the care 
of the weakest sectors of society, and lost most of its planning functions (Molina 2003: 
12).  
During the government of Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the dilution of MIDEPLAN’s original 
functions led to severe internal and external criticism of its functioning. In 1998 its 
director, Roberto Pizarro, proposed the creation of a new ministry which would bring 
together all social policies, and which would have to intensify the planning of these 
policies, ‘which will define the strategic lines of long-term modernisation that we desire’ 
(quoted in Cantero 2000: 1). By then, however, the position of MIDEPLAN seemed to 
have been eroded too much: some, such as PS vice-president Gonzalo Martner, openly 
labelled it a ‘useless ministry’ and ‘a mistake’. Eventually Pizarro resigned, after not even 
having been consulted on drawing up the social agenda for 1999-2000 (ibid., p. 2). 
Around this time, Frei decided to discontinue MIDEPLAN, a decision which, in the 
end, was not put into action. However, the formal role of planning in the politics of the 
state had all but died.  
Under Lagos, MIDEPLAN regained some coherence and influence, but at the cost 
of its original planning functions. Initially, Lagos sought to reorganise it into a ‘Ministry 
of Social Affairs’ whose main objectives would be to plan and monitor social policies, 
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in particular those targeted towards poverty reduction, and the creation of policies for 
special groups, such as the incapacitated, indigenous groups and youth (Molina 2003: 
18). Although the reorganisation never took place, MIDEPLAN came to be a virtual 
Ministry of Social Affairs after all, especially after the Lagos government added to its 
social tasks the new welfare project Chile Solidario. In consequence, the Ministry has lost 
most of its original planning functions, operating mainly as creator and executor of 
social policies.  
MIDEPLAN has not completely lost its function as regulator of public policies, 
however. It still has the ‘investment division’, through which all public investment 
proposals must pass in order to be implemented. However, rather than being a 
coordinating service which harmonises the different proposals according to one general 
vision, the National Investment System is more of a quality improvement tool, which 
benchmarks, standardises, systematises and measures investment proposals.  
While the formal planning structures have lost most of their influence under the 
Concertación, more informal harmonising and coordinating practices have become 
increasingly important. One of those less formal functions is the provision of 
information for the other ministries. By guaranteeing that all ministries and services 
share the same information on social issues (which MIDEPLAN sets out in the so-called 
CASEN-report which is published every two or three years), a certain level of informal 
policy coordination is achieved. As the MIDEPLAN minister, Clarissa Hardy, put it in 
2006:  
By law, this is a ministry which has the responsibility to coordinate social 
policies. But this is not coordination in a ‘pro-cratic’ sense, it is policy 
coordination that is essential for the construction and definition of the public 
policies of others, and which is based on available information instruments 
(speech by Clarissa Hardy on 14 March 2006). 
On an even more informal level, the technocratisation of Chilean politics, and 
especially the deep influence of think-tanks on them, has had the consequence of 
harmonising the policy-making process. Not only do most politicians follow the same 
procedural paths and academic standards, but they also form an academic network that 
is oriented in one general direction. Often they have known each other and worked 
together in the main think-tanks for many years, and share the same fundamental 
outlook. As Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, the director of studies at the Central Bank during 
the Aylwin government, indicates, the network of former CIEPLAN and CEPAL 
collaborators in the government facilitated up to a high level an easy coordination of 
policies:  
We were able to function in a highly harmonious fashion, because we all knew 
each other well at CIEPLAN. In the Ministry of Finance, there were Foxley and 
Marfán, there was Zahler at the Central Bank, who was from CEPAL but had 
done projects at CIEPLAN (…) We profited from the renewed prominent role 
that CEPAL played, but combined it with a CIEPLAN way of understanding 
Chilean reality. This allowed us to do so well during the government of Aylwin 
(interview with Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 11 May 2004).  
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As a result, the harmonisation of policies is effective, and can often be achieved on an 
informal basis. In this way, much of the role of planning has been internalised by the 
Concertación. 
6.2.2 Competition and the End of History? 
In the theoretical outline of this study it has been argued that modernisation in Latin 
America takes place through the interaction and competition of elite projects. It has 
also been pointed out that in general these projects do not alternate in the form of 
consecutive governments. This is of course why the period in question is of such 
interest and relevance: it is highly uncommon for four governments (or, in the case of 
the Concertación, coalitions) to carry out successive all-encompassing projects of 
modernisation. It should be remembered that many governments do not come to 
power with integral projects and, for instance, focus exclusively on economic 
stabilisation or other partial objectives.45 Other governments present ambitious and all-
encompassing projects during their campaign, only to shift course as soon as they have 
reached the presidential palace. Yet other governments seem never to have had any 
project whatsoever.  
Seen from this perspective, it is unlikely that the fourth consecutive project of 
modernisation in a forty-year period should bring about yet another project that could 
replace it in the short term.46 And indeed, no such project has emerged in Chile yet. 
Moreover, the project of modernisation that had been promoted by the Right, neo-
liberal economics combined with a ‘tutelary democracy’, has slowly disintegrated. Its 
economic programme has largely been carried out by the Concertación, if not 
improved, and its authoritarian political order rapidly lost legitimacy during the 1990s 
and was eventually largely discarded by the Right itself. In the end, most of the 
‘authoritarian enclaves’ were derogated with the support of the Right itself. As a result, 
it could be argued that under the Concertación Chile has entered something that might 
be called an ‘end of history’, in a ‘Fukuyamaian’ sense, that is, a situation in which there 
no longer exist:  
fundamental ‘contradictions’ in human life that cannot be resolved in the 
context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative 
political-economic structure (Fukuyama 1989: 9).47  
In other words, the ‘end of history’ in the case of Chile is a situation in which the 
deficiencies of the current hegemonic model cannot be resolved by any alternative 
                                              
45 This was for instance the case in the conservative government of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), which 
combined a general conservative outlook with cautious and partial modernisations in some areas of the 
economy. 
46 Of course, this does not imply that an alternative project could not come into existence some time 
soon. It should be remembered that the project of the Concertación only became a solid alternative 
shortly before the 1988 plebiscite, that is, some 15 years after the coup.  
47 See also Fukuyama (1992). Obviously, the application of Fukuyama’s global thesis, which, contrary to 
common belief, is argued by him as a question rather than as a certainty, to a single country can only be 
rudimentary, simplifying, and partial.  
 270 
model.48 This seems to be exactly the case of Chile under the Concertación: even 
though there exists ample criticism of the Growth with Equity-model, from both Left 
and Right, there is no alternative model that could replace it, and as a result, for the 
first time in decades, Chile’s road to modernity is supported by all sides of the 
country’s political spectrum.49 As a result, competition takes place on minor matters 
rather than on the essential issues. As Mario Vargas Llosa observed during the 2005-
2006 elections:  
In the debate between Bachelet and Piñera (…) one had to be clairvoyant or a 
diviner to be able to describe those points in which the candidates of the Left 
and the Right differ in a frontal way. Despite their respective efforts to distance 
themselves from each other, the truth is that their differences did not touch any 
neuralgic theme, but rather quantitative (not to say trivial) topics (Vargas Llosa 
2006).50 
This is not to say that there exist no differences of opinion between the Chilean parties. 
In the area of ‘moral issues’ the government and the opposition take almost opposite 
positions. However, when it comes to the general organisation of society and the path 
towards development and modernity, a broad consensus exists, with only minor 
differences, for instance on the matter of more or less state influence in the economy.  
 
Political competition under the Concertación: the eternal SÍ and NO? 
One of the most conspicuous features of the Chilean political model after the return of 
democracy is the demise of the traditional ‘three-thirds’ division and the rise of a two-
block system, formed by the Concertación on one hand and the opposition from the 
Right on the other. This new political order did not arise by coincidence: it had been 
meticulously designed by the gremialistas under the military regime and established in 
the 1980 constitution, with the specific purpose of creating a ‘protected democracy’.51 
Jaime Guzmán and his collaborators argued that institutional stability would be best 
preserved for the long term by a two-block system in which the two blocks kept each 
                                              
48 I am not the first to use the term ‘end of history’ to describe the case of Chile. One of the first authors 
to use it was Alejandro Foxley, who in 1993 argued that for some it would seem that Chile ‘has reached, 
to paraphrase a fashionable expression, the ‘end of its history’ (Foxley 1993: 20). A year later, Tomás 
Moulian, complaining about the lack of fundamental intellectual discussion in Chile, asked himself: ‘Are 
we then facing an end of ideas and of history as Fukuyama has announced?’ (quoted in Pinedo 2000: 6). 
More recently, the historian Alejandro San Francisco published an article in which he argued that after 
the political turbulence of the 1970s and 1980s, Chile had reached its ‘end of history’ (San Francisco 
2002). However, little attention has been paid to an analysis of the precise nature of such an ‘end of 
history’.  
49 The only exception to this consensus is the Communist Party and other parties Left of the 
Concertación. However, these parties are not represented in parliament and therefore do not form part of 
the political establishment. 
50 In the magazine ‘The Clinic’, UDI prominent Hermán Chadwick (who forms part of the more liberal 
wing of the party) confirms that within the party there are many who considered Lagos’ government to 
be ‘excellent, that was a really good government’. Chadwick, who is also personally involved in the new 
think-tank that was set up by Lagos, also argued that ‘we fundamentally share the political and economic 
ideology with the Centre-Left’ (Chadwick 2006).  
51 See section 5.3. 
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other in balance. To that end they created an electoral system that favoured the 
creation of two electoral coalitions. Furthermore, they had ensured that the winning 
coalition would gain relatively few seats in Congress compared to the losing coalition. 
As a result, the differences between the government coalition and the opposition tend 
to become levelled, giving the opposition a disproportional representation in Congress. 
Key factors in this model were the so-called ‘designated senators’ and the binominal 
electoral system.52  
A second important characteristic is the electoral support for the two blocks; it has 
remained more or less constant since the 1988 referendum for the SÍ and the NO, when 
the Concertación received around 55 per cent of the vote, and the Right 45 per cent.53 
Although after 2000 this division seemed to move in the direction of a 50-50 division, 
the 2006 elections have once again shown a 53.5 per cent of the vote for the 
Concertación, against a 46.5 per cent for the Right.54 This continuity, Patricio Navia 
argues, is an indication that essentially the Chilean model is still dominated by the 
cleavage between the SÍ and the NO of 1988. This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that the large majority of the voters are middle-aged or older: 86 per cent of the voters 
in the 2001 elections were eligible to vote in 1988. In other words, the electoral support 
for both the Concertación and the Right consists of those who have internalised the 
logic of the dictatorship as adults, while the youth, who do not feel represented by the 
SÍ-NO cleavage, do not take the trouble to vote (Navia 2004: 95-97).  
These two facts form key elements in the process of competition in Chile under the 
Concertación, in a conflictual way. On the one hand, the existence of two electoral 
blocks has given competition in Chilean politics a bipolar character, which could lead 
to zero-sum thinking and centrifugal movements. On the other, the relatively equal 
balance between the two blocks makes it extremely difficult for the one block to 
completely bypass or override the other. As will be seen in this section, the outcome of 
these contradictory forces has been in favour of the latter element, in the sense of a 
growing consensus between the government block and the opposition on the socio-
economic course of society and the on what Chilean modernity should look like.  
 
 
 
                                              
52 Scully (1992: 194) argues that after the dictatorship, the three-thirds model actually did return: the 
Right, the Concertación (which he considered to be the Centre) and the Communist Party on the Left. 
However, the meagre electoral support for the Communists and their continued exclusion from 
parliament (another success, from the gremialista perspective, of the institutional order designed by 
Guzmán) have reduced the PC to a small faction that can by no means count as a ‘third’. See also: 
Garrido and Navia (2003: 175).  
53 The exception to this rule was the 1999-2000 elections, when Lavín and Lagos ended up with 48.7 and 
51.3 per cent respectively. Silva (2001: 29) has argued that Pinochet’s detention was a crucial factor for 
this outcome, as it allowed Lavín to distance himself from the regime and attract middle-of-the-road 
voters. This view was shared by Eugenio Tironi, who in 2000 argued that Judge Garzón was ‘Lavin’s 
campaign leader’ (Navia 2004: 71).  
54 Date from: http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/pdf/2005_2v/res_pres_total_2v.pdf 
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Competition from the Right: A Growing Consensus 
The Right in post-authoritarian Chile is not a homogenous movement. As has been 
seen in the previous chapter, at the end of the dictatorship it came to be organised into 
two parties, the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN). 
However, as Cañas (1998: 53-89) argues, this two-party structures includes three 
historical currents of the Right. The ‘old Right’ is represented by the conservative wing 
of RN, while the more progressive side of RN can be traced back to the liberal and 
democratic tradition of the Right. Meanwhile, the traditional ‘extreme Right’ is 
represented by the UDI.55 Although this comparison is far from accurate (the UDI has 
little to do with the facistoide Patria y Libertad), it is important to note that at the three 
currents of the Right are still present in present-day Chile, albeit in the form of two 
parties.  
The cooperation between the UDI and RN takes place on the basis of what Carlos 
Fuentes has called the ‘logic of pacts’. Rather than uniting themselves in the pursuit of a 
long-term project, as the parties of the Concertación have done, the parties of the Right 
function on the basis of incidental pacts or agreements (1999: 194). This is not 
necessarily due to the incompatibility of ideologies: as Morales and Bugueño (2002: 
311) show, the two parties have several ideological points in common. They both 
support the neo-liberal model and the notion of a subsidiary state. The UDI is clearly 
more Catholic, but does not profile itself as a confessional party, and shares its faith 
with the conservative wing of RN. Both parties supported the military regime, but the 
progressive wing of RN has taken a more critical position, especially toward the Human 
Rights violations which took place under the government of Pinochet.  
In the early 1990s, competition between the Concertación and the Right largely 
reflected the logics of the SI and the NO. The Concertación had a clear project, based 
on the ideas of democratisation and social justice. The Right, especially the UDI, stood 
for an authoritarian order and market-oriented social solutions. These were two clear 
models that interacted in clear competition. Especially during the first part of the 1990s, 
the UDI offered close opposition to the Concertación. As Aylwin recalled:  
Not in themes such as terrorism, Human Rights, labour reforms, neither in 
fiscal reforms, did we receive a single vote from the UDI. The UDI totally 
rejected all we wanted to do, and all we have achieved was thanks to the 
entrepreneurial world and Renovación Nacional (Serrano and Cavallo 2006: 
55). 
The aggressiveness of the UDI towards the Concertación reflects what Lechner has 
labelled the ‘poor secularisation’ of political parties in Chile: while the ideological 
differences between the parties have been minimised after the fall of the anti- and pro-
capitalism dichotomy, some parties in Chile continue thinking in dogmatic black and 
                                              
55 Correa (2004: 282) makes a different comparison. She compares the UDI to the Conservative Party, 
despite the fact that the UDI is, in its own perception at least, not a confessional party, and RN to the 
independent nature of the Liberal Party of the mid-twentieth century. However, her analysis does not 
include the modern, liberal and democratic Right that is represented by the moderate wing of RN, and its 
leader, Andrés Allamand, in particular.  
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white schemes and zero-sum games. They have, so to speak, consecrated their identity 
and sail a polarising course in its defence (Fuentes 1999: 214). This certainly seems to 
be the case for the UDI (and to a much lesser degree for RN), which, as Tironi (2000: 
187) has argued, have preferred to maintain a closed organisation, centred on its own 
ideology, rather than to use all possible strategies in order to win the presidency.  
The belligerence of the UDI should also not be taken as indicative of the attitude of 
the business sector as a whole. Although that sector is strongly inclined to the Right, 
and makes up almost all of UDI’s support base, it never took a confrontational line of 
action towards the Concertación - not even when its strategies hurt their direct interests. 
As soon as it was clear that the Concertación was not going to jeopardize economic 
growth by reversing the Chicago Boys’ reforms, the business sector as a whole took a 
cooperative attitude towards the government. This phenomenon has been explained by 
Weyland (1997: 52-54) by pointing to the organisational structures of the business 
sector. Its representation in the political arena takes place almost exclusively through 
‘encompassing organisations’ (such as peak organisations and political parties, which, 
due to their ‘encompassing’ nature, tend to take wider perspectives. As a consequence, 
they will be prepared to defend their interest in a broader context and in a longer term, 
and have a greater interest in the provision of collective goods such as social policies. 
The aggressiveness of the UDI should neither be taken for disagreement with the 
general socio-economic course of the Concertación. During the 1993 presidential 
elections, it was hardly debated, apart from some minor themes such as inflation (which 
had reached a historic low of 12 per cent) and the rights of the relatively powerless 
labour unions. Already by 1993, Angell and Pollack argue, an ‘overwhelming consensus 
on the macroeconomic policies’ had taken shape in Chile (2005: 62).  
During the second half of the 1990s, though, the dynamics of competition between 
the Concertación and the Right changed. Slowly the two projects began to converge as 
a result of three developments, mainly within the Right. First of all, the success of the 
socio-economic policies of the Concertación in the 1990s fortified the basic consensus 
with the opposition on the macroeconomic course. With economic growth figures 
soaring around 7 per cent a year and poverty dropping by half between 1990 and 1996, 
the Concertación had made its point of being excellent administrators of the neo-liberal 
model. If disagreement existed between the two blocks on socio-economic issues, they 
tended to be quantitative rather than qualitative, usually centring around issues like 
more or less state intervention or taxation. Second, the Right slowly began to move 
away from the heritage of the military regime. With Pinochet’s arrest in London in 
1998, important sectors of the UDI sought to distance themselves from the military 
regime and profile themselves more as moderate, modern and optimistic (Silva 2001: 
29). As a result, the heritage of Guzmán and the political project of a ‘tutelary, 
protected democracy’ came to move to the background in the UDI, while it had never 
had much appeal to RN, which came from a more liberal tradition. This process of de-
linking from the legacy of the military regime was first made ‘official’ when in 1999 the 
Right’s candidate for the presidency, Joaquín Lavín, stated that he wanted Pinochet 
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returned to Chile in order to stand trial for the Human Rights violations under his 
regime (Joignant and Navia 2003: 140).56 Gonzalo Rojas, one of the stoutest defenders 
of the political project of Guzmán, explains its demise by pointing to the Right’s 
increasing emphasis on the economic field:  
When we saw we had economic success, we started to forget our social and 
moral basis, which are entrenched in political institutions. We came to care less 
about compromising them, and have ended up defending the economic model 
more. We were left without the moral and the political, and remain happy 
because the economy functions well. But the project of Guzmán was a moral, 
social and economic project. It is therefore very true to say that we are left with 
almost nothing of our original project (interview with Gonzalo Rojas 9 May 
2006).  
Finally, divisions within the Right also weakened its capacity to compete with the 
Concertación with a proper and coherent agenda. These divisions seem to originate 
from style and identity issues rather than from profound ideological conflicts.57 This 
already started in 1988, when an attempt to unite both parties proved to be short-lived, 
and RN displayed doubts on a prolongation of Pinochet’s rule. RN also kept to a much 
more cooperative course vis-à-vis the Concertación, with its so-called política de acuerdos 
(agreement politics), which consisted of a structural cooperative approach towards the 
government in return for a certain level of power-sharing. From this period on, the 
relations between the two parties have been structurally tense, despite their shared need 
to form electoral unions. Several conflicts and struggles, almost none of which can be 
traced to ideological clashes, have severely debilitated the Right’s ability to construct its 
proper project and mount substantial competition to the Concertación.58 
Seeing their economic project successfully being implemented by the government 
and distancing itself from its political legacy, and also being utterly divided internally, 
the Right lost most of its capacity to present the electorate with a true alternative to the 
project of the Government. As Fuentes (1999: 199) shows, the main issues that divided 
the two blocks had to do with power issues such as the ‘authoritarian enclaves’, the 
Human Rights violations committed under the dictatorship, and moral issues like the 
‘morning-after pill’ and divorce. However, during the government of Lagos, even in 
                                              
56 A good strategy should be used scarcely. In the 1999 presidential elections, Lavín’s strategy of 
distancing himself from the military regime was highly successful and almost gained him the presidency. 
In 2005, however, his declaration that he, in hindsight, wished he had voted for the ‘NO’ in the 1988 
plebiscite did little more for him than raise a few eyebrows.  
57 One source of the conflicts between the UDI and RN seems to lie with the closed social nature of the 
UDI. As Joignant and Navia (2003: 169) show, the internal cohesion within the UDI is extremely strong, 
due to three factors: its leaders have attended the same schools, share the same Catholic outlook, and 
come from the same generation. As a result, the UDI has become what Joignant and Navia call a ‘special 
kind of Leninist party’: extremely homogenous, highly motivated, and belligerent in style. 
58 The most severe clash between RN and the UDI came with the infamous ‘Spiniak’ case, in which a 
well-known entrepreneur was arrested for leading a paedophile network in 2003, triggered accusations 
from RN deputy Pía Guzmán towards, among others, UDI senator Jovino Novoa, of having participated 
in it. This led to a profound and extremely bitter conflict between the two parties, which was mainly 
fought out in the press. Only two years later, when the prime witness retracted her testimony, RN and 
UDI were able to more or less be reconciled. 
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these areas a growing consensus seemed to be appearing. In 2003, most of the 
‘authoritarian enclaves’ were abolished, and a round-table dialogue (mesa de diálogo) was 
set up with the military in order to locate the remains of the victims of the dictatorship, 
both with the support of the Right. In 2005, a divorce law was passed through Congress 
which had been drafted in ‘mixed committee’, as the cooperation between the two 
blocks had come to be known. Finally, UDI-president Pablo Longueira surprised friend 
and foe in 2003, when he saved Lagos from one of the most difficult moments during 
his government, when he was linked to a corruption case. 59  
As a result, the ideological lines between the two blocks started to blur. This has 
been criticised by many observers. Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, for instance, argues that the 
lack of competition is the direct result of the project of Jaime Guzmán, which 
fundamentally consisted of creating a political order that had become so balanced that 
no matter who might govern, almost no change would be made (1997: 27). However, 
this argument does not explain why the general consensus has remained in place after 
most of the authoritarian enclaves have been abolished. Others blame the Concertación 
for moving towards the Right. For instance, in 2002, political scientist Carlos Huneeus 
remarked that the Concertación had come to resemble the Right’s programme so 
closely that in the 2005 elections the population might ‘prefer the original to the copy’ 
(quoted in Aguiló 2002).  
Others, however, have claimed that the lack of a true alternative for ‘Growth with 
Equity’ may well be a sign of political maturity and of modernity. Tironi (2005: 20) 
claims that it is a sign that Chilean society is moving in the direction of a USA-style 
modernity, which also has a two-party system in which the two parties share the same 
fundamental socio-economic project. Peruvian novelist and commentator Mario Vargas 
Llosa, in turn, speaks admiringly of the lack of competition between the candidates of 
the 2005-6 elections:  
The truth is that this electoral competition resembles those civic adjustments in 
which the Swiss or the Swedes change or confirm their governments every few 
years, rather than a third-world election, in which a country puts at stake the 
political model, its social organisation, and even its simple survival at the ballot 
box (Vargas Llosa 2006).  
The consensus that has been developing within the Chilean political system has had 
strong repercussions for its functioning. In the late 1990s, the competition between 
projects seemed to make way for a different competition: that between a ‘populist’ or 
rather high-profile style of governance and the more low-key style that the 
Concertación had adopted under Aylwin and Frei. The ‘Lavín phenomenon’, as Silva 
(2001) has labelled it, became a new element in the political competition. Lavín’s 
                                              
59 The corruption case (caso coimas) did not have political consequences for Lagos as the UDI 
unexpectedly agreed to support a bill on modernisation of the state and corruption control. Other cases 
in which the UDI helped the Concertación were in 2001, when Longueira bailed out the PDC, which 
had committed severe errors in its candidate registration for the parliamentary elections, and a 2002 deal 
between Longueira and vice-president Inzulsa on municipal taxes, bypassing most other parties, especially 
the PDC (La Nación, 26 January 2003).  
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flamboyance and sometimes outrageous but highly theatrical actions (such as the 
construction of a ski lane on the borders of Santiago’s Mapocho river, using snow that 
had been brought in from the Cordillera, and a highly publicised visit to Fidel Castro) 
seemed to give the electorate the choice if not between content, than at least between 
style. This exuberant style has spread to all sectors of the Chilean political spectrum, 
leading to a strong emphasis on electoral marketing and ‘total personalisation of 
politics’ (Tironi 1999: 123). The presidential campaign of Michelle Bachelet is an 
excellent example of this development. During the elections, Bachelet presented herself 
explicitly as a woman (claiming modernisation in the political culture as she would use 
a more ‘feminine’ style of leadership), as an icon (repetitively using giant Chilean flags 
as the backdrop for her speeches), and as a victim of the repression of the military 
regime (implying the ability of the Chilean people to overcome the past and look 
forward). While she by no means refrained from presenting her political agenda, the 
first thing that distinguished Bachelet from her competitors was not her programme but 
her person (El Mercurio 15 January 2006).  
6.2.3 Adaptation of the Project 
As has been shown in the previous chapters, it is characteristic of projects of 
modernisation that they enter a crisis and adapt in the light of popular protest. This 
process reflects the fundamental tension that exists between social order and 
modernisation. As Huntington (1968) has pointed out, projects of modernisation tend 
to generate social disorder as they untie the traditional bonds of society. As a result, and 
as has been seen in the previous projects, this has confronted the governments in 
question with the dilemma of restoring order at the cost of jeopardising the project, or 
pushing the project ahead at the risk of chaos. So far, three different responses have 
been given to this dilemma. Frei imposed order at the cost of his modernisation project; 
Allende failed to find an answer, and Pinochet succeeded where others failed by stalling 
the opposition and adapting his project adequately. The key element in explaining the 
difference in responses lies in the position of the state vis-à-vis civil society, and 
specifically the civil groups that support the government. The more relative autonomy a 
government is able to achieve, the more room it has for the successful adaptation of the 
project.  
 
Responding to the Pressures of a Passive Civil Society 
In contrast to the previous projects, Growth with Equity hardly encountered serious 
resistance from the population. In the sixteen years of the first three governments of the 
Concertación, very few mass protests, strikes or other forms of popular mobilisation 
have taken place, and certainly not to the extent that they threatened the 
implementation of the project.60 This was not an obvious outcome of the transition. 
                                              
60 This is not to say that all was quiet; especially in the late 1990s, as some popular mobilisation took 
place, mostly in the form of student protest at the public universities, indigenous movements, and 
protests pro and contra Pinochet during his arrest in London.  
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Around 1990, many expected — or feared — mass participation in politics in one way or 
another. The theme was also expressed by the political elites of the Concertación, who 
advocated a ‘participative society’:  
We want to create a participative society. Democracy means participation and 
we will have to open more and more channels for participation (speech by 
Patricio Aylwin 1991). 
Despite these intentions, this participation never took place. This can be explained by 
focusing on the relations between the state and civil society under the Concertación. 
First of all, and from the perspective of the state, the new political order that was 
created during the transition served to de-politicise civil society and has given the 
government the relative autonomy it needed in order not to become dependent on 
pressure groups. A key factor in this model was the cupulista and elitist nature Chilean 
post-authoritarian politics assumed. Although democracy was restored, it no longer 
emphasised the notion of political participation by the population, whether directly or 
through intermediate bodies. Marras (1999: 498) even speaks of a ‘regressive 
democracy’, in which ‘the regular people have increasingly fewer opportunities to 
participate in national life’. In part this was intentional: especially in the early nineties, 
the Concertación was very aware of the danger of what was called the ‘populist cycle’: 
the tendency of new democracies to appease civil society demands with increased 
spending which, in the end, leads to poor economic performance and social protest. 
Having witnessed the result of such policies in Peru, Argentina and Brazil, the 
Concertación became very hesitant to let social pressure groups have serious influence 
on the decision-making process (Weyland 1997: 52). This was combined with a 
‘sacralisation’ of the notion of order, in which order was associated with values such as 
equality, reason and justice (Moreno 2006: 122). Here the trauma of the recent past 
played a great role by creating a consciousness among the Concertación that a return to 
the socio-political situation of the early 1970s should be avoided at all costs (Silva 2004: 
65).61 To a large extent, too, the relative autonomy that the political system under the 
Concertación enjoyed was an outcome of the logic of the transition. As Gonzalo de la 
Maza (1999: 377) argues, the state apparatus the Concertación came to administer in 
1990 had been thoroughly isolated from popular demands through the diminution of 
the number of public servants, the loss of control over key variables of the political 
economy, and the privatisation of state enterprises. This status quo was secured through 
the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ and the opposition from the Right. As a consequence, both 
                                              
61 This consciousness is reflected in several of the Concertación’s policies, for example in its media 
policies. In the early 1990s, the media in Chile underwent a process of ideological homogenisation, as the 
newspapers and magazines of the Left proved unable to compete against those of conservative character. 
However, the government refused to intervene in favour of those media involved in order to support a 
heterogeneous media spectrum. Eugenio Tironi, spokesman of the Aylwin government, repeatedly 
claimed that the best media policies were no media policies. When the Dutch government offered to 
cover the debts of the magazine Análisis in order to keep it running, the Chilean government refused, 
arguing that ‘it already was planned that the media that had been opposing Pinochet would disappear’ 
(Correa et al. 2001: 340).  
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the intentional distancing of the Concertación from popular pressures and the 
outcomes of the transition (carefully planned and guarded by the project of the Right), 
served to give the state a high level of independence vis-à-vis civil society.  
Obviously, relative autonomy of the state only goes so far to explain the absence of 
popular pressure on the government. It would certainly not be sufficient, if not for the 
booming economy of the first half of the 1990s. Not only did this help to alleviate the 
demands of the population, but it also strengthened the discourse on what De la Maza 
calls ‘modernisation the Chilean way’, that is, top-down modernisation, within the 
context of democracy, but excluding the direct participation of social pressure groups 
(de la Maza 1999: 402). Additionally, the economic model reinforced the de-
politicisation of the population in several ways. As Silva has argued, the neo-liberal 
model has reinforced the de-politicisation of the population, as: 
Individual competition and personal strategies have finally triumphed over 
collective actions. In addition, Chilean citizens have increasingly learned not to 
expect anything from the state but only from their own personal efforts and 
achievements (2004: 65). 
From the perspective of civil society, a certain weariness and desire for normalisation 
came to take hold of the population after the return to democracy. Furthermore, the 
traumas of the past and the subsequent fear for polarisation and political conflict were 
not limited to the country’s elites but extended to the population at large (Bickford and 
Noé 1998: 15-16). Furthermore, the social movements which had thrived under the 
dictatorship now lost much of their impetus and proved unable to modernise 
themselves. They lost their position of defenders of the common good and increasingly 
were seen as single-issue organisations that focused on matters of the past. This image 
was reinforced by their methods: the use of tomas de terreno and other means of making 
a statement were increasingly conceived as obsolete and illegitimate. Finally, the often 
ad hoc protest movements against Pinochet proved to be unable to create formal 
structures, and as a consequence most of the social movements had disintegrated 
towards the end of the 1980s (Taylor 1998: 107-109).  
 
Embedded Autonomy and the Autoflagelante-Autocomplaciente Debate 
It would be a mistake to conclude on the basis of the above that the project of the 
Concertación did not have to be adapted in light of popular dissatisfaction, like its 
predecessors. Despite the fact that almost no public unrest has been discernible during 
the first three governments of the Concertación, the project has been adapted in 
response to public opinion. The difference lay in the fact that the government was able 
to identify the sources of social dissatisfaction before they erupted, and was able to 
change course in time.  
The high level of autonomy that the Concertación had achieved vis-à-vis civil 
society was not enough to guarantee success in governance. It needed to be able to keep 
in contact with processes inside civil society in order to anticipate areas of discontent or 
conflict. This is what Peter Evans has labelled ‘embedded autonomy’. According to 
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Evans, a truly ‘developmental’ state is characterised by the fact that it is both 
autonomous and embedded:  
Either side of the combination by itself would not work. A state that was only 
autonomous would lack both sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on 
decentralised private implementation. Dense connection networks without a 
robust internal structure would leave the state incapable of resolving “collective 
action” problems, of transcending the individual interests of its private 
counterparts. Only when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together can 
a state be called developmental (Evans 1995: 12).  
The position of the Concertación in Chilean society closely resembles this ideal of 
‘embedded democracy’. In fact, it had been defended by Patricio Aylwin as early as 
1991:  
Participation does not mean that every issue should be resolved through 
agreements and that if one sector disagrees, no decision can be made. The 
government decides while listening and creating institutions for debate (…) But 
always the final decision has to lie with the institutions of the state that have 
been appointed by the constitution (speech Aylwin 1991).  
In the process of ‘listening’, the technocratic outlook of the coalition has been 
particularly useful, as the public dissatisfaction that arose in the second half of the 
1990s was channelled through the social sciences and think-tanks. Having close ties 
with those think-tanks, the Concertación was able to adapt the course of its project 
towards a more social and state-oriented project of modernisation.  
This process started around 1998, when the series of developments abruptly ended 
the atmosphere of optimism and success that up to then had surrounded the 
Concertación. At the end of 1997, the parliamentary elections indicated a decline in the 
support for the Concertación. Additionally, the low turnout for the elections was 
interpreted by many as a negative response to the policies of the Frei government. 
Social studies also indicated that the country’s youth had become largely disconnected 
from politics. Not even bothering to vote or show interest in political developments, 
they had become a generation that no longer ‘cared’, and which expressed itself with 
the phrase no estoy ni ahí, ‘I’m not even there’ (Riquelme 1999). Around the same time, 
the country started to experience the effects of the ‘Asian crisis’ and economic growth 
came to a grinding halt; as a consequence, the social policies of the Concertación were 
threatened.62 Simultaneously, the UN’s Human Development organisation UNDP 
(PNUD using its Spanish acronym) published a report showing that the Chileans 
suffered from malestar (discontent) as the result of the side-effects of the path of 
                                              
62 The government of Frei Ruiz-Tagle eventually found a very attractive and efficient solution to the 
problem of how to maintain macroeconomic stability and not choke social spending. It was decided that 
social spending should be maintained at the level of income that would be generated if the economy 
were producing at full potential, and when copper prices were at their mid-term average. This way, the 
state would accumulate wealth when the economy overheated, and have back-up funds if it cooled down 
too much. In order to reassure the economic sectors and the Right, the potential productivity of the 
economy was intentionally deemed lower than in reality; additionally, a structural budget surplus of one 
per cent was implemented (Ffrench-Davis 2003: 53).  
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modernisation the country had followed. The report, titled The Paradoxes of 
Modernisation, claimed that due to the emphasis on the economic aspects of 
modernisation under the Concertación, the Chilean population had become more 
insecure, both economically and socially, and out of touch with the rapidly changing 
patterns of their society. Simultaneously the report indicated low levels of trust between 
individuals, as well as towards the state and state institutions (PNUD 1998: 116-126). 
Finally, two books were published which received nation-wide attention and became 
instant best-sellers, and which, from different perspectives, radically attacked the course 
the Chilean transition to democracy had taken, and, more fundamentally, the role the 
Concertación had played in the process. In El Chile Actual: Anatomía de un Mito, Tomás 
Moulian argued that the transition had been a process of ‘transformism’, or 
gatopardismo, in which the people in charge had been replaced, but the underlying 
structures of society, based on military influence on government and a neo-liberal 
economy which favoured the business sectors and the Right, remained the same (1997: 
18). A year later, Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, in his well-known aggressive and cynical style, 
claimed that the democracy under the Concertación was in fact a continuation of the 
previous regime, a model that is in fact a civil-military regime but tries to pass for a true 
democracy. On a deeper level, both authors attacked Chilean modernity, which, in 
their view, was nothing but the project of modernisation of the military regime 
disguised as a truly and happy modernity:  
In the end, we have entered modernity, through the back door and in stalemate. 
Welcome to modernity, our modernity! Still the Ancien Régime exercises its 
influence; in fact we are in full Restoration. (…) All in all, the faking of a ‘happy 
modernity’ to which we are invited time and again is extremely powerful, but if 
this happiness fails to come, it will engender a profound dissatisfaction (Jocelyn-
Holt 1998: 308).63  
The national debates that arose in this period abruptly ended the Concertación’s 
honeymoon. The self-congratulatory tone that had characterised its discourse now 
made way for reflection and critical analysis. In May of 1998 a group of sixty 
Concertación leaders, parliamentarians and ministers published a document called 
Renovar la Concertación: la fuerza de nuestras ideas, in which they defended the Growth 
with Equity model, but also indicated possibilities for improvement. On the one hand, 
they warned that:  
the country will pay a high price for each deviation from the central elements of 
our development scheme (…) which will open the floodgates for populist 
experiments. 
                                              
63 For an excellent analysis of the intellectual debates in Chile on the transition, including those who have 
defended it, see Pinedo (2000). I agree with Pinedo that both Jocelyn-Holt and Moulian are guilty of 
extreme simplification when they argue that fundamentally nothing has changed in the transition - for 
one thing, their books would never have been published during the dictatorship. Nevertheless, their 
analysis has been essential in the critical review of the process of the transition, and is still valuable in 
recognising the elements of continuity between the military regime and the democracy of the 
Concertación.  
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On the other, they acknowledged the existence of unresolved problems that needed 
attention, and called for an ‘active, but limited role’ for the state in their solution. 
Specifically the state was to delegate more functions to the market and ‘focus on its 
essential tasks’ in order to become ‘efficient’ and ‘modern’. Finally, the malestar that had 
been brought out into the open by the UNDP report was considered to correspond to 
‘all societies that, as in the case of Chile, have experienced processes of accelerated 
change’ (Concertación 1998).  
A month later an answer came in the form of a second document, this time signed 
by 146 top Concertacionistas who felt unrepresented by the first one. La Gente Tiene la 
Razón (The People are Right), as the document was titled, attacked the ‘simplification of 
the new social realities’ of the first document, and called for a more profound 
discussion on what Chilean modernity should look like:  
There exists not just one modernity. After the debate within the Concertación 
different positions regarding modernity have become possible. (…) [o]ur values 
determine the type of modernity we aspire to. The road to modernisation does 
not consist exclusively of economic growth (Concertación 1998b) 
The document argued in favour of a form of modernisation in which the insecurity and 
anxieties that the UNDP report alluded to were to be alleviated, in which civil society 
was to be strengthened, democracy to be deepened, and the markets were to be 
regulated more strictly by the state. However, in its fundamental assumptions the 
document remained loyal to the project of the Concertación. It did not argue in favour 
of a state-oriented model, and supported the idea that economic growth is a prerequisite 
for increased equality and poverty reduction. It called for a critical evaluation of the 
model, rather than for a replacement of it; it is for this reason that it specifically 
attacked the self-congratulatory tone it perceived in the Renovar la Concertación-
document:  
complaisance and conformism are tendencies that we should leave reserved for 
the Right (Concertación 1998b) 
From this moment on, the Concertación came to be divided into two groups: the so-
called autocomplacientes (self-satisfied) and autoflagelantes (flagellants, referring to self-
chastising monks), where the former more or less defended the model of modernisation 
as it was, while the latter called for a more encompassing and ‘human’ form of 
modernisation. In contrast to what could be expected, the division in the Concertación 
did not take place along party lines or in a simple Left-Right division. Many influential 
PDC leaders, such as Andrés Palma and Tomás Jocelyn-Holt, aligned themselves with 
the autoflagelantes, while PS members such as Antonio Viera-Gallo and Enrique Correa 
supported the line of the autocomplacientes. The PPD remained divided.  
This debate, which took place in the press and was widely publicised, created strong 
tensions within the Concertación. President Frei forbade all members of his cabinet to 
become involved in it, and during the campaign of 1999 presidential candidate Ricardo 
Lagos attempted to downplay and even suppress the discussion (Navia 2004: 237-238). 
However, these efforts were to no avail. In fact, in 2002, two years after the socialist 
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President Lagos had come to power, the debate was rekindled and intensified by an 
open letter by PS deputy Sergio Aguiló, called Chile entre dos Derechas (Chile between 
two Rights), in which the author attacked the congruence between the Concertación 
and the opposition. Arguing that both presented more market and less state as the 
solution for all problems, Aguiló claimed that fundamentally Chileans had little choice 
left: 
the agendas of the Concertación and the Alliance for Chile are fundamentally 
identical. They are of the Right, nothing else (…) The democratic Right or the 
authoritarian Right, that seems to be the choice. A poor choice for a country 
that is proud of its democratic tradition and progressive image! (Aguiló 2002). 
Although Aguiló’s letter echoed much of the argumentation of the extra-parliamentary 
Left, he claimed to defend the model of the Concertación, calling on Lagos to change 
the course of his government from a ‘neo-liberal model’ to true ‘Growth with Equity’.  
Aguiló’s letter not only landed like a bomb (triggering furious reactions from La 
Moneda), but also seemed to touch a nerve. From different and sometimes unlikely 
directions, suggestions were made to ‘humanise’ the model. Leading Christian 
Democrats such as Alejandro Foxley and Osvaldo Artaza openly supported a tax reform 
that would allow the government to increase its efforts in poverty reduction (Navia 
2002). Even the director of the national copper company CODELCO joined in the 
discussion, calling for the ‘constant augmentation of expenditures targeted to attend to 
the unsatisfied social needs’, partially to be financed out of the rising copper incomes 
(Villarzú 2002).  
Finally, in October 2002, a forty-eight page development programme was presented 
by fifteen parliamentarians of the Concertación, among which Sergio Aguiló, titled La 
Concertación Chilena para un Desarrollo con Justicia. Rather than simply criticising the 
model, this document sought to propose serious and technical solutions to create a 
development model that combined economic growth with true social justice. It did not 
call for ‘revolutions or significant institutional transformations’, but rather the 
awareness within the Concertación that a tax reform was essential for development:  
Development, if taken seriously, has to be financed. However, this cannot be 
reached with a fiscal expenditure that does not come above 23 per cent of GNP, 
while the average of the developed countries - the member states of the 
European Union - is about fifty per cent (Group of 15 2002: 9).64  
As a consequence, the debate on the course of the Concertación, which took place 
within the coalition itself but was simultaneously widely publicised, never produced 
proposals that sought to replace ‘Growth with Equity’ with a different paradigm. 
Instead, it intended to redirect the original project towards a higher level of equality in 
Chilean society. At the same time it identified two sections within the Concertación 
which were not tied to party lines. The autoflagelantes pursued a broader path of 
                                              
64 For a more extensive analysis of these debates, see Navia (2004: 235-245), and Van der Ree (2003).  
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modernisation, with more emphasis on social justice, while the autocomplacientes 
emphasised the need to maintain the current course of the project of modernisation. 
 
The Influence of the Debate on the Project of the Concertación 
Patricio Navia (2004: 235-245) has argued that autocomplacientes and autoflagelantes are 
‘two avenues east of Plaza Italia’ that is, a discussion that takes place within the 
country’s elites and does not really affect the population at large (Plaza Italia square is 
the symbolic border between ‘up-town’ to the east and ‘down-town’ to the west). 
Although his assertion is correct, in my opinion he misses the point in assessing the 
importance of the debate. The discussion has been essential for the Concertación and 
for the success of its model. It has allowed the Concertación to negotiate differences 
and shift consensus. Rather than a series of conflicts, it has been a series of attempts to 
coordinate the gradual adjustment of the model. In this sense, ‘Growth with Equity’ has 
followed the same line as its predecessors, only through different channels. The call for 
change came from civil society - perhaps not in the form of popular protest, but by 
decreasing electoral support, by publications that were as successful as critical, and by 
social science reports that revealed high levels of malestar, anxiety and political 
disconnection among the youth. This was exactly the language the ‘technocratised’ 
political parties of the Concertación understood, and rather than wait until the 
sentiments of popular dissent led to an outbreak, they attempted to negotiate the 
adaptation of the model among themselves. 
There are three aspects of the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente discussion that show its 
constructive and functional character. First of all, it has never led to party-line clashes 
or threatened the Concertación in its essence. Second, even the most radical 
autoflagelantes, such as Aguiló, have emphasised their loyalty to the model of Crecimiento 
con Equidad, arguing that it has been precisely the lack of equidad that has spurred their 
criticisms. The autoflagelantes continue to constructively work within the parameters of 
the model despite their criticisms; to date, not one of them has left the Concertación 
out of ideological concerns. And third, the discussion has always taken place on the 
basis of intellectual arguments. Even the severest critics have offered serious and 
technical proposals on how the model should be adapted, rather than lean back and 
simply attack it.  
The result of the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente discussion has been two-fold. On the 
one hand, it has strengthened the Concertación by allowing a certain level of dissent in 
order to reinforce consensus. The freedom to follow different lines of argument within 
the same paradigm has stimulated the flexibility and creativity in the coalition, which is 
essential for a coalition that rules for a long period. José Joaquín Brunner, himself 
something of a champion of the autocomplacientes, has argued that in fact the policy 
outcomes of the two groups are more or less the same. However, they have been 
reached via different intellectual routes. As he put it: 
Take, for instance, Carlos Ominami, and his autoflagelante sector. If you look at 
the proposals each of us puts forward, there is not a great difference. It is not as 
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if he has revolutionary approaches to education, or that I would refuse to accept 
any change to the market system. We reach similar solutions, by ways of 
reflexively and discursively very different routes, which at a single point separate 
us very much (interview with José Joaquín Brunner 18 April 2002).  
On the other hand, the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente discussion has allowed the gradual 
adaptation of the project. The need to re-think the model under the influence of the 
debate has created shifts in the consensus within the Concertación. This was especially 
visible around 2002, during the ‘second round’ of the debate, when sectors of the 
Concertación that had never been associated with the autoflagelantes, including 
influential figures such as Alejandro Foxley, came to support the call for more social 
investment by the state. This is not to suggest that the governments of the 
Concertación directly adapted their course under the influence of the autoflagelante-
autocomplaciente debate, or the malestar that was perceived in civil society. As has been 
shown, the reactions of the governments of Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Lagos were 
fundamentally negative and repressive. As a result, no direct adaptation of the political 
course of one of the Concertación governments can be connected to these debates. 
However, in a broader sense, it had the influence of creating the space within the 
Concertación for more progressive proposals. As a result, the debate has created the 
support within the coalition for the more ‘Social-Democrat welfare approach’ of Lagos, 
and later, of the more radical approach of Bachelet.  
The exclusive use of technical and intellectual language, the emphasis on content 
instead of individual conflict and the outspoken loyalty to the coalition of all 
participants, have made the autoflagelante-autocomplaciente discussion as asset rather than 
a problem for the Concertación. In fact, the debates within the Concertación have 
strengthened, rather than weakened, the governance within the coalition. The 
comparison with the Right is instructive in this respect, as conflicts between the parties 
of the Alliance for Chile tend to be personal, non-intellectual and particularly vicious. 
As a result, the president of the UDI, Pablo Longueira, lamented: 
When there are struggles within the Concertación, it is not news. They even 
capitalise on it, calling it diversity. However, when we fight, it is called lack of 
governability (speech by Pablo Longueira 2006). 
The autoflagelante-autocomplaciente discussion has also allowed for the successful 
adaptation of the model in the light of public discontent. This adaptation has taken 
particularly technocratic channels and paths, as the discontent was filtered through to 
the Concertación by means of social science studies rather than popular protest, and 
the adaptation did not take place directly and rapidly from the presidential office, but 
through a slow process of consensus-building within the coalition itself. This consensus-
building has even allowed for a new approach to civil society by the government of 
Bachelet. As has been argued at the beginning of this section, the Concertación has 
allowed for the structural disarticulation of civil society, despite verbal adherence to 
participation, in the name of governance and social order (Moreno 2006: 15). However, 
the government of Bachelet has openly and consistently argued for a model of 
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governance based on demands coming from civil society. For Bachelet, the expressions 
of those demands are the sign of a vital and healthy democracy, rather than a dangerous 
return to the mistakes of the past. As she put it, after fierce student protests in May of 
2006:  
We should be prepared for dialogue with the citizens. I have engaged in 
hundreds of those dialogues, and they are very pressing. We should also prepare 
for conflict, because conflict is part of a society that moves, that has interests, 
strength, and it is especially when this strength is felt that society absorbs and 
empowers it. It is, moreover, part of the exercise of power. (…) I believe that we 
should start from the basis of the citizen’s demands, those that we consider just 
and legitimate, of course (…). If they are just, legitimate, and we can fulfil them, 
then we will do it. And we will say in advance if those demands exceed the 
possibilities or what is just. But basically, what I want to say is that not every 
demand should be seen as problem. Even less should we have a fear of 
mobilisations, protests or differences (speech by Michelle Bachelet on 7 June 
2006).65 
This new model of governance has not just been one of Michelle Bachelet’s favourite 
themes. Instead, it reflects the ability of the Concertación to go beyond the verbal 
adherence to popular participation and to create pathways for participation (albeit in 
the form of protests) in order to strengthen the influence of civil society. Whether this 
is a move away from ‘embedded autonomy’ or is in fact an attempt to improve the 
connection between the government and civil society in Chile remains to be seen. But 
it certainly is a proof of the ability of the Concertación to adapt its project in view of 
civil society responses (however inarticulate) through technocratic networks and 
internal debates.  
6.3 The Concertación and the End of the History 
As has been argued at the beginning of this chapter, the project of the Concertación 
can be interpreted in two different ways. First, as a fourth project of modernisation, 
following in many ways the same trajectory as its predecessors, both in its construction 
and way of dealing with modernity and in its implementation. Second, the project can 
be interpreted as a synthesis in a Hegelian sense: a mix between the previous 
modernisation projects that seems to have overcome the conflicts from the past. This 
idea of a synthesis corresponds with the metaphor of interacting waves that has been 
presented in the theoretical section. Whereas the three previous projects of 
modernisation can be compared with individual waves, the project of the Concertación 
can be seen as the result of the interaction of those waves, forming specific and original 
patterns of modernity. Elements of each wave come into contact, interact, and as a 
                                              
65 This view seems to have increasing support from different sectors of the Concertación. In an interview 
with La Tercera, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle has argued that the student protests are actually a proof that the 
country has finally returned to normality: ‘No, I believe that this is the first ‘normal’ government we 
have. Now there are no more fears like during the transition (…) Therefore, we have to take the 
responsibility that the citizens feel they can express themselves and that now their demands will be 
resolved’ (interview with Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 2006).  
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result may amplify or nullify each other. Thus a new pattern of waves comes into 
existence, based on the original waves but at the same time completely original. Hence 
the question is, what is left of the three competing projects of modernisation? What 
traces of the Revolution in Liberty, the Chilean Road to Socialism and the Silent 
Revolution still characterise Chilean modernity?  
 
The representation of the Revolution in Liberty in Chilean Modernity 
The Revolution in Liberty is mainly represented in Chilean modernity by the emphasis 
on social integration. As has been argued before, this idea can be traced back to the 
notion of ‘social justice’ which was a prominent concept that has been supported by all 
political sectors since the 1920s. However, the interpretations that were made of ‘social 
justice’ by the Christian Democrats, the Left and the Right have differed substantially. 
The Christian Democrats emphasised the social inclusion of the marginalised masses 
(through promoción popular), in order to guarantee minimal dignity of life and access to 
state benefits for all. For the Left, it was directly connected with class exploitation and 
imperialism, and to the creation of the three sectors of the economy, through which the 
state would be enabled to perform large-scale income redistribution in order to create 
an ‘equal society’. For the Right, in return, the ideas of redistribution and state 
intervention were considered counterproductive. Social justice was reinterpreted to 
‘equality of opportunity in the market’ on an individual basis, which was equated with 
the absence of state action (Silva 1993a).  
In today’s Chilean modernity, the interpretation that is being given to social justice 
reflects much of that of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ in the 1960s. As in the years of 
Ahumada and Pinto, there exists an ample consensus that exclusion of large sections of 
society is intolerable, not just from a moral standpoint, but also from the perspective of 
sustainable economic growth and governability.66 As a consequence, the state has to 
take the responsibility to raise the standard of living of its citizens to a minimal level, 
and provide basic infrastructure such as housing and services such as sanitation, health 
care, education and direct support for the poorest. The results of the Concertación in 
these areas have been impressive: practically all poblaciones and tomas have been 
eradicated and basic housing has been made available for all Chileans. Moreover, the 
state has extended itself to the formerly ‘excluded’ masses, providing access to the basic 
benefits that the state offers the poor. However, the state does not provide ‘equality’ in 
a more socialist sense - the word ‘equity’ in the phrase ‘Growth with Equity’ has come 
to refer almost exclusively to the eradication of extreme poverty, social inclusion of the 
marginal sectors, and the equal treatment of all citizens by the state (Oyarzún 2006).67 
                                              
66 As has been shown in section 6.2.2, the neo-structuralist approach follows the structuralist argument 
that development can only take place together with social inclusion and increased equity. For a 
comparison between the works of Ahumada and Pinto and the Concertación, see: Larraín (2005: 375-
377).  
67 In this sense, Growth with Equity has fulfilled T.H. Marshall’s notion of ‘social rights’; that is, the right 
to a minimal standard of living for all citizens. As Marshall’s basic ‘civil rights’ and ‘political rights’ have 
also been fulfilled under the Concertación through the restoration of the rule of law and democratisation 
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The egalitarian interpretation that is often given to the word ‘equity’ and which 
corresponds with the tradition of the Left has lost most of its legitimacy since the 
collapse of Allende’s government. As a result, the idea of creating a society with 
minimal socio-economic differences is, despite the verbal adherence from the socialist 
parties, not a priority on the agenda of the Concertación. Not even Bachelet’s emphasis 
on citizenship and the creation of a welfare state escapes the ruling paradigm that 
poverty reduction policies and investment in social security and education are the only 
legitimate tools the state has at its disposal in the struggle against inequality. As Joaquín 
Vial (1999: 195) has pointed out, these tools do allow for significant poverty reduction, 
as was seen in the early 1990s. However, they have much less influence on the 
distribution of income. Growth with Equity as a model has positive influence on 
poverty, but is more or less neutral with regard to inequality. Even if income 
distribution has normalised somewhat compared to the 1980s, income inequality in the 
period 2000-2002 was still one-third higher than in the 1960s (Ffrench-Davis 2003: 324). 
Furthermore, several studies have shown that it is one of the highest for Latin 
America.68  
While the notion of promoción popular, in the form of inclusion of the ‘masses’ and 
state provision of basic needs, has remained a key element of Chilean modernity today, 
the form it has taken has radically changed. The notion of collective self-help, through 
the centros de madres (mothers’ centres) and juntas de vecinos (neighbourhood groups), had 
become too closely connected to the social unrest that came to characterise the late 
1960s and the early 1970s. Instead, under the Concertación the programmes for social 
inclusion have been implemented in an exclusively top-down manner.  
More importantly, the limits of the justicia social have been set by the logic of neo-
liberalism. The fear of collective civil-society actions induced the Concertación to 
embrace the idea that social justice should be achieved at the individual level rather 
than at the collective level. As a result, ‘equity’ has acquired the added value of ‘equality 
of opportunity’. Up to a certain level, the state takes the responsibility for the creation 
of certain minimum levels of quality of life. After that, the ‘equality of opportunity’ is 
assumed to have been achieved and the state withdraws all support. This conception 
has been maintained by the Concertación, and explicitly promoted even under the 
                                                                                                                                        
in the early 1990s, it could be argued that modern citizenship has become, for the first time, a reality in 
Chilean history (Marshall 1950).  
68 During the 2005-6 presidential elections, income distribution became one of the most pressing political 
campaign issues. All parties promised to alleviate these, in the words of the Episcopal Conference of 
2005, ‘scandalous differences of income’. However, no candidate came up with solutions that amounted 
to anything other than ‘more of the same’: poverty reduction and investment in education and health 
care. Many analysts and critics have dealt with the topic, but so far with few concrete policy proposals. 
One of the most original recent proposals comes from Patricio Navia and Eduardo Engel, who argue that 
many of the inequalities in the country are not the result of individualism and the logic of the market 
(which are most often identified by the Concertación as the central problems), but rather the result of a 
lack of these. If competition increases, and simultaneously the state guarantees true ‘equality of 
opportunities’ (for instance by improving the educational system), then Chilean society will really 
become based on merit, and will allow for larger sections of society to move ahead (Navia and Engel 
2006).  
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government of Bachelet. As Clarissa Hardy, minister of MIDEPLAN, put it, the 
Bachelet government seeks to:  
help to create a society with equality of opportunities, which means guaranteed 
social rights for all civilians, male or female, for simply being citizens. We want 
a society without discrimination (speech by Clarissa Hardy on 14 March 2006).  
As a result, the project of the Centre is represented in Chilean modernity specifically by 
its interpretation of social justice. According to this interpretation, social exclusion is 
not only morally condemnable, but also hinders the full development and 
modernisation of the country. Simultaneously, social justice is limited by two elements 
from the past. On the one hand, the legacy of the project of the Left has de-legitimised 
the promotion of social justice through the political mobilisation of the masses. At the 
same time the idea of an ‘egalitarian society’ is not actively pursued in Chilean 
modernity. On the other hand, the idea of social justice is limited by the neo-liberal 
logic of the project of the Right: once state support produces a certain standard of 
living, the requirement of ‘equality of opportunity’ has been fulfilled, and the state 
withdraws its support in order to allow for the free competition of individuals in the 
market. Even though in recent years this approach has been put under pressure by the 
AUGE Plan and the intentions of the Lagos and Bachelet administrations to extend the 
welfare system beyond the poor, it is still a strong feature of the Concertación’s 
interpretation of justicia social.  
 
The project of the Left in Chilean Modernity 
The project of the Left has been represented in quite a different fashion. In fact, it 
would be more correct to say the project of the Left, the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, 
has largely been excluded from Chilean modernity. The notions of class struggle and 
imperialism, the dependencia theory, and the idea of a ‘bourgeois state’ that has to be 
‘conquered’, all these elements have never been integrated into the Chilean model. This 
goes in particular for the poder popular that had made the UP so infamous among the 
middle classes and the Right: the expansion of the state into the economic realm at the 
cost of the right to property of the capitalist classes, as well as the mobilisation of the 
workers and marginal masses in the achievement of a ‘socialist society’. In fact, popular 
participation has become such a tainted notion that it has been converted into 
something of an anti-value in today’s Chile. Many have shown that de-politicisation 
and a weak civil society have become key characteristics of patterns of modernity and 
identity in Chile (Larraín 2001: 215-225). Patricio Silva speaks of a techno-
Schumpeterian democratic model, implying that popular participation remains limited 
to the formal election process (1998: 87). Sergio Marras speaks of the ‘anti-value of 
politics’ (1999: 512). Tironi, finally, refers to the ‘spectacle politics’ of the 1990s, based 
on mass media for its diffusion, and links it to the passiveness and lack of interest in 
politics among the population (1999: 87-88).  
While it is clear that almost none of the central values of the project of the Left 
have been maintained in contemporary modernity in Chile, two exceptions should be 
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made. The agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the Copper Mines, both initiated 
under Frei Montalva but finished under Allende, and only partly reversed under the 
military regime, have become key elements of Chilean modernity. The agrarian reform 
led to the demise of the traditional socio-economic relations in the countryside, and 
this has allowed for a more modern and efficient model of production to emerge in the 
1970s. Nowadays, competitive and high-tech agrarian production is one of the 
foundations of the ‘Chilean Model’ (Silva 1987). The same goes for the national copper 
enterprise CODELCO: without its contributions to the Treasury, the impressive social 
investments that have taken place since 1990 would have been impossible. As agrarian 
reform has contributed to Growth, so the nationalisation of the copper mines has made 
Equity an attainable goal.69 
Even though of the project of the Left has not come to be part of Chilean 
modernity, the leadership of the Left actually has. Since the mid-1980s former 
collaborators of Allende have filled key positions in the Centre-Left opposition and 
have been highly visible leaders in the Concertación.70 The desire of the elites of the 
Left, after the fall of the UP, for rehabilitation and a ‘second chance’ was very powerful, 
for two reasons. First of all, this was because the legacy of the Left itself was at stake. 
The failure of the Allende government had put an abrupt end to a long and impressive 
rise of the Left in Chile, and had de-legitimised much of its historical project. Many of 
its leaders were well aware of this, and sought rehabilitation for the Left - if not in the 
form of its old project, than at least in showing that they were able to administer the 
country in a responsible manner after all (Silva 1993b: 104). The fact that in the process 
ideological compromises would have to be made was of lesser importance, and actually 
fitted the renovation of the Left, its ‘technocratisation’ and new pragmatism very well. 
As Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt and Tomás Moulian have pointed out at length, for the Left 
                                              
69 This argumentation is not shared by the Right in Chile, which still resents the expropriations that took 
place in the agrarian sector. As Cristián Larroulet, the director of the neo-liberal ‘Libertad y Desarrollo’ 
think-tank answered to the question of whether the agrarian reform actually was not, economically 
speaking, a blessing in disguise: ‘There existed less costly instruments to achieve this modernisation. The 
opening of the economy and the fiscal reforms that took place after 1973 would have been enough to 
change the structures of agrarian production. And we wouldn’t have had to go through this dramatic, 
conflictive process’ (interview with Cristián Larroulet, 4 May 2006). The weak point in this 
argumentation is of course that the Chicago Boys would probably never had been able to reform the 
economy, if the country had not passed through just that dramatic and conflictive process.  
70 The Left regained its leadership through what must have been the first true occurrence of ‘tele-politics’ 
in Chile (Tironi 1999: 100) This took place in 1987, in a famous appearance by Ricardo Lagos in a 
political programme on Canal 13 that was broadcast in the context of the 1988 plebiscite. During the 
programme, Lagos turned to the camera, pointed his finger towards the camera, and said: ‘General 
Pinochet has not been honest with the country (…) I will remind you, General Pinochet, that on the day 
of the 1980 plebiscite you said that President Pinochet will not be a candidate in 1989. And now, you 
promise the country eight more years of torture, assassinations, and Human Rights violations. I find it 
intolerable that a Chilean has such an ambition for power that he aims to be in power for twenty-five 
years’ Through this single action, Lagos gave the Left back the leadership it had lacked for years, making 
himself one of the key leaders of the Concertación (Arrate and Rojas 2003: 404-5). 
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the transition to democracy was more about toppling Pinochet and gaining power than 
about ideological consistency (Jocelyn-Holt 1988: 218-230; Moulian 1997: 334-5).71 
Secondly, the former collaborators of Allende were of a particularly young 
generation, many of them still in their twenties in 1973, and in particular the Christian 
Left and the Socialists were very well educated. As a consequence, the leaders of the 
Left after 1973 were still in a period in their lives when they could afford to grow and 
mature for sixteen years, and then take up a new, historical challenge: to rehabilitate 
themselves from their past (Hite 2000: 18; 154) Both arguments are applicable to the 
leadership of Ricardo Lagos, for instance. As Navia (2004: 261-263) points out, Lagos 
carried the weight of the burden of Allende’s legacy on his shoulders when entering La 
Moneda. As a result, his attention was focused on creating a new legacy, to gain for 
himself a ‘privileged place in the historical gallery of the Presidents of Chile’.72  
 
Chilean Modernity and the Project of the Right 
For the Right, more or less the reverse argument applies. Since the return to democracy, 
no candidate of the Right has been able to win the presidency, while much of the 
project of the Right has remained intact. The neo-liberal economic model has largely 
been continued by the Concertación, and has even been improved (from the 
perspective of the neo-liberals) in several key aspects: the independence of the Central 
Bank and the privatisations of the ports and other important institutions. In fact, it 
could be argued that the Concertación has administered the neo-liberal model better 
than the Right could have done, because of its ability to control or at least to moderate 
labour organisations and other pressure groups. Moreover, the political legacy of the 
military regime, in the form of the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ remained largely intact until 
2003, when the Right itself agreed to undo much of its structure. These two elements 
combined make the ideological victory of the Right significant, even though it has not 
been able to administer what remained of its model itself.73 As El Mercurio, the 
conservative newspaper with the strongest affinity to the neo-liberal model, argued in 
an editorial in 1997:  
The greatest victory of the protagonists of that date [11 September 1973, GvdR] 
has been that its opponents, transformed into Government on the basis of the 
                                              
71 Jocelyn-Holt makes a specific case to link the ideological flexibility of the Left with its modernising 
spirit. In an open letter to Eugenio Tironi, he accuses the ex-MAPU member of having betrayed all his 
values in the name of modernisation. First, for having exchanged the PDC for the MAPU; second, for 
leaving the MAPU once again for the PDC in the early 1990s, and third, for embracing the neo-liberal 
modernisations of the Right: ‘Once MAPU, always MAPU; once DC always DC; before anti-neo-liberal, 
now liberal, but always faithful to the same, always modernising’ (Jocelyn-Holt 2000).  
72 Navia’s analysis of Lagos transcends the borders of social science by analysing the deeper motives of the 
president without having investigated them - this section of his book is essayistic rather than academic. 
However, Navia’s analysis, as usual, both makes sense and comes over convincingly.  
73 As has been argued in section 6.2.2, the excellent administration of the neo-liberal model in the 1990s 
seems to have limited the Right’s drive to actually gain power. Rather than claiming themes that appeal 
to large sections of undecided voters, it tended to gather around the old banners (Tironi 2001: 287-188). 
However, during the Lagos government, some changes were made in this respect, as the UDI started to 
slowly move away from its gremialista legacy.  
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institutional order that the former have left as a legacy, have not modified 
anything fundamental in the new structures (quoted in Corvalán 2000: 447).  
The influence of the project of the Right in present-day Chilean modernity is not 
limited to the political and economic structures exclusively. It has also become 
dominant in the managerial and quantifying approaches to processes in society. The 
economic approach of the Chicago Boys introduced a range of United States-style 
management techniques and approaches to Chilean discourse on politics, emphasising 
topics such as ‘measurement’, ‘quality control’, ‘benchmarking’ and ‘human resource 
management’ in the political, bureaucratic and business arenas (Silva 1993c: 214). One 
good example of how the discourse and approach of the Right have been continued is 
the approach to poverty alleviation. During the military regime, ODEPLAN, under the 
leadership of Miguel Kast, started to make national inventories of the scale and 
intensity of poverty in order to ‘measure’ the problem. These ‘maps of extreme poverty’ 
became policy tools, which, on the basis of quantitative information (is there a TV 
present, how many rooms does the household have, are the children clean?), was 
decisive for the support that poor families would obtain from the state. This 
methodology has been maintained and even intensified under the Concertación, 
despite the severe drawbacks of such a quantitative approach - many families will move 
their TV-set to a neighbouring family if they suspect they are going be visited by a 
representative of FOSIS and will even have their children walk around dirty for days, 
just in order to qualify for support. Only in 2006, a new and qualitative system for the 
assessment of poverty has been implemented (La Nación, 27 November 2006).  
 
The Crystallisation of Chilean Modernity 
The projects of modernisation of the Centre, Left, and Right have then crystallised into 
a balance, an equilibrium, in which all are represented in different fashions. In this way, 
the three ‘waves of modernisation’ have created a pattern of standing waves in which 
some elements of all three original waves have been amplified, while others have been 
muted. The result is a solid model; in fact, it could be argued that the three projects 
hold each other in a sort of ‘Pareto optimality’, a zero-sum game between three actors, 
in which an expansion of the influence of the one automatically implies a reduction in 
the influence of the other. This explains the ‘fixedness’ of the Chilean model - the 
equilibrium between the Right, Centre, and Left is so tight that only through extensive 
negotiations between the three, and on the basis of transversal consensus, can 
adaptations be achieved.74 This explains why any attempt to make a change in the 
fundaments of the model, be it political or economic, has encountered fierce responses 
from the other sectors. This is most clearly the case with the opposition, but also 
noticeable between the Christian Democrats and the Socialist sections of the 
Concertación. The transversal consensus that was praised during the 1990s in many 
                                              
74 Obviously, the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ played a large role as well in ‘fixing’ the model before they were 
largely abandoned in 2003.  
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ways can be seen as a prison, or an ‘iron cage’, as well as a blessing (Moulian 1997: 45-
56). 
Apart from the ‘authoritarian enclaves’, the stability of the model can be attributed 
to the fact that it is based on several internal paradoxes. These paradoxes, or internal 
contradictions, reconcile conflicting elements of the three projects in such a way that 
they leave little room for adaptation. First of all, the model combines democracy with 
the disarticulation of civil society and very low levels of political participation. As a 
result of this contradiction, the democratic structures of the country are top-down 
oriented and highly presidential, reflecting both the authoritarian and Portalian 
tradition of the elites and the fear of popular participation (Marras 1999: 498; Larraín 
2001: 226-233).75 It also is indicative of the technocrat character that Chilean politics 
has assumed and the subsequent limitation of the political game. At the same time it 
reflects a civil society that has been oriented to the market rather than to the political 
arena for the fulfilment of its demands, and which has been defined by the 
individualisation of its possibilities and risks - that is, as Tironi (2005: 20) has argued, a 
liberal society in the style of the United States.76 However, it should be noted that the 
neo-liberal logic of individualism and market orientation has not penetrated all sectors 
of modern Chile’s consciousness. An international survey showed in 2000 that only 
one-third of the Chileans believed that ‘personal effort leads to success’ (quoted in 
Larraín 2001: 234). Similarly, the student protests of 2006 also seem to indicate a latent 
but still present orientation towards the state for the solutions of social problems.77 
The second contradiction that has come out of the interaction between the projects 
of modernisation of the Centre, Left and Right is that Chile has become the Latin 
American country with the highest level of state spending on social policies, while it 
occupies a very high position on the global list of income inequality (World Bank 
2003). Although the statistics are somewhat deceptive (according to the 2005 UNDP 
human development index, income distribution between the poorest and richest 
                                              
75 Chilean democracy has gained some characteristics of what Guillermo O’Donnell has labelled 
‘delegative democracy’: strongly individualistic leadership, strong technocrat approach to policy-making, 
and relatively low horizontal accountability of the executive. However, O’Donnell explicitly excludes 
Chile from the Latin American ‘delegative democracies’ (which includes neighbouring countries such as 
Peru, Bolivia and Argentina) because of its strong and functioning institutions (O’Donnell 1993). Silva’s 
characterisation of Chilean democracy as ‘techno-Schumpeterian’ seems to be a more suitable one (1998: 
87).  
76 Other arguments that Tironi uses to support his claim that Chilean society has evolved in the direction 
of a United States model rather than a European one are the emphasis on family values, the two-party 
system, the personification of the political process, and the persistence of conservative and religious 
values.  
77 It should be noted that civil society may not be as disarticulate as has been suggested in the literature. 
As Gonzalo de al Maza (2005: 108-9) argues, the number of non-profit organisations in Chile is relatively 
high compared to the other countries of the region. However, as de la Maza also shows, numbers do not 
explain everything. Apart from their credibility, they do not reflect the influence or orientation of these 
organisations. In general, the Chilean civil society organisations tend to focus on the increase of welfare 
of their own members, rather than on the general well-being of society. Furthermore, most of them are 
very small. Despite their large number, the Chilean civil society organisations have relatively little 
influence on the political arena.  
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quintile falls from 1:20 to 1:10 when social government spending is taken into 
account), it is indicative that despite all the efforts of the governments of the 
Concertación and the discursive adherence to the theme, Chilean modernity may have 
a human face but does not create anything approaching an egalitarian society. As 
Taylor (2006) argues, the heart of this contradiction lies with the internal logic of the 
project of the Concertación, which intends to combine a neo-liberal economic model 
with social justice. 
The third contradiction lies in the administration of a neo-liberal economy by 
socialists. As has been shown, this has led to severe criticism and even allegations of 
ideological treason from different sides. However, it can also be interpreted as an 
indication of the willingness of Chile’s elites (especially those from the Left) to engage 
in processes of political learning and to approach new developments with a high level 
of realism. It also reflects the continuity of Chile’s drive towards modernity and its 
inclination towards progressiveness. The Left, together with the Centre, has taken up 
the challenge of administering the neo-liberal model, not just because they were forced 
to by the incumbent regime, but also because they correctly acknowledged its 
modernising and progressive potentials. Despite its downsides, the Centre and Left have 
been able to improve the neo-liberal model and transform it into a motor for more 
integral development and modernisation (Larraín 2005: 376). The projects of 
modernisation of the Christian Democrats, the Left and the Right individually were 
unable to create a ‘developed’ and ‘modern’ Chile, in which prosperity, equality and 
freedom go hand in hand. However, under the Concertación the three projects have 
entered into a mix that has, as Navia has argued, opened the grandes Alamedas (central 
Santiago avenue) that Allende spoke of in his farewell speech:  
Much sooner than later the grandes Alamedas will open through which free men 
will walk to build a better society (Navia 2004: 68). 
These paradoxes, democracy without participation, social integration without equality, 
and a neo-liberal economy administered by the Centre-Left, form key elements of the 
Chilean modernity and keep it ‘fixed’. Like a house of cards, they keep each other in 
balance and the ‘model’ in place - and, as with the game, if one card is removed, the 
whole construction may collapse.  
Finally, the last contradiction that characterises Chilean modernity is that it 
generates sentiments of disillusion and malestar (disenchantment) regardless of its 
success. Apparently the ‘happiness’ announced by the opposition with such fervour and 
enthusiasm in 1988 has never arrived. As has been noted before, the Human 
Development Report of 1998 showed that on the level of the population at large the 
economic model has generated increased insecurity and high levels of anxiety, as the 
old collective securities have been replaced with individual competition in the market. 
As a result, large sections of the Concertación have been affected by a form of malestar, 
the sense that their own project is fundamentally flawed and should be replaced by a 
more radical, maximising one. Although these sentiments are not shared by the 
Concertación as a whole, they have affected large sections of it. As Tironi put it:  
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the principal source of exhaustion experienced within the Concertación has 
been its own disenchantment with the work of its governments and its project 
(2000: 204).78  
This sense of frustration among the elites of the Concertación has, on the one hand, 
allowed the coalition to adapt its project without social or political conflict (see section 
6.2.3). On the other, it has laid bare a line of thinking within the Concertación which 
critics such as Brunner and Tironi have attacked as being anti-modern. Both have 
argued that the feelings of malestar in Chilean society are the unavoidable and harmless 
by-products of the return to normality after decades of social and ideological conflict 
(Tironi 2000: 129-133) and of a culture that is adapting to modernity (Brunner 1998a: 
26-32). Both have also claimed that the sense of frustration within the Concertación is 
in fact a form of disenchantment with modernity itself. The autoflagelantes, who mainly 
(although not exclusively) come from the Left-wing of the Concertación, have taken up 
an anti-modernising, ‘neo-conservative’, and ‘nostalgic’ discourse, and seek, in the 
words of Brunner:  
to slow down or reduce the advances of modernisation in society, which is 
identified as the source of all the turmoil (1998: 196). 
How this sense of frustration with modernity may develop is uncertain. On the one 
hand, it is clear that the malestar with modernity may well be the by-product of a 
country that has been able, in the course of thirty turbulent years, to solve its 
fundamental problems and set a firm course towards a balanced model of modernity. 
On the other, it might be emblematic of the sensation of being locked in an iron cage 
of modernity, an ‘end of history’, which does not allow for the promulgation of 
alternative proposals for modernity. In the end, this sensation may provoke the 
downfall of the current model and the subsequent formulation of new projects of 
modernisation. For better or for worse, this might eventually lead to the ‘end’ of Chile’s 
‘end of history’.  
                                              
78 In this sense, the Concertación runs the risk of following the course of the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, 
which, in the words of Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt, was only revolutionary in the sense that it was not able to: 
‘capitalise on its own results’ (Jocelyn-Holt 1997: 97).  
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Conclusions 
Chilean historians and social scientists have traditionally shown a strong inclination to 
divide the political and social history of their country in the twentieth century into 
periods that are largely unconnected. This has been in part a result of the strong 
ideological and political conflicts that have characterised the second part of the century, 
and which have produced very different and at times even antagonistic political 
projects. As a consequence, it has too often been assumed that little long-term 
continuity has been seen in this period.  
This is particularly the case with the study of modernity and projects of 
modernisation in Chile. Jorge Larraín’s (2002) influential study on Chile’s trajectory 
towards modernity is a case in point. By arguing that Chile has experienced alternating 
periods of expansion and crisis of modernity, he fails to acknowledge the elements of 
continuity that have occurred in this period, especially in the area of modernisation. It 
is for this reason that I propose a different interpretation, roughly based on the 
‘multiple modernities’ approach that has been put forward by Eisenstadt (2002), 
Whitehead (2002) and others. Looking at the case of Chile from this theoretical 
perspective, it can be argued that the Chilean trajectory towards modernity has been 
characterised by successive projects of modernisation that have been created by 
different political elites, often with the support of certain sectors of the economic elite. 
These were the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ of the Christian Democrat Party under the Frei 
government (1964-1970), the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ of Allende’s Unidad Popular 
coalition (1970-1973), the ‘Silent Revolution’ of the military regime of Pinochet (1973-
1990), and ‘Growth with Equity’ of the Centre-Left Concertación coalition 
governments (1990-2006). All of them have been modernising at the social, political, 
and economic level, but have put different emphasis on these levels.  
These projects of modernisation have been key elements in the formation of 
patterns of modernity in Chile. Nevertheless, none of them has been able to dominate 
that process. Rather, like interfering waves, the interaction between the different 
projects has produced specific patterns of modernity that are different from the original 
ones (section 1.2). As a result, the continuous interaction between projects of 
modernisation has produced patterns of what may be labelled ‘Chilean modernity’.  
 
The Chilean Trajectory Towards Modernity 
Chile’s path toward modernity started in the late colonial period. During its long 
trajectory, Chilean processes of modernisation have acquired characteristics that have 
remained dominant since. This is, for instance, the case with the attitudes of Chilean 
elites towards modernisation. These were largely defined in the late colonial period, in 
two different ways. First, as Jocelyn-Holt (1992) has argued, Chilean local elites came to 
support modernisation (in this case, the eighteenth-century ‘Bourbonic reforms’) even 
when it hurt their direct interests, because they realised that their support could be 
exchanged in return for a share of power. This pragmatism towards modernity and 
 296 
modernisation has since then become a characteristic of Chilean elites, who have 
tended to accept modernisation as long as it did not jeopardise the social order. Second, 
from its late-colonial beginnings onwards, modernisation became intrinsically tied to 
the formation of the state and of state institutions. As a result, the engagement of 
Chilean elites in modernisation has taken place within the framework of the state since 
then (section 2.2). 
Nineteenth-century processes of modernisation also exercised a strong influence on 
the Chilean trajectory towards modernity. First, modernisation acquired a particularly 
top-down and even authoritarian character. This was the case during the ‘Portalian 
state’, which combined some elements of modern democracy with the maintenance of 
an authoritarian order (section 2.3). It was also a key feature of the dictatorship of 
Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-1931), who set in motion a process of state-centred 
industrialisation, modernised the state apparatus, and gave the middle classes access to 
the administrative centres, all within the context of an authoritarian order. The top-
down character of modernisation in Chile can also be seen in the state-led 
industrialisation project of CORFO, which was set in motion in 1939, and was once 
again implemented from above (section 2.5). Second, from the mid-nineteenth century, 
modernisation became closely associated with science, rationalism and a technical 
approach. Nineteenth-century liberalism emphasised education and science as the 
prerequisites for progress (section 2.3). From the 1880s onwards, positivism became a 
driving force among influential Chilean intellectuals who sought to lift the country to a 
‘scientific phase’, in which reason and rationalism would bring full progress to the 
country (section 2.4). Under the dictatorship of Ibáñez, the modernisation of society 
came to be administered by young, independent professionals and technicians, who 
were strongly guided by values such as efficiency, rationalism and meritocracy. This 
orientation towards technical and scientific modernisation gained influence with the 
implementation of the industrialisation project of the CORFO in the late 1930s and 
1940s (section 2.5).  
By the 1960s, proposals for modernisation showed a clear tendency towards 
radicalisation. The party system had divided into three sectors of more or less equal 
strength: the Centre (in this case, the Christian Democrats), the Left, and the Right. All 
of them had adopted, up to different levels, a strong orientation towards top-down and 
state-oriented modernisation, as well as an increasingly technical outlook. This was 
reinforced by the exhaustion of the industrialisation project of the CORFO, and the 
subsequent need to find an alternative path of modernisation. Simultaneously, the rise 
of the Left in Latin America, symbolised by the Cuban Revolution of 1959, intensified 
the political and ideological competition between the three sectors. As a consequence, 
from 1964 on, the Centre, Left and Right succeeded one another in the implementation 
of their project of modernisation, oriented toward the re-foundation of the country’s 
social, economic and political structures. In 1990, these projects were followed by the 
fourth project, that of the Concertación coalition. These four projects share strong 
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elements of continuity in the main phases of their development: their construction, 
their implementation, and their legacies.  
 
The Construction of the Projects 
All four projects have been based on different doctrinal and ideological interpretations 
of modernity that were developed by the Centre, Left and Right, and, in the case of the 
fourth project, by the Concertación coalition. These interpretations were both critical 
and selective. They were critical, because they were critiques of modernity just as much 
as they were proposals for it. Apart from criticising the path of modernisation that the 
country had followed so far (and specifically the previous project of modernisation), 
they were based on very specific understandings of what modernity should be (and not 
be) for a country like Chile. For instance, all of them were highly critical of the roles 
that capitalism and democracy had fulfilled in modernity. Rather than simply rejecting 
them, though, both projects sought to transform them and create ‘alternative 
modernities’ instead (sections 3.1.1 and 4.1.1). Similarly, the project of the Right argued 
against a modernity that was based on liberal democracy, and proposed an authoritarian 
(if still formally democratic) alternative (section 5.1.1). 
The interpretations of modernity that were used in the construction of the projects 
were selective in the sense that they emphasised certain elements of modernity and 
ignored (or rejected) others. This can be seen in the use of the existing examples of 
modernity that served to orient the projects, such as North-Western Europe or the 
Socialist world. The projects also placed different emphases on the economic, political, 
and economic dimensions of modernity. Finally, foreign theories and doctrines have 
been adapted to the Chilean context. Eduardo Frei selectively adapted the teachings of 
Maritain, the Left reinterpreted Socialism in order to fit the democratic system, and the 
Right ‘Chilenised’ Chicago school neo-liberalism (Chapters 3-5, section 1.1). 
Even if all projects of modernisation have been formulated and constructed by 
political elites, they have not been exclusively political in nature. Chilean elites have 
shown a strong orientation towards economics, and have been actively supported by 
influential economists, who have added specific developmental elements to the 
projects. In the case of the Christian Democrats this was structuralism, for the Left it 
was dependency theory, the Right used neo-liberalism, and the Concertación used neo-
structural approaches in its project. These theories were all new and vanguard theories 
that had never been put into practice in Latin America before. Their incorporation in 
the projects of modernisation reflects the importance that has been put on rationalism 
and science in the construction of projects of modernity. A solid and state-of-the-art 
economic framework not only served to translate modernising doctrines into direct 
policy-making, but also contributed to the legitimacy of the project as a whole. Once 
again, however, selectivity was a key factor. The Christian Democrats, for instance, 
neglected the emphasis on state-led industrialisation that had been prescribed by 
structuralism. The UP never sought to fully move out of the paradigm of international 
capitalism as the radical dependentistas had advocated, and the Right deviated from 
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‘Friedmanian orthodoxy’ by maintaining relatively high levels of state influence in the 
economy and by allowing for some level of income redistribution by the state 
(Chapters 3-6, section 1.2).  
In all projects, the ideological and developmental elements were merged into one, 
all-encompassing programme. These programmes were characterised by their focus on 
resolving all the main problems in society with one integral approach. They did so by 
introducing modernisation at the social, political, and economic level. However, the 
emphasis on these levels differed: the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ was mainly focused on the 
social dimension of modernity, while the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’ and the ‘Silent 
Revolution’ were primarily oriented towards the political and economic dimensions 
respectively. As a result, they were true projects of modernisation, which intended to fill 
the gap between Chile and the ‘modern world’ in a short period of time, but with very 
different approaches towards modernity itself (Chapters 3-6, section 1.3).  
 
The Implementation of the Projects 
In the phase of their implementation, the projects shared a strong focus on the state, 
technocracy and state planning. Furthermore, their implementation was strongly 
influenced by the intense competition that took place between the Centre, Left and 
Right. Finally, all projects have encountered a moment at which they needed to adapt 
in order to survive.  
All four projects have been implemented within the framework of the state. This 
was not self-evident, as the projects were based on ambivalent positions towards the 
state. During the project of the Centre, Frei warned against the ‘tutelage of the state’, 
while the Left considered the state to be a bulwark of bourgeois interest. The Right 
argued that the role of the state should be limited as much as possible, so that it could 
not be used to impose Communism on the nation. Finally, the Concertación was very 
careful not to disrupt the dynamics of the markets and limited the role of the state to 
that of regulation. Despite these ambiguities, however, the state has functioned as the 
main channel for modernisation in Chile. This emphasis on the state as the motor of 
modernisation reflects the dominant role of the state in Chilean society, as well as a 
need to maintain control over projects that are as radical and far-reaching as the projects 
of modernisation in question. Even the military regime, whose project consisted to a 
large extent in minimising the powers of the state, had to resort to that same state in 
order to do so. 
State-led modernisation has been intrinsically linked to the modernisation of the 
state itself. All projects have attempted to redefine the role of the state in society, and 
the state has been adapted accordingly. The Christian Democrats sought to transform 
the state into the ‘director of the common good’, while the UP sought to transform it 
into a ‘people’s state’. Under the military regime, it was reduced to a subsidiary role. 
Under the Concertación, finally, it was expanded into a regulating state. Moreover, the 
need for control over the process of modernisation itself created the need for a state 
functioning within rationalistic parameters. As a result, the state’s institutions have been 
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subjected to important processes of modernisation, especially under the projects of the 
Right and the Concertación.  
Technocracy and state planning have been two other key elements of the projects of 
modernisation. As Silva (1998a) has shown, the level of influence they have gained in 
Chilean politics has been largely defined by the degree of relative autonomy they were 
able to maintain in relation to civil society and political actors other than the President. 
Under Frei and Pinochet, the technocrat teams and their planning centres answered 
mainly to the President only, and were able to strongly influence the decision-making 
process. Allende showed much less direct interest in the work of the technocrats in his 
government, and his planning office was subordinated to several other institutions. As a 
result, the technical decision-making and state planning that had been envisioned by 
the UP never became dominant. The political elites of the Concertación, finally, had 
become profoundly technocratised themselves before taking office, and were able to 
successfully install a technocratic model of governance. The success of this model was a 
consequence of what Peter Evans (1995) has labelled ‘embedded autonomy’. The 
technocratic elites were able to maintain sufficient distance from civil society to insulate 
the decision-making process, while simultaneously they did not lose their sensitivity to 
the demands within society. State planning lost most of its influence under the 
Concertación, though, ironically because of the strong formal institutional position it 
acquired in the 1990s, which cut it off from its direct and exclusive ties to the 
presidency (Chapters 3-6, section 2.1).  
The implementation of each of the projects of modernisation was accompanied by 
an intense competition between the Centre, Left and Right. The projects of the others 
were strongly influenced by this competition. As a result, in the phase of their 
construction, development and fall, each of the projects was largely defined by the 
competition with the others. In the case of the project of the Centre, the ‘Revolution in 
Liberty’ produced a process of ideological and electoral competition which provoked a 
radicalisation of the Left. It also plunged the Right into a profound crisis, after which it 
would lose most of its pragmatic attitude toward modernisation and democracy. 
Meanwhile, the competition between the Centre and Left set in motion a process of 
popular mobilisation that became increasingly difficult to control (section 3.2.2).  
Under the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, political competition rapidly radicalised, 
provoking a process of polarisation that would eventually lead to the breakdown of the 
democratic system. The Centre made a sharp move to the Right after losing its second 
split-off to the UP. Simultaneously, the Right turned openly towards authoritarianism. 
Furthermore, sectors of the Right began to develop the bases for their future project. 
Eventually, the PDC joined the Right in the call for a military take-over (section 4.2.2).  
Political competition under the ‘Silent Revolution’ caused the sectors of the Left 
that had gone into exile to undergo a slow process of ideological moderation and 
renovation, while the Centre, after initially supporting the military regime, became 
increasingly oriented towards cooperation with the moderate Left. Simultaneously, both 
the Centre and the Left experienced a profound ‘technocratisation’. As a result, the 
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Centre-Left came to be characterised by an orientation towards centrism, pragmatism, 
technocracy and internal consensus-seeking. This was reinforced by the realities of the 
transition, which made it clear that the military regime still possessed broad support 
among the population and which put several limitations on the process of 
democratisation (section 5.2.2).  
Under the Concertación’s ‘Growth with Equity’, political competition all but 
vanished. This was largely a result of the project of the Concertación, which included 
key elements of the project of the Right in their own project. As a result, a general 
consensus on the country’s socio-economic strategies emerged between the Right and 
the Centre-Left, while the extra-parliamentary Left, which did not share this consensus, 
remained of little political significance. Consequently, the competition between 
contesting proposals for modernity, which had characterised the Chilean trajectory 
towards modernity for decades, ended. Instead, Chile seems to have entered into a 
Fukuyama-style ‘end of history’, in which all actors agree on the main course that the 
country should follow, despite their clear, and at times bitter differences on minor 
issues (section 6.2.2).  
The political competition that took place between the projects of modernisation was 
at times so intense that minor events came to play relatively large roles. This was for 
instance the case of the Naranjazo of 1964, when the death of a Socialist member of the 
parliament from the Curicó region turned out to be decisive in bringing the PDC to 
power. Similarly, the assassination of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
General Schneider in 1970 proved to be a crucial element for the Left’s ascent to power, 
as it was decisive for the PDC’s support for Allende’s inauguration as President. Finally, 
a less significant, but still influential, incident was the failed assassination attempt on 
Pinochet in 1986. This caused the radical wing of the Socialist Party to moderate and 
join the Concertación, strengthening the Centre-Left in relation to both the Right and 
the Communist Party (Chapters 3-5, section 2.2). 
Even though the competition between the Centre, Left and Right was particularly 
intense, at least until 1990, this did not mean that no ‘intellectual borrowing’ took 
place. The Christian Democrats used monetary prescriptions that had been used by the 
Right under the Alessandri-government (1958-1964). The idea of the three areas of the 
economy of the UP came from the leader of the centrist Radical Party, who soon after 
the elections moved over to the opposition (section 4.1.3). Under the military regime, 
the adaptations that were made to the economic model after the crisis of 1983-4 largely 
followed the proposals that had been made by Christian Democrat economists some 
years before (section 5.2.3). And finally, the Concertación profited greatly from the 
successes of the neo-liberal model in the late 1980s and appropriated much of the 
military regime’s economic model. 
It should be noted that despite the political mass mobilisation that took place in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s (as well as the early 1980s), Chilean political actors have 
shown a great propensity to competition within the context of the formal political 
arena. During the ‘Revolution in Liberty’, the Christian Democrats moved away from 
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the political and social mobilisation of the masses when they discovered that it 
provoked popular unrest. Under the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, the main actors (the 
PDC and the Left) continued to seek a solution for the political conflict within the 
institutional order, even when social order was breaking down rapidly. Only when the 
legal system proved unable to resolve the main conflict between the Centre and the 
Left did an extra-legal solution (a military coup) became a serious alternative (section 
4.2.2). Under the dictatorship, finally, the massive protests that took place in 1983 and 
1984 were rapidly abandoned by the Centre and moderate Left when they started to 
radicalise. Instead, these sectors opted to follow an institutional strategy within the 
parameters that had been set by the 1980 constitution (section 5.2.2).  
All projects of modernisation have encountered moments in which they were forced 
to adapt under the pressure of popular resistance and the threat of civil disorder. 
However, this has taken place in very different forms. In the case of the ‘Revolution in 
Liberty’, the Frei government was able to ‘step on the brake’ in 1967, but did not 
succeed in reigniting the project afterwards (section 3.2.3). Allende, in turn, proved 
unable to moderate or adapt the project of the Left when the social order was about to 
collapse, and lost control (section 4.2.3). The military regime, in contrast, was able to 
slow down its project when it faced mass protests in the period 1983-5. After that, it was 
able to successfully adapt the project and lead it into a second period of expansion 
(section 5.2.3). Finally, the Concertación was able to anticipate popular discontent and 
slowly adapt its project before social unrest could emerge. The coalition followed, so to 
speak, a ‘slow curve’ by generating internal debates that created the space for more 
progressive proposals and government candidates, and this resulted in a gradual move 
towards a more welfare-oriented state model of modernity (section 6.2.3). 
The degree of success of the governments in adapting their projects is largely 
dependent on their ability to convince their political support groups of the need for a 
change of course. This is linked to the degree of relative autonomy they have been able 
to maintain from civil society and political actors, combined with the level of internal 
cohesion of the governmental forces, and the authority of the President. In the case of 
the military government, the authoritarian nature of the regime was evidently very 
helpful in creating such relative autonomy. Still, the ability of the regime to temporarily 
distance itself from its two main civil support groups and replace them with others was 
remarkable. The Frei government was able to make a conservative turn, but at the cost 
of splitting the party, and lost the initiative. Allende proved unable to move away from 
political pressures by the radicalised sectors of the UP. As a result, the negotiation of an 
agreement with the Christian Democrats remained blocked. In the case of the 
Concertación, the relative autonomy remained very high, and was enhanced by its 
‘embeddedness’. Moderate divisions within the parties of the Concertación actually 
proved to be functional here. The coalition, which closely followed academic analyses 
of the political culture of the country, was able to anticipate dissent and start internal 
debates that eventually provoked a slow change in strategy. A contributing factor here 
was of course the passiveness of Chilean civil society, which created the space for the 
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Concertación to search for a new course. However, the main explanation for the 
successful adaptation of ‘Growth with Equity’ lies in the academic and technocrat 
‘metalanguage’ the political elites of the Concertación adopted.  
 
The Legacies of the Projects 
The projects of the Centre, Left and Right created legacies, some of which strongly 
influenced the following projects. These legacies, which have developed at the social, 
political and economic level, have often been intended, but at times have also taken the 
form of ‘unforeseen legacies’. Together, they eventually crystallised into patterns of 
modernity that became particularly stable, and which have become known as the 
‘Chilean model’ of the Concertación.  
In the case of the project of the Centre, the ‘Revolution in Liberty’ left the 
important economic legacies of the agrarian reform and the ‘Chilenisation’ of the 
copper mines. Additionally, it left a strong legacy in the social area through the 
inclusion of the marginal urban and rural masses. Even while the promoción popular 
programme was aborted well before 1970, the idea that a society cannot become truly 
modern if large sections of the population are excluded from society and from state 
benefits came to be shared by all political sectors. At the political level, an unforeseen 
legacy of the project of the Centre was the growing social unrest and popular 
mobilisation it had provoked.  
The UP’s main legacies in the economic field were the intensification of the agrarian 
reform and the nationalisation of the copper mines. The remainder of the legacies of 
the Left, however, were not foreseen or intended. Direct and large-scale state 
intervention in the economy came to be broadly associated with the economic chaos of 
1972 and 1973, including galloping inflation, scarcity of products, and long lines 
outside the stores. The same applies to the political modernisations of the UP. The 
mobilisation of the population through take-overs, demonstrations and strikes became 
strongly linked with the political conflict under the UP and the fall of Allende. As a 
result, mass participation in politics beyond the ballot box became strongly connected 
with the rupture of social order and a possible return to the chaos of the 1970s. Even 
after thirty years, these associations remain strong.  
The main economic legacy of the project of the Right consisted of the neo-liberal 
model. In addition, it confirmed part of the agrarian reform, as only a third of the 
expropriated land was distributed among the peasantry. At the political level, its legacy 
took the form of ‘authoritarian enclaves’ which were maintained after the return to 
democracy until they were largely abolished in 2003. An unforeseen social legacy of the 
military regime was the high level of social exclusion, marginality and poverty that it 
created. Simultaneously, though, the country’s social practices and identities underwent 
a move from collective to individual orientation, from citizenship to consumerism, and 
bargaining to competition in the market, which, even though they were far from 
complete by 1990, proved to have become key elements of post-autoritarian Chilean 
modernity. 
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Under the Concertación, the interaction of the legacies of the projects of 
modernisation of the Centre, Left and Right have crystallised into a synthesis. This 
synthesis consists of elements of all three projects which have produced what has 
become known as the ‘Chilean model’. However, the three projects are represented in 
very different ways. Furthermore, the representation of each project in the ‘Chilean 
model’ has been limited by the presence of the legacies of the other projects. 
From the Revolution in Liberty, the strongest element that has come to characterise 
the model is its interpretation of social justice. The idea that a society cannot develop 
properly if large sections of its population are socially excluded has been one of the 
most prominent elements of the post-1990 order. However, the limits of social justice 
have been set by the projects of the Left and Right. On the one hand, equity in a more 
socialist sense, meaning the creation of an ‘equal society’, has not become part of the 
model. On the other hand, the neo-liberal interpretation of equality, namely equality of 
opportunity, has come to determine how far the state can go in its social policies. As 
soon as true equality of opportunity has been achieved, the state is no longer expected 
to actively interfere. 
Little of the project of the UP has survived in the Chilean model. However, this has 
been compensated for by the strong presence of Left-wing political leaders in the 
governments of the Concertación. This has allowed the leadership of the Left to 
rehabilitate at least part of their project and to show their ability to govern responsibly. 
However, this prominence remains conditioned by limitations that have been defined 
under the project of the Right: ideological moderation, consensus seeking, technical 
leadership, and political pragmatism. For the Right, the story is reversed: it has been 
unable to join government during the last sixteen years, but has seen a large part of its 
project being continued by the Concertación governments. Here, the limits have been 
set by the notion of social justice of the Christian Democrats. Neo-liberal reforms and 
transformations remain highly legitimate, but only up to the point where they start 
having negative consequences for poverty reduction. Where the free market has clear 
negative consequences for social justice, it becomes legitimate, and expected, for the 
state to intervene. 
In this way, the projects of the past have generated patterns that have largely come 
to define Chilean modernity. Like the interference of waves forms patterns that can 
produce ‘standing waves’, the interaction of the three projects of modernisation of the 
Centre, Left and Right has created patterns of modernity that are particularly stable. 
The reason for this stability is that all three projects hold each other in a tight balance. 
All three contributors are represented in a ‘zero-sum game’ manner: gain for one of 
them necessarily comes at the cost of the others. If one card is removed, so to speak, the 
whole house might collapse. This tight balance has also produced four internal 
paradoxes which have come to define Chilean modernity. First, it combines the return 
to democracy with low levels of political participation. Democracy in Chile under the 
Concertación has adopted a technical and formal character, in the sense that the 
democratic model is combined with a highly top-down
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civil society is far from non-existent in Chile, it plays hardly any role in the political 
decision-making process. Second, it combines effective and massive poverty reduction 
schemes with one of the highest levels of income inequality in Latin America. As has 
been seen, the logic of social justice has become limited by equality on the one hand 
(social policies should be focused on improving the situation of the poor, not on the 
creation of an egalitarian society), and by equality of opportunity on the other (as soon 
as equality of opportunity is achieved, the state should withdraw). As a result, income 
redistribution beyond poverty reduction clashes with the internal logic of the Chilean 
model. This results in wide differences in income, even while levels of poverty have 
been dramatically reduced. The third paradox consists of the neo-liberal model (albeit 
with a social face) being co-administered by the Left. This allows for government by the 
Centre-Left, but only as long as this takes place within the limits that have been 
outlined above: ideological moderation, acceptance of the neo-liberal context, and a 
highly technocratic, consensus-seeking outlook. A fourth internal paradox lies in the 
fact that despite the model’s clear success in the socio-economic field, it has provoked 
sentiments of discontent and frustration rather than of happiness. As some have 
observed, this may well be interpreted as a by-product of modernisation, and as an 
indication that the country has indeed become profoundly modern.  
Concluding, the interaction between the projects of modernisation of the Centre, 
the Left, and the Right has produced patterns of modernity that are internally 
paradoxical but very stable. This ‘Chilean model’ has been able to resolve most of the 
pressing problems in the country: the integration of the masses, the achievement of 
rapid and sustainable economic development, and the maintenance of political stability 
and governability. Nevertheless, it has provoked sentiments of discontent rather than of 
happiness among certain sections of the population. For better or for worse, this 
discontent may eventually lead to the termination of Chile’s ‘end of history’.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Concurrerende Moderniteiten: 
Moderniseringsprojecten in Chili, 1964-2006 
 
Het ‘moderne’ heeft sinds de onafhankelijkheid een grote aantrekkingskracht 
uitgeoefend op Latijns-Amerikaanse elites. Dit is in het bijzonder het geval in Chili, 
waar de politieke elites een groot enthousiasme voor modernisering en moderniteit aan 
de dag hebben gelegd. De relatieve stabiliteit van het land en de verhoudingsgewijs 
hoge mate van ontwikkeling hebben de wens tot het bereiken van de ‘volledige 
modernisering’ alleen nog maar versterkt. Blijkbaar wordt de aantrekkingskracht van de 
moderniteit sterker naarmate die dichter benaderd wordt. 
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de manieren waarop Chileense elites hebben 
geprobeerd hun land te moderniseren door middel van politieke projecten, en hoe als 
gevolg daarvan specifieke patronen van moderniteit zijn ontstaan. Het zal laten zien dat 
ondanks de ideologische verschillen tussen verschillende politieke elites, een sterk 
element van continuïteit kan worden gevonden in de moderniserende aard van hun 
projecten.  
Sinds 1964 zijn er in Chili vier moderniseringsprojecten geïmplementeerd. Het 
eerste project was de zogenaamde ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’, van de Christendemocratische 
regering van Eduardo Frei (1964-1970). Deze werd gevolgd door de ‘Chileense Weg 
naar het Socialisme’ van de socialistische Unidad Popular onder leiding van Salvador 
Allende (1970-1973). Het militaire regime van Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) zette 
vervolgens een neoliberale ‘Stille Revolutie’ in gang. Ten slotte werd vanaf 1990 het 
project ‘Groei met Gelijkheid’ ingezet door de zogenaamde Concertación-coalitie, onder 
de regeringen van Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), en Michelle Bachelet (2006-heden). Deze vier projecten 
waren ideologisch zeer verschillend en zelfs conflicterend, maar deelden tegelijkertijd 
een sterk moderniserend karakter.  
Deze projecten gingen veel verder dan eenvoudige regeringsprogramma’s of 
electorale strategieën. Ze waren gebaseerd op vernieuwende en grondig uitgewerkte 
politieke doctrines en ontwikkelingstheorieën. Bovendien werden ze niet uitsluitend 
door regeringen uitgevoerd, maar werden ze mede ondersteund door belangrijke 
actoren uit de civiele maatschappij. Hierdoor konden ze een bijzonder grote impact 
krijgen. Het waren echte ‘projecten van modernisering’, die er op gericht waren om in 
één stap de kloof met de ‘moderne wereld’ te overbruggen, gebaseerd op verschillende 
interpretaties van de moderniteit.  
De klassieke benadering van moderniteit en modernisering biedt weinig ruimte voor 
het idee dat moderniteit locaal wordt geconstrueerd. Traditioneel wordt het gezien als 
een Europees fenomeen dat bestaat uit processen en instituties als secularisatie, 
rationalisering, kapitalisme, democratie en industrialisatie, die elkaar wederzijds 
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versterken. Vanuit dit perspectief zou een land als Chili alleen modern kunnen worden 
als het deze processen nauwgezet zou reproduceren. Dit is echter slechts gedeeltelijk het 
geval geweest aangezien modernisering er een ander traject heeft gevolgd dan in Europa. 
Hierdoor is vanuit dit perspectief het vooruitzicht voor Chili om echt modern te 
worden somber. Recentelijk zijn er echter nieuwe benaderingen ontwikkeld, die 
benadrukken dat het ‘moderne’ lokaal vorm gegeven wordt door de interactie van 
elementen van moderniteit en traditie. Eén van deze conceptualiseringen is de 
zogenaamde ‘multiple modernities’-benadering, die claimt dat er niet één, maar 
meerdere moderniteiten bestaan. Moderniteit is dan niet noodzakelijkerwijs een 
exclusief Europees fenomeen, maar wordt lokaal geconstrueerd, in interactie met 
externe invloeden en referentiekaders zoals Europa of de Verenigde Staten. Als een 
gevolg kan een regio of een land eigen sociale, culturele, politieke, en economische 
structuren creëren die specifieke patronen van moderniteit voortbrengen.  
De ‘multiple modernities’ benadering is niet oncontroversieel. Toch is het een voor 
dit onderzoek heel nuttig perspectief, omdat het verklaart hoe moderniteit op locaal 
niveau wordt geconstrueerd. Latijns-Amerikaanse elites hebben volgens de deze 
benadering sinds de onafhankelijkheid van de regio een zeer sterke hang naar 
moderniteit gehad, gebaseerd op verschillende interpretaties van het ‘moderne’. Vanuit 
deze interpretaties construeerden ze projecten waarmee ze hun maatschappijen 
trachtten te moderniseren. Deze elitegroepen bevochten elkaar onderling om de macht 
en om de mogelijkheid om hun project te implementeren. Wanneer dat lukte, slaagden 
ze er meestal slechts gedeeltelijk in om hun project uit te voeren, waarna ze vervolgens 
de macht aan andere elites en nieuwe projecten moesten overdragen. Deze 
‘opeenvolgende golven van modernisering’ creëerden patronen van moderniteit, die 
niet zozeer het resultaat waren van de achtereenvolgende moderniseringsprojecten zelf, 
maar van hun interactie, waarin ze elkaar in sommige opzichten versterkten en in 
andere ophieven. Als gevolg ontstonden er uiterst complexe patronen van moderniteit 
die uniek waren en karakteristiek voor de regio of het land in kwestie. 
In dit onderzoek wordt de ‘multiple modernities’ benadering toegepast met een 
bijzondere nadruk op de metafoor van golven. Ieder moderniseringsproject kan gezien 
worden als een golf die bepaalde sporen nalaat in een maatschappij. Wanneer echter 
twee of meer golven met elkaar interfereren, vormen ze patronen die anders zijn dan de 
originele golven. Op deze wijze worden er patronen van moderniteit gevormd door de 
interactie van verschillende projecten van modernisering. Hiernaast ontwikkelen de 
projecten zich ook op dezelfde wijze als een golf, in hun constructie (opkomst), 
implementatie (piek), en neergang (val). In deze drie fases beïnvloeden de verschillende 
projecten elkaar op specifieke manieren die in deze studie geanalyseerd worden. 
In de fase van hun constructie zullen de projecten worden geanalyseerd op hun 
onderliggende moderniseringsideologie en economische ontwikkelings-strategieën. In de 
fase van hun implementatie zal er gekeken worden naar de rol van de staat, 
technocratie, en economische staatsplanning. Tevens zal er gekeken worden naar de 
politieke competitie tussen de verschillende partijen, die de vorming en ontwikkeling 
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van de verschillende projecten grotendeels heeft bepaald. Ook wordt de rol van de 
civiele maatschappij belicht, die telkens een tegenreactie heeft gegeven op de 
moderniseringsprojecten, waardoor deze aangepast moesten worden teneinde de orde te 
bewaren. Ten slotte komt de neergang van de projecten aan bod, en de sociale, 
economische, en politieke erfenissen die ze achterlieten. 
In de Chileense geschiedenis is modernisering is een constante factor geweest, ook 
al heeft het telkens andere vormen aangenomen. Het is voor het eerst een factor van 
belang geworden in de laatkoloniale periode, toen het koloniale bestuur een zekere 
mate van rationalisering onderging en er verschillende moderne instituties werden 
ingesteld. In deze periode verkreeg modernisering twee karakteristieken die zich 
ontwikkelden tot constanten in de Chileense geschiedenis. De eerste was de bereidheid 
van Chileense elites om een zekere mate van modernisering te accepteren, zelfs als die 
tegen hun directe belangen inging, mits ze daarmee hun machtspositie konden 
behouden. Hierdoor heeft modernisering op een relatief vreedzame wijze kunnen 
plaatsvinden in de Chileense maatschappij. Ten tweede werd in deze periode de staat 
onlosmakelijk verbonden met modernisering. Sindsdien is de staat altijd gezien als de 
belangrijkste motor van modernisering.  
Na de onafhankelijkheid, begin negentiende eeuw, behield modernisering zijn ‘top-
down’ karakter. Dit werd vooral duidelijk in de formatie van de zogenaamde 
‘Portaliaanse staat’ (vernoemd naar de staatsman Diego Portales): een formeel 
democratische, maar tegelijkertijd autoritaire institutionele orde, die uitermate succesvol 
en stabiel bleek te zijn, en die tot in de twintigste eeuw invloedrijk bleef. In deze orde 
werden elementen van traditie en moderniteit op een instrumentele wijze met elkaar 
vermengd, waardoor een zekere mate van modernisering plaats kon vinden zonder dat 
de sociale orde in gevaar werd gebracht. Tevens kreeg modernisering door de opkomst 
van het liberalisme een uitgesproken rationalistisch, wetenschappelijk, en technisch 
karakter. De grote invloed van Comte’s positivisme, dat een sterke koppeling maakte 
tussen modernisering en wetenschap droeg hier ook aan bij. 
Tussen 1880 en 1920 veranderde modernisering gedeeltelijk van gezicht. De 
‘Portaliaanse staat’ maakte plaats voor een ‘parlementair model’ dat zich kenmerkte 
door een geringere invloed van de president. Tegelijkertijd werden de inkomsten van de 
nitraatvelden in het noorden van het land aangewend om het staatsapparaat uit te 
breiden en de bureaucratie te moderniseren. Tevens werd het onderwijsapparaat 
vernieuwd en uitgebreid. De sociaaleconomische positie van de lagere klassen kwam 
echter steeds meer onder druk te staan door het laissez-faire beleid van de Chileense 
overheid. Het ‘sociale vraagstuk’ dat zich hierdoor ontwikkelde, leidde er toe dat de 
groeiende middenklasse de oligarchische hegemonie steeds meer begon te betwisten, en 
aandrong op politieke modernisering. Deze toenemende druk leidde er in 1920 toe dat 
de middenklassen voor het eerst toegang kregen tot de macht. Het einde van de 
‘oligarchische moderniteit’ werd bezegeld door de dictatuur van Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo (1927-1931), die de middenklassen, en in het bijzonder professionals, 
integreerde in het landelijke bestuur. Tevens zette hij een proces van materiële en 
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economische modernisering in werking door de creatie van talloze staatsinstituties en 
industrialiseringsinitiatieven.  
Modernisering veranderde wederom van gezicht gedurende de economische crisis 
van de jaren ’30, die duidelijk maakte dat de Chileense economie te kwetsbaar was voor 
invloeden van buitenaf. Om dit tegen te gaan werd een proces van versnelde 
industrialisering in werking gezet, onder leiding van de staat. Tegelijkertijd werd er een 
basaal systeem van sociale zekerheid in het leven geroepen. In het begin van de jaren 
’60 kwam het einde van deze moderniseringsfase in zicht. Het industrialiseringsproject 
had zijn impuls verloren en was niet langer in staat om de economische groei te 
genereren die nodig was om de sociale eisen van de lagere klassen te bevredigen. Het 
sociale vraagstuk werd weer een dringend probleem, aangezien de sociale voorzieningen 
van de staat zich niet uitstrekten tot de plattelandsbevolking en de marginale massa’s in 
de sloppenwijken. Tegelijkertijd vormde het succes van de Cubaanse Revolutie een 
bewijs dat een revolutionaire omwenteling een reële mogelijkheid was in de Latijns-
Amerikaanse context. De hoofdstromingen van de Chileense politiek (rechts, links, en 
het politieke centrum) ondergingen een proces van ideologische radicalisering, wat zich 
vertaalde in een intensivering van hun onderlinge politieke competitie. Het is in deze 
context dat radicale en vergaande projecten van modernisering werden ontworpen, die 
vanaf 1964 de Chileense politieke agenda zouden domineren.  
Dit ving aan met de ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’ van de Christendemocratische Partij 
(PDC) onder leiding van Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970). Dit project was 
gefundeerd op twee verschillende doctrines. Aan de ene kant was het gebaseerd op een 
‘sociaalchristelijke’ ideologie die grotendeels was geïmporteerd uit Europa maar die 
zorgvuldig aan de Chileense context was aangepast. Deze ideologie verdedigde bepaalde 
elementen van de moderniteit terwijl het andere afwees. Het was een alternatief voor 
zowel het ‘materialistische kapitalisme’ als het ‘seculiere Marxisme’, en had als doel om 
sociale modernisering te verwezenlijken zonder de morele basis van de maatschappij te 
verzwakken. Aan de andere kant was het project van de Christendemocraten gebaseerd 
op een nieuwe, in Chili ontwikkelde economische ontwikkelingstheorie, het 
zogenaamde structuralisme. Volgens het structuralisme was de enige mogelijkheid voor 
sociale en economische modernisering een versnelde en duurzame economische groei. 
Deze groei was echter geblokkeerd door een aantal structurele factoren. Alleen een 
integrale aanpak, waarin onder andere agrarische hervormingen, industrialisering, en 
sociale integratie met elkaar werden gecombineerd, zou deze structurele blokkade 
kunnen overwinnen. Deze twee basiselementen van de ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’ werden 
met elkaar verenigd tot een alomvattend politiek project van modernisering, met als 
belangrijkste elementen agrarische hervorming, de gedeeltelijke nationalisering van de 
kopermijnen in het noorden van het land, en een project van sociale incorporatie dat 
promoción popular, ofwel ‘bevordering van het volk’ genoemd werd.  
In de fase van de implementatie werd het project gekarakteriseerd door ‘top-down’ 
benadering. Hoewel Frei herhaaldelijk waarschuwde voor het gevaar van een té grote 
oriëntatie op de staat, werd het project volledig door het staatsapparaat uitgevoerd, dat 
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voor dit doel ook nog eens aanzienlijk werd uitgebreid. Een soortgelijke ambivalentie 
kan gevonden worden in de rol die technocraten speelden bij de invoering van de 
‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’. Aan de ene kant werd hun rol naar buiten toe gebagatelliseerd, 
vanwege de negatieve naam die de technocratie bij de bevolking had. Aan de andere 
kant werd het project gekarakteriseerd door de grote rol die technocraten, meestal 
economen, bij de formulering en de implementatie hadden. Teneinde de complexiteit 
van hun integrale aanpak te beheersen, gebruikten deze technocraten staatsplanning als 
het centrale gereedschap in de invoering van het project.  
De competitie tussen links, rechts, en het centrum, die al onder druk was gezet door 
de keuze van de Christendemocraten om zonder coalitiepartner te gaan regeren, werd 
sterk beïnvloed door de invoering van de ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’. Rechts werd door het 
project in een diepe crisis gestort, omdat de agrarische hervormingen de traditionele 
machtsbasis van de conservatieven verzwakten. In deze crisis verloor rechts, dat 
traditioneel open stond voor een zekere mate van modernisering, zijn tot dan toe 
pragmatische en gematigde houding. In het geval van links leidde de ‘Revolutie in 
Vrijheid’ tot een felle electorale competitie, aangezien de Christendemocraten door hun 
sociale beleid steun konden verwerven onder de onderklassen van de samenleving, die 
tot dan toe bijna uitsluitend door de linkse partijen werden bediend. Hierdoor ontstond 
een felle strijd om de stem van de bevolking in de sloppenwijken en op het platteland, 
waarbij links en de PDC elkaar in ideologische zin steeds meer overboden. Dit leidde er 
toe dat de verwachtingen van de bevolking steeds verder werden opgeschroefd. Toen na 
1967 de economische groei snel begon af te nemen, vertaalden deze verwachtingen, in 
combinatie met de intense politieke competitie, zich in toenemende sociale onrust. 
In het licht van deze sociale en politieke spanningen hadden de 
Christendemocraten twee keuzes: ófwel doorgaan met hun moderniseringsproject, met 
het risico dat de sociale orde in gevaar werd gebracht, ófwel het project afremmen. Frei 
koos voor het laatste, waarmee hij een breuk in de PDC veroorzaakte. Het bleek echter 
niet voldoende te zijn, en de laatste jaren van zijn regering werden gekarakteriseerd door 
sociale onrust en de radicalisering van vrijwel alle sectoren van het politieke spectrum.  
De economische erfenis van het moderniseringsproject van de Christendemocraten 
bestond hoofdzakelijk uit de agrarische hervormingen (die rond 1970 nog in volle gang 
waren) en de gedeeltelijke nationalisering van de kopermijnen. Op het sociale vlak had 
het een brede consensus gegenereerd over de noodzaak van het incorporeren van de 
rurale en urbane massa’s. Politiek had de ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’ een radicalisering van 
het politieke systeem ten gevolge die van grote invloed zou blijken te zijn onder het 
moderniseringsproject van links.  
In 1970 kwam de linkse Unidad Popular (UP) van Salvador Allende aan de macht. 
Het project van deze coalitie, de zogenaamde ‘Chileense Weg naar het Socialisme’, was 
ook fundamenteel ambivalent ten opzichte van de moderniteit. Het wees het 
kapitalisme af, en richtte zich op de vorming van een egalitaire maatschappij. De 
‘werkelijk bestaande Socialistische landen’ werden als voorbeeld genomen, maar niet 
zonder aanpassingen. De nationalisering van het grootste deel van de industriële sector 
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werd gecombineerd met het behoud van liberale democratie, waardoor een specifiek 
‘Chileense’ combinatie ontstond. Hiernaast werd er opnieuw een vernieuwende 
ontwikkelingstheorie als basis voor het project gebruikt: dependencia, ofwel de 
afhankelijkheidstheorie. Volgens deze benadering was echte modernisering en 
ontwikkeling alleen mogelijk door buiten het paradigma van het internationale 
kapitalisme te treden. Deze elementen werden vermengd in een project van 
modernisering dat erop gericht was om de politieke, economische, en sociale basis van 
de Chileense maatschappij te hervormen. De belangrijkste onderdelen van het project 
waren de intensivering van de agrarische hervormingen, de nationalisering van de 
belangrijkste sectoren van de industrie, inclusief de kopermijnen, en de herverdeling 
van de macht door arbeiders controle te geven over de productiesector.  
Ondanks het officiële discours, dat de grote rol van het volk in het 
transformatieproces benadrukte, was de ‘Chileense Weg naar het Socialisme’ een bijna 
volledig op de staat georiënteerd en van boven af uitgevoerd project. Hoewel het door 
sommige sectoren van de UP als een bolwerk van de bourgeoisie werd gezien, was de 
macht van de staat essentieel voor het volbrengen van het project. Tevens speelden 
technocraten wederom een belangrijke rol in de formulering en implementering van het 
project- ook al hadden ze, vanwege hun ‘niet-politieke’ imago, te kampen met een 
slechte naam bij de linkse partijen. Staatsplanning werd onder de UP op een hoger plan 
getild door middel van de invoering van vijfjarenplannen. Door de sterke politisering 
van het economische beleid en de economische crisis die na 1971 ontstond kon 
planning echter geen sterke invloed verkrijgen.  
Politieke competitie nam extreme vormen aan onder de ‘Chileense Weg naar het 
Socialisme’, en was van cruciale invloed op alle sectoren van het politieke spectrum. 
Voor rechts vormde het project van de UP een figuurlijke doodsbedreiging. De 
intensivering van de agrarische hervormingen en de nationalisering van belangrijke 
delen van de industrie betekende een de facto opheffing van rechts als een 
sociaaleconomische klasse. In de context van deze dreiging lieten de conservatieven 
iedere gematigdheid varen en namen een confronterende houding ten opzichte van de 
regering aan. Economische blokkades en politiek geweld werden ingezet om een 
militaire interventie af te dwingen. Uiteindelijk zou dit bijdragen aan de economische 
crisis die de laatste jaren van Allende’s regering kenmerkten, en een autoritaire uitweg 
legitimeren.  
Voor de Christendemocraten was de verhouding met de UP complexer. Rond 1970 
was de linkervleugel van de partij aan de macht gekomen, die sympathiek stond ten 
opzichte van het project van de UP. De verhoudingen verkoelden echter snel doordat 
de UP veelal buiten het parlement om regeerde en de macht van de staat instrumenteel 
gebruikte. Uiteindelijk werd het pleit beslecht door een technische kwestie: de pogingen 
van beide partijen om tot een compromis te komen over de nationalisering van de 
industrie strandden in een ‘grijs gebied’ van de parlementaire regelgeving. Hierdoor 
werd de laatste mogelijkheid om tot een legale oplossing te komen geblokkeerd. Als een 
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gevolg wendden de Christendemocraten zich af van de UP en creëerden daarmee de 
noodzakelijke steun van de middenklasse voor een militaire coup.  
Evenals Frei werd ook Allende geconfronteerd met de keuze om het project te voort 
te zetten met het risico om de controle over de sociale orde te verliezen, of het af te 
remmen en aan te passen aan de politieke realiteit. Even als in het geval van Frei werd 
Allende onder druk werd gezet door een groot deel van zijn eigen coalitie om het 
project te intensiveren en een gewelddadige confrontatie met de oppositie aan te gaan. 
Allende moest een keuze maken tussen een compromis met de Christendemocraten en 
de radicale krachten in zijn coalitie. Uiteindelijk bleek hij echter niet bij machte om 
deze keuze te maken, en kwam het initiatief bij de extreme sectoren van zowel rechts als 
links te liggen.  
De ‘Chileense Weg naar het Socialisme’ liet na de coup in 1973 diepe sporen na in 
de Chileense maatschappij. Op het economische niveau bevestigde het de legitimiteit 
van de agrarische hervormingen en de nationalisering van de kopermijnen, maatregelen 
die niet of slechts gedeeltelijk zijn teruggedraaid door het militaire regime. Aan de 
andere kant had de economische crisis die plaats had gevonden onder de UP het gevolg 
dat populisme en staatsinterventie in de economie veel van zijn steun verloor. 
Tegelijkertijd leidde de sociale wanorde en het politieke conflict die door het 
moderniseringsproject van de UP waren ontstaan er toe dat volksmobilisatie zijn 
legitimiteit verloor als politiek middel.  
Tijdens het militaire regime (1973-1990) werd er een derde moderniseringsproject in 
gang gezet, met de steun van verschillende civiele groepen. Dit project, dat door deze 
groepen de ‘Stille Revolutie’ werd genoemd, bestond uit de combinatie van een 
conservatieve Latijns-Amerikaanse politieke ideologie en Amerikaans neoliberaal 
economisch denken. Politiek bestond het uit een conservatieve en autoritaire orde, die 
vorm werd gegeven door de zogenaamde gremialistas. Argumenterend dat een militaire 
dictatuur op de lange termijn onhoudbaar zou blijken, stelden ze voor om deze orde in 
te bedden in een formeel democratisch model. Op deze wijze zou er een ‘beschermde 
democratie’ geconstrueerd worden, die, zoals de ‘Portaliaanse staat’ in de negentiende 
eeuw, autoritair conservatisme vermengde met moderne democratie, en die geen ruimte 
liet voor .  
Het neoliberale ontwikkelingsmodel dat het project van rechts ondersteunde was 
geïnspireerd op de economische leer van de Amerikaanse econoom Milton Friedman, 
die echter werden aangepast aan de locale context. In vergelijking met het 
‘Friedmaniaanse orthodoxie’ behield de staat een relatief grote rol in de economie, bleef 
economische staatsplanning bestaan, en vond er een zekere mate van herverdeling van 
inkomen plaats. In combinatie met de politieke ideologie van de gremialistas werd de 
‘Stille Revolutie’ een grootschalig moderniseringsproject, waarin een vrije-markt 
maatschappij werd gecombineerd met een autoritaire politieke orde. 
Wederom speelde de staat een centrale rol bij de implementatie van het project, 
ondanks het ideologische doel van de neoliberale beleidsmakers om de staat zo veel 
mogelijk uit de maatschappij terug te trekken. Een grote en actieve rol van de staat bleek 
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echter een vereiste te zijn voor de terugtrekking van de staat uit de economie. Tevens 
werd de ‘onzichtbare hand’ van de vrije markt begeleid door een uitgebreid en complex 
systeem van staatsplanning. Hoewel deze planning niet langer de productieve sector 
betrof maar zich richtte op de coördinatie van staatsinvesteringen en 
armoedebestrijding, bereikte staatsplanning in termen van invloed zijn hoogtepunt 
onder het militaire regime. Het neoliberale project leidde ook tot een sterke 
technocratisering van het beleid. Waar voorheen politici en advocaten het sterkst 
werden geassocieerd met de ontwikkeling en vooruitgang van Chili werd nu deze rol 
overgenomen door economen en ondernemers.  
Formeel bestond er geen ruimte voor politieke competitie onder het militaire 
regime. In hun pogingen om een serieus alternatief voor de ‘Stille Revolutie’ te creëren, 
ondergingen de Christendemocraten en links echter belangrijke ideologische 
veranderingen, die bepalend zouden blijken voor het moderniseringsproject van de 
Concertación. Voor de Christendemocraten bestond dit hoofdzakelijk uit de 
bewustwording dat een succesvol toekomstig project niet legitiem en succesvol zou 
kunnen zijn als het niet ondersteund zou worden door een het grootste deel van het 
politieke spectrum. De partij oriënteerde zich daarom sterk op de mogelijke 
samenwerking met de gematigd linkse partijen. Tegelijkertijd onderging links een proces 
van ideologische ‘renovatie’, dat er toe leidde dat politiek geweld en revolutionaire 
strategieën werden afgezworen en een meer sociaaldemocratische koers werd ingezet. 
Ook het militaire regime werd geconfronteerd met massale sociale onrust en met het 
dilemma om het project aan te passen of het risico te lopen de controle te verliezen. In 
dit geval bleek echter de aanpassing succesvol. De regering was in staat om genoeg 
afstand te behouden van zijn ondersteunende civiele groepen en het project af te 
remmen zolang de protesten aanhielden. Vervolgens werd het project op een gematigde 
en pragmatische wijze voortgezet, een strategie die zeer succesvol bleek in de tweede 
helft van de jaren tachtig.  
Hoewel het regime in 1988 in een referendum werd weggestemd, en het democratie 
een jaar later terugkeerde, bleven belangrijke elementen van het project van rechts 
bestaan. Op het economisch vlak had het succes van het neoliberale model een brede 
consensus gegenereerd over de noodzaak van versnelde en duurzame economische 
groei. De moderne Amerikaansgeoriënteerde consumptiemaatschappij, die in de jaren 
tachtig zijn entree had gedaan, bleef daarmee een blijvend element in de Chileense 
maatschappij. Op het politieke vlak slaagde het militaire regime er in om het 
democratische systeem in verschillende aspecten in te perken, zodat de 
bewegingsvrijheid van de toekomstige regeringen beperkt bleef, en de conservatieve 
orde die door de gremialistas was ingezet, gedeeltelijk intact bleef. 
Het project van de Concertación coalitie, ‘Groei met Gelijkheid’ (1990-heden), kan 
vanuit twee perspectieven worden geanalyseerd. Het kan aan de ene kant gezien worden 
als een vierde project van modernisering, dat belangrijke karakteristieken deelt met zijn 
voorgangers. Aan de andere kant kan het project ook worden geïnterpreteerd als een 
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synthese van de voorafgaande projecten, een soort eindfase, ofwel een ‘einde van de 
geschiedenis’. 
Vanuit het eerste perspectief gezien is ‘Groei met Gelijkheid’ een 
moderniseringsproject dat ideologisch gebaseerd is op een ‘terugkeer’ naar de 
moderniteit die Chili kenmerkte voor 1973, in het bijzonder in de vorm van het liberale 
democratische model. Tevens vermengde het elementen van de Europese welvaartstaten 
en het Amerikaanse economische liberalisme in een specifiek Chileense mix. In plaats 
van echt een ‘alternatieve moderniteit’ na te streven, richtte dit project zich meer op 
een brede interpretatie van het moderne, waarbij de terugkeer van Chili in de 
internationale gemeenschap een centrale rol speelde.  
Wederom speelde een nieuwe stroming in de ontwikkelingstheorie een grote rol in 
het moderniseringsproject. Dit was het zogenaamde neostructuralisme, dat evenals het 
structuralisme sociale insluiting, herverdeling van inkomen en een sterke rol voor de 
staat benadrukte. Het trachtte echter niet de economie op een planmatige manier te 
besturen. In plaats daarvan benadrukte het de voortdurende beheersing van de macro-
economische balansen en een pragmatische en heterodoxe basishouding.  
Het project van de Concertación was gebaseerd op de claim dat neoliberale groei en 
sociale rechtvaardigheid geen tegengestelden hoefden te zijn, maar elkaar juist konden 
versterken. Zonder sociale insluiting zou versnelde economische groei niet duurzaam 
kunnen zijn, terwijl sociale investeringen alleen verantwoord bekostigd zouden kunnen 
worden uit de opbrengsten van die versnelde groei. Werkelijke modernisering kon dus 
alleen plaatsvinden door beide elementen te combineren. 
Hoewel dit centrale argument een constante is gebleven gedurende de verschillende 
regeringen van de Concertación, zijn er ook verschuivingen in de interpretatie van de 
moderniteit en modernisering aan te wijzen. De regering van Patricio Aylwin (1990-
1994) legde een sterke nadruk op de integratie van Chili in de wereldgemeenschap, de 
versterking van de civiele maatschappij, en het afronden van het politieke 
transitieproces. Zijn opvolger, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) legde veel meer 
nadruk op technologische vooruitgang en de modernisering van de staat. De regering 
van Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) behield de nadruk op technologie en moderne 
communicatiemiddelen, maar bewoog zich tevens in de richting van de vorming van 
een bescheiden verzorgingsstaat. Onder president Michelle Bachelet (2006- ) lijkt deze 
lijn te worden doorgezet.  
Ook in dit project speelde de staat een centrale, maar ambivalente rol. Aan de ene 
kant werd staatsinterventie gezien als essentieel voor het succes van het project; aan de 
andere kant mocht de staat nooit de economische groei hinderen. De staat werd nog 
verder in grootte teruggebracht door middel van nieuwe privatiseringen, terwijl het 
tevens aan kracht won door een grootschalig moderniseringsprogramma. Door alle niet-
essentiële functies af te stoten kon de staat alle aandacht schenken aan sociaal beleid en 
het reguleren van de markten. Hoewel planning oorspronkelijk een grote rol was 
toebedacht in dit proces, bleek de creatie van een officieel Ministerie van Planning 
contraproductief te werken. Het heeft zich vrijwel uitsluitend met armoedebestrijding 
 338 
kunnen bezighouden. De technocratisering van de Chileense politiek zette zich echter 
voort onder de Concertación. Onder het militaire regime had de oppositie zich 
noodgedwongen georganiseerd in wetenschappelijke instituten en think-tanks, die relatief 
ongemoeid bleven. Het resultaat was dat de politieke elite van het centrum en links een 
proces van ‘technocratisering’ onderging waarbij pragmatisme en doelgericht 
beleidsmaken belangrijker werd geacht dan het strak vasthouden van politieke principes. 
De technocratische politieke elite van de Concertación ontwikkelde tevens een 
‘academische metataal’ die de oplossing van interne politieke conflicten binnen de 
coalitie vergemakkelijkte.  
Onder het project van de Concertación veranderde het proces van politieke 
competitie sterk. Hoewel de regering door de oppositie fel werd bestreden over ethische 
thema’s en de erfenis van het militaire regime, kwam er aan het eind van de jaren 
negentig een groeiende consensus aan het licht over de algemene koers die het land zou 
moeten varen. Over thema’s zoals de sociaaleconomische ontwikkeling van het land, 
het handelsbeleid, of het democratisch model zijn alle politieke sectoren het 
grotendeels eens. In die zin is er een ‘einde van de geschiedenis’ ontstaan in Chili, 
waarin het moderniseringsproject van de Concertación door vrijwel alle actoren wordt 
ondersteund.  
Onder de Concertación is de civiele maatschappij opvallend kalm gebleven. Hierdoor 
zou het beeld kunnen ontstaan dat ‘Groei met Gelijkheid’ niet, zoals zijn voorgangers, 
een koerswijziging heeft moeten ondergaan onder druk van de publieke opinie. Dit is 
echter niet het geval. De coalitie heeft het project aangepast aan de wensen van de 
publieke opinie zonder dat er sociale onrust nodig is geweest om deze kenbaar te 
maken. Dit werd mogelijk gemaakt door de ‘academisering’ van de politieke leiders van 
de Concertación. Zij ontwikkelden een grote interesse in wetenschappelijke analyses over 
de politieke voorkeuren van de bevolking. Toen er in 1998 in academische studies naar 
voren kwam dat de Chileense bevolking zich steeds meer ongemakkelijk voelde met de 
neoliberale koers die het land voer, ontstond er in de Concertación een intense en 
levendige discussie over de te volgen strategie. Deze leidde er uiteindelijk toe dat er 
binnen de coalitie de ruimte ontstond voor een aanpassing van het project door middel 
van de invoering van een beperkte welvaartsstaat. Op deze wijze heeft de Concertación 
het dilemma tussen modernisering en het behoud van de sociale orde weten te 
omzeilen.  
Vanuit het tweede perspectief is ‘Groei met Gelijkheid’ een historische synthese van 
de drie voorafgaande moderniseringsprojecten. Van de ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’ is vooral 
het element van sociale rechtvaardigheid blijven bestaan, in de betekenis dat alle 
sectoren van de maatschappij toegang moeten kunnen hebben tot de diensten van de 
staat. Actieve en massale politieke participatie van de bevolking, één van de pijlers van 
de ‘Chileense Weg naar het Socialisme’, is echter afwezig in deze synthese. In plaats 
daarvan hebben vele politieke leiders van de UP een prominente rol gekregen in de 
regeringen van de Concertación. Het omgekeerde geldt voor rechts: een groot deel van de 
neoliberale agenda wordt nog steeds uitgevoerd, maar de rechtse politieke partijen zijn 
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sinds 1990 niet aan de macht geweest. Het resultaat van deze mix is een model dat door 
alle drie de sectoren wordt ondersteund, en dat daardoor uitzonderlijk stabiel is 
gebleken te zijn.  
De moderniseringsprojecten hebben ook op andere wijze patronen van moderniteit 
gegenereerd die specifiek zijn voor Chili. Naast institutionele moderniseringen, zoals de 
agrarische hervormingen en de nationalisering van de kopermijnen, bestaan deze 
patronen hoofdzakelijk uit vier paradoxen. De eerste is dat de Chileense moderniteit 
wordt gekarakteriseerd door democratie aan de ene kant, en een passieve civiele 
maatschappij aan de andere. De tweede paradox is dat de sterke nadruk op sociale 
investeringen niet heeft geleid tot een egalitaire samenleving: ondanks een 
indrukwekkende afname van de armoede blijft Chili op sociaaleconomisch gebied een 
van de meest ongelijke landen van Latijns-Amerika. De derde is dat het Chileense 
model bestaat uit een neoliberale markteconomie die wordt geadministreerd door de 
voormalige leiders van het project van links en van de Christendemocraten. De vierde 
paradox van de Chileense moderniteit is ten slotte dat ondanks het grote succes op het 
sociale, politieke, en economische gebied, het model sentimenten van frustratie en 
ontevredenheid bij de bevolking lijkt te genereren.  
 
Concluderend kan er gesteld worden dat modernisering een constante is geweest in de 
geschiedenis van Chili die in verschillende periodes andere gedaantes heeft 
aangenomen. Vanaf de jaren zestig ondervindt modernisering een proces van 
radicalisering en intensivering, dat resulteert in de constructie en implementatie van vier 
vergaande projecten van modernisering. Deze projecten waren gebaseerd op 
verschillende interpretaties van wat de moderniteit is, of zou moeten zijn. Ze waren 
kritisch in de zin dat ze tegelijkertijd een kritiek op, en een voorstel vóór moderniteit 
waren. Ze waren ook selectief omdat ze bestaande voorbeelden van moderniteit 
aanpasten aan de lokale context, waarbij bepaalde elementen werden benadrukt en 
andere werden genegeerd. Alle vier projecten werden ondersteund door een nieuwe en 
toonaangevende economische ontwikkelingstheorie. De prominente rol van deze 
theorieën is indicatief voor de mate van legitimiteit die wetenschap in Chili heeft als 
motor voor modernisering. Selectiviteit was echter opnieuw een sleutelbegrip in het 
gebruik van deze ontwikkelingsmodellen, waarbij bepaalde elementen integraal werden 
overgenomen, en andere niet. Uiteindelijk werden alle elementen samengevoegd in een 
integraal project van modernisering dat tot doel had om in één stap de kloof met de 
‘moderne wereld’ te slechten.  
In hun implementatie stonden alle projecten ambivalent ten opzichte van de staat, 
maar richtten zich uiteindelijk volledig op de staat als de belangrijkste motor van 
modernisering. Zelfs het neoliberale project van het militaire regime, dat grotendeels 
ten doel had om de staat zoveel mogelijk te ontmantelen, richtte zich op de staat om 
dit te bewerkstelligen. Tegelijkertijd heeft modernisering door middel van de staat in 
alle projecten een modernisering van het staatsapparaat zelf met zich meegebracht.  
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De vier projecten hebben geleid tot een toenemende rol voor technocraten in de 
Chileense politiek. Hun effectiviteit en invloed werden voor een groot deel bepaald 
door de relatieve autonomie die ze hebben kunnen weten te behouden ten opzichte 
van de andere politieke actoren. Hetzelfde geldt voor staatsplanning, een instrument dat 
het beste lijkt te werken als het een informele institutionele positie combineert met 
sterke banden met de president.  
De politieke competitie tussen de verschillende politieke actoren heeft een cruciale 
invloed uitgeoefend op de constructie, implementatie, en neergang van de verschillende 
projecten. Ieder project bracht op een bepaald niveau het volgende voort, terwijl het 
zelf gedeeltelijk was voorgebracht door het vorige. Alleen in het geval van de 
Concertación lijkt de politieke competitie tot een stilstand te zijn gekomen, een ‘einde 
van de geschiedenis’, waarin alle actoren het fundamenteel eens zijn over het te volgen 
traject van modernisering. De invloed van de politieke competitie betekent echter niet 
dat de projecten elkaar ‘automatisch’ en mechanistisch opvolgden: in de context van de 
felle strijd tussen de verschillende moderniseringsprojecten werden ‘toevallige 
gebeurtenissen’ juist extra belangrijk, en konden de balans doen doorslaan naar een 
onverwachte kant. Ondanks de massale politieke activiteit die plaats vond onder de 
verschillende moderniseringsprojecten, hebben de verschillende Chileense politieke 
elites een duidelijke voorkeur voor het formele systeem als arena voor politieke 
competitie aan de dag gelegd. Alleen in de gevallen waarin het systeem niet bij machte 
bleek om de bestaande conflicten op te lossen, werd gekozen voor een oplossing buiten 
de officiële politieke arena. 
Alle projecten hebben te maken gehad met het dilemma tussen het behouden van 
de sociale orde en het voortzetten van de moderniseringsagenda. Het succes van de 
verschillende projecten in hun aanpassing kan verklaard worden door de relatieve 
afstand die de regeringen konden bewaren ten opzichte van hun achterban. In het geval 
van de Concertación heeft de aanpassing zelfs kunnen plaatsvinden zonder dat het tot 
sociale onrust kwam, omdat de politici van de coalitie, door hun academische 
oriëntatie, gevoelens van ontevredenheid in de bevolking in een vroeg stadium konden 
signaleren. 
De projecten van het centrum, links, en rechts hebben, al dan niet intentioneel, 
allemaal belangrijke sporen nagelaten in hedendaags Chili. Deze erfenissen houden 
elkaar in een strak evenwicht. De ‘Revolutie in Vrijheid’ heeft een sterke nadruk op 
sociale rechtvaardigheid achtergelaten, die echter wordt beperkt door de neoliberale 
noodzaak tot economische groei aan de ene kant, en het gebrek aan legitimiteit van 
massale politieke participatie aan de andere kant. De voormalige leiders van de 
‘Chileense Weg naar het Socialisme’ hebben een prominente rol gekregen in het Chili 
van nu, maar wel tegen de prijs van een ideologische renovatie. De neoliberale agenda 
van de ‘Stille Revolutie’ wordt nog steeds grotendeels uitgevoerd, ook al hebben de 
rechtse partijen geen deel uit kunnen maken van de regering. Deze agenda vindt echter 
zijn grens in de notie van sociale rechtvaardigheid van de Christendemocraten: wanneer 
het economische model tot een toenemende armoede leidt, is het legitiem als de staat 
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ingrijpt. Op deze wijze hebben de projecten van modernisering die sinds de jaren zestig 
Chili als golven hebben overspoeld, patronen van ‘staande golven’ gecreëerd, die 
uitermate stabiel zijn en elkaar in balans houden. Onder dit ‘Chileense model’ zijn de 
meeste fundamentele problemen van het land opgelost: de integratie van de marginale 
groepen, het genereren van versnelde en duurzame economische groei, en het behoud 
van politieke stabiliteit en bestuurbaarheid. Tegelijkertijd heeft de modernisering van 
het land bij de bevolking sentimenten van frustratie en onbehagen opgeroepen. 
Modernisering heeft in Chili zijn eigen ongenoegen gecreëerd, wat in de toekomst 
mogelijk tot nieuwe moderniseringsprojecten zal leiden.  
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